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INTRODUCTION 
A Look Forward and a Point of View 
Throughout the history of Western Civili~ation, Natural 
Law has been a continuing philosophical and moral concept 
which has profoundly influenced the growth and interrelation-
ship of characteristic legal, political and social develop-
ments and institutions. Imbedded in Christian theology, Na-
tural Law, with Christianity and Science, both of which it 
antedates, is'one of the three main shaping forces in the 
ideologies and practices of the West. It has other roots 
and major accretions besides those of the Church, Catholic 
and Protestant, and the moral concepts which the Church has 
endorsed. Found in Plato and Aristotle, the Greek tragedi-
ans and the Scholastics, it is also, apart from Europe, en-
demic to Confucianism and Chinese thought. It has a strong 
line of development through Stoic sources and in Stoic-in-
fluenced concepts into our present cultural hybridieation. 
Rationalism and the En~ightenrnent provide further roots by 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which bring Natural 
Law into a strong shaping influence for the development of 
American political thought. 
The first time, to my knowledge, I heard of the subject 
of Natural Law, was about ten years ago in a class in Harvard 
Summer School, on The Age of the Baroque, when Professor 
\// 
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Carl Fredrich said that the Nuremberg Trials would have been 
more effective if they had been based on Natural Law instead 
of on the Kellogg Pacts. He had been lecturing, I believe, 
on Bodin or Grotius, and this was something of an aside. My 
ignorance of the subject is illustrated in the question I 
recall asking him after class: "But what other law is there 
but natural law'? 11 Regarding me in the briefly speculative 
but unastonished manner which sminent professors all assume 
before absurd questions, he answered in two words only: 
"Statutory law.n That this short exchange was an eye-opener 
at the time should disqualify me at once from ever having 
attempted this essay. But, on the contrary, it was the spark. 
I began reading, and the more I read under.the topi.c of 
Natural Law the more confused I became. Natural law was 
this, was that and many other matters and it had been exem-
plified by many, many persons on opposite sides of many con-
troversies. But hooks had been fastened into my directional 
interest, and as a constant background to this cognitive in-
quiry I have had, over the past decade, a veritable academic 
feast. A series of great courses and seminars at Boston and 
Harvard Universities have more than furbished and fructified 
a spare background. Out of dozens for which I want to give 
joyful thanks, in addition to Professor Friedrichts, it is 
almost at random to mention Robert McCloskeyts American Poli-
tical Thought and American Constitutional Development; Louis 
Hartzts Democratic Theory and Its Critics; The Study and Writ-
iii 
ing of History of Warren Ault; Edwin Booth's Seminar on the 
City of Rome; Carl von Weitzsacker's History of Scientific 
Method; Robert Moody's American Colonies and the Revolution; 
Hans Kohn 1s Intellectual History of Nineteenth Century Europe; 
James Billington's Russian Intellectual History from Ivan 
the Terrible to Pasternak; Richard Millard's American Philo-
sophy; John Copp 1s Psychology of Mysticism; and Paul Tillich 1s 
History of Western Man's Self-Interpretation. The harvest 
now~ in late Nobember 1961~ is Thanksgiving for what has 
seemed an immense cornucopia of wisdom~ even though I dare 
not apply such a word to my reception of it. 
In this disseration the definition of Natural Law will 
be: The principle of Justice~ or Reason in the affairs of 
men. This includes a related ancient meaning: 11 To each his 
own~" i.e. the right of all living beings to develop to the 
fullest their highest potential; and the belief that this 
right~ as a basis for justifiable conduct in human societyJ 
is rooted in objective norms or rules established by God or 
the nature of things as they are. 
Apart from its direct connection with Christian think-
ing) Natural Law has served historicallY as a main founda-
tion stone for such diverse political developments as Con-
stitutionalism and limited government) the connection between 
CovenantJ Contract and Constitution) and the supra-sovereignty 
of International Associations (to the extent that such supra-
sovereignty has e.xistedJ in theory or in fact). In contrast 
to this wide development over two thousand yearsJ Natural Law 
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in the nineteenth century began to be seriously questioned 
only with the beginning of the Utilitarians~ and this chal-
lenge was strongly increased by the publication of The Ori~ 
gin of the Species. 
In addition to Jeremy Bentham's definition of natural 
rights as 11 nonsense on stilts", and John Austin's analysis 
of sovereignty as the will of the strongest~ Henry Maine's 
researches into Ancient Law had enormous impact. Positivis-
tic~ historical and sociological concepts of law began to 
dominate jurisprudence and in the twenty or thirty years 
before 1900 Natural Law had fallen into disrepute. This was 
especiallY so among the most forward looking lawYers and at 
the most advanced law schools~ which increasingly taught law 
according to the case or precedent method, and not according 
to principles or philosophical universals. It began to be 
widely denied that there was such a thing as Justice as a 
principle or a generalization. Reason also, as a philoso-
phical certainty, was down-graded before the sociological and 
behaviouristic jurists. The growing understanding of the in-
fluence of judges in interpreting the law led to the widely-
held concept of "judge-made law." Increasingly, law was re-
garded as custom, habitual useage, or the will of the strong-
er. Law became positive law, and that only, i.e. that which 
is enforceable through the courts. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, being a great Common Law 
scholar always felt an affinity for the view of law as an out-
v 
growth of custom and useage. He disliked the Roman Law an-
cestry of universals in jurisprudence~ and expressed this 
dislike by deriding notions whlch dealt with abstractions or 
theorized about Justice. Yet there are strong and continued 
evidences in his writings which indicate his affiliations 
with universals, as well as a persisting strain of mystical 
insight into final goals and aims. He considered himself to 
be~ and was considered to be by all who knew and admired him, 
a philosopher of the law. On ~his characteristic of philoso-
phizing much of his popular reputation rested. It is the 
problem of this dissertation to examine these contrasting as-
pects of his approaches and positions to discover the signi-
ficance of Natural Law in Holmes' thought. Why and for what 
reasons were there these diverse attitudes? As we look at 
the conflicting tendencies here, there is also the question 
of how his friendship with the English Labour leader, Harold 
J. Laski, illuminates the problem, in examining the opinions 
they both held on Natural Law. 
It is not involved in the discussion to question or dis-
parage Holmes' contribution to Constitutional Law. His in-
consistencies, though widely recognized by his commentators, 
are brushed aside by them before his great importance in Con-
stitutional development. Probably these inconsistencies in 
themselves have been a fruitful factor in his particular ac-
complishments which resulted in his outstanding influence for 
a dynamic pragmatism involving points of law in such important 
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matters as the sanctity of contracts or the civil liberties 
of the unpopular~ or the natural rights of property or the 
personality of corporations or the privileges of combination. 
Early in my reading on Natural Law~ I came across Justice 
Holmes' essay with that title_, and Edmund Wilson's essay on 
the Holmes-Laski Correspondence led me to those volumes_, pub-
lished by Harvard University and edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe. 
I began asking myself questions about attitudes and relation-
ships here. ~-now I knew what Natural Law was or what it 
was variously said to be~ and I found in this correspondence 
a point to take a stand~ for it was because of Laski that 
Holmes' paper was published when Laski was editor of the Har-
vard Law Review. I began reading what Justice Holmes and 
Professor Laski themselves wrote and said_, in particular what 
they wrote to each other. It will be taken as a point of 
view of this essay that personality is important in that 
there is no finding out or developing of knowledge without 
it; no meaning in the human story except in terms of it. I 
became interested in the personality of the Holmes-Laski 
friendship as an illumination of the problems centering 
around Holmes' basic thought. Since Holmes was a very old 
man and Laski a very young one at the time their friendship 
began~ and since Laski was an unknown nobody_, and Holmes a 
revered figure of world renown~ the interplay of relationship 
between them is interesting and curious. 
The Catholic writers are_, at present_, the principal (as 
vii 
they have been the traditional) force to sustain and publi-
cize Natural Law concepts, and they have severely criticized 
Holmes for the positions he assumed here. In one notable ex-
change in the American Bar Association Journal,l Holmes has 
been called a ladder to Hitler. While this is not at all 
. 
true, it would seem plausible, from looking at the evidence, 
that some of Holmes' authoritative and cynically acid views 
in regard to power, sovereignty and justice did seriously in-
fluence his young friend. It seems arguable that Laski set-
tled into the rigidity of his Marxist outlook in political 
science after he began to abandon, under Holmes' steady dis-
paragement, earlier views which centered about pluralistic 
concepts of sovereignty and the individual conscience as the 
final arbiter in the state. 
In taking positions opposed to Natural Law_, many modern 
commentators who praise Holmes so highly have referred to his 
opinion on Natural Law with great respect and have considered 
his paper on this subject to be of basic importance as a 
source criticizing Natural Law concepts. The following chap-
ters will examine the background of the exchange between 
Holmes and Laski at the time this paper was published, as well 
as other general factors in their friendship. I find the 
1. See Ben Palmer, 11Hobbes_, Holmes and Hitleru_, American Bar 
Association Journal (Nov. 1945)_, 569. And Charles W. 
Briggs_, "Justice Holmes Was Not on a Ladder to Hitler_, n 
ABA Journal (Oct. 1946), 631. 
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paper to be a matter of opinion only~ written with a fine turn 
of phrase~ from motivations to be discussed. The sincerity. 
of Laski's enthusiastic endorsement of Holmes' essay is de-
batable~ since the paper takes a point blank issue with so 
many of the positions Laski had been endorsing and for which 
he had been vainlY attempting to solicit Holmes' sympathy in 
the correspondence between them in the few months preceding 
the appearance of the article. 
In brief fashion I shall examine various definitions 
and opinions concerning Natural Law~ with the end of bringing 
out how conflicting and various these interpretations are 
and how universal an ideation it is~ affecting so many dif-
ferent and opposite views on government~ law~ morals. Also~ 
what of Holmes' other friendships by correspondence? What 
characteristic patterns are here? I propose to deal in some 
measure with a certain few of these other relationships~ 
with the aim of discovering how these persons felt about Natu-
ral Law~ and if this affected Holmes' most characteristic 
apercus (a favorite word of his). In addition~ what was his 
relationship with his famous father~ and not only what was 
the effect of his father upon him as a person but also as 
representing the effect of the whole New England ancestry? 
Throughout this essay~ I shall attempt to bring in 
Holmes' and Laski's concepts of sovereignty and justice~ 
against the implication at least of some wider~ deeper or 
more lasting definition or understanding of these all-~mportant 
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topics. My own point of view~ which is not the topic to be 
argued~ will be made evident that there would be no Western 
civilization as we know it but for the emphasis which Chris-
tian tradition through Natural Law has placed on these for-
mulations ~in an historical shaping of the relationship between 
the individual with society and the state. I believe that 
the source of sovereignty is individual conscience, under 
what that consicence believes to be the moral imperative~ 
the commandments of Deity, the reason for living, or what-
ever authorization of idolatry conscience substitutes for 
this imperative. Again~ this is a point of view -- not the 
topic under discussion. I is my position that historical 
evidence provides the principal~ if not the only, scientific 
certainty for an objective basis for judgment here. I be-
lieve that historical evidence warrants confidence beyond 
reasonable doubt in the continuing primary Natural Law base 
for the dynamic creativity of the pattern of Western culture. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Holmes-Laski Correspondence 
1 
11You teach our generation how we may hope to live_, 111 
wrote a very young man to an old one on July 11, l9i -, and 
in sending along Sorel's Reflections on Violence, and in 
coining a pert comparison between historian Viscount Morley 
and Harriet Martineau, and Pope Pius the Ninth and the Vir-
gin Mary, began one of the most important documentations on 
record of twentieth century intellectual history. "Did you 
know Harold Laski, an astonishing young Jew, whom Frankfurt-
er brought over here the other day?"2 Justice Holmes coun-
tered to his eminent life-long English friend, Frederick 
Pollock, about a month later, and the Holmes-Laski corres-
pondence was under way. 
Although its roots are deeper than the Civil War, the 
importance of this incredibly copious exchange is bounded 
on its nearer end by the Atomic Age. Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Junior, at ninety-six, died within a decade of Hiroshima 
and the distraction of Harold J. Laski's unfinished last 
book, The Dilemma of Our Times, indicates the anxiaty with 
1. Mark DeWolfe Howe (ed.), The Holmes-Laski Correspondence, 
I, 3. 
2. Mark DeWolfe Howe (ed.), The Holmes-Pollock Correspond-
ence, I, 238. 
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which he was trying to probe into the political ruture or 
his own country and the United States at,the time or his 
sudden death in 1950. The intense and ranging interest~ in 
the topics under discussion in the letters exchanged between 
these two ror nearly twenty years~ spans over rrom the 
thought patterns belonging to the period or the American 
Civil War, those or the rrontier and or early industrializa-
tion, to well beyond the present halr-cehtury mark. (It was 
about Laskits halr-century too; he died at rirty-six.) It 
is possible to comment that in the rine two-volume edition 
or this material, published by Harvard and edited by Mark 
DeWolre Howe, with the rootnotes, bibliography and biography 
aimed at convenience or inrormation and rurther investiga-
tion, the cultural historian or a thousand years rrom now 
would know all he would need to know or the Age or Change 
which reached rrom Victoria's runeral to the hydrogen bomb. 
This historian or 2950 would rind his evidence or this 
or that intellectual bent, psychological bias, cultural 
pattern or syndrome or the period or the rirst two world 
wars not alone in the topics that are discussed here between 
the two correspondents over and over, but in the signiricant 
gaps or what they do not discuss, or only with easy dismissal 
(Einstein and Freud are two major areas or vacuum not made 
up ror in the homage to Darwin and Malthus), not only in the 
writers, books, men and ideas that are advocated here, but 
even more so in those that are treated with antagonism or 
contempt -- religion, ehureh~ theology, this whole subject 
3 
is conspicuous for the disapproval it stirs:. He-- the 
historian -- would find this informing picture of a signi-
ficant day above all in his own attempt to answer the ques-
tiona which strike out at him from any perceptive reading 
of this correspondence. These would include insistent in-
terrogations on motives~ influence~ ends~ reasons why such 
and such an attitude was formed and clung to with tenacity 
against the logic or influence of other points of view 
equally persistent, equally emphatic or reasonable. There 
are questions here regarding very large philosophical ab-
stractions as well as detailed and mundane facts. In at-
tempting to answer them, the future historian would gain a 
comprehensive knowledge of the period~ as well as finding 
himself stirring up puzzles in inconsistencies and curious 
intellectual cross-breedings. Yet we may suppose that a 
thousand years from now as a thousand years ago the hybrid-
. - . 
ization of ideas will continue to be one of the major objects 
of scholarship in the attempt to understand the life of civ-
ilization, and one of the main hybridizations of ideas will 
still center around Natural Law. The leading subject of 
this thesis is concerned principally with Holmes' and Las-
ki 1s relationship with this idea. 
4 
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-In considering the nature of the friendship itself, the 
dramatic comparison could not be more clearly stated than tt is 
by Felix Frankfurter in his foreword to the published corres-
pondence. Referring to the noutpour, 11 he asks, nin all sober-
ness, was there ever another such eorrespondencet«1 as that be-
tween these two men who at once were so profoundly attracted to 
each other on that 3uly day in 1916, when Frankfurter took Las-
ki to call on Holmes at his summer home in Beverly Fanms, Mass-
achusetts, and Laski wrote the little bread-and-butter note 
which had such a far-reaching result. The mos.t revered and :con-
troversial justice of his time on the Supreme Court of the u.s., 
••• through his writing--a famous little book, a few 
essays, and his opinions--Holmes had powerfully 
changed ways of thinking about law •••• A few months 
earlier, his seventy-fifth birthday had been ceie-
brated as a national event. His fame transcended 
the boundaries of his own country. He was acclaimed 
the preeminent judge of the English-speaking world ••• 
Neither David Belasco nor Max Reinhardt could have 
contrived a more dramatic contrast than Laski and Holmes 
when their friendship began. Facing one of the most 
impressive personalities of his day was a frail strip-
ling of twenty-three. More than half a century sepa-
rated them. Until he spoke Laski was not particularly 
noticeable ••• At the time of his visit·to Holmes he had 
just come to Harvard, an obscure junior instructor in 
the Department of Government, piecing out an academic 
pittance with which to support his wife and child (he 
had married at eighteen), by much writing2during the summer, for Herbert Croly's New Republic. 
In the ubiographical memoiru which Kingsley Martin has 
written of Harold Laski, with whom he was closely associated 
1. Howe (ed.), H-L, I, xiii. 
2. Ibid. , xi v. 
5 
f-er some time at the London School of Economies., Martin 
says: 
I have come to the eonelusion that the clue to 
Harold's strength and weakness lay in his desire 
to love and be loved. His argument might be de-
rived from Marx but at the final test he was a 1 follower of William Morris rather than of Lenin. 
The pointed words here are "lovett and ttMarx.n That 
ttlove_~1 is a key-word is authenticated in the number of sig-
nificant_, lasting relationships whieh Laski formed and main-
tained over his lifetime. First ~f these relationships was 
his marriage. Martin comments: 
They were completely devoted to each other; 
they remained so all their·· lives ~ Frida was 
eight years older than Harold., good-looking_, in-
tensely practical, enthusiastic about women's 
suffrage., birth control and socialism. She 
scorned finesse_, was suspicious of-compromise_, 
liked shocking elegant or conventional people., 
and tended to regard any form of tact as insin-
cerity. She instinctively sided With all under-
dogs -and espoused advanced eauses •••• She was the 
most loyal and disint~rested of women •••• an ideal 
partner for Harold ••• 
In his preface to American DemocracY (1949)., Laski's 
list of his eminent American friends is truly amazing_, with 
a listing of the President of the United States and three 
Supreme Court Justice~ almost as a matter of course. These 
friendships were legion_, with the obscure as well as the 
great., and of these •1greatu friendships the one which was 
formed earlY and lasted for a life-time between Laski and 
Felix Frankfurter himself was undoubtedly the most meaning-
1. Kingsley Martin, Harold Laski: A Biographical Memoir, 
p. 256. 
2. Ibid., p. 21. 
6 
f'ul of all f'or Laski. It "fftas Frankfurter who was respon-
sible for Laski's coming to Harvard~ in the influence he ex-
erted when he was a young law school professer there. Laski~ 
as instructor at McGill University~ had been referred to 
Frankfurter by Norman Hapgood~ editor of Harper's Weekly~ 
who had happened to meet him in the spring of 1915 on a 
visit to Canada. 
Frankfurter still recalls the way in which Norman 
Hapgood burst into his room at Langdell Hall and 
said~ 11I've just come from MeGill and I've met the 
most extraordinary young fellow I've ever come 
across anYWhere • 11 He went on to describe this se If-
assured young Englishman with an encyclopaedic mind~ 
an inexhaustible store of' anec4otes~ a sharp wit and 
an unparalleled flow of words. 
11 To meet this fabulous creatureu Frankfurter made a 
visit to Montreal some months later. 11 'The meeting of minds 
and emotiens was immediate~ 11 and Frankf'urter :recommended 
Laski to Charles H. Haskins~ then Dean of Harvard's Gradu-
ate Schoo1.2 A further description from Martin~ whose bi-
ography is very sympathetic~ and who wrote with the close 
cooperation of Mrs. Laski and of Frankfurter as well as 
many others) will help in the background sketch. 
The first impression produced by Harold was 
that he was extremely small~ small in the build 
of his body though his head was large. He was 
extremely neat and precise and even dignified in 
his movements; he astonished by his unhesitating 
self-confidence~ his capacity for knowing all the 
answers and being able at a moment's noti-ce to 
provide a complete bibliography for a very wide 
range of topics. He could recite long passages of 
1. Ibid.~ p. 23. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 23. 
.• . '""/!· --~ 
poetry and prose> and he had the peculiarly im-
pressive quality of being able to support his 
arguments by reference to an exact page of a 
book, which he would direct the skeptical listen-
er to take down from his shelves or look up in 
the library. He already had an apparently lim-
itless repertoire of aneedetes and an inexhaust-
ible .stream of learned information with which 
to sustain theses tha~ in·eanada in 1914 seemed 
dangerous and impertinent. The pair found McGill 
dull and depressing ••• l 
7 
Frankfurter•s life-long correspondence With Laski has 
not been published. Perhaps it will not be. In view of 
Frankfurter's distinguished career and present stature as 
Justice of the Supreme Court, it would seem also to have 
bearing in an estimation of Harold Laski's thought> and yet 
by the time Frankfurter leaves the Supreme Court bench, 
perhaps Laski's meteoric career Will be ~all but forgotten. 
Martin gives glimpses of the nature of their correspondence> 
including the marked differences of opinion between the 
writers during the Second World War. Although during Jus-
tice Holmes' lifetime> Laski felt or stated, that Holmes 
was the friend who meant the most to him of all others, it 
is evident that Frankfurter> if not then, then as the years 
went on, was the nearest and dearest to him. On August 15, 
1925, in answer to some unfavorable criticism from Holmes 
about his recently published Grammar of Politics, Laski 
wrote him: "Friendship goes deeper than all these things. 
You, apart from Frida, have been the great thing in my life 
in that realm, and my main sentiment is one of profound 
1. Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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gratitude for it."1 Martin quotes a letter from Laski to 
Frankfurter~ after thirty-three years of friendship between 
them: 
••• and it does not seem a generation since I 
rather timidly knocked at your door in the Law 
School and walked into the second most precious 
experience it has ever 'been my lot to have.2 
Laski dedicated Authority in the Modern StateJ publish-
in 1919: "To Mr. Justice Holmes and Felix Frankfurter~ The 
Two Youngest of My Friends n. Felix Frankfurter was himself' 
a close friend and warm admirer of Justice HolmesJthus 
forming the other point of a triangular ref'erence which ap-
pears constantly in the pages. of the Holmes-Laski corres-
pondence. He wrote some of the most glowing and unstinted 
tributes to Holmes' legal insights and accomplishments which 
he has received. He is the editor of' a bouquet of tributes 
to Holmes on his 90th birthday~ (Mr. Justice Holmes: N.Y. 
1931) and author of Mr. Justice Holmes and the ConstitutionJ 
a review of Holmes' twenty-five years on the Supreme CourtJ 
a detailed study of most of his influential decisions and 
opinions. fiRe isJ indeedJ philosopher become king~ 11 says 
Frankfurter. 3 This does not touch on Holmes' opinions which 
have contradicted his reputation as a great liberalJ and is 
therefore a less complete general treatment than Max Lerner's 
1. Howe (ed.)J H-LJ IJ 776. 
2. MartinJ op. cit.) p. 259. 
3. Julius Marke (ed.)) The Holmes' Reader) p. 178. 
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Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes~ even though the former 
is a closer examination of Constitutional law. 
Of this admiration of Frankfurter for Holmes, Walton 
H. Hamilton has commented, in a footnote in his article: 
On Dating Mr. Justice Holmes: 
The classic account of the myth is Felix 
Frankfurter Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme 
Court (1938). Personal admiration does not be-
token intellectual or spiritual kinship. Holmes 
himself is singularly devoid of the streak which 
leads Felix Frankfurter to record, to approveJ 
to rejoice, but not to question or to qualify. 
As men and as jurists -- as the reports have al-
ready made
1
clear -- their universes are radically 
different. 
In the last thirty years articles and books about 
Justice Holmes have been many. Almost all of these, like 
Frankfurterts, have been 1i!l.udatory. Certainly the noble 
facets of Holmes' characterJ as well as the major role he 
has played in the development of American Constitutional 
law have not been taken lightly by the layman or the public. 
It might not be exactly fair to call Catherine Drinker 
Bowen's Yankee from Olympus (1943) a keynote to these writ-
ings, since its sentimental journalese and its Book-of-the-
Month embroideries of fact with fiction could hardly be 
considered as produced by any exact standard of scholarship, 
and yet its immense popularityJ the way certain prejudices 
and portraitures it contained caught on like wildfire, is 
symptomatic. Few, very few, who have written on Holmes have 
1. Walten Hamilton, "On Dating Mr. J'llstice Holmes 11 , Uni-
versity of Chicago Law ReviewJ No. 1 (December, 1949), 
FN-p. 1. 
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been as scathing as H. L. Menoken~ who has attacked with 
characteristic iconoclasm the pop~lar notions of his polit-
1 ical and social liberalism; or, on the other hand~ as crit-
ical of him as certain Catholic writers who have taken 
Holmes to task -- basically for his position on Natural 
Law in controversies about him in the law journals. 
Like Laski, the ability to form noteworthy and lasting 
friendships was an outstanding characteristic of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, the Second. ~he reader of these letters is 
continually surprised at the footnote references to the un-
usual range of "intimate friendsn of Holmes with whom he 
was corresponding, such as Canon Sheehan in Ireland. Many 
of these references indicate women~ here and in England. 
His letters to Mrs. John Chipman Grey and Lady Pollock, for 
instance~ are charming, as including the wives of old 
friends in the same intimate circle as held their husbands~ 
and Charles Curtis' recent Commonplace Book quotes frequent-
ly from correspondence between his mother and Holmes which 
Holmes referred to in other letters. 
When he was 80 years old Holmes tells Laski of taking 
Mrs. Gray to see his own "private show -- Fort Stevens 
where I saw Lincoln when the big guns were firing and our 
skirmishers going up the opposite slope and the enemy got 
their nearest to Washington. It is a hidden spot that few 
know and I was posing as the last survivor in the little 
1. Alistair Cooke (ed.), The Vintage Menoken, p. 189. 
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cemetary nearby when we met three 80-year o1derS 3 two at 
least of whom I believe were there -- and we held a little 
reunion that pleased Mrs. Gray and them. 81 Something less 
than a year later he writes: 11Did I ever take you to my 
little private show of Fort Stevens •••• ? I wanted to take 
Mrs. Asquith but it was no go. It is an old earth work 
hidden behind houses3 but rather interesting for a last 
2 survivor to take a dame to. 11 One smiles gently at the 
whimsical, indulgent vanity of an old warrier3 but one 
wonders also how superficial the vanity-is, for the first 
letter (May 27, 1921) inaludes also a discussion of Holmes' 
feeling about the appointment to fill the place of Chief 
Justice White on the Supreme Court bench, which office has 
ju~t fallen vacant. 
The only thing that gives me appreciable plea-
sure is when people -- the rare ones that I eare 
about and whose judgment I respect -- tell me that 
I have hit the ut de poitrine in my work. Then for 
half an hour r·feel that the long struggle has 
been rewarded ••• As I may have-written, the last 
year or two has brought more of the feeling of re-
ward than ever before -~ and I fully appreciate 
the part that you have played in bringing that 
about. [I.e., Laski had oeen responsible for the 
publication of the essay on Natural Law in the 
Harvard Law Review and for the publication3 Which 
he supervised, of Holmes' book Collected Legal 
Papers, which appeared in 1920.] ••• Now people 
speculate as to who will take Wbi te 1s plaee --
Taft is mentioned. I would rather have Hughes but 
I think he doesn't want it. Hughes is very hard 
working. Taft is said to be indolent •••• You may 
wonder if I am thinking of it. Not in any sense 
1. Howe (ea.), H-L, I, 339-340. 
2. Ibid., p. 414. 
except that all pessibilities oeeur to one and 
that no doubt a few here and there have named 
me •••• I wonder how many men are pulling wires 
now. I give you my word of honor that I am not. 
I don't even know what, if any, wiles I could 
pull-- !_haven't lifted a finger. 
Laski's comment on the appointment is written on 
July 6th. 
But first a word about Taft's appointment, 
for I must wreakmy anger somewhere. I thought 
it was a scandalous appointment. First it was 
so obvious that as a matter of simple justice 
you should have been appointed; next, after his 
attaek on Brandeis of last October I should 
have thought decency would have made him see 
that colleagueship was impossible. I boil 
about it; for I fear that Taft's emiling exter-
ier rea21Y conceals a very malicious and petty 
nature. 
12 
It might be remarked in passing that of".:the three 
American presidents of this period, T. R. Roosevelt, Taft 
and Wilson, who represent, taken all in all, almost as var-
ious policies as it would be possible for the representa-
tive for.m of government to find, Laski and Holmes disliked 
them all, with the single reservation that Holmes was much 
more amiable in his criticism of Taft than of the others, 
. -
and by his own account got along very well with him as 
Chief Justice. This easy-goingness he carried over into 
his attitude toward both Harding and Coolidge, although 
. . 
with Laski affability applied only to the former, for the 
bitterness of Laski's participation in the Boston Police 
1. Ibid., p. 339. 
2. Ibid., p. 347. 
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strike, when the mild speech he made in defense of the 
strikers was the indirect cause er his leaving Harvard, 
never allowed him to see anything but the cheapest or pol-
itical machinations back or Coolidge's rise. 
One might wish that the Justice's reminiscences of 
Fort Stevens at this point had included enough to know 
whether he was or was not the soldier who shouted naet down, 
you fool!n to Lincoln, who stood on the parapet under fire 
on the occasion he refers to. Howe feels there is direct 
evidence that Holmes was the soldier in question, even 
- -
though Holmes told that part of the story only ve~y seldom 
to the many visitors he took to the spot. That both Laski 
and Alexander Woolcott have embroidered fanciful accounts 
- - -
around the incident does not, however, testify to its auth-
enticity. Lincoln was another of the many American Presi-
dents for whom Holmes had ne admiration. Later .be modified 
this opinion. "Until I was middle-aged I never doubted that -
I was witnessing the growth of a_myth. Then the revelation 
of some facts and the greatness of some of his speeches --
helped perhaps by the environing conviction of the later 
world-- led me to aecept_the popular judgment-- which I 
do, without a great deal of ardor or very great interest in 
the man. nl 
at all fam-iliar with the Holm_es storY is aware Everyone 
of the permanent effect that his battle experience and the 
1. Mark De Wolfe Howe, The Shaping Years, PP· 167, 169, 
FN-p. 169. 
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Civil War had upen his subsequent thinking. Yet in the 
second reference to the little 11private show" of' the lonely 
old earth-worksJ quoted aboveJ which was for some reason a 
treat that Marget Asquith missedJ the suggestion of' gallant 
pleasantry misses fire for the reader who is aware that it 
comes at the end of his letter giving an aeeount of his in-
human decision in the Poisoned Pool ease (so-ealled). Jus-
tice Holmes in that ease refused to find a ehemieal company 
liable for leaving unmarked or unfenced an open pool in an 
abandoned works into whieh sulphuric acid had seepedJ al-
though it was known the water was poisonous. Two boysJ 
eight and elevenJ sons of an itinerant worker camped near-
byJ on a hot day swam in this water whichJ as the reports 
make plainJ looked clear and invitingJ and so died a ter-
rible death. The companyJ which had given up the works and 
torn down the buildingsJ knew that the pool was poisonedJ 
and that it was in an open area with several paths leading 
up to it and a highway near byJ but they had neither drain-
ed the foundations nor put up a warning signJ though the 
cruel accident happened six years_after the demolition of 
mhe defense was simplY the archaic common-law the factory. .L 
one of trespass at peril. HolmesJ in giving the opinion of 
the courtJ deciding against the father of the children and 
overruling the decision of the Kansa~ CourtJ gave a deci-
sion both against the interests of society and of human 
i f 1 W and monied investment in lifeJ an interpretat on o a J 
the most absolute exemplifying of Grant era materialism. 
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In the cold-blooded sentences of his decision, in which one 
feels the contempt fer his brother Clarke's ularmoyant dis-
sent that seemed to me more sentiment and rhetoric than 
1 
reasoning,tt he strikes a blow for the ultimate reactionary 
interpretation of property. Here it is: 
••• a basement and cellar, in whieh in July, 
1916, water was accumulated, ·clear in appearance 
but in fact dangerously poisoned by sulphuric 
acid and zinc·sulphate that had come in one way 
or another from·the petitioner's works, as the 
petitiener knew. The respondents had been trav-
elling and encamped at some distance from this 
place. A travelled way passed within 120 or 100 
feet of it. On July 27, 1916, the children, who 
were eight and eleven years ·old, came upon the 
petitioner's land; went into the water, were 
poisoned and died •••• 
••• If the children had been adults they would 
have had no case. They would have been trespass-
ers and the-owners of the land would have owed no 
duty to remove even hidden danger... On the oth-
er hand the duty of one who invites another upon 
his land not to lead him into a trap is well set-
tled, and while it is very plain that temptation 
is not invitation, it may be held that knowingly 
to establish and expose, unfenced, to children of 
an age when they follow a bait as mechanically as 
a fish something that is certain to attract them, 
has the legal effect of an invitation to them al-
though not to an adult •.• 
In the ease at bar it is at least doubtful 
whether the water could be seen from any place 
where the children lawfully were and there is no 
evidence that it was what led them to enter the 
land. But·that is necessary to start the sup-
posed duty. There can be no general duty on the 
part of a landowner to keep his land safe for 
children, or even free from hidden dangers, if he 
has not directly or by implication inVited or li-
censed them to come there ••• 
••. It is suggested that the roads across the 
1. Howe (ed. L H-F, II) 92. 
·place were invitations. A road is not an invita-
tion to leave it elsewhere than at its end.l 
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In his critical comment on this decision~ Max Lerner 
says: nHolmes shows here the characteristic detachment from 
'humanitarian' considerations on which he prided himself. 
One need not quarrel with him on that scere. 112 (The reader 
asks~ Why not? And why such detachment from humanitarian-
ism and intelligence should not be quarreled with by the 
liberal and left-wing political science, upon which Lerner's 
reputation rests.) Lerner goes on: 
••• Nevertheless he is open to two serious con-
siderations quite apart from the question of human-
itarianism. He himself often stated that in border-
line cases under the common law the function of the 
judge was to make articulate the social values on 
which his decision turned. In this ease Holmes 
leaned toward the protection of the property owner 
as a social value, rather than toward the interest 
which the community has in protecting the children 
in their free and natural impulses toward play. 
The second criticism is that even in technical legal 
terms Holmes was not right. Although he often pro-
tested against the idea of a 'general' common law 
superior to the doctrine held by the Supreme 
Court of the particular state, he here overturned 
the ruling of the Kansas courts and substituted for 
it the common-law ruling associated with the Massa-
chusetts courts.3 
In making the corporation appear a monster in this de-
cision, Holmes forcibly expressed a concept almost satiric-
, 
ally the contrary of the point of view Laski had been ear-
(~ 
neatly delving for in his study of the personality of asso-
1. Max Lerner (ed.), The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes, 
p. 203. 
2. Ibid., p. 203. 
3. Ibid., p. 203. 
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ciations, recently published (1921) in his Foundations of 
Sovereignty, a book which Holmes had professed to praise 
highly, even while differing from Laski's contention for 
plural and divided sovereignty. ttsurely it is but a limita-
tion of outlook not to extend the conception of personality 
h nl into this incorporal sp ere, Laski wrote, in his attempt 
to make of the corporation a powerfUl, benevolent symbol, 
with a mind of its own, of human liberty, as opposed to the 
fictitious totalitarianism of Leviathan, and further: 
••• The law ••• knows persons; by Act of Parlia-
ment 11personsn may include bodies corporate. Per-
·sons are the subjects of rights and duties which 
the coarts will, at need, enforce. If a body cor-
porate is a person, it will also be the subject of. 
rights and duties. If it is a person, it is so 
because the st~te has conferred upon it the gift of 
personality ••• 
And again: 
••• No one would think of charging an associa-
tion with incest or adultery. But it can be sued 
for malicious libel, fo3 assault and imprisonment, 
for fraud and deceit ••• 
Did the Fourteenth Amendment in its due process and 
equal protection clauses make the corporation a person under 
United States law? In 1882 Roscoe Conkling advanced this 
argument before the Supreme Court in his "conspiracy theoryrr, 
stating that these clauses were deliberately drafted into 
the Amendment in order to protect corporate property and to 
1. Harold Laski, Foundations of Sovereignty, p. 157. 
2. Ibid., p. 141. 
3. Ibid., p. 153. 
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extend the protection of these pr®visions to corporations as 
well as to3 or as it worked out3 in place of3 individual hu-
man persons (these persons then being Negroes). Scholar-
ship and common sense disproves this contention~ yet for at 
least a generation "substantive due processu in judicial 
review unmade a good deal of crucial legislation in center-
ing about this point~ and the Supreme Court ruled with 
Conkling's interpretation3 and a hands-off Big Business pol-
icy~ in a number of important cases and in an uninterrupted 
trend. up to the turn of the century. 'The whole current of 
the interpretation of Constitutional law throughout the •8os 
and '90s and into the 1900's was to protect vested rights in 
the corporation as though they were natural rights in the 
individual~ and the legal and semantic legerdemain by which 
this was accomplished went largely unquestioned by the jus-
tices themselves until Holmes came to the bench and declared, 
by 19213 with his masterly irritation~ "There is nothing 
that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words3 to prevent 
the making of social experiments that an important part of 
the community desires ••• " 1 And it is just here that Holmes' 
historical significance lies. 
it! 
The authors of a well-known Constitutional history put 
In a series of cases between 1877 and 18983 the 
court gradually coupled vested rights to the due 
1. Truax vs. Corrigan~ 257 US, 312 (Dec. 193 1921). 
process clause~ so that due process came to be a 
substantive limitation upon the power of a state 
to regulate private property in the interests of 
the public welfare. Liberty of contract also be-
came a vested right~ guaranteed by due ~recess 
against unreasonable state legislation. 
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The liberty or sanctity of contract had~ however~ been 
a "natural right" and even coupled with "Natural Law" in Am-
erican history~ from the first establishment of the Consti-
tution. A year or so after his Poisoned Pool decision~ 
Holmes wrote Laski~ explaining his Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital (Minimti.In Wage Case) dissent: nrt was intended in-
ter alia to dethrone Liberty of Contract from its ascendancy 
2 in the Liberty business." What~ then~ was Holmes doing 
in the Poisoned Pool ease? ~th a powerful unconscious 
mockery~ which might have been not so unconscious at that> 
it would seem he was pushing to the point of vengeance~ 
under the old guise of his beloved Common Law> Laski's 
theory of the personality of corporations, only here Holmes 
was investing the association~ along with all the protection 
of its property and vested rights~ with a personality which 
wore the robot mas.k of mechanical and cruel activity~ like 
a Rivera or Orozco mural might depict the fact of Capitalism 
as a calloo.sly mur:de~~ng Plutocracy~ a surrealist Moloch~ 
consuming the sacrif:U~ial bodies of children tortured to 
death with burning poison~ trapped into a horrible suffering 
1. Kelly and Harbison~ The American Constitution~ p. 520. 
2. Howe (ed.)~ H-L~ I, 495. 
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at the moment of gaiety and play~ as that same Big Business 
whose power here Holmes was ruthlessly extolling. 
Pollock highly approved this decision and repeatedly 
praised Holmes for it. In his Tribute to Holmes on his 90th 
Birthday~ he says of this and of Holmes' almost equally re-
actionary grade-crossing decision1 
Concerning Mr. Justice Holmes' judicial opinions 
Professor Frankfurter lately said~ consciously or 
unconsciously using a classical figure of Eastern 
poetry: 1 ~o cansider Mr. Justice Holmes' opinions 
is to string pearls.' But so large a number of 
these opinions deal with questions peculiar to 
American Constitutional law that an·English workman 
is hardly competent to handle them ••• 
I will~ therefore~ within my proper limits~ only 
give thanks for two pretty recent contributions to 
sound learning in questionS of·pure common law. 
United Zinc and Chemical Oo. v. Britt~ 258 US. 268 
(1922) gave a timely check to the persistent at-
tempts made through a long course of years to deny~ 
in effect~ that a child below the age of discre-
tion can in any circumstances be a trespasser ••• 
And in Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Goodman~ 275 u.s. 
66 (1927)~ the court~ per Holmes J.~ tend to remind 
every man who drives or walks over-a grade crossing 
that he must stop for the train~ not the train stop 
for him.~ 
One may note here how obsolete the matter in these two 
opinions of Holmes has become. In both cases legal prac-
tice is now customarily decided from a point of view exactly 
the opposite from that he assumed here as self-evident and 
uncontrovertible in Common Law. Yet if he is at a dead end 
in cases such as these~ on those issues of social control 
and civil liberties which are considered to be the ground of 
1. Pollock~ "Tribute to Holmes on his 90th Birthdaytt, Har-
vard Law Review, 44 (March~ 1931)~ 695. 
; W· 
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his great opinions, the Supreme Court is now his court, and 
he ha~ justly deserved the tribute given him. 
Laski does not seem to have commented on the Poisoned 
Pool decision. In Holmes' adcottnt to Laski of this case, 
which reads in contrast to the hard-boiled realism of the 
decision as given, he misrepresents some of the facts as he 
himself had stated them wi thoa.t any varnishing in his legal 
opinion. He says in the letter to Laski that the children 
died by drowning (rather than by immersion in sulphuric 
acid), that the defendant was a "landowner., 11 (rather than 
a Zinc and Chemical Company)., that it did not appear that 
the children had been "temptedn to enter the land (althongh 
paths led across it from the highway nearby.) 1 He seemed to 
be softening the significance as though regretfully for what 
he was compelled to decide, tempering it in behalf of Laski's 
radical humanitarianism, but he need not have felt concern. 
~he letter is a long one, full of all sorts of chitchat, 
including a reference to 11 a young good-J_ookern one Nevinson · 
brought over once. ur begged her to drop one word, "2 but .. · 
the charmer disappeared, and Mrs. Asquith didn't go to visit 
.'1-,· 
the old earth-works with him either. Whether Laski was 'dl-
.. 
verted is not evident. The law reports went to him regular-
ly, and without question he knew of the e~it~a1sm in legal 
as well as in less technical circles which Holmes' interpre-
1. Howe (ed.), H-L, I, 413. 
2. Ibid., p. 414. 
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tatien or liability here stirred~ but it seemed it was not 
to be necessary to inject a sour note. In the letter just 
preceding this~ the Laskis had had dinner with the H. w. 
Nevinson in question~ the journalist and writer~ and Laski 
had reported: 
He insisted (to a willing hearer) that no man 
has ever made the splendour of the law more appar-
ent than·you have done in Collected Papers. Har-
conrt ~ote me of its sale -- an amazing achieve-
ment I think. But really even the technical 
papers have a special flavour that puts them on 
the plane or general philosophic interest (especi-
ally 'Privilege~ Malice and Intent r) as well as 
that or jurisprudence. I'm more proud or having 
persuaded you to collect them than or most 
things I have done. But next I want the deci-
sions. I shan't really be contint until they 
are accessible in similar rorm. 
In the way Holmes begins the letter outlining the Poi-
soned Pool decision~ the reader hardly needs to be reminded 
that Laski single-handed had been responsible for the pub-
lication or Collected Legal Papers. ttWhat a pleasure would 
depart from my life if I ceased to receive letters rrom 
2 you," Holmes responds to the above. But one would like to 
know just what was the plane of general philosophic interest 
as well as that of jurisprudence which Laski so greatly ad-
mired in the paper~ which he specifically names. Except for 
a rather obscure rererence to boycotts buried in it~ and a 
word or caution against the restraint or combination~ which 
might by indirection apply to trade-unions~ although it is 
1. Ibid.~ p. 413. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 413. 
evident here that the corporation is meant~ there is no trace 
of liberal thought of any kind in this essay: in fact~ quite 
the oppoaite. 1 Laski's admiration of the essay is peculiarly 
sinister in its elose juxtapesition te the Poisoned Pool mat-
ter~ for Max Lerner's references~ in his discussion of this 
case~ refer to just this paper as being the base for eon-
temporary articles in the law reviews which deal with Holmes' 
indifference to humanita~ianism~ so strongly exemplified in 
this case. But aside from re~erring the inquiring reader to 
the footnotes in Lerner's treatment of the controversy here~ 
pointing to other discussions~ based on this paper~ of the 
legal origin and development of what Lerner ealla Holmes' 
11Draconianism", 2 it is bootless to probe for Laski 1 s reao-
tiona. The glow of mutual admiration was enough, both for 
him and for the old law-giver whose patriarchal reputation 
was based on something other than that he had never been a 
father~ in fact, or in a heart which justified the cruel des-
truction of playing children. 
We have plunged so immediately in this essay into the 
Poison Pool decision because it is the most drastic and forth-
right dramatization of inconsistencies which will be dis-
cussed in our examination of the Holmes-Laski relationship. 
Yet, in addition~ lest this approaeh and its treatment seem 
too one sided and too hostile toward Holmes, let Max Lerner 
summarize at the outset also the positive aspeet of Holmes' 
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Collected Legal Papers, pp. 
128-129. 
2. Lerner, op. cit., p. 202. 
24 
contribution to national history. He says: 
He had a serenity even in his moments or anger 
or near-despair~ an assurance even in the midst or 
skepticism. It is a chastening thing to read his 
writings over the span or his life -- to see how 
slow has been the movement toward a workable democ-
racy~ ••• how unmalleable have been the interpreta-
tions placed on the fundamental laws by the dom-
inant judicial caste~.~.But if it is chastening~ 
it is also heartening ••• to see how at the high 
tide or capitalist materialism there were still 
those who stood by their faith in social reason 
and in the competition or ideas~ their belief in 
the steady~ if slowJ march or social progress. 
Holmes was one or these. He was at once bouyant 
and unrooled. The most striking thing about him 
was that he refused to live in a closed universe. 
He was a great spokesman or our Constitutional 
tradition because he was a great enough conserva-
tive to stretch the framework or the past to acco-
modate at least some or the needs or the present.l 
And again: 
Holmes has had a great impact on our Constitu-
tional development and national history. For a 
time it seemed that his workJ however:gallant~ would 
prove frustrate. The Supreme Court majority con-
tinued to show a glacial hostility to his basic con-
stitutional attitudesJ and the country as a whole 
showed an indifference to his fighting faith. Ir 
Holmes had to wait for his vindication on the latter 
until Dunkirk and Pearl HarborJ his victory with 
respect to the former came earlierJ only a year or 
two after his death. The constitutional-crisis of 
the New Deal and the struggle over the Court reor-
ganization plan of another Roosevelt cleared the 
way ror the complete adoption or Holmes 1 s views on 
constitutional law. The new doctrinal directions 
of the present Supreme Court s~ell more than any-
thing else a return to Holmes. 
1. Ibid.J p. xlvii. 
2. Ibid.~ p. xlix. 
--· :~~;- · .. 
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The interested reader naturally compares the Holmes-
Pollock and the Helmes-Laski exehanges. The Holmes-Pollock 
letters were published in 1941 and covered a much longer 
period~ beginning when ~oth were young men~ extending from 
1874 to 1932. Sir Frederick Folloek was four years younger 
than Holmes. Each rose to a position of first importance 
in the interpretation of Constitutional law in his own coun-
try. Each ke~t the other posted and shared with him the 
satisfactions of mutual and distinguished increment in bon-
ora as the years went on. The comparison is apt~ made by 
the reviewers~ between this correspondence and that of two 
old Roman senators~ who watch from a high and detached em-
inence the turmoils of time and the ferment in political and 
social thought. Yet in its early stages it does not have 
this Olympian attribute but is matter-of-fact~ technical 
and dry. The value to the general reader seems to begin~ 
roughly~ at about the period or a few years before that in 
which the Holmes-Laski correspondence began. After Holmes 
reached the age of seventy and more he began to pour himself 
out more personally in letters than he bad ever done before~ 
possibly in response to his own inner need for expression, 
and possibly also because he was consciously aware that his 
letters weuld be saved and published and would be considered 
as source material by future students. 
It is stimulating to compare two good reviews of these 
bodies of letters~ one~ On Dating Mr. Justiee Holmes by 
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Walton H. Hamilton~ Law Professor at Yale~ and the other 
The Holmes-Laski Correspondence by Edmund Wilson~ the lit-
erary critic. The first~ based on the Holmes-Pollock ex-
change~ is a careful page by page analysis of the material~ 
with what a laWYer and an observant person might note in 
what they reveal about the writers. Wilson's essay deals 
With biographical and personal interpretation of a high 
order. 
Hamilton's article on the Pollock exchange is very 
clever and not a little disparaging. He begins: 
••• The wonder rather is that there is so little 
of it ••• Whether or not the two worthies played 
for the record~ •••• It is a commwnem between Cam-
bridge~ ·massachusetts~ and Cambridge~ England ••• 
Holmes ••• represented the flewer of New England~ 
had fought in the wars ·With David~ was sitting in 
the judgment seat of Solomon. Holmes was a kind 
of American agent to Pollock's reputation; Pollock 
in trne reciprocity~ took care of Holmes' fame in 
England. But the mild attraction created no 
Damon and Pythias .1 
Hamilton believes Pollock is revealed here as the "lesser 
man.n 
•• ~Such omnicompetence a~ide~ Pollock is clearly 
the kind of person his environment w®uld create • 
••• Such speculation is a single aspect of person-
al habit. It belongs to a round of polite living 
rather than a burning·quest for truth. It can 
hardly be elevated above ether aelights which a 
life of intellectual leisure affords ••• All is 
illumined by wit~ learning~ individuality; yet 
all remains the2common opinion of his age~ coun-try~ and elass. 
1. Hamilton~ op. eit.~ p. 2. 
2. Ibid.~ pp. 3-5. 
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11
'fo such a person Holmes is less an alien than •the 
great liberal justice' wenld have been", Hamilton centin-
ues. fiif' he is freer from bendage to respectability, he 
1 
was enough its preduet to be telerant ef' Bolleck. 11 .But 
let us pause with this comparison. Though there is much 
evidence that Holmes was the greater lawYer of the two, in 
general range of' intellect it seems evident from the let-
ters that Pollock had more expert knowledge, more artistic 
judgment, and more cormopolitan taste in many matters which 
Holmes simply settled with "I don 1 t like." Often this comes 
out in Pollock's appreciation of' books or writers (Henry 
and William James are examples) which Holmes altogether 
damns, in repetitive phrases which become tiresome to read-
ers of' a great many of his letters, putting Pollock repeat-
edly in the position of showing the greater humane or lit-
erary insight. 
Since this is a paper en intellectual insight, with the 
aim of arriving at a norm for judging the acamen of Holmes' 
and Laski's philosophical pronouncements on Natural Law, it 
would seem fitting, as an example, to refer to the way each 
man -- Holmes and Pollock and Laski (at this point) -- treat-
ed the topic of Einstein, since the whole configuration 
about the name, however it is dealt with, is a basic key-note 
fer the half-century. On August 15, 1920, Pollock writes: 
I have ne use for materialists who talk of epi-
phenomenon. Experience in censeiousness is the 
1. Ibid. , p. 5 • 
only kind of thing we know at first hand (and so 
far as ita immediate contents go) are absolutely 
sure of. The rest is reflection~ abstraction 
and-reconstruction. To regard thought or con-
sciousness as a by-product of something abstract-
ed out of its own content is a ludicrous muddle. 
It also postulates the absolutely real space and 
time which Einstein seems to have demolished 
without recourse to metaphysic~ The object of 
natural science is-the world common to you and 
me~ disregarding your and my individual points 
of view (but Einstein seems to suggest doubt 
whether~ in the last resort~ there is not a nec-
essary fiction there): and that world is itself 
an ideal construction. Just now I am about to 
tackle a book by Whitehead of Cambridge and now 
of the Imperial College of Science -- The Con-
cept of Nature --_one of the few men who really 
know all the mathemat:tcs there are~ and eo-author 
with Bertrand Russell of a work which perhaps a 
dozen oth!r men in the world are competent to 
estimate. 
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Holmes answers that he is going to try to get White-
head's book ("or moJt?e probably vainly try to get. 11 ) He 
adds: 11 I can't recite on Einstein~ though the same Jewish 
philosopher who sent me Tourtoulon and recommended White-
head sent me two articles of his expounding Einstein's the-
ory [i.e.~ this is a reference to Morris Cohen] and a dame 
lent me an English pamphlet which I returned unmastered. 112 
By the end of the summer his prognostication had proved to 
be correct~ and he says: "Whitehead I failed to get and 
therefore can't recite.n3 But the following June he returns 
to the encounter in a reference to Haldane's Relativity. 
1. Howe (ed.)~ H-P, II~ 50-51. 
2. Ibid., p. 52. 
3 • Ibid. , p • 55 • 
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"Hard reading and I have not.yet got far enough into it to 
criticize or indeed to talk -- but Haldane seems to me a 
great man."1 Less than a month later: ni read Haldane's 
Relativity with partial understanding -- not complete. As 
in other cases the difficulty is not with the ideas but 
. . 
with the words ••• with much, though not with the ultimate 
Hegelian conception, I found myself agreeing, and somehow 
the book made me like and admire him more than ever. 112 It 
all, however, as consequence, does no more than send him 
back to Hegel, an old and much hashed over topic throughout 
his letters. Hegel gives him another chance at the oft re-
peated quoted aphorism: 11Hegel can't persuade me that a 
syllogism can wag its tail. n3 Hegel also takes him back to 
Bergson (and another popular catch-sentence of his own) via 
Aristotle's Metaphysics. 
I confess that I find reading him (i.e. Aris-
totle) like reading Hegel, a bore which I go through 
with to understand the history of thought, not for 
illumination. Otherwise it is with Bergson's 
Creative Evolution which I have just read for the 
third time. I doh't believe it --I think he is 
churning the void to make cheese -- bat I find him 
full of stimulus, letting.me further i~to truth, 
and making a world poem that moves me. 
Pollock comments, on August 14, 1921: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
I have started on Haldane's Relativity after a 
preparatory re-reading of !L· Poincare~ La valeur 
Ibid., p. 70. 
Ibid., p. 71. 
Ibid., p. 71. 
Ibid., p. 75. 
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de la Science ••• which I find much the best intro-
duction to the whele business of the new physics: 
it makes one realize that Einstein is not a revo-
lutionary but has put in the key stone 3 so to 
speak) of an arch that his predecessors have been 
building these two generations. Thus Foincar~3 
some twelve years ago 3 pointed quite plainly to a 
system in which the velocity of light would be 
the only real constant) only it was then not cer-
tain whether astronomy could or could not do with-
out it. Haldane would be difficult reading I 
think fer any one not already on speaking terms 
with both m·ar_hematico-physical and philosophical 
conceptions. 
The preceding February3 Laski 3 who most evidently is 
not the kind of person referred to in the last sentence 
quoted above 3 had gotten into the exchange. He relates 
that he spent Sunday morning with Haldane 3 nand talked over 
things. 11 11 Things 11 was mainly3 as always) gossip about Eng-
lish political personalities) but finally Haldane 
••• switched off on to Einstein and outlined the 
two.:.volume work he lias just finished on relativ-
ity. 'H. J. L. (pathetically) 3 Lord Haldane) I 
simply don't understand Einstein; ·Haldane (stern-
ly)3 But I am explaining it to you! You can im-
agine the completeness of my collapse. But Hal-
dane is an old dear3 though rather li~e a hippo-
potamus in his intellectual (and physical) move-
ments. Let me add th~t he keeps far the best 
cigarettes in London. 
. . 
The subject is not dead 3 and about five years later 
the Einstein-Whitehead-Haldane-Holmes-Pollock-Laski cycle 
comes round again. On January 3J 1926J Holmes writes to 
Laski: "I read Whitehead's Science and the Modern World. 
It seemed to me obscurely writtenJ perhaps not so to math-
1. Ibid. 3 p. 74. 
2. Howe (ed.) 3 H-L) I) 314. 
I':'-\ / . 
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ematicians and it did not change my view of the universe. 
He's a clever man~ but I doubt if he wields a thunder-
b -It nl 0 ••• 
He had written Pollock of this also. Pollock answers: 
••• Aa to Whitehead he is in the very front rank 
of mathematicians -- he wrote a great book with 
Bertrand Russell some years before the war --
and ean speak With Einstein in the gate. More-
over he can explain things to you and me: there 
is an admirable little introduction of his to 
mathematical-methods in the Home University ser-
ies of handbooks. Four or five years ago I read 
his Concept of Nature -- not very elementary; and 
stiff in places~· I don't know what his philo-
sophy is like •••• when it gets loose from mathe-
maties~ ·or just what work he does nowadays at 
Harvard. I know him in person by means of the 
Cambridge Society called the Apostles~ having 
met him sundry times at our annual dinner. It is 
a body to whieh I owe much -- friendship with 
Maine and Fitzjames Stephen and an earlier dis-
covery of Maitland tb.an I should have made other- ""'. 
wise -- as my father owed not less to it before 
me.~ · 
Laski answers Holmes here: on January 17~ 1926. 
I envy you the patienCe that works through 
Whitehead's book. I began it at the behest of 
Bertrand Russell~ but found it too far from me 
in mental point of view to get much headway. 
Russell says that we have not yet reached the 
point where we ean distinguish between faets 
about relativity and mathematical operations 
which may have nothing to do therewith; I 
bought a couple of books· for the trip t~ Edin-burgh~ but I can't say I was greatly illumined.3 
Laski's references to Haldane go on and on. Most of 
these are in the area of chatter~ but one more may be quoted 
1. Ibid.~ II~ 817. 
2. Howe (ed.)~ H-P~ II~ 174. 
3. Howe (ed.)~ H-L~ II~ 820. 
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f'or the subject under consideration. On September 30., 
1926., he reports another long talk with Haldane at an ad-
ult education conference in Cambridge. (The f'ootnote tells 
us that Haldane gave up the presidency of' the group on this 
occasion.) Laski tells Holmes: 
(Haldane) interested .me enormously in a number 
of' ways. First., the regions where his mind simply 
doesn't function at all. e.g." in the quality of' 
historic mindedness ••. Haldane e.g. urged that 
much more attention should be given in education 
to mathematics. Now if' there is one thing I am 
certain of' it is that beyond a certain elementary 
point., mathematics are a permanently closed sub-
ject to the larger part of' mankind. Yet I heard 
distinguished professors of' classics getting up 
one af'ter another and saying that without a grasp 
of' Einstein men lost a significant part of' the 
heritage of mankind when they must have known (I) 
that they themselves didn't and couldn't understand 
relativity and (II) that if' it were proposed to 
make mathematics af'ter say the elementary calculus 
com~ulsory they would fight like eats to prevent 
it. 
On February 13" 1927., Laski suddenly states "I re-read 
Whitehead's Science and the Modern World with even more ad-
miration than before" but with a still complete inability 
- . 
to know what the chapters on God and Abstraction are about. 112 
- -
It would appear that in this exchange Pollock., of' the 
three., wins hands down. Laski's blankness here is one of' 
the many euri~us f'acets of' his intellectual composition. He 
was a young man, avid f'or ideas and talk" an omnivorous 
reader., yet I cannot f'ind evidence that anything apart f'rom 
his personal acquaintance with J.J. Thomson, the distinguish-
1. Ibid • ., ··P· 880. 
2. Ibid • ., p. 920. 
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ed British physicist at Cambridge University_, gave him any 
inkling of what was really going on in science_, or stirred 
his interest to find out. To have said that he could not 
understand Whitehead's Science and the Modern World is sil-
ly. Delivered as Lowell Lectures in 1925_, it has long 
been in paper-back because of the demand by bright under-
graduates. Only one or two chapters are severe]V mathemat-
ical (Abstraction is one of these)_, but the bulk of the 
boak is of the popular-personal-cultural explanation and 
interpretation of the new reflections about the universe 
which any intelligent. lay person can absorb. It would be 
rather more than a guess that because two of the chapters 
were entitled God and Religion and Science_, Holmes and Las-
ki dismissed the whole as outside their range_, more than a 
guess because Holmes implied as much in first referring to 
the book. " ••• I hope (it) will stir up my monkeys_, though 
. 1 
the titles to chapters suggest some reserves. u 
But Laski cannot be easily pigeon-holed_, and it weuld 
seem fair_, in considering his p~eparation_, during this cru-
cial quarter century_, for the event which burst upon the 
world on August 5_, 1945_, to follow through his references to 
the British physicist J. J. Thomson. Thomson seemed at least 
to move him to an awareness that vast new undertakings in 
science were underway_, rather than Haldane had been able to 
do. 
1. Ibid._, I_, 810. 
.. ; .·· U'\ ~ 
The first is on March 20, 1917, when he is still teach-
ing in Cambridge, Massachusetts. In quoting these letters 
it has been impossible to resist the addition of other sen-
tences in eaeh letter which are revealing of Laski's taste 
and insight, even when not applied to scienee • 
••• There isn't time to read the romance of 
other people's lives if you study properly the 
spider's web of your own. I·am clear that in 
reading one ought to have tw0 rules -- (a) to 
knew one subject inside out and (b) to have an 
eye to what the rest of the world is doing. I 
mean·, to take myself, that I ought to be able 
to recite on Duguit or Austin 0r Maitland in 
detail and hear say J. J. ~homson tell a good 
story abou-t Jean Perrin {e.g.:, the footnote ex-
plains~ French physicist {1870-1942] and author 
of Les atomes [1914]) without feeling a cool 
breeze of ignorance. And of eourse while I 
listen to Sir J: J. I want also to have an in-
timate conviction that my subject is much more 1 fascinating and important (as of course it is). 
On October 23, 1923: 
••• On the other hand I went to dinner to J.J. 
Thomson and met there Eddington the physicist~ 
I persuaded them to talk-in single syllables of 
the prospects of science. I had a vision of man 
the rebel slowly mastering the Nature who had 
defied his punyness which left me ·exhilarated 
as I have not been these twelve months. Or take 
the younger set. I dined the other night with 
Arnold Bennett and he teld me that- a novel-- Uly-
sses by James Joyce was a most-important portent 
in modern letters.- CC>nseientious as I am, I 
got hold of a copy. I make only two remarks. 
First, that no two consecutive pages were ever 
intelligible to me, and, second, that I can onl2 
conceive it to have been written in a lavatory. 
On February 4, 1924: 
••• A really adorable skit was Daedalus by 
1. Ibid., p. 68. 
2. Ibid., p. 553. 
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J. B. s. Haldane -- (Note: . Not Vicount Haldane, 
already in the discussion;) a semi-serious, semi-
witty analysis of the prospects of science. As 
soon as Frida has read it, I shall send it along 
to you. I think it a very brilliant jeu d'esprit, 
and I look forward eagerly to a reply Bertrand 
Russell is writing tinder the title of Icarus. The 
more I come across men of science in general, the 
more broadly speaking, I envy and respect them. 
First they deal with an exact medium. Second they 
mean the same thing by-their returns. Third you 
can test their results. FoUrth these results 
seem te be made in a·background frem which emotion 
is singularly absent. And I feel in people like 
Rutherford, and J. Thomson, as I felt in poor 
Rivers, a devotion to truth of an extraordinary 
quality. And, just at present, there is a breadth 
of speculation amongst them, a receptivity to new 
ideas, especially in physics, which is wonderfully 
exhilarating. We in political science seem sur-
rounded on all sides-by little men tinkering away 
at 1i ttle su.bjects, or dealing With big subjects 
so broadly that the result is·not worth having. 
And much of the controversy e.g. do judges make 
or declare law seems to me-literally-sheer waste 
of time. I see value·in work like.John c. Gray~ 
and Maitland; but e.g. the jural postulates of 
Pound which I see discussed in every legal maga-
zine just now are really so obvious that I doubt 
if -they justify the immense labour and research 
upon which they are based.l 
On July 1, 1924: 
••• Above all I have read -- and you 1b:oth. IDuErt read 
Saint Joan by Bernard Shaw. To say· that it is a 
masterpiece literally isn't enough ••• The preface 
I thought ~ood; but I warmly dissent (and so 
wrote Shaw) from the doctrine that we are as 
credulous as the middle ages, having merely chang-
ed the objects of credulity. For, obviously, it 
is not credulity for me to accept J. J. Thomson's 
account of atomic structure when I know that I 
am in the realm of verifiable hypothesis. But it 
is credulity for me to accept the Angelic Doctor's 
computation of the number of angels capable of 
standing on the head of a pin •••• 2 
1. Ibid., p. 589. 
2. Ibid., p. 629. 
On October 43 1925: 
••• Also a visit to Cambridge where I had to speak; 
but here J. J. Thomson was in the chair and he was 
wholly delightful. Afterwards we dined and he 
told me tales of Clerk-Maxwell3 Rayleigh and Kel-
vin till the small hours~ I was particularly in-
terested in his account of Kelvin's complete im-
pregnability to new ideas unless he himself origi-
nated them. He also told me a story ••• of Spencer 
saying that a theory x could not be true, as he 
had said the opposite in his Psychology and it was 
impossible to alter the plates! A clerical don 
who was there opined tb.at scientists in general 
were not more open than the clergy; but I thought 
Thomson countered very neatly by remarking that 
the ehief difference was that whereas in the end 
the clergy always mastered facts3 facts always ul-
timately mastered the scientists. I saw in the 
Library of Trinity with great reverence tbemss of 
Newton, and Thomson pointed out to me that, broadly 
speaking3 he had laid down the o~tlines of all his 
great discoveries by the time he was thirty. It 
is 3 I think, an interesting fact that whereas in 
literature 3 politics and philosophy the great dis-
coveries are usually made by men of middle age3 in 
physics, mathematics and music the big steps are 
taken, even if they are not proved3 by comparatively 
young men •••• So3 also, lawyers usually bloom late. 
Maitland was forty before he achieved anything of 
consequence; Montesquieu was fifty-four when he 
published the Esprit; Savigny was in middle age 
when his great book appeared; and Helmes, 1J. was forty when he published The ,Common Law.~. 
It may be added here that the implication of these 
long quotations is not complete unless seen in relation to 
the whole correspondence 3 where Laski's praise and admira-
tion of Thomson shows up as something very exceptional, since 
almost invariably3 when mentioning anyone, except his own 
tight circle of nearest intimates 3 his comments are critical 
and unfavorable. The reader must judge for himself whether 
1. Ibid., p. 791 
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Laski's understanding of the new science~ about to erupt in 
nuclear fission and change every aspect of Laski's known 
and familiar world~ as revealed in these extracts through-
out the twenty-five years before the Atomie Age did burst 
forth~ extends beyond the gossip stage. My own estimate is 
that it is a cut above the irresponsibility of such a base~ 
but that it in no way approaches a standard of sound self-
infor.mingj comparative knowledge. 
To return to Hamilton's rather invidious comments on 
Holmes and Pollock~ the same comparison between the three 
is also true in regard to important political considerations: 
regarding international control~ or the League of Nations. 
Though Pollock does reveal the standard British hatred of 
1917 for the "Boche" and wants to try the Kaiser for war 
crimes (he was on an Attorney-General's Committee to explore 
the possibility of bringing William II to trial which he 
expressed as 11E:x:pand '!lang the Kaiser' in rational termstt1 ) 
in view of the Nuremberg trials of 1946~ it seems evident 
' 
he was speculating here in the vital~ proleptic area of legal 
frontier~where international law (so referred-to) presents 
so far nothing but blanks or question marks~ as Rebecca 
West's essays in A Train of Powder so powerfully show. 
Holmes just wasn't interested at all. Pollock appreciated 
the significance of the League of Nations and was greatly 
concerned with its program and purpose. ni have let the 
1. Howe (ed.)~ H-P~ II~ 4. 
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League go its way Wi thou.t much study, 11 .said Holmes, carry-
ing over his contemptuous indifference to Woodrow Wilson 
to Wilson's brain-child. '~I .have my hands full and am too 
old and too busy to take a part, and futile worry is 
wa.ste. 111 Futile worry or not, Pollock was going to write 
a book about it. ("I shall cut tln.e historical inducements 
short. 'Precursors• have been overdene I think. They are 
a fatal temptation to doctGlral theses ••• "2 ) 11I await the 
appearance of your book on the League of Nations with in-
terest," wrete Holmes on April 27, 1919, 11but the subject 
hitherto has left me a little cold. What you say about 
Precursors has been illustrated in connection with our Con-
stitution •••• 113 With this encouragement, Pollock published 
his book, and Holmes was pleased to comment on February 1, 
1920: 
••• your League of Nations has just come •••• I have 
only read the first 30 pages or so but I want to 
go on at once to the end. I must admit, however, 
that I am afraid that I am in a class that you 
rather despise pp. 25, 26. [The footnote tells 
us: 'Describing one class of critics of the League 
of Nations, Pollock said; 11 0ne sees a little 
group of elders who stand aside and shake their 
wise heads. This new-fangled operation, they say 
will never do •••• beware of laying profane· experi-
mental hands on the ultimate right of resort to 
the blood-feud. It is a venerable and sacred in-
stitution •••• 11 ' n] ••• I loathe war -- which I de-
scribed when at home with·a wound in our Civil 
War as an organized bore ••• I think the sacredness 
1. Ibid._, p. 8. 
2. Ibid., p. 10. 
3~ Ibid., p. 10. 
-,-; _,: __,. 
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of human life is a purely municipal ideal of no 
validity outside the-jurisdictien. I believe that 
force mitigated so far as may be by good manners, 
is the ultima ratio, and between two groups that· 
want to make ±nconsistent kinds of world I see no. 
remedy except force. I may add what I no doubt 
have said often enough, that it seems to me that 
every society rests on the death of men •••• I 
should be glad, to speak Hibernianly, if it 
should be arranged that the death should precede 
life by provisions for a selected race, but we 
shall not live to see that. However, I dare say 
that all this is in the air and that you may say 
that on these or any other principles it is a 
good thing if we can unite forces to put down 
avoidable displays of force. I find it somewhat 
hard to believe that we can come to such intimate 
understanding with the East that future slaughters 
can be avoided. But I am very nearly an old man 
and must content myself with my job and leave 
this business to you young chaps. Now I return 
to your book •••• Laski is getting up a·colleetion 
of my seatt:e:toad essays, etc., for a volume which 
I hope some day will be published in N.Y., ·1 
signed a contract yesterday authorizing it •. 
Pollock's answer to this perhaps smacks of the smugness 
which Hamilton finds characteristic: 
A.s to the sanctity of human life I quite agree 
with you that there is too much fuss about it. My 
complaint against war is not that it kills men 
but that it kills the.wrong ones, taking an undue 
proportion of the strong and adventurous and leav-
ing too many weaklings and shirkers, thus working 
a perverse artificial selection of those who are · 
least fitted to adorn or improve the commonwealth.2 
This attitude in regard to international organization 
is to be more or less expected from Holmes and respected ac-
cordingly, but that Laski•s interest in this area was weak 
or sarcastic, as it patently was, condemns him by his own 
standards, for if anything lay within his own field of pol-
1. Ibid., p. 36. 
2. Ibid., p. 39. 
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itical science~ certainly it was the formation of the League 
of Nations~ precursors~ sequellae et al. Whether he was 
simply imitating Holmes in the beginning here, or whether 
his attitude had been instrumental in shaping Holmes• in-
difference, is one of those fine points which probably have 
no exact determination. In any event his references to 
this all-important aspect of his own field in its demand for 
expert knowledge are singularly oblique. Here are a few. 
On February 1~ -192~: 
••• a wonderful week-end with Zimmern in Aberyst-
wyth from which I have just returned.~.Together 
we dismissed the League of Nations; together we 
agreed that every social-panacea is the prelude 
to social disillusion; together-we travelled 
over the American continent, people and places~ 
and found that we put you and·lound, Felix and 
Cohen, on much the same pla?e• 
On February 4, 1924: 
••• Your blessed Europeanized.Americans- come over 
here and fill our statesmen up with the notion 
that you are dYing with anxiety to interVene; and 
poor fellows like Robert Cecil, who saw only·the 
pro-Leaguers,_ of course come back with the notion 
that it is·a·h~ly cause to America as it is to 
themselves •••• 
In the same letter there is a comment on Woodrow Wilson•s 
death: 
Poor Wilson!· I was stirred by his death for it 
is a grim irony. I saw him-half_.a dozen times~ 
never with liking, btit two or three times with 
some real admiration; above·all, he liked Felix 
which was a title to my regard. ·But he had the 
most unpliable mind I ever met, with a kind of 
1. Howe (ed.), H-L: I, 309. 
2. Ibid., p. 588. 
intellectual hubris which I found very distaste-
ful •••• The end was a great tragedy.l 
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On June 30~ 1925: 
••• Manly Hudson~ item~ who was fine on things in 
general~ but inclined2to get the League of Nations mixed up with God; ••• 
At last in the summer of 1926 his researches and con-
tacts bring him to Geneva. Oddly enough~ it was h±s first 
visit to that city. On August 22~ 1926~ he writes: 
••• I came back from two thrilling-days in Geneva . 
••• I had never been to Geneva before.· ·The city 
itself~ to begin wi tfl. is quite lovely ••• (there 
follows a paragraph of description.] _ 
To this must be added-the pleasure of finding 
what was~ from my point of view~ the best book-
shop I have ever entered~ 3 (Here follows another paragraph of description.) . 
Finally he gets to the purpose of his trip: 
The League-itself was not especiallY-impress-
ive. I saw some old American friends •• ~ .I also 
met Zimmern~ but he is now a crusader fer the 
League and nothing but the League- and to- a scep-
tic that does not help discussion. The place 
itself~ as the centre of the League~ has become 
the most amazing medley of nationalities; and 
one finds oneself continually searching for an 
interpreter to find out what some Czech or Pole 
is trying to·- say~ On the other hand the Inter-
national Labour office does impress. One_has 
the sense that fertile thinking is on foot- B.ijd 
that really effective work is being done •••• 
Two comments may be made here~ at the end of quotations~ 
for beyond this there is much material showing the applica-
l. Id. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 756. 
3. Ibid.~ II~ 870. 
4. Id. 
~ -_... ~·"'-. 
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tion, or modification~ of Laski's attitude toward the League 
of Nations. The first comment points out that all through 
his letters there runs a curious thread of Laski's feeling 
as a matter-of course that the white skin and the English 
' ·~ 
language is the basic natural norm from which all other 
tongues and pigmentat~ons are_an off-center departure. (It 
is always some Czeeh or Pole or Hindu or Chinese who is 
trYing to say something that reqUires an interpreter either 
for his speech or for his eccentric and usually ludicrous 
demands -- not Laski.) Again~ this would not be an odd 
characteristic in Holmes or Pollock (and in neither of them 
is it as pronounced as it is with the young radical) but it 
is very curious in the budding communist apologist (--or 
perhaps it is·not!) The second comment relates to Laski's 
charge against Wilson as guilty of intellectual hubris. 
nHubris" is a fascinating word. Herbert J'. Muller points 
out in his stimulating Uses of the Pas~that as Toynbee em-
ploys the term~ for instance (and he greatly admires Toynbee)~ 
perhaps it approaches a certain meaninglessness~ for human 
pride is a universal of history which takes so many forms 
and manifestations that almost any movement or institution 
or individual in history~ good~ bad or indifferent~ which 
somes to a cropper,could be said to be the result of "hubrisn. 
Nevertheless~ it remains one of the tragic humanistic eon-
cepts which have a long tradition and slow accreti~n of mean-
1. Herbert J. Muller~ The Uses of the Past, p. 26. 
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ing. It is beside the point to ask the rhetorical ques-
tion: what did Laski want? Or to observe that in his com-
ment, the "great tragedy" was a tragedy of his (Laski's) 
own making, along with all the other enlightened opponents 
of Wilson at the time. Yet it might be said that this is 
an example of Laski 1s own "hubris« -- the fatal flaw of 
blindness in his self-confident but unexamined view of him-
self, his work and his purpose, which led to the vague and 
mixed-up muddle which his work and his purpose became. 
Hamilton ends his essay on Holmes in which there is 
so much sarcasm not without a tribute: 11 Human frailties 
seem to signify less than they would with another man •••. 
It is certain that as a man of letters he must rank with 
the greatest on the bench. 111 
1. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 29. 
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Edmund Wilson~ in his survey of the Holmes-Laski"cor-
respondence~ is far more sympathetic and open in his atti-
tude toward Holmes than Hamilton has been. He is concerned 
with the off-eenteredness here and with oddities in explana-
tion for which he is offering psychological suggestions. 
He gives Holmes more credit for serious reading and inde-
pendent and significant opinions on his reading than Hamil-
ton does~ and ~ts psychological data is especially apt in 
regard to Laski. He plunges at once into the most impor-
tant fact to be considered about Laski in. ·any critique of 
his reputation and his influence on other men~ and that is 
the very curious evidence that he was to a certain undeter-
mined extent a pathological liar. Such a noun and such an 
accompanYing adjective are harsh words. Wilson does not 
use them~ for along with others who knew Laski well on a 
personal basis~ he is inclined to be amused at a foible~ 
rather than experience the historian~!·s, rising gorge. He 
says~ after commenting on the tact with which both Profes-
sor Howe and Justice Frankfurter have shown in dealing with 
this aspect of Laski's character: 
••• The great scandal about Harold Laski~ regret-
ted by all his friends and sometimes used against 
him by his enemies~ was his habit of unscrupulous 
romancing. He would freely invent stories that 
had often no basis whatever in fact about people he 
did not know but whom he claimed to have met and 
talked with~ exploits that he had not performed~ 
scenes that had never occurred and books that he 
had never read. It is obvious that these false-
hoods of Laski 1s represented a genuine aberration~ 
because they were entirely gratuitous. Laski~ 
on confidential terms with distinguished and fa-
mous people; he did have a phenomenal memory, 
and he ~ immensely learned; he did have an un-
canny knack of picking up unsuspected treasures 
.from the shelves of secondhand-book dealers. 
From what motive, then, could he have allowed 
himself' to bewilder and trouble his friends, to 
leave traps for his biographers and editors, and 
to make himself ridiculous in retrospect by pro-
viding in his personal letters so much evidence 
against himself?l 
Wilson refers to Kingsley Martin's book for complete 
candor in treating of this phenomenon, and for source o~ 
corroborating material in his own discussion, yet Martin 
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seems less inclined to any head-on illumination here than 
Wilson. ~=: Mg:rtip 's book is not particularly good biography, 
excuseable on the basis of its own title as a ttMemoirn. In 
meeting Laski in 1920 at the London School of Economics, 
where Laski was teaching after leaving his post at Harvard, 
Martin was: 
a couple of years older than undergraduates usually 
are because of the war, intensely interested and 
excited about the world as well as deeply sceptical 
about its progress. We discussed~ as generations 
of undergraduates had before us, whether there is 
a god, what great mind -- in our day Freud, Aldous 
Huxley, or Bertrand Rus~ell -- to revere as an auth-
ority on sexual ethics. 
When he heard Laski lecture at Cambridge, nhis notion of 
politics was even more disturbing than the psychological 
approach o.f Graham Wallas [author of Human Nature in Poli-
tics, who had been largely responsible for Laski's going 
1. Edmund Wilson, Eight Essays, pp. 219-220. 
2. Martin, op. cit., p. 42. 
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t'o the London School of Economics_, and through whom llYfar_~­
tin:- had first heard of Laski_, but for whom Laski himself_, 
judging from his comments to Holmes_, had increasingly lit-
tle respect]; he thought American institutions at least as 
important as British and talked more about the Supreme 
Court than about Aristotle. After dinner he lectured the 
experts on their own subjects and seemed not even to notice 
that they resented his anecdotes about famous people even 
more than politics.ul After this not too reassuring preface 
to his own grasp on Laski 1 s personality_, Ma!:tin:'-· goes on 
to his only detailed mention of the subject of the prevari-
cations: 
These stories about all the great and good of 
our day soon made Laski famous. He told them with 
complete confidence and had no idea of the effect 
they had on listeners •••• The first result was to 
impress. The second was scepticism_, and there 
were many who were ready to write him off as a 
liar and a charlatan. As one got to- know him bet-
ter_, however_, one learned how much weight to at-
tach to his anecdotes. They were not strictly 
true_, but they were seldom wholly false_, and they 
were never at all malicious ••• Most of the stories_, 
I learned by analyzing them through a period of 
years_, were well founded in truth. The stories 
were changed in the telling_, and the moral would 
vary a little with the audience_, but those few who 
heard the same story told in different contexts 
and with different attributions on many occasions 
easily forgave a foible which was as harmless in 
its res~lt as it was brilliant and entertaining 
in its execution. 
I have.heard Harold called a ffmythomaniac 11 --
a man who has an irresistible impulse to make up 
stories. But how careful one must be not to as-
sume that strange events and lucky encounters 
I 
- ' . •: ~..; ; ... ~. 
which sounded pure invention were not really sober 
faet! True~ he would tell you what Mr. Churchill 
had said to him at dinner or Mr. Roosevelt had 
said on the phone when in fact he was quoting a · 
past or reported remark of Mr. Churchill's and a 
letter not a phone call from Washington.l 
Wilson also has an attitude of indulgence here: 
Yet Laski was a real person and a person of some 
importance. Though his boasting suggests megalo-
mania and his habit of romancing frivolity~ he was 
actually not only a well-equipped scholar and an 
able political thinker but a fighter for unpopular 
ideals whose career as a whole is an example of 
singularly disinterested devotion. About the 
things that were essential to his subject~ he did 
not mislead his students~ and he did not~ so far as 
I know~ allow any improvisations to get into the 
text of his books. He was trying to expound what 
he thought was the truth~ and he was willing to go 
to bat for it. From the moment one recognized this 
and learned to discount what was specious~ one 
found~ in one's personal relations With Laski~ that 
he inspired respeet and affection.2 
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There is no question about Laski's genius as a teacher 
or about his great personal kindness to countless individual 
students. There is page after page of testimony in his let-
ters and in what others say about him to the credit of these 
magnificent attributes. Yet it does not seem there is mueh 
possibility of gloss on the pathological quality of his 
gratuitous prevarications~ which Wilson himself admits and 
discusses in the first of his significant perceptions into 
the Holmes-Laski relationship under the appellation of "fan-
tasy11. Two examples of this ufantasy" may be given. In Al-
pheus Mason's biography of Harlan Fiske Stone~ Stone's great 
1. Ibid.~ pp. 45-46. 
2. Wilson~ op. eit.~ p. 222. 
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admiration of Holmes in their work toegher on the Supreme 
Court is discussed~ and an account given of the hoax Laski 
later played on Stone~ by telling him after Holmes' death 
that in his correspondence with Holmes~ Holmes wrote let-
ters of great praise about Stooe. Stone was delighted and 
kept begging Laski to send him these letters. Laski faked 
excerpts and sent Stone several of these false letters~ sup-
posedly out of the correspondence. Poor Justice Stone re-
sponded: "My children Will be glad to have these excerpts, 
and will thank you for them~ as I do. If it could ever be 
possible for me to have one of the original letters~ it 
would be one of my most valued possessions.u But~ Mason 
tells us: "Laski could no longer continue the hoax~ not a 
single one of the excerpts Laski sent appears in the pub-
lished Holmes-Laski Letters ••• nor did Laski take the trouble 
to include the few references Holmes did make to Stone .. 11 ~tit 
seems to me quite clear,n Mark De Wolfe Howe wrote to Mason 
about this~ nthat Laski sat down and manufactured for Stone's 
li t ul satisfaction the string of comp men a ••• 
The other example was used by years by Professor Warren 
Ault in his seminar at Boston University on historical ac-
curacy and how to determine it. One of the many projects 
assigned to his students in the course to unravel fact from 
fancy was the charge made by Stewart Alsop about Harold 
1. Alpheus Thomas Mason~ Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the 
· Law~ FN. pp. 334~ 335. 
·-'··:~~ 
•': -.-' 
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Laski's book~ The American Presidency (1940)~ in which Alsop 
proved to his own satisfaction by citing chapter and verse 
that Laski had plagarized large sections of W.E. Binkley's 
Powers of the President (Doubleday~ Doran~ 1937). This was 
a minor historical uncertainty according to Professor Ault's 
outline~ which included such matters as the Pseudo-Isidoran 
Decretals~ the Marcus Whitman story and which side fired the 
first shot at Lexington~ but whose culminating effect on his 
students was~ to paraphrase something like his own summary 
of the course: "I don 1t know what the value of the study of 
history is~ but at least it's basic that it must be true." 
Today we hear a great deal about "myth 11 in interpreting 
culture and the plight of the individual in the cultural 
milieu. The time seems to be past when nmyth 11 had a total-
ly disparaging meaning~ containing the immediate corollary 
that the one who was referring to myth was purely a ration-
alist. Diminished~ too~ is the meaning it had in Fascist 
ideology when it was associated with the names of Sorel 
and Pareto in the 11myth" of revolution~ the "myth11 of vio-
lence~ the ffmythn of the elite -- the ttmyth•1 of race~ the 
usages of the emotionally. fertilized and skillfullY repe-
titive and conditioned lie as a "myth" of belief artifici-
~Y created and aggrandized. The concept of myth is now 
being treated with increasing respect by scholars in their 
search for accurate analysis of the sources of power and the 
representations culturally of the way this power is express-
ed or held in suspension. With this~ the depth psychologists 
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have gone hand in hand, in their exploration of dream-life 
and the use of symbols to give a deeper amplification to 
the individual's pursuit of his own wholeness in a splin-
tered and contingent world. 
But Harold Laski's field was not an area touching on 
primitive symbolism, religious anthropology, or the signi-
ficant interlacings which try to interpret human life and 
history, in comparative studies of philosophy, supersti-
tion, theology, psychology. He had no use at all for any 
of these meanderings. They annoyed him, and he brushed' 
them off as a practical man and a scientist of politics. 
To use the term 11practical mantt as applied to him might be 
questionable, for he ordinarily employed it as a way of 
criticizing others. 11In re (Franklin) Ford", he wrote., 
11I regret that he is cursed with a belief in the practical 
man. My own experience has been that nowhere do you find a 
being so tortured by an unconscious metaphysic and psychol-
ogy as you do in the business world. 111 Yet with the often 
vague meanings that Laski gave to words and phrases, he was 
not clear here about the way he would define either nprac-
tical" or nunconscious.u As for the first, it was essenti-
ally the way he saw himself, as a busy man of affairs, in-
fluencing important currents of contemporary history behind 
the scenes. As for the second, even the most superficial 
and uninformed user of the term pulled out of popular read-
1. Howe (ed.), H-L, I, 120. 
·._ -'"•,.. 
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ing might be employing it with more precise understanding 
than Laski. In the entire two volumes of correspondence 
- -
with Holmes~ he refers to Freud only three times by name~ 
in very brief sentences~ in each case with a derogatory 
jeer. As for the developing interest~ Within his own 
field of history and politics~ of bringing together con-
cepts from different disciplines in interpretive amalgam~ 
this~ on its higher levels~ was just bosh to him. He 
could praise highly such an early work as Franz Cumont's 
The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism~ as Holmes could 
enjoy Reinsch's Cults~ Mythes, et Religions, but in a fur-
ther verdict on Whitehead than the ones already quoted (this 
time in regard to Process and Reality), Laski damns the 
whole composite business as intellectual dishonesty • 
••• certain parts~ like the treatment of God~ seem-
ed to me as near intellectual dishonesty as be 
damned. For Whitehead doesn't mean by God anything 
that any theologian has ever meant, with the result 
that he quite unjustifiably leaves an impression 
of a harmony between science and religion which is 
only reached by making words, ·a la Humpty Dumpty, 
mean whatever he wants them to mean just by paying 
them more. And the style seems to me excessively 
difficult. Nol I prefer ignorance if that is 
the cost of entrance to the phl.losophic fair. I 
wonder whether even such an admirer of his as Felix 
would really justify this book.l 
~he reader can only note as somewhat significant Laski's 
own statement preferring ignorance to insight in~o semantics, 
and wonder if Holmes, even on the basis of his long past as-
sociation with Charles Sanders Peirce in the Metaphysical 
1. Ibid., II, 1205. 
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Club_, had much·more sympathy with the effort pioneered in 
by the latter toward arriving at new verbalizations or ide-
ograms (ttsignifics" Peirce's .friend_, Lady Welby_, had called 
them) to express the increasingly rich and complicated con-
cepts o.f modern physics and metaphysics_, or should the com-
mentator in the· interests of doing them justice_, simply say 
that their position was that there was no connection between 
the two. The statement just queted o.f Laski's in re White- .,.. 
head is_, indeed_, the typical proneuncement issuing from 
the ttpractiealtr man on matters that fill him with irritation 
because he cannot comprehend them easily in terms of his 
own interests • 
If·Laski had been associated with any imaginative call-
ing_, i.f he had been_, even on the side_, a novelist., dramatist., 
poet_, there would perhaps have been justification in the ex-
tenuations of his indulgent apologists., but his field was 
particularly that where literal truth_, as a statement of 
fact_, is all important. I.f any science is peculiarly liable 
to corruption and deterioration in practice because of the 
untruth_, or the half-truth tied in with the lie_, it is pol-
itical science. Nor is it correct to say that Laski profit-
ed nothing from these tall tales about himself., the impor-
tant people he knew_, and his influence with them -- that 
these falsifications were innocent in that they had no ul-
terior motive. This is where Laski's real and unconscious 
devotion to myth (Wilson calls it 11fantasy 11 ) comes in. For 
it was his legend about himself which was all important to 
him and which became his motivating passion. He saw him-
self as a personality extremely important for his time~ 
maneuvering always behincl_the scenes t? sway_public policy 
in his country toward a comprehension of Labor's needs and 
toward increasing Labor participation in the government. 
The fact that his aim was valid and at best unselfish and 
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idealistic mitigates little the speciousness of the means. 
He-consciously gave up accuracy~ often. nHe didn't quite 
like my teasing him about attaching momentous importance to 
minutiae,n he wrote Holmes in 1932 of Professor Carl F. 
Friedrich~ one of Harvard's great historians. " ••• he had 
an immense almost idolatrous worship of Pound, built~ I 
gathered, on Pound 1 s capacity for the footnote. nl By 1932 
he himself had long given up in his own writings any seri-
.. -
ous allegiance to~ or use of, the footnote. With this in 
mind, only the last ten words of Wilson's concluding dic-
tum demand agreement. 
As for his fantasies, they were no more repre-
hensible than the commoner kinds of vice that we 
easily forgive in gifted men and that often do 
more harm than Laski's, since it was Laski who 
suffered most from his failure in realism. 2 
It would be interesting if a case could be made that 
these amplified fairy-tales began enly after he returned to 
England after teaching at Harvard. Here is where Martin 
picks up the thread and first begins commenting on them. 
1. Howe (ed.)~ H-L, II, 1377. 
2. Wilson, op. cit., p. 229. 
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There is a point here which Wilson notes himselft 
In these letters one gets the impression that 
Laski became more reckless under pressure of his 
busier life and in proportion as Holmes who was 
ninety in 1931~ grew mentally dimmer and less at-
tentive.l 
But it is not a sufficient point to b~ biographically sig-
nificant~ for as Wilson also notes~ in February~ 1917~ in 
Writing to Pollock of his first acquaintance with Laski~ 
less than a year old~ Holmes innocently passes along one of 
the latter's untrue romances about himself. (He) "beat 
the American champion at tennis~ (and) is one of the very 
most learned men I ever saw of any age ••• n2 
Wilson's way of developing his explanation for Laski's 
fantasy is to point out the number of closed environmental 
circles of which Laski was a member in which his aim to be 
an expert flourished. First in importance was the rigid 
Jewish orthodoxy of his upbringing~ then Oxford University~ 
where he "felt that he had to out-Oxford Oxford by an ex-
hibition of easy accomplishments~ rr3 then his amazing short 
flight in America~ where he taught at the most venerable 
and hard-to-crash of its universities and became the inti-
mate of the most talked-about~ forward-looking and disting-
uished of the justices of the Supreme Court~ whose epoch-
making decisions and dissents were changing the working of 
1. Ibid.~ p. 221. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 234. 
3. Ibid.~ p. 224. 
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the United States Constitution, then, back in England he 
readily became not only an inside member of the Labour Par-
ty, of unquestioned influence, but also, apparently the 
dinner companion of most of the governmental leaders of ev-
ery persuasion, as well as of the great in the literary 
world. 
Later Laski attempted this same inside expertise about 
the Soviet Union, but here his slip began to show badly. 
Nevertheless, after the visit to the Soviet Union in 1946 
as a member of a Labour Party delegation, he apparently 
thought of himself as on the inside with Stalin, yarning 
about a private tete-~a~-tete (historically non-existent) 
which had taken place between them, and it is out of this 
mental potpourri he wrote his last books, including the big 
one on American Democracy. Edmund Wilson stresses the fact 
that as an inside, altogether informed member of all these 
specialized milieux he was continually trying to interpret 
one to the other, and to play off one against the other in 
the comparative competition for influence. Particularly im-
portant psychologically as a matter of course was the mono-
lithic character of this upbringing. Wilson writes: 
I had not any idea, before reading Mr. Martin, 
of the self-contained character of the Jewish world 
in which Laski had grown up in Manchester or the 
struggle he had had to break out of it. His par-
ents had come from Poland, and his father, a success-
ful businessman, was the recognized leader of the 
Jewish community. The Laskis were rigorously ortho-
dox, and they practiced all the Mosaic regulations 
about eating and drinking and washing, wearing phyl-
acteries and keeping the Sabbath. Harold was sent 
to a Gentile school, but this English education ran 
parallel with his Jewish training without ever being 
allowed to impinge on it. This must have created 
a split in his mind~ for it eventually gave rise 
to rebellion. The time came~ says Mr. Martin~ 
when Harold said to his-rather~ 1I am English~ 
not Polish; an agnostic~ not a Jew. I cannot 
reconcile Maimonides :f1 th Mill~ nor Ann Veronica 
with the Mosaic Law. t -, 
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This last phrase seems a most singularly inept raison:: .. 
d 1etre for adolescent rebellion~ although neither of the 
two previous commentators seem to find it so. Why Ann 
Veronica and the Mosaic Law? Why not Ann Vickers or Harri-
et Hume or Hester Prynne or Becky Sharpe or Gwendolen 
Grandcourt or Hypatia or Ophelia~ daughter of Polonius~ and 
the Mosaic Law? But I t'ake it Laski is referring to the 
Decalogue rather than tofue Jewish dietary laws~ and what 
both Martin and Wilson tacitly accept .from him in quoting 
this with respect is that his Wife reminded him o.f the hero-
ine of H. G. Wells' novel Ann Veronica or vice versa. Wil-
son continues: 
He was allowed to go to Ox.ford~ but be.fore he 
went he had managed at eighteen~ to marry~ with-
out telling his parents~- a young non-Jewish girl_, 
a lecturer on eugenics and a champion of woman 
suf.frage_, who was also at odds with-her .family. 
This precipitated a terrible crisis. The two 
young people were separated. Harold's allowance 
was stopped till the term began at Ox.ford, and he 
was told by the elder Laski that unless he renounced 
his marriage or persuaded his Wi.fe to_become a 
Jew_, he would not be given a penny .from the moment 
he graduated. Harold flouted this ultimatum_, and 
when he later emerged .from Oxford in 1914_, he set2 out to make a living for himself and his wi.fe ., ••. 
1. Ibid.~ p. 223. 
2. Id. 
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It is evident that the impact of this experience_, a 
wound to be encysted or talked away_, a trauma to be shouted 
down or lived with_, was quite as important in Laski's exper-
ience and subsequent development as the Civil War was to 
Holmes. Holmes was ·m his twenties at Antietam and Balls 
Bluff. Laski was only eighteen when he was disinherited. 
It would 'seem that the initial facts of his age and the age 
of his wife (eight years older) indicated in him an emotion-
al instability and need for dependence which amplified his 
outstanding characteristic of self-assertion_, just as the 
happiness of that marriage in the life-long satisfaction 
it gave to both the participants showed his mature ability 
for the long-term continuity of relationship which was ba-
sic in his success as teacher and friend. 
It is out of the stresses of these various environmental 
experiences_, the s_elf-imposed necessity of expertly mediating 
between them_, that Wilson believes Laski's habit of fantasy 
imposed itself. That it- did this_, he interprets in large 
part constructively: 
'The small boy at a disadvantage_, who_, puny of 
physique_, had pitted his will against the steam-
rollering vested interests of orthodox Judaism_, 
one-hundred-per-cent Americanism and the formid-
able class structure of the British Empire had 
made of his intellect an instrument that could 
analyze and estimate these great social entities 
as few members of them could do for themselves. 
He had performed for the liberal press of both 
England and the United States the service of act-
ing between them as a kind of liaison man_, and 
Mr. Martin makes one feel that for England he 
performed a unique service in keeping English 
students of politics in-touch with the rest of 
the world. (I cannot do justice to Laski's books_, 
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since I have never done more ·than look into them.) 
But the power that Iasltl exerted had_, beyond this_, 
another~ an ultimate source -- a vision (in the 
Jewish sense~ prophetic) both of the larger forces 
that were working in the social-world and of what 
he desired that world to become. He not only 
watched politics intently_, -he bet em and worked 
for those movements and groups that he thought 
would help realize- his vision. He succeeded in 
maintaining this long-range vision through all 
the years of the sicond war as few figures in 
politics could •••• 
As before quoted_, the negative aspect of this_, Wilson be-
lieves_, was deleterious only to Laski himself. He goes on: 
In some sens·e_, Laski 11 ved in a dream -- a 
dream full of actual data, with its foundations 
in a real grasp of history_, and made vivid With 
first~hand impressions of a variety of modern 
societies_, btit a dream that did not neverthe-
less quite make the right contact with life.2 
As evidence of this_, Wilson feels his great mistake 
~ . 
was not to go into active politics, stand for Parliament as 
his friends the Webbs constantly urged_, and as Trade Union 
and worker delegations continually appealed to him to do_, 
that he run as their representative. There is no question 
that in this Wilson's judgment is right -- if Laski had be-
- -
come a member of Parliament, as he so readily and easily 
could have been~ the whole course of his life and his ac-
quaintance with polities would have perforce become far 
more realistic and more realistically influential. 
It is to be noted that Holmes always backed up Laski 
in his decision not to stand for Parliament. He never sug-
1. Ibid._, p. 226. 
2. Ibid., p. 227. 
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gested a hesitation or a consideration about it. It was 
always~ as Holmes wrote~ the matter-of-course correct action 
to stay out of politics. The reader wonders a bit why this 
was. Why~ by implicationJ was politics so dull or dirty or 
unimportant in Holmes• sight as it concerned his young 
friend? The ostensible reason was that Laski was to have 
time to write his book. But trthe book" when it appeared 
(Grammar of Politics~ 1925) was nothing that Holmes could 
value or praiseJ in fact it is evident that he felt embar-
rassed at even reading it~ 1 and it would seemJ by this 
time at leastJ he would have realized the necessity for 
correcting the highly abstruse quality which Laski 1s pro-
gram and interests had assumed~ with practical Parliamentary 
experience> to give a factual base to the "practical" in-
fluence which Laski was so sure he was presenting on all 
sidesJ an experimental structure other than in dinner chit-
chatJ the writing of reviews in progressive weekliesJ or 
the constantJ almost obsessive~ hunting around for bargains 
in old bookshops. 
1. ·Howe (ed.L H-L, IJ 768-769. Also:, ni fear your get-
ting into the frame of mind that I saw in the Aboli-
tionists (and shared) -- the martyr spirit. It is 
apt to be.wrongheaded. I say this very timidly and 
with proper reservesJ but I cannot forbear a word of 
apprehension. I value enthusiasm but not enthusiism"J 
p. 772. And againJ 11I am glad also at the sale of 
your book~ and hope it will let you see Venice -- but 
fail to convince the readers.u p. 786. 
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The father-son relationship is the next facet of Wil-
son's interpretation_, and this has several aspects_, includ-
ing the apposition of each man to his own father_, as well 
as their interchange with each other. For if Laski was dis-
inherited_, Holmes' problem psychologically was just the op-
posite_, that he was over-shadowed by his father's prestige 
and eminent standing in every department of his background 
so that there could have been a family-inflicted hurt from 
the very excellence of his education_, particularly when his 
terrible battle experience broke into his matter-of-course 
ttadjustmentrt to that background. Holmes' relationship with 
his father Will be discussed in another chapter. Here it 
is sufficient to quote Wilson again_, in regard to the fas-
cination which 11 this visionary elusive creature" possessed 
f'or old Justice Holmes_, who udisagreed with most of' Laski's 
premises. 11 
The easy and obvious answer is probably to some 
extent truet Holmes had no children and needed a 
son_, and certainly Harold Laski_, who continued to 
the end of his life to f'ind it a considerable 
strain to revisit his Manchester f'amily_, was badly 
in need for a f'ather. He even needed a Jewish 
f'ather_, and I believe that Holmes filled this role. 1 
Edmund Wilson is undoubtedly right in f'eeling that there 
was a prof'ound piety in this relationship_, yet there was one 
paragraph in Martin's descriptive account of' Laski's recon-
ciliation with his father which Wilson seems to have missed. 
Martin is speaking of an occasion at which he himself' was 
1. Wilson_, op. cit._, p. 229. 
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present after the prodigal had been allowed to return. That 
this was on the basis that Mrs. Laski had consented tore-
ceive instruction in the Jewish faith, and apparently had 
done soJ is a rather amazing circumstance) which remains 
undeveloped by further reference. On this occasion the 
father, Nathan Laski, a wealthy and influential merchant, 
. . 
was sitting in Harold's chair, smoking. The phone rang, 
and Harold talked a long time. When he hung up his father 
asked who had been speaking. 
10h,' said Harold, 'that was Bob Cecil.' (Lord 
Robert Cecil was then interesting himself in an 
educational project with Lord Haldane and Laski.) 
The great name was magic to Nathan Laski. I re-
member his face today; the proud parent's grati-
fied smile was just visible through the clouds of 
rich tobacco smoke.l 
The great name, the ball of fire, the influential pull) 
and rich tobacco smoke ---the piety becomes too adolescent 
to carry over) when even disinheritance, decked in such 
flummeries and the gift of a uli ttle motor car11 , which Laski 
received in reconciliation, becomes a matter of a smile, 
and the question mark also carries over to another great 
( 
name, that of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. But Holmes' 
relationship with his father was, at least, no joke, and so, 
by implication could his position of surrogate-fatherhood 
toward Harold Laski be a matter of deep seriousness. 
This is the transitional point for the third and last 
of Wilson's interpretive insights here. From the feeling 
1. MartinJ op. cit., p. 50. 
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that Laski badly needed a f'ather ,; and a ffJewish f'ather, 11 he 
says: 
There would be a long chapter to write, for 
which this is not the place, about the close self-
identification with the Jews of the Old-Testament 
of the Puritans escaping f'rom England to what 
they called the Promised Land, and the profoundly 
Hebraic elements that persisted in the New Eng-
land theology and the New England discipline of 
life. Though this theology had been seriously 
undermined by the middle of the-nineteenth cen-
tury through the rationalizing of Unitarianism, 
which had softened the creed of the elder Holmes, 
the apocalyptic vision of a better world ••• had 
been revived with ardor on the eve of' the Civil 
War, an1 it had gone to the head of the youthful 
Holmes. 
Though one may question the phrase ngone to the head 11 
as used here in regard to the rather pallid way Holmes did 
endorse the ideals of the Abolitionists on the eve of' the 
Civil War, the whole comment is cogent. The important para-
llel Wilson points to here as a source of American culture 
is too scantily or contemptuously treated in most cultural 
histories, such as Vernon Parrington 1s ignorant and vindic-
tive Main Currents of American Thought. 
But we do have scholarship in this major source and 
spring of American cultural cross-breeding. Perry Miller's 
two volume study on The New England Mind is a beacon light, 
with its examination, among other matters, of the concepts 
in Federal Theology, and his smaller work in its very title 
Errand into the Wilderness, reaffirms the ancient parallel 
1. Wilson, op. cit., p. 236. 
........ · 
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of a "moral found in a talen in the phrase attributed to 
Pope Gerbert which goes back to the earliest roots of Wes-
tern history. There are other studies, notably Alice W. 
Baldwin•s monograph published by Duke University (1928): 
The New England Clergy and the American Revolution. 
The kinship between Hebraic and Puritan organizations 
of power as intellectual history will not go unexamined; 
yet I would go further than either Edmund Wilson or Perry 
Miller. The Mosaic-Calvinist conception of a Covenanting 
God is an all important base fa± the American reverence for 
the Constitution. The foreeful religious imagery of an Al-
mighty God of justice who has elected a chosen people on 
the basis of a sacred written contract· (whether at Sinai 
or Philadelphia), polarized between divine promise and human 
obligations, is the particular and not too obscure back-
ground for the peculiar American doctrine of Judicial Re-
view, and all the awe (whether applied to~~al tradition, 
or to revolutionary flexibility) which surrounds the popu-
lar attitude toward the Supreme Court. It is at this point 
that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes enters history, and it 
is immaterial whether or not one attributes to him and his 
situation the half-derogatory words he applied to Marshall: 
uA great man represents a great ganglion in the nerves of 
society, or, to vary the figure, a strategic pdnt in the 
campaign of history, and part of his greatness consists in 
his being there. nl The fact remains that Holmes too was 
1. Marks, op. cit., p. 115. 
· •.~_.- . - . 
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there. He represented all this original complex in his per-
son and his thinking, for he was there from New England, 
where the whole business had started· (with some apology to 
Virginia). He was there so completely from New England, 
that the perfection of the outline of conflict and synthe-
. . 
sis in three generations would seem to be artificial if a 
novelist had thought it up. His grandfather was the Cal-
vinist minister, dismissed from his church in doctrinal 
controversy, his father the doctor-scientist, touched with 
Unitarianism, the poet-arbiter of liberal American letters, 
then the skeptical judge, the expert in law, who, verbaliz-
ing, repudiated it all, except, unconsciously, the Freudian 
axiom that nothing is forgotten. (It was no wonder that 
Holmes liked Proust.) In what other personality could be 
exemplified with such unqualified vividness the value to 
. . 
the social amalgam of the three learned professions of New 
England, and that the;y>c were there when the instant of Am-
erican history required their focus upon the cracking sinews 
of a venerable document? 
It is significant that Holmes was on the Court right up 
to the opening guns both of Franklin D. Roosevelt and of 
Hitler. Though it is a trhunchu --one of Holmes• own kind 
of "apergus" it seems subject to proof that but for the 
long history of the Holmes-Brandeis dissents -- the Puritan-
Jewish interpenetration -- to furnish the knowledge in the 
. . 
public consciousness, that the possibility of compromise was 
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constructively already there as the Cour;!;1~lhad always exist-
ed -- if it were not for the work of Holmes and Brandeis 
Roosevelt's attempt to so change the weight of the Court in 
the governmental system of checks and balances that the con-
cept of Judicial Review would have been greatly emasculated 
if not destroyed3 this attempt would have been carried. What-
ever the consequences would have 'been3 the continuity of 
the specific place the Supreme Court has traditionally held 
in history would certainly have bean severed. The legisla-
tive branch would thereafter have been supreme~ as the House 
of Commons became in England after the passage of the Parl~­
ament Act of 1911> which sheared power from the House of 
Lords> although the p~rallel is by no means exact 3 for the 
Court took such a beating anyway in the "Switch in time 
that saved Nine"~ of the New Deal decisions> that the new 
directional aspect of the uses of. its power of review have 
had a qualitative effect, as the present tendential concept~3 
around whieh the Court operates now plainly show. 
In the compound from New England thought and tradition3 
which Holmes brought to the work of the eourt when Theodore 
Roosevelt appointed him in 19023 the concept of "Reform"> 
was undoubtedly the weakest as expressed in his own person-
ality. We hear quite a bit about his early affiliation with 
the Abolitionists 3 but there is not mueh evidence surviving 
to reveal any intense. conviction in this affiliation, or 
even much preoccupation. Passionate a reality as the matter 
of ttReformtt could be in New England3 it was left in Oliver 
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Wendell Holmes~ Jr.~ as an uncompleted term and a pallid .im-
print. That this was so was due to the facts of his nature 
and personality~ disposition~ upbringing and experience~ but 
that the imprint was still there, stronger as motivation · 
than he consciously knew~ Edmund Wilson makes abundantly 
clear in the closing paragraphs of his critique. After 
speaking of the number of intellectual Jews (Frankfurter~ 
Laski, Brandeis, Cohen (and he might have added the still 
younger Max Lerner)~ as prophets of a better social order 
with whom Holmes felt a special affinity, who had behind 
them~ with him~ the same Biblical culture and nthe convic-
tion that what we do in this world must have the sanction 
of non-worldly values and be ae ted in the sight of eternity, n 
Wilson draws the following conclusion: 
••• Though Holmes, like his young admirers, had 
dispensed with the ancient Jehovah, these latter 
must have felt that he figured in his field as 
something of a pri'est and prophet as well as a 
man of learning; as, at any rate, a lawgiver 
and moralist who held himself quite superior to 
worldly considerations~ In Laski's case --in 
spite of divergencies of opinion that became 
more and mere pronounced -- we feel that his at-
titude toward Holmes is quite that of the loyal 
disciple of one of the great modern Jewish think-
ers or leaders whose position has something of 
the·rabbinical --Marx or "..'rotsky or Freud, 
Arnold Schoenberg or·Alfred Stieglitz ••• In this 
sense~ he found in Holmes a father. And on 
Holmes's side, the veteran of the Civil War, who 
had continued to serve all his life an ideal that 
he sometimes questioned, must instinctively have 
felt at home with the minds of such men as 
Laski~ whose moral inspiration stemmed from the 
same remote but still operant source as that 
moribund New England tradition which, by the era 
of Calvin Coolidge~ could no longer nourish one 
much. It may be that even Laski's extravagances, 
-. ..-: . .JI·.:'" 
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the excitement of a dream that could not become 
real, were needed to quicken the interest of the 
stoical old soldier-judge, to reawaken a flush of 
that fervor for the destiny of haman society 
which had been1blighted on the battlefields of the Civil War. 
This is the penetrating insight of good criticism, the 
beat there is, and yet it does not quite go far enough. We· 
hear a great deal about Holmes' inconsistencies. These fa-
mous inconsistencies: his atheistic mysticism, putting ill-
digested emotional concepts about the.rreosmos 11 in the place 
of systematic thinking, metaphysical or scientific, in terms 
of reality, deity, power; his ethical dialectics, reiterating 
that only armed might has any final jurisdiction in the af-
fairs of men, the command of the sovereign as that of the 
mailed fist, yet disregarding his own motivations in the 
arena of choice which had ruled himself and his career, as 
well as so much of the ideational directives of history; 
his bifurcation toward 11refor.mn, bestowing with the left hand 
what his right hand took away and what his voice emphatically 
denied} the inconsistencies also, so noticeable in some of 
his decisions and dissents, in the opinions he expressed in 
the Northern Securities, Poisoned Pool, Nebraska Language, 
Grade Crossing, Alabama Peonage cases, for instance, and even 
in his Civil Liberties and Free Speech pronouncements, some 
of which have become almost folk aphorisms -- these incon-
sistencies of Holmes detract in no way from the worth and 
1. Wilson, op. eit., pp. 237-238. 
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piety of his long friendship with Laski~ but they do match 
the characteristic of incoherence in Laski's life and 
thinking~ and in the long run I believe they were a harm-
ful influence over the younger man. It is true that'this 
was the famous inconsistency which created the flexibility 
of interpretation which gave new life under stress to our 
Fundamental Law~ but it is equally true~ as the work of 
_Brandeis shows~ that that flexibility could have been 
brought into the Constitution at work without the necessity 
for inconsistency. The Constitution was a greater document 
of government than even Holmes knew~ for all his mighty con-
tribution to its successful weathering of storms_~ for it is 
finally true in any consideration of the useages of incon-
sistency~ that inconsistency can be put to a reactionary 
and destructive purpose~ and often is~ as readily or more 
readily than to a constructive or liberally progressive one. 
Holmes essentially left the real question of whether the 
purpose or the end was creative or destructive to the fall 
of the dice of the Unknown Gods. 
In his wish to keep abreast of the currents of modern 
thought~ in his youth Holmes dismissed too readily the prin-
ciples of classical syllogism. So later~ when he could 
write: nThe ideal man never would think about morality. 
nl He naturally would do the kind~ generous~ splendid thing~ 
he was~ of course~ talking nonsense~ for he ruled as non-
1. Howe (ed.)~ H-L~ p. 523. 
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existent the major premise by which this ideal man would 
know or could be measured by what the kind~ generous~ splen-
did thing was. Such a statement is meaningless according 
to any principle of reason in the life of man as he is. 
. . 
Still later~ when he was drawn to the work Morris Cohen was 
doing in explaining new concepts of logic and reason~ as 
expanding the investigations of such as Pierce~ Russell~ 
Whitehead through the vast insights of the development of 
natural science~ his correspondence shows how badly he 
limped and lagged among the ideations~ because~ for one 
factor~ even the corner Cohen still allows to Aristotle~ 
Holmes had never treated with respect or tried to master~ 
as a discipline. nThe life of law haS. not been logic~~ 11 
Holmes proclaimed again and again. He also enunciated 
throughout all his non-legal writings that he had little 
taste or aptitude for Logic itself~ or for the concept ex-
pressed perfectly in the title of a book by one of Cohen's 
students~ Ernest Nagel: Sovereign Reason. It is at this 
point that we can go to the heart of the study: a discus-
sion~ in the next chapter~ of the meaning of Natural Law. 
CHAPTER TWO 
WHAT IS NATURAL LlW? SOME HOLMESIAN CONTRADICTIONS. 
1. 
What is Natural Law? What, indeed1 To arrive at an 
adequate definition of this subject is a formidable task. 
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Ask the question at Fandom of college students today 
and an almost total percentage will assume that expression 
typical of the quiz-conscious generation--a look blank, 
wary, interested, polite, as the question is answered by 
repeating it: ttNatural Law? Just what do you mean--Natural 
Law?11 
The ignorance, or innocence, of the topic is so universal 
at the superficial level of information that the non-legal 
student who asks this question seriously will have a curious 
experience ahead if he follows it through consistently. He 
will move from a blank area with no cross-reference at all, 
into another, quite suddenly, of complete contrast, of diverse 
and conflicting definitions, into a super-abundance of stimu-
lating and contradictory reference and discussion which will 
include scorn, d~sparagement, diatribe and denial, and then v 
after being altogether confused and distu~bed by opposing 
juxtapositions, he will arrive, if his reasoning powers are in 
healthy operation, out again into the locale of minimal state-
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ment, not, however, it is to be hoped, into the original con~ 
ceptual dearth, but into a matter-of-fact, commonsenee directness 
of ideas. But the perplexities and disarrangements which he 
is about toencounter will be tremendous. He will be surprised 
at the outset at both the silence which surrounds the topic~ 
then by the historical importance of the subject of Natural 
Law, then by the denunciations heaped upon it by so many. 
( 
Since that hush is initially so profound it is very likely 
that the student will be in graduate work before he even hears 
the ter.m mentioned. Perhaps he is working in philosophy, or 
government, perhaps-in political science, perhaps in juris-
prudence, or perhaps he has an unusually perceptive professor 
in intellectual history in which theological ter.ms may figure. 
I have indicated my own experience here. And so it comes up~-
Natural Law ••• 
What, indeed, is Natural Law? 
. . 
If the subject is so important why is it so little known 
or talked about in average infDnmation? If the question is 
answered, as it rightly must be, that Natural Law is one of 
the great shaptng, meaningrul cultural concepts of Western 
civilization, second in importance, for the intellectual 
history of Western Man, only to Gbristianity, from which it 
is distinct, although not unrelated, and to Science, to which 
it is also, in certain of its aspects, indirectly connected, 
the student so informed will register amazement that if this 
is so why does he never near the topic explained or discussed. 
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If h~s sources are really adequate, he will learn that while 
it is true that there is an almost universal lay ignorance of 
the subject (and this is a fact which any investigator may 
test for himself simply by asking questions at random among 
his acquaintances) this has not always been so, and is a 
phenomenon of only the last fifty years. But part of the 
confusion is due to the circumstance that Natural Law has 
been known historically by many different and even opposing 
concepts, and has been claimed as exemplifying the single and 
exclusive truth of many rival positions in thought. That this 
is a certain perversion of its meaning has only served to dis~ 
credit its basic definitions in the history of the West. But 
the disparagement of Natural Law has been more primarily due 
to the particular approach to ways of knowing what is true 
which have become so congenial to the modern temper. What 
Lewis Mumford called, (with prejudice), the Pragmatic Acquiescence, 
and what progressive education has called the child centered 
curriculum have become so accepted that now it is unusual to 
find concepts shaping up around connections between causality 
and teleology or to hear goals discussed as other than in 
relation to means, methods, process and consequences. Value 
is seldom spoken of as the thing in itself. This latter mode 
is little in evidence outside of theological thinking, although 
up to the last quarter of the last century, to determine value, 
good, justice, in themselves, was the main way that traditional 
thinking processes worked. But the break in the tradition of 
this partic~ar sequence of discovery and development has been 
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sharp. Whether it is called pgilosophical radicalism, utili-
tarianism, pragmatism, instrumentalism, the conditioned re~lex, 
behaviorism, motivational research, or a half-dozen other 
similar scheol~the particular approach to what is true as 
indicated by this terminology has had its effect, and Natural 
Law as a clear cut ideational for.mulation has almost disappeared. 
And yet it is possible that perh~s it has never been 
entirely clear eut, even with the Roman Stoics, for this would 
be one of the first sources that our hypothetical student would 
investigate. If he came across such a study as R. M. Wenleyts 
Stoici&m and Its Influence, for instance, he would readily 
appreciate the rieh complexity which has flowered in two 
thous~d years from the Stoic ethic, in which Natural Law is 
embedded. He would read: 
Thus Stoicism has survived on the one hand in a 
theory which swings all the way between ho~ess yet 
pathetic recognition of natural law, and a mystic 
suspicion that, respite temporal mischance, the very 
stability of •the eternal return' may portend a 
1Divine Friend.' On the other band, it has vivified 
the dignity of the man who, sure of the approval of 
his own conscience, can govern his private self -· a 
glorious realm, -- or, by the same sign, can account 
himself peculiarly worth the special aid or favour 
vouchsafed by infinite grace • 
••• Travelling a third line, Stoicimn stepped into 
tb.e break with a eosm.oplitan cread: men are born equal 
by nature, and owe allegiance, not to the parochial 
regulations of petty towns, but to that universal law 
which ttappears with the beginnings of the rational 
creation, and remains unchangeable.tn The private 
individual, urbane or uncouth as the case might be, 
was led to appreciate or assert himself, raising fresh 
issues destined to ring down the centuries. Renee, the 
question of the 'inalienable rights' of personality 
challenged dd,cision and with it, the no less thorny 
problems of the-ground and justification of sovereignty 
in civil societies. For, obviously, the doctrine of 
natural equality implies that each human being enjoys 
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an inherent capacity to exercise political judgment 
quite apart rrom the dower coDrerred by rolk conscious-
ness.l 
Or ir, in quite another direction, our student had an 
interest in Oriental religions, or Chinese poetry, he might 
look into certain interesting cross-rererences on Natural 
Law, even if, because of barriers or space, it is unlikely 
that these are cross fertilizations. Yet the ~ element di.oes 
not pose a ~arrier, on the contrary, it could be coordinating. 
The Li of Confucianism, for instance, how much of a Natural 
Law a:reh.e.type is that? Are we so sure that European and 
Oriental origins here could never have met, and so have brought 
about some ancient, delicate fusing or East and West in the 
very beginning of their separation, to prognosticate a com-
position still to be in the future? There could. have been an 
unrecorded journey of Pythagoras in the sixth century before 
Christ, and we do know that later, in the fourth century came 
the spreading solvent of Alexander's armies. 
But in putting aside such distant speculations, let us 
start searching through. coni&mporary confusions and current 
developments. We might begin with two more or less clear 
statements. 
What precisely is meant by the doctrine of natural 
law, and who are its authentic representatives in the 
history of Western philosophy? At the present time 
great confusion reigns in this area. No authoritative 
answers are available ••• 
lR. M. Wenley, Stoicism and Its Influence, Marshall Jones 
Co., Boston, 1924, pp. 109, 111. 
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The basic issue between the defenders of natural 
law and its opponents has never been that of theism 
versus non theism. This is a peripheral metaphysical 
issue. The basic issue concerns the nature of moral 
nor.ms. Are they grounded in something which exists 
independently of human interest and opinion, or are 
they man-made? The philosophers of natural law are 
moral realist~. They bold that certain moral nor.ms 
are grounded on nature, not merely on human decress.l 
Yet one point history does make clear. The idea 
of natural law obtains general acceptance only in the 
periods when metaphysics, queen of ub,e scie.nces, is 
dominant. It recedes or suffers an eclipse, on the 
other hand, .wb.en being (not taken here in Kelsen's 
sense of mere existentiality or factuality) and _ 
oughtness, morality and law, are separated, when the 
essences of things and their ontological order are 
viewed as unknowable. 
The natural law, eonsequently, depends on the 
scienee of being, on metaphysics. Hence every attempt 
to establish the natural law must start from the funda-
mental relation of being and oughtness, of the real and 
the good.2 
~t what would our hypothetieal student do, for instance 
with the following: 
He Li.e., Roussea~ agrees, then, with Hobbes' attack 
on the traditional natural law teaching: natural law 
must have its roots in principles which need not be 
specifically human. He further agrees with Hobbes in 
finding the principle. of natural law in the right of 
self-preservation, which implies the right of each to 
be the sole judge of what are the proper means for his 
self-preservation.3 
l3ohn Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of 
Natural Law, University of Chicago Press, 1953, pp. 103, 104, 
105. 
2Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law, B. Herder Book Go., 
St. Louis and London, 1955, P• 161. 
. .. 
3Leo Strauss, Natural Ri~t & Historz (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 2~. 
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And by way of contPast: 
••• Thus the natural law offers a correeting principle 
of balance, taking its stand midway between these two 
poles of deter.minism and freedom. 
All this means that law is not law because it gives 
the maximum embod~ent to individual freedom or because 
the members of society have agreed contractually that 
it is law... Law, therefore, derives its authority (that 
i,.S to say, it is constitutei law) by its directing of 
men to benefic.ial activity. 
The prospective student of government, trying to define 
Natural Law, can sharpen his intellect on concepts such as 
these; centering around Hume's eriti~ism of it: 
k"reader is entitled, if he is interested, to an 
avowal of an historiants own philosophical preferences. 
Those of t be aut b.or are in general agreement -w:i th the 
results of Hume 1 s criticism of natural law described in 
the first part of Chapter m:rx:. So far as b.e can see, 
it is impossible by any lGgical operation to excogitate 
the truth of any allegation of fact, and neither logie 
nor fact implies a value. Consequently he believes that 
the attempt to fuse these three operations, whether in 
Hegelian idealism or in its Marxian variant, merely 
perpetuated an intelle~tual confusion inherent in the 
system of natural law. . 
Hume's philosphy, whether true or false, represents 
the bankruptcy of eighteenth-century reasonableness. He 
starts out, like Locke, with the intention of being sen-
sible and empirical •••• But having a better intellect 
than Locke 1 s, ••o he arrives at the disastrous conclu-
sion that from experience and observation nothing is 
to be learnt. ••• 
l.George W. Constable, uNatural Law Jurisprudence and 
the Cleavage of Our T~es, 0 .Georgetown Law Journal, XXXIX 
(March, l95J.), 405. . 
2George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New 
York: Henry Holt & Co., 1955), p. xii. 
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It is therefore important to discover whether there 
is any answer to Hume within the framework of a philospphy 
that is wholly or mainly ampiricalo If not, there is no 
intellectual difference between sanity and insanity. The 
lunatic who believes that he is a poached egg is to be 
condemned sol~ on the ground that he is in a minority 
or rather--since we must not assume democracy--on the , 
ground that tbe government does not agree with him. This 
is a desperate point o:f view ••• • 1. 
We quote this here :for a late~ reference to a paragraph 
in Holmes' Natural Law Essay.2 But let us go on: 
Well, there is one sort o:f proof which Hume himself is 
bound, upon his own showing, to admit. Re ends the 
essay 'Of Original Contract• by tan appeal to general 
opinion.• 'In all questions wits regard to morals,• 
he writes, !there is really no other standard by which 
any controversy can be decided.' What then was the 
general opinion of Hume' s own country ••• about t be problem 
o:f political obligation? Surely it was in his day, as 
it had been before his day and continued to be a:fter his 
day, an opinion that ••• sovereign and subject ••• were 
equally bound by the law at the constitution. The 
opinion is as old as Magna Oarta: •• ~Meanwhile it is not 
inapposite--though it may also be a mere offering on 
the altar of pragmatism--to end by recurring to the good 
service which the doctrine of contract (and the doctrine 
o:f natural law which is behind it, or, above it) has 
rendered to the cause of liberty, and to the general 
cause o:f political progress. Its fruits do not prove 
its truth. But they deserve to be remembered.3 
lBertran~ Russell, A History o:f Western Philosophy (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), pp. 672, 673. 
2see Perry Miller, (ed..), heriean Thought, Civil War to 
World War I, New York, Rinehart and Go., Inc., 1954, p. 207. 
11If I. think that I am sitting at a table I :find that 
the other persons.present agree with me; so if I say 
tba t the sum o:f tbe angles o:f a triangle is equal to 
two right angles. I:f I am in a minority o:f one they 
send for a doctor or lock me up; and I am so far able 
to transcend the to me convincing testimony of my 
senses or my reason as to recognize that i:f I am alone 
probably something is wrong with my works. tt 
3Sir Ernest Barker (ed.), Social Contract (llWorld's 
Classics;u O:x:f'ord~ Oxford University Press, 1947), lviii, 
lix, lx •. 
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,· 
Or here is the comparatively simple .. statement o:f an 
historian: 
This much, at least, is evident. The natural law 
concept has been used in many ways and :for many purposes. 
It has aided in the defense of the most diverse causes. 
It has, in other words, not been a narrowly con:fined 
group of ehangless rules, but rather a :flexible instru-
ment. And in the century preceding the Civil War, the 
century in which political speculation in America was 
most active, it had a role o:f some importance in most 
o:f the controversial and systematic political theory, 
and was o:f scarcely less importance in the development 
of written constitutions. 
Its origins are not in this country. They are as 
remote as the origins of political thought •. And although 
the earliest known example of appeal to the laws ~f 
nature doubtless had no direct influence in America, a 
number of the writers of classical antiquity, particularly 
Cicero, were o:f distinct importance in st~ulating the 
use of the concept in this country. It was, however, not 
the ancient writers upon the science of politics, but 
rather the European authors of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth eenturies,--Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, 
Burlamaqui, Coke, Milton, Sidney, Locke, Blackstone,--
from whom the American derived their conception of the 
J.aws of nature. 
But before most of these men had published their 
writings there appeared in the New England colonies an 
interpretation of natural law in terms of divine J.aw 
which owes J.ittJ.e to these secular phiJ.osophers. The 
earJ.y New EngJ.and Puritans drew their ideas of the 
higher laws from a body of religious doctrine which 
was developed mainly in England, although it was in-
fJ.uenced by many Continental currents of thoughtof the 
period of the Reformation, as it was, of course, based 
upon the centuries-old teachings of the Christian 
Church.J. 
In this connection, Edward s. Corwin in The 11Higher Law" 
Background of American Constitutional Law begins his remark-
.. 
abJ.e historical survey of Natural Law with a quotation from 
lBenjamin F. Wright, Jr., .American Interpretations o:f 
Natural Law (Cambr~dge: Harvard University Press, 1931), 
PP• 327, .. 328. 
79 
Holmes: 11Theor;r is the most ~portant part o:f the dogma o:f 
the law, as the architect is tb.e most important man who takes 
part in the building o:f a house. tt In his introduction to the 
-Great Seal paper edition of' this monograph,, Clinton Rossiter 
summarizes: 
, Y~t the most compelling explanation is. the American's 
deep-seated conviction that the Constitution is an ex-
pression o:f the Higher Law, that it is in :fact imperfect 
manta most per:fect rendering of' what Blackstone saluted 
as 1~the eternal, immutable laws o:f good and evil, to 
which the creator himsel:f in all his dispensations con-
forms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, 
so far as they are necessary for the conduct o:f human 
actions.tt This conviction has been a dominant inf'luence 
in American constitutional law almost :from the d ay the 
Constitution was put into commission •••• 
Above all, it ti.e., Pro:fessor Corwin's essay7 is 
humbling: No one can come away from reading it without 
realizing how much. we in Ameriea are a part o:f Western 
civilization. The men we meet in the pages of' this 
essay--Demostb.enes, Sophocles, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, 
Ulpian, .Gaius, John o:f Salisbury, Isidore o:f Seville, 
St. Thomas Aquinas, Bracton, Fortescue, Coke, Grotius, 
Newton, Hooker, Pu:fendor:f, Locke, Blackstone--all insisted 
that the laws by which men live can and should be the 
ttembodiment o:f essential and unchanging justice,tt and we 
may salute them respect:fully as :founding :fathers.o:f our 
experiment in ordered liberty. It should do us good to 
remember at tne height o:f our power and sel:f-esteem that 
our political tradition and cons~i~tional law are late 
blooms on a sturdy growth more than two thousand years 
old and still vigorous.l 
R. R. Palmer, in his History o:f the Modern World, has as 
accurate summary: 
The idea o:f natural law has unde~lain a good deal 
o:f modern democratic develop~, and its decline in 
the last century has been closely connected with many 
o:f the troubles o:f recent times. It is not easy to 
lEdward S. aorwin, The nHigher Lawtt Background o:f 
American Constitutional Law (Chicago:: Great Seal Books, 
1950), pp. vi, vii. 
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~~ ,, say in what the philosophy of natural law essentially 
consisted. It held that there is~ somehow~ in the 
structure of the world~ a law that distinguishes right 
from wrong. ·It held that right is "natural~n not a 
mere invention of men. This right is not determined~ 
for any country~ by its heritage~ tradition~ or customs~ 
nor yet by its actual laws (called "positiven laws) of 
the kind that are enforced in the law courts. All these 
may be unfair or unjust. We detect unfairness or 
injustice in them by comparing them with natural law 
as we understand it; thus we have a basis for saying that 
cannibalism is bad~ ••• Nor is natural law~ or the real 
rightness of a thing~ determined by the authority of any 
person or people •••• They are universal~ the same for 
all. No one can make them up to suit himself •••• But 
how~ if we cannot trust our own positive laws or cus-
toms~ or our leaders or even our collective selves~ can 
we know what is naturally rl.ght? .... The answer~ in the 
natural law philosophy~ is that we discover it by rea-
son. Man is considered to be a rational animal. And 
all men are assumed to have~ at least potentially and 
when better enlightened~ the same powers of reason and 
understanding -- Germans or English~ Siamese or Euro-
peans. This view favored a cosmopolitan outlook~ and 
made international agreement and general world pro-
gress seem realizable goals. As time went on~ the prem-
ises of this philosophy came to be questioned. B.y the 
nineteenth century it was widely thought that man was 
not an especiallY rational being~ but was motivated by 
drives or urges or instincts~ and that human differ-
ences were so fundamental that men of different nation-
alities or classes could never expect to see things in 
the same way. When this happened the older1philosophy of natural law lost its hold on many minds. 
But I am already presupposing that our student has reached 
the second stage of his inquiry~ which is the confusion of too 
much comment, and a contradiction of statement~ so that whether 
Rousseau~ Hobbes or Hume for instance or the North or the South 
in the Civil War, or the Roman Catholics or the Presbyterians 
do or do not advocate Natural Law seems to depend~ not on some 
1. R. R. Palmer~ A History of the Modern World~ pp. 9~ 10. 
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objective definition easily understandable and acceptable to 
all, but on ter.ms relatively esoteric, known accurately only 
by the particular writer and a select group. The semantics 
of Natural Law seem to have given the term an embellishment 
frequently irrelevant, sometimes directly in opposition to a 
meaning usually accepted, or what is more misleading, on an 
oblique angle from some accepted meaning, which neither 
amplifies nor argues against that accepted definition, but 
twists it into a loose compound of notions which lets it mean 
or not mean vaguely almost anything. 
For instance, in the stirring up of inquiry and comment 
'' 
on this subject ~ recent years, the Natural Law Forum of 
Notre Drone Law School has been a publication of prime importance. 
Its aim has been a liberal one, to provide a medium for open 
discussion on all facets of a complicated issue. Yet there 
might be some question here whether a completely realistic 
clarification of this fundamental controversy is always being 
effected. So many different terms are being used and so many 
opposing conceptions are being expanded in print, that the 
praiseworthy object of illustrating how much comment in all 
directions the phrase ttNatural Law1t spearheads may fail in 
coherence. One example of this, chosen almost at random, 
might be the excellent article in the 1958 issue of the Natural 
Law Forum by Helen Silving, entitled, "Positive Natural Law11 --
a contradiction in terms in itself, under any traditionally 
acceptable definition. And for all of the great respect that 
g2 
the reader feels for Margaret Mea~, isn't this, from Volume 6 
'' .. 
(1961), a little precious? tt'Natural Law' might thus be 
defined as those rules of behavior which had developed from a 
species--specific capacity to ethicalize as a feature of 
those ex~ples of such ethicalizing that appear in all known 
societies. 111 However, the author is more direct at the end 
of the article, and for this, since we have in mind definite 
pronouncements of Holmes and Laski in her field, to refute, 
we thank her. 
Although a system of jurisprudence provides us with 
a very different set of problems, it would be worthwhile, 
I believe, to exper~ent with the model of stripped 
universals when we are faced with attempts to diffuse 
our legal system beyond the boundaries of the civilization 
within which it grew. We have seen that recognition of 
natural rights» to life, property, and reproduction, is 
for.med in all societies, although with profound variations 
in interpretation.~ · 
~ 
But to return to our student's induction into this 
matter, and his first stage of encountering an almost universal 
silence on the subject, let us pick it up, say, as I have 
already indicated was my experience, at the Nuremberg Trials 
or Bodin or Grotius or John Marshall and Judicial Review. So 
he hears the phrase, and begins to read, to ask, and to trace 
and verify references, and from this first inquiry he will 
find the double response, already documented: viz., Natural 
Law is one of the great meaningful cultural constellations of 
lMargaret Mead,. 1'some Anthropological Considerations 
Concerning Natural Law,u The Natural Law Forum, Notre Dame Law 
School, V. 6, (1961.) ph.54. 
2~., p. 64. 
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Western Civilization, and Natural Law is such an obsolete 
idea that nobody thinks seriously about it any more, and 
advanced minds in law, political science and philosophy no 
longer even discuss theoretical problems in their fields in 
the language of Natural Law thinking. Yet since those who 
give him the second answer will not deny the truth of the 
first, and vice versa, the student is sure to find something 
intriguing here wbi ch keeps him probing. He will finally 
realize that the controversy is not new. It was old with 
Plato and Thrasy.machus, old in the Hellenistic world with its 
categories of cynics, sceptics and stoics, old with Cicero, 
old with Machiavelli, yet its modern status deceives many into 
believing that it has been debated only in the recent past and 
as a drastic and splitting question can be easily dismissed 
because present day findings have settled it. Justice Holmes 
himself gave the impression that he was offering fresh, novel, 
tough-minded conclusio~, when in reality his observations were 
as old as the hills. 
In The Common Law Holmes gives the example of the two 
drowning men on th.e plank in the sea which will hold only one 
of them, and of' the basic fact, he says, that one of them will 
push the other off into the water if' he can, as an illustration 
that force and superior strength are the only final rule of law. 
He is fond of this example. It appears again in his writings 
and letters. Here it is: ttrf a man is on a plank in the deep 
sea which will float only one, and a stranger lays hold of' it, 
he will thrust him o:ff if he can. When the state finds itself 
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in a similar position, it does the same thing. 111 
~ 
Holmes does not say that the source o~ this example is 
the speech of Carneades, the Greek sceptic, in his series or 
lectures in Rome in 156 B. c. when he so enraged Cato, the 
Elder. Eduard Zeller tells us something o~ these circumstances. 
nLQarneadey denied that there is such a thing as natural 
right ••• he is regarded as ~oolish who~e~ers justice to interest ••• 
He ~pressed into his services the many casuistical questions 
raised by the Stoics, expressing the opinion that in all these 
cases it is better to commit the injury which brings advantage--
for instance, murder another to save onets own li~e--than to 
postpone advantage to right, and hence inferred that intelligence 
is a state o~ irreconcilable opposition to justiee.tt2 And again: 
A still greater impression seems to have been made 
by the criticism o~ moral concepts, o~ which a sample 
was given by his two lectures for and against justice 
delivered in Rome. In these lectures he ~ollowed the 
precedent of the sophists in employing the opposition 
of natural law and positive law. Our information on 
this criticism is o~ course very imper~ect. 113 
~ 
Zeller gives the references as Oic. de rep. III 6, 9 f~.; De 
0~~. III, 13, 23, 89; Lacn., inst. div. v., l4 ~~., ~lut. 
Cat. maj., 221 ff.; Gell., VI, J.48 ff.; ~uint., XII, l, 35. 
loliver Wendell Hommes, Jr., The Common Law, Boston, 
Little, Brown.& Co., 1881, 1909, 1923, p. 44 •.. 
2nr. Eduard Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, 
Trans •. by o. J. Jeichel, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1892, 
p. 551. 
3Eduard Zeller, Outline of the Histor o~ Greek 
Trans. by Palmer, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1931, p. 
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Those which I checked were Plutarch and Cicero. In The Republic 
of Cicero it is debated whether or not injustice is necessarily 
a part of the structure of every state. Here Oarneades' 
arguments were presented for the purpose of refuting them by 
Cicero who is one of the many authorities for Natural Law, 
and who himself died the violent, cruel death of proscribed 
assassination. Bertrand Russellreviews Carneades' tangle with 
Oato the Elder on this occasion, in his History of Western 
Philosophy: 11:Great States, ( Oarneades) poini;ed out, had be• 
-
come great by unjust aggressions against their weaker neighbours; 
in Rome this could not well be denied. In a shipwreck, you 
may save your life at the expense of some one weaker, and you 
are a fool if you do not.tt-1 
Russell summarizes this encounter: 
The contrast between Ca.to and Carneades was very 
complete: The one brutal through a morality that was 
too strict.and too traditional, the other ignoble 
through a morality that was too lax and too mueh in-
fected with the social dissolution of the Hellenistic 
world.2 
And Russell says, on Scepticism: 
It should be observed that Scep.ticism as a 
philosophy is not merely doubt, but what may be 
called dogmatic doubt. The man of science says 
tti think it is so-and-so, but I a.m. not sure. 11 The 
man of intellectual ouriesity says tti don't know 
how it is, but I hope to find out. 11 ~.The philosophic 
Sceptic says ttnobody lmows, and nobody ever can 
can know. tt It is this element of dogmatism that 
lBertrana Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, New 
York, Simon and Schuster, 1945, p. 236. 
2.Ibid., p. 237. 
86 
makes the system vulnerable. Sceptics, of course, 
deny that they assert the impossibility of knowledge 
dogmaticilly, but their denials are not very con-
vincing. 
This comment could be applied to Holmes' ~tellection, 
but one could go f~ther in the analytical quest of his 
favorite, though uncredited, second century B.C. example of 
the impossibility of justice and question its universal 
applicability. In the length of time in world history since 
Carneades fir$t angered Oato in his clever lectures, applauded 
by the modern youth of Rome, in which he tore down Flato's 
arguments for the necessity of justice in statescraft, though 
he, Oarneades, was, rather curiously, the head of the Platonic 
Academy at the time, the Stoic and Christian mandates along 
the way have been sufficiently effective so that at least it 
can be seriously debated as to how true the example given is. 
There is no way to prove such matters by statistics, but at 
least it can be convinc~gly maintained that in a minority 
of eases anyway it would not be true, and on the contrary it 
might be likely that two people in desperate straits would 
pool their inventive and physical energies for escape and 
survival rather than for mutual destruction. Rivalry to the 
death is not by any means the necessary reaction to extreme 
danger. To tussle desperately as against an advers~ '...':Lt::. ·::. 
with a companion on a submerging plank, at a moment when both 
are likely to drown anyway is not inevitably the mark of that 
libid., P• 234. 
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intelligence which is commonly supposed to lead to survival. 
In raot, we may or:fer the evidence of a distinguished, up-to-
the-moment case in point. 
One halt or the PT remained afloat, but it took 
three hours to round up all hands :from the water. 
Kennedy dived in and towed McMahon, too burned to 
manage, back to the boat. That alone required an 
hour as the wreck drifted away almost as rast as 
Kennedy could swim toward it. SSkipper Kennedy 
went back into the sea ror two more men. 
In the morning they found themselves surrounded 
by islands, but only one was known to be without 
Japanese on it. 11At 1400, u says the Navy intelligence 
report written on.J,ugust 22, 1943, "Lt. Kennedy took 
the badly burned McMahon in tow and.set out :for land, 
intending to lead the way and scout the island in 
advance of the other survivors.'* Kennedy, cij:.ad. only 
in scivvies, clamped his teeth on a strap or McMahon's 
life jacket and swam breast stroke. The others did -
as best they could, some hanging to a.spar and kicking 
it rorward. The island was three miles distant. It 
took them :five hours to make it. 
It was rive days berore Kennedy or his men had 
anything solid to eat, but during those days Kennedy 
swam to three islands, trying to make contact with 
American forces. Again he towed McMahon--ror three 
hours. Rain, chills, fever, illusions, and near 
madness gripped the PT crew •••• l 
It is a matter of signiricance to the American nation 
and to history that here one of Holmes' favorite illustrations 
of human motivation and conduct is so palpably rendered untrue, 
as Holmesf own war experience would have warned him although 
it is possible in his own defense he might have pointed out 
his use o:f the word u strange:~:tt Perhaps because his own 
knowledge of war did so inform him otherwise he never quoted 
that other example from Carneades 1 ethics·which Russell also 
gives us:: nwhat would you do i:f you were rlying rrom a 
lEric Sevareid (ed.), Candidates 1960 (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1959}, pp. 192, 193. 
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victorious enemy, you had lost your horse, but you round a 
wounded comrade on a horse? If you were sensible, you would 
drag him off and seize his horse, whatever justice might 
ordain. 111 In any popular mythology of conduct in war--which 
always indicates the standards of a society--such action would 
be universally regarded as heinous and an abomination. As 
for our own culture, any war movie, such as nThe Naked and 
the Dead, 0 11 The Story of Audia Murphy,u ttTwelve O'clock High,n ... _,_ 
to name three out of hundreds similar--will illustrate the 
altogether opposite standard current for battle conduct toward 
an injured comrade, nor does it require Christianity nor 
democracy, nor Communism, to put the disloyal coward into 
disrepute in any day or age. These mores are as old as Oliver 
and Roland or the pass at Thermopylae. But, of course, 
Carneades has always been there. I can hear old Justice Holmes' 
cynical chuckle today (Fall, 1961) throughout the recent rlurry 
in the newspapers regarding the ttnatural Lawn right to shoot 
down a neighbor invading one's fallout shelter, since this 
-
position was sparked and stated as uNatural lawtt (a la Hobbes) 
in a religious publication. This is an even more loathesome 
contention than Carneades' original one, the more so since 
Carneades was cynical, and the churchman repulsively sincere. 
The basic ways of knowing are few, and the patterns by 
which human intelligence attempts to solve its predicamen~ 
are repeating ones. As listed, they seem necessarily to go 
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by antimonies -- deduction3 induction; reason3 mysticism; in-
tellect, emotion; universal3 particular; a priori and empiric-
al; metaphysical and utilitarian; religious, atheistic; 
tough and tender minded; natural and positive law. But the 
mutuality of exchange is vital to science. The importance 
of the hybridization of ideas cannot be over-stressed, as 
every major scientist interested in the public relations of 
his division of knowledge is always anxious to declare. Edu-
cational television programs on science, such as that given 
on Channel 2 in Boston in the fall of 1957 of a presentation 
by Dr. Harold Urey, for instance, frequently make this the 
core of their message. Thus 3 since each body of knowledge 
is not complete in itself, but depends on all other discovery 
and the accretion of thought everywhere 3 the sharing of in-
. formation, it is regrettable that so much ill-will is expend-
ed in the defense of particular approaches in method. Dif-
ferent ways are known to be fruitful and are therefore valid. 
It is one of Morris Cohents contributions to modern philosophy 
that he has brought out this point. 
Since we have just been quoting Bertrand Russell to 
recognize him as an exceptionally perceptive modern think-
er, it is surprlsing to find another quotation from him, 
illustrating the 11classicaln way of regarding logic -- the 
black and white, either-or, fashion which Holmes objected 
to, but which he himself usually meant when he used the word. 
Here is an exce~pt from Russell's introduction to WhY I 
Am Not A Christian: 11I think all the great religions of 
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the world--Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and 
Communism--both untrue and bar:m..fu.J.. It is evident as a 
matter of logic that, since they disagree, not more than 
one of them can be true.ul Cohen, however, would point out 
-
that so many different and multiform facts must be considered 
in making such a statement, that made as baldly and simply 
as Russell has made it, it would not be true and that 
different and contradictory aspects of these various religions 
could approach relative truths, and must not be stated in an 
overall nAristotelian11 premise. Cohen's criticism of ttselt-
evident truths as a matter of logic" would be implied in the 
following quotation: 
Approaching the subject from the point ot view 
of the requirements of a scientific theory, let us 
ask what is the character of the principles of legal justice or natural law, and how are they to be 
established? The traditional answer from the Stoics 
down to our ·own day is that they are axioms whose 
self-evidence is revealed to us by the light of 
natural reason. This belief is ±mplied in the way in 
which these principles are appealed to in popular 
discussions as to natural rights •••• The discovery 
of non-Euclidean geometry and the whole trend of 
modern mathematical though has led us to discard as 
unreliable the self-evident character of axioms or 
principles. Such principles as that two magnitudes 
equal to the same are equal to each other, or that 
a straight line is the shortest distance between two 
points, are seen to be s~ply definitions, while others 
are either hypotheses or assumptions or else rules of 
procedure or postulates, whose contraries may not only 
be just as conceivable but even preferable in certain 
systems of mechanics. If now we apply the same 
criticism to our assumed principles of natural law, 
such as 'All men are equal before the law,' or 'All 
men have.the right to life,' to the product of their 
lBertrand Russell, Why I Am Not A Christian, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. v. 
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labor, etc., it becomes evident that it will not do 
to rely on their apparent self-evidence, and that the 
only way to defend them against those who would deny 
th~ is to show that like other scientifie principles, 
e.g., the copernican ~~othesis in astronomy, they 
yield a body or system or propositions which is 
preferable to that which can possibly be established 
on the basis of their denial.l 
G. E. Moore stresses the importancefor truth of knowing 
just what is being asked: 
At all events, philosophers seem, in general, not to 
make the attempt LI.e., the attempt to discover what 
question they are askin~7; and, whether in consequence 
of this ommssion or not, they are constantly en-
deavouring to prove that 'Yes' or 'No' will answer 
questions, to which neither answer-is-correct, owing 
to the fact that what they have before their minds is 
not one question, but several, to som~ of which the 
true answer is 'No,' to others •Yes.• 
The genius of the modern spirit which part of Holmes' 
philosophy would represent, leans to the position that any 
single sharp authoritative answer to profoundly moral questions 
is inadequate and incorrect. Debating the rightness or wrong-
ness of living animal experimentations for scientific purposes 
is a case in point. Scientists see only one possible answer 
to the question, and condemn as sentimentalism even the raising 
of it. Yet great contemporary insights like that or Albert 
Schweitzer, Carl von Weizsacker, Martin Buber, Paul Tillich, 
repeat the warning of Kant and the Greeks on the mortal danger 
to our society or treating the living creature as a thing. 
Scientists see no other possibility but the justification of 
lMorris Cohen, 11 Jus Naturale Redivivum,tt The Philosoph-
ical Review, XXV, No. 6 (1916), 774. - . 
2Principia Ethica (Oamb~dge: Cambridge University Press, 
1959), p. vii. 
92 
cruelty here in terms or teleology. The end (i.e., the con-
quest of disease, to give the most reasonable end) justiries 
it. Yet minds like Holmes' reject, apparently, any moral 
teleology, and as for treating a sentiEnt being as an altogether 
exploitable object, Holmes seems to leave no question as to 
where he stands in this alignment. And again--(it is the same 
context)--we have the man on the plank in the sea. 
The ever-growing value set upon peace and the social 
relations tends to give the law of social being the 
appearance of the law of all being. But it seems to 
me clear that the ultima ratio, not only of regum, 
but of private persons, is force, and that at the 
bottom of all private relations, however tempered by 
sympathy and all the social feelings, is a justiriable 
self-preference. If a man is on a plank in the deep 
sea which will only float one, and a stranger lays 
hold of it, he will thrust him off if he can. When 
the state finds itself in a similar position, it does the 
same thing. 
The considerations which answer the argument of 
equal.rights also answer the objections te treating a 
man as a thing, and the like. If a man tives in society, 
he is liable to find himself so.treated.. . 
Holmes says much the same thing again in Ideals and Doubts, 
(1915) taking an article by Del Vecchio, For.mal Bases of Law, 
as a point of departure: 
••• If I may do Del Vecchio the wrong of summing up 
in a sentence or two what from a hasty reading I 
gather to be his mode ••• , it is that of a Neo-Kantian 
idealist •••• From this it is easy to proceed to the 
Kantian injunction to regard every human being as an 
end in himself and not as a means. 
I confess that I rebel at once. If we want con-
scripts, we march them up to the front with bayonets 
in their rear to die for a cause in which perhaps they 
do not believe. The enemy we treat not even as a means 
but as an obstacle to be abolished ••• ! feel no pangs of 
lMax Lerner, Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes (llModern 
LJ..brarytt ,· New York• .. Random House Inc 195r.) p 59 ' ., '"~'' .. 
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conscience over either step •••• I therefore define 
the truth as the system of my limitations, and leave 
absolute truth for those who are better equipped. 
With absolute truth I leave absolute ideals of con-
duct equally on one side.l 
Let us take a few pages to examine some of the questions 
which arise from this increasing tendency of modern man to 
exploit into things not only lesser life about him but all 
aspects of his environment. In the theology of Paul Tillich, 
which is having an ever widening influence, there are no things, 
in the Given, in nature. The atom has a center and a periphery 
which resists manipulation, and so with all other aspects of 
creation. The atom has in it the potentiality of, the dimensions 
of humanness and so or animals and plants. But man alone can 
thingify everything about him into objects from which his sub-
jectivity is totally cut off, isolated and irresponsible. He 
can transform the encountered world into a totality of mere 
things, without centeredness. Tillich uses the German bedingt 
to refer to this process of which the conditioned reflex is 
a further aspect. It is characteristic of animals that they 
must live within the closed circle of their instincts and their 
instincts' conditioning, though in some cases, as with migrating 
birds, this cirele can be very large. But man has language and 
tools to change his environment and give him choice. He has 
the freedom to be a fabricator and so a manipulator. The unity 
of center and periphery of something given, once destroyed can 
never be restored. In a mass society the transformation of the 
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individual into a mass man is a relentless, continual process. 
This is the characteristic of our society and our century. 
This is education for 11 adjustment.n Education for what? 
Adjustment for what? For man, in our society, to be the con-
ditioned means for consumption and production. So organization 
man and motivational research. But every great accomplishment 
in our civilization has been created by those who were not 
adjusted. You can count on the reactions of a man in which 
his freedom of choice has been taken away; but to fight 
against this conditioning, this objectifying of the subjective, 
this thingifying, this turning of all creatures into means for 
the exploitable ends of the manipulator, is of tremendous 
practical consequences.l 
We have just been dipping into Plutarch to look up Marcus 
Catots tussllie with Carneades, and we see that Plutarch shows 
plainly his criticism of Oato because he used his slaves as 
objects, exploiting and manipulating them at will to serve his 
own interests and profit. (" ••• but afterwards, when he grew 
richer, ••• as soon as supper was over he used to go with a 
leather thong and scourge those who had waited or dressed the 
meat carelessly. He always contrived, too, that his servants 
should have some difference one among another, always suspecting 
and fearing a good understanding between them. 11 ) 2 And not his 
lpaul Tillich, The Lowell Lectures, King's Chapel, Boston, 
February 11. and 18, 1958.. . -
2Plutarch's Lives, Dryden Translation, New York, The Modern 
Library, (Reprint. of ()lough1 s Ed. 1864), p. $~7). .. 
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slaves only were things to him to use up, exhaust at his own 
pleasure and throw out at will, but lesser li~e he so regarded 
as well, and other aspects of animal and plant productivity 
around his estates or in the public calling. Since we are about 
to speak o~ the present-day use of animals to advance the con-
quests of science over nature as a moral question, let us look 
back at a comment on the genius of the Greeks in regard to 
human dominion over animals--a long quotation, but worth it. 
Plutarch is speaking o~ Oato's parsimonies: 
Some imputed these things to petty avarice, but 
others approved of bUn, as i~ he had only the more 
strictly denied himself for the rectifying and , 
amending of others. Yet certainly, in my judgment, 
it marks an over rigid temper for a man to take the 
work out ot his servants as out ot brute beasts, 
turning them otr and selling them in their old age, 
and thinking there ought to be no turther commerce 
between man and man than whilst there arises some 
protit by it. We see that kindness or humanity has 
a larger tield than bare justice to exercise itselt 
in; law and justice we cannot, in the nature ot things, 
employ on others than men; but we may extend our goodness 
and charity even to irrational creatures ••• It is doubt-
less the part ot a kind-natured man to keep even worn-
out horses and dogs, and not only take care of them 
when they are foals and whelps, but also when they are 
grown old. The Athenians, when they built their 
Hecatompedon, turned those mules loose to teed freely 
which they had observed to have done the hardest labour. 
One of these (they say) came once of itself to offer 
its service, and ran along with, nay, and went before, 
the teams which drew the waggons up to the acropolis, 
as if it would incite and encourage them to draw more 
stoutly; upon which there passed a vote that the creature 
should be kept at the public charge even till it died. 
The graves of Gimon's horses, which thrice won the 
Olympian races, are.yet to be seen close by his own 
monument. Old Xanthippus, too (amongst many others who 
buried the dogs they had bred up), entombed his which 
swam after his galley to Salamis, when the people fled 
from Athens, on the top of a cliff, 'Which they call the 
Dog's Tomb to this day. Nor are we to use living 
creatures like old shoes or dishes and throw them away 
when they are worn out or broken with service; but if 
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it were for nothing else, but by way of study and practice 
in humanity, a man ought always to prehabituate hims.~lf 
in these things to be of a kind and sweet disposition. 
As to myself, I would not so much as sell my draught ox 
on the account of bis age, much less f'or a small piece 
of money sell a poor old man, ••• and that more especially 
when he would be as useless to the buyer as to the seller. 
Yet Cato for all this glories that he left that very horse 
in Spain which he used in the wars when he was consul, 
only because he would not put the public to the charge 
of his f~eight. Whether these acts are to be ascribed 
to the greatness or pettiness of his spirit, let every 
one argue as they please.l 
We are introducing the ethical consideration of live 
an~al experimentation here not to support those an~al lovers 
who raised an outcry of condemnation against the Soviet Union, 
for instance, for its use of the dog, Laika, in the sputnik, 
but the subject is presented in the belief that there is a 
real vacuity in Christian ethics and cosmology in the attitude, 
or lack of it, in regard to man's relationship and r esponsi""' 
bility toward the lower an~al life, a serious gap which can 
only be bridged, with the tremendously important implications 
which arise from this gap, by going as Schweitzer has done, 
to Eastern religions to acknowledge with them the wonder and 
reverence of the great chain of being, though without the pro-
found pessimism of much that is related to. Oriental reincarna-
tion. Yet Christianity has more insight in this respect than 
its official ruoricg as witness the continuing symbol of 
Christ as the lamb of God, an allegory overwhelmingly powerful 
in such a painting of the intensely felt signigicance of the 
terrible innocence and happiness of animals in their immediate 
untroubled existence as that of the Van Eycks' great altar 
piece at Ghent. This kind of reverence can only rightly be 
1. Ibid., p. 427. 
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carried over into an attitude towards Laika hersel~, the 
sputnik dog, the sacri~ice o~ li~e ~or the saving o~ a man. 
This dog, in her sagacity, her submission and teac~bility be-
~ore the scientists who trained her, her eagerness and docility 
to please human beings, her readiness to learn what was re-
quired o~ her, consented in canine ~ashion by eager willing 
participation, anxiety to know and obey her god's commands, 
in the incredible accomplishment which sent her to live 
hundreds o~ miles high, circling the earth in weightlessness, 
the first space traveller ~rom our planet, the ~irst to suf~er 
the unspeakable emptiness out there, where so many men are 
shortly due to ~ollow her. 
In this death met duti~ully in the extremity of solitude, 
it was her eagerness to be taught, to obey, to participate, 
to consent, which removes her altogether ~rom the class of 
the exploitable object, the thing, and puts her where her 
genus has always been, man's ~irst companion in the animal 
world, ready to die in his service and ~or his well-being. 
Yet it is only the attitude o~ human beings toward her, remem-
bering her personality, the hero Laika, that can bestow on her 
this status, and in giving her this due, remove from themselves 
the stain and curse, as deep as the Greek ~uries, o~ the result 
of cruelty, whose nightmarish doom, along with the curse of 
indi~~erence and sel~-righteousness, never seemB to be ~ar 
removed ~rom its potential in these days. 
It can be argued that I ~ over-humanizing Laika, in 
transforming her teachability into consent. I do not think so. 
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Religious knowledge must be symbolic, and it was through trust 
that she was teachable. The analogy between such an animal's 
death and the sacrifice of the Crucifixion is apt, not perfect. 
God Himself must be a Vivisectionist, for a purpose that we 
see through the dark glass of our clouded reason only little 
more clearly than Laika could understand the circumstances of 
.. 
her incredibly lonely death. If the Soviet Union would put 
up a monument to her, for its reverent school children to 
stand silently before, if we would pay the same respect to 
the chimpanzees who pull the levers in our space flights, not 
regarding them as comical, the nemesis of thermonuclear war, 
would give one howl less, draw back a step and veil her face 
even in pity, so that she too could shed a tear. 
But Holmes' attitude would deny this state of mind as 
valid, desirable, or, even less, as vitally necessary for our 
social preservation and our humanity, not only in regard to 
a dog but in regard to a simple man, a common servant or even 
a baker, whose existence as being human and not a thing he. 
did so much indirectly to proclaim in the Lochner dissent: 
But a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism ••• or of laissez 
faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing 
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions 
natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought 
not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether 
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution 
of the United States • 
••• I think that the word "liberty11 , in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent the 
natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be 
said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit 
that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental 
principles as they have been understood by the traditions 
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of our people and our law. It does not need research 
to show that no such sweeping condemnation can be 
passed upon the statute before us. A reasonable man 
might think it a proper measure on the score of 
health. 
Dry enough! Yet we are back in the full swing between 
opposites in Holmes 1 case, and he is here turning from justi-
fying the use of men as things to affirming humanity. It does 
not need research either to point out that in the quotation 
above. 11fundamental principles as they have been understood by 
the traditions of our people and our law" is one acceptable 
definition of Natural Law. 
In concluding this section, it is fitting to refer again 
to Paul Tillich, who says of Justice: "Justice is not a social 
category far removed from ontological inquiries, but is a 
category without which no ontology is possible, 112 ·and again, 
11Justice is first of all a claim raised silently or vocallY by 
a being on the basis of its power of being. 11~ For his remark-
able study of the ontological unity of justice, power and love, 
the reader is referred to his monograph on the subject, almost 
every page of which is pertinent to the over-all discussion of 
this paper. 
1. A. T. Mason and W. M. Beaney, American Constitutional Law: 
Introductory Essays and Selected Cases, p. 427. 
2. Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, p. 55. 
3. Ibid., p. 63. 
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2. 
Any standard treatment or the development or political 
theory must include in large part a history or Natural Law~ 
and one thinks orr-hand~ in this connection~ of the names of 
A. J. Carlyle~ Charles Mcilwain~ Jrumes Bryce~ Frederick 
Pollock, David Ritchie, Ernest Barker, Otto Gierke, F. W. 
Maitland, Leo Strauss, John Wild, Charles Haines, Benjamin 
Wright, Edward Corwin, Rosc~e Pound, Heinrich Romm.en, and many 
others. The contributors to the Notre Dame Law School Natural 
Law publications compose, in addition, an imposing list of 
names here and abroad. The above makes no claim to be even 
partially complete. Whether Natural Law be defined as Higher 
Law~ Divine Law, Eternal Law, Moral Law, Law of Nature, Law 
of God, Fundamental Law, the Pentateuch, Gravitation, Evolutimn;, 
Relativity, the White Man•s Burden, Abstract Justice, Right 
Reason, the Absolute, Development of Full Individual Potential, 
To Each His Own, or the sanctity of Contract and Property, it 
is evident that a very great deal has been written about it, 
rrom many points of view. And to say that there is a general. 
ignoring of Natural Law on the undergraduate level at the 
present time, is not to say that good text books do not con-
tinue to treat with the subject in ter.ms of the recognition 
which belongs to it as an historical subject. R. R. Palmer 
has already been quoted. Here is E. M. Burns: 
·-
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The most interesting and in many ways the most 
~portant branch o~ the Roman law was the jus naturale, 
or natural law. This was not a product o~ judicial 
practice at all but o~ philosophy. The Stoics had 
developed the idea o~ a rational order o~ nature which 
is the embodiment o~ justice and right. They had 
a~~irmed that all men are by nature equal, and that 
they are entitled to certain basic rights which govern-
ments have no authority to transgress. • •• This develop-
ment o~ the concept o~ abstract justice as a legal 
principle was one o~ the noblest achievements o~ the 
Roman civilization.l 
Carl Becker mentions it in his text-book ~or secondary 
schools, Modern HistoEI, and says much that is penetrating 
on the subject in The Declaration of Independence and ~ 
Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers. John 
Wild's summary also should be quoted: 
••• the theory of natural law is a radically realistic 
point of view which has been defended by able thinkers 
from the t~e o~ the Stoics to the eighteenth century 
and a~ter. Five basic doctrines are found to be always 
characteristic o~ it. 
1. The world is an order o~ divergent tendencies 
which on the whole support one another. 
2. Each individual entity is marked by an essential 
structure which it shares in common with other members 
of the speciesCl 
3. This structure determines certain basic exis-
tential tendencies that are also common to the species. 4. If these tendencies are to be realized without 
distortion and ~rustration, they must follow a general 
dynamic pattern. This pattern is what is meant by 
natural law. It is grounded on real structure, and is 
e~orced by inexorable natural sanctions. 5. Good and evil are existential categories. It is 
good for an entity to exist in a condition of active 
realization. ~ its basic tendencies are hampered and 
~rustrated, it exists in an evil condition.2 
1E. M. Burns, Western Civilizations (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., Inc., 1954), p. 207. 
CWild, Op. Cit., pp. 132, 133· 
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To such authors as these nNatural Law would have its 
•. 
most orig~al rooted meanings: 1) To each his own," or 2) 
~ 
reason and justice. But A. P. d 1Entreves in the first number 
-
of the Natural Law Forum (1956) equates Natural Law with 
-
morals or morality. This is also the slant which Roscoe Pound 
would give it, and in accepting this def~ition perhaps we 
also allow the first blurring of outl~e to take place in the 
conceptual clarity of our terms; for if the root meaning of 
morals is custom or mores, custom swings us to the idea of 
established precedent or Common Law, which, according to 
-
definition (and none with more vigorous authority than that 
asserted by Holmes) is altogether the opposite from Natural 
Law. 
Says Pound: ttrt is equally a mistake to divorce the 
- . 
legal and the moral wholly as the analytical jurists sought 
to do, and to identify them wholly as the natural law jurists 
sought to d~.u1 
-Says dtEntreves: 
As for the predicament of the world at large, let 
us be perfectly clear that natural law is no out and 
dried solution, no infallible cure for all our troubles. 
Here indeed the problem is not even that of a conflict 
between natural and positive law, but that of the absence 
of a legal order altogether. International law, as 
things stand today, is a good target for the shafts of 
the skeptic. But ••• the weakness of international law is 
not due to the. lack of enforcement, but nto the absence 
of an international moral sense. 11 These-words can only 
mean: that what matters is first to "instaure11 or re-
store the ttinternational moral sense.l! The possibility 
lRosooe Pound, Law and Morals (Chapel Hill, N. 0., 1924), 
p. 77. 
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o:f agreeing on the "rules o:f the ga.me11 and o:f abiding 
by them will :follow_as a logical consequence. Surely 
this is where ttnatural law11 may have a word to say, 
especially i:f we take it, as I have tried to, as a 
minimum o:f agreement on principles.l 
We have already begun to reach a con:founding and com-
pounding o:f our attempt at sharply analytical meanings. 
These same overlappings and interminglings o:f signi:ficance 
are implied in the sequence o:f titles contained in the third 
volume o:f the Natural Law Institute Proceedings. These 
articles are: The Natural Law and Common Law, The Natural 
Law and Constitutional Law, The Natural Law and Canon Law, 
The Natural Law and International Law. The purpose o:f this 
juxtaposition is summarized in the :first paragraph o:f the 
Introduction to the series by its editor, Edward F. Barrett: 
Men have invoked the Natural Law :for more than 
twenty-two hundred years. Expressions o:f the concept 
have varied in detail. There is, nevertheless, a 
central core o:f meaning common to them all. The State 
is not the sole source o:f human rights and duties. 
Above it there abides an objective nor.m, unchanging and 
unchangeable, by which the moral integrity o:f man-made 
laws can and must be measured. Hebrew prophet, Greek 
philosopher and Roman jurist long ago envisioned such 
a higher law. The Christian Era saw its meaning deepened 
and its sanctions made complete.2 
The series o:f articles thus has the purpose o:f showing 
how much Natural Law exists in Common, Constitutional, Canon 
and International Law, or in other words how much aim :for 
justice or an abstract standard o:f morals exist in these 
lA. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law Forum, I, No. 1 (1956), 
p. 52. . 
2Natural Law Institute Proceedings, (Notre Dame, 1950), 
III, 1. 
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bodies and categories. It would seem to be both mere common 
sense and historical knowledge also that this would be so, 
that the idea of intending to discuss law in theory or in 
practice without any reference to justice would seem to be 
the most arrant nonsense, although that this could be and 
should be done was Holmes' expressed opinion. Yet in both 
Barrett's and d'Entreves' comments there are the seeds of the 
head-on controversy which has arisen. The words ttunchanging 
and unchangeable11 in the excerpt above already provide a clue 
to this. Earlier in his paper d•Entreve has this statement: 
But I may as well say forthwith that a 11pragmatiett 
natural law--whatever its merits with regard~to the 
ult~ate foundation of English law may prove to be-w 
seems a contradiction in terms. Surely if natural or 
moral law must provide the ground for the obligation 
of positive law, we must assume that its validity is 
an absolute one, and not one to be estimated (I am 
taking this definition from the Oxford Dictionary, 
sub 11 pragmatism11 ) 11 solelv by its practical bearing 
upon.human interests.ulv 
Barrett's explanation continues thus: 
11To his Creator, Man as a creature owes primary duties. 
Correlative to such duties he has certain rights, 
nunalienablen and beyond human power to impair or to 
destroy. The laws then which men make for men in civil 
society will express and supplement the Natural Law. 
Knowing therefore no limitations of time or. space, 
no boundaries based on color, race or creed, the 
Natural Law is the God-given birthright of all men, 
everywhere, forever. From it the Spanish Catholics, 
Vitoria the Dominican and Suarez the· Jesuit, drew the 
first principles upon Which the Dutch Protestant, 
Grotius, later built a modern Law of Nations. English 
lawyers in their contest with would-be despots appealed 
to the Natural Law. Following in the same tradition 
American lawyers wove its doctrines into the texture 
of the Declaration of Independence, and for generations 
lp. 19. 
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American law students began their studies with acknowl-
edgement or the Eternal Law and the Natural Law as valid 
criteria o:f human laws •. Such doctrines vanished :from 
most American law schools in more recent days o:f 
Secularism, Pragmatism and Subjectivism •••• 
With the :future o:f the Atomie Age rushing swi:ftly 
toward him, Man once again :faces the concept o:f a State 
claiming unlimited power over the human personality and 
re:fusing recognition to rights and duties not created 
by itself. To meet the "Absolute" of the State, Man 
has desperate need of an.ttAbsolutett of his own. Such 
an Absolute to the thinkers o:f over twenty-two centuries 
is :found in the Natural Law. Is that doc~rine the 
answer to Man's need today? ••• 1 ·· 
Before developing the thoughtleading out o:f these state• 
menta by Catholic thinkers, as it applies to the Holmesian 
treatment o:f Natural Law, I must take exception to a statement 
by Sidney J"a:f:fe in the article on 11Natural Law and the Nurenberg 
Trialstt in the Nebraska Law Review :for November, 1946, in which 
he regrets that no one has yet written a de:finitive history o:f 
the law o:f nature, and I do so in terms o:f the opening paragraph 
o:f Section 2 o:f this chapter. But J"a:f:fets article, wh~ch in toto 
is slight enough, goes on to say that the Law o:f Nature is 
being revived as a political norm, and::· nThe old world, with 
- . 
the doctrine o:f absolute sovereignity is rapidly passing away, 
and a new world is being created. In this new world there be 
rede:finitions of our fundamental concepts o:f sovereignty and 
.p • t• It 2 o.~. JUS ~ce •••• This should bring us back to an examination 
~ 
o:f some o:f the material we have been quoting in the last :few 
pages, :for if J"a:f:fe :feels that we no longer needed doctrines 
lNatural Law Institute Proceedings, III, 2 • 
. ' . 
2sidney E. Ja:f:fe, 11 Natural Law and the Nuremberg Trials,n 
Nebraska Law Review, XXVI, No. 1_(1946), 95. 
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o~ absolutes, this does not seem to be the expressed ~eeling, 
as quoted, o~ d 1Entreves or Barrett who both call ~or a return 
to such a doctrine. It is this word 11Absolute,n I believe, 
-
as it is used in above quotations which is one o~ ~ew keys o~ 
basic importance in the entire controversy over Natural Law 
and it is at this point that we can come back directly to 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and his ~riend Harold Laski. 
Both o~ them hated Absolutes. 
Says Julian W. Mack in his introduction to Jerome Frank's 
Law and the Modern Mind: 
Their disciples reveled in the Langdell inductive 
method, in the study o~ concrete cases, which revealed 
the law as a dynamic, vital growth and not as a bundle 
o~ static max~s •••• A realization that the law was 
but one strand in the ~abric o~ community li~e began 
to appear in the cases, a reliance on extrinsic ~acts, 
o~ten ramote to the instant case, became necessary, and 
a new technique was evolved; the day o~ the great 
sociological jurists--Holmes, Brandeis, Cardoza, Hand, 
Pound and Frank~urter--had arrived.l 
Frankts thesis is: 
Only a limited degree o~ legal certainty can be 
attained. The current demand ~or exactness and pre-
dictability. in law is incapable o~ satis~action be~ 
cause a greater degree o~ legal ~inality is sought 
than is procurable, desirable or necessary.... It 
must have its roots not in reality, but in a yearning 
~or something unreal. Which is to say that the wide-
spread notion that law either is or can be made 
approx~ately stationary and certain is irrational 
and should be classed as illusion or myth.2 
A ~ootnote adds: 
lJerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, (New York: 
Coward-McCann, Inc.,_l953J., P• x. 
2Ibid., P• 11. 
There is no denying that_, in part, the demand 
for exactly predictable law arises from practical 
needs_, has its roots in reality. But the practic-
al aspect of the demand is usually exaggerated.l 
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Mack also underscores this dislike of predictability as 
a norm for law when he says: 
(Mr. Frank's study] serves to bring home to 
lawyer and judge alike a better understanding of 
these deficiencies in his own thought processes, 
an awareness of his shibboleths and cliches, and 
an exposure of his hopes and fears which underlie 
the common fallacy that rules of law are predict-
able certainties.c 
Yet if anyone's definition of law used 11 prediction" at 
its ro!bt_, it was certainly Holmes 1 _, whose famous: "The pro-
phecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law_,"3 is quoted as often 
as Holmes and Law are mentioned together. A significant por-
tion of Frank's book is devoted to praise of Holmes as the 
11 completely adult jurist," because: 
He has abandoned the phantasy of a perfect, con-
sistent legal uniformity_, and has never tried to 
perpetuate the pretense that there is or can be 
one. He has put away childish-longings for a father-
controlled world •••• As a consequence, whatever clear 
vision of legal realities we have obtained in·this 
country in the past4twenty-five years is in large measure due to him. 
1. Ibid., p. 11. 
2. Ibid._, p. x. 
3. Perry Mille~ (ed.), American Thought Civil War to World 
War I, p. 188. 
4. Frank,. op. cit., p. 253. 
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Elsewhere, in an article entitled, u:Mr. Justice Holmes 
and Non-Euclidian Legal Thinking, n Frank praises Holmes even 
-
more highly, yet comes back again to his dislike of the idea 
of predictability in law, which he links to rigidity and to 
the belief that law can be a certainty. In Section v, he 
lists under nAdditional Legal Axioms to Be Q.uestioned/1 as 
. 
his third point: 11The Axiom that Exact Rules Make Decisions 
Predictable. 11 He goes on: 
Thanks to Holmes, we are now able quite conscious:cy-
to develop non-Euclidian or postulational legal think-
ing. There have been gropings in that direction before 
now. Those who advocated the exclusively economic 
interpretation of all decisions were surely attacking 
•=and justifiably--some of the fundamental postulates 
of the old jurisprudence •••• But they were for ousting 
one set of sacred or tyrannical axioms in order to 
install another such.... Holmes made possible a clear-
eyed study of these problems. He paved the way for the 
overthrow of all legal dogmatism •••• He secularized 
legal axioms. Did he not say, nTo have doubted one's 
own first principles is the mark of a civilized man?"l 
But Holmes also said, in that same Path of tbe Law in 
which he de.fined law as prophecy and prediction: nif a man 
goes into law it pays to be a master of it, and to be a 
master of it means to look straight through all the dramatic 
incidents and to discern the true basis for prophecy.tt2 And 
law is ni:iothing but a prediction that i.f a man does or omits 
~ 
certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way 
by judgment of the court.tt3 
l.Jerome Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidian Legal 
Thinking, Cornell Law ~uarterlz, (1932), p. 598. 
-2American Thoug~(~d~, Miller, P• 203. 
3~., J.85. 
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The reader must take a pick here as to just what he 
th~s prophecy and prediction mean, ~or it is not at all 
evident what Frank thinks they mean. l'erhaps they mean ~or 
Frank a fondness for the Absolute. l'erhaps they mean for 
Holmes dislike for the Absolute. Although Frank who dislikes 
prophecy and prediction as legal characteristics, admires 
Holmes so highly .for his fluid realism, Holmes himself had 
adopted them as an integral part of his most basic definition 
of law. It would appear from these quotations that Holmes' 
inconsistency is taken over at times by his admirers. In 
passing it might be noted as one of Laski's opinion, on June 
11, 1931: 11 I met there, too, Jerome Frank whose book I think 
you know. He is pleasant and earnest, but, I should bave 
ul guessed, rather a muddled person •••• 
One thing, however, on which his commentators are all 
agreed, is Holmes' dislike of the Absolute. One of the best 
books on the interpenetration and influence o~ ideas in this 
area which concerns Holmes, and all the group centering around 
Charles Sanders Peirce's Metaphysical Club (to the extent t ba. t 
it actually existed) is PhilipP. Wiener's Evolution and the 
Founders of Pragmatism. Members of the club were supposedly 
Chauncy Wright, William James, John Fiske, Holmes and others. 
His chapter, 11Evolutionary Pragmatism in Holmes' Theory of 
the Law,n he expands .from the topic sentence: 11Holmes, like 
. . 
James, abhorred traditional systems of static law and absolutistic 
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metaphysics.ul This is from his final summary chapter: 
What philosophical fruit can we cull from our his-
torical review of' the crossing of' arguments about the 
interpretation of' evolution among the mmnbers of' the 
Metaphysical Club? ••• They applied the Darw~ian 
ideas of' chance variations and natural selection to a 
host of' important questions in logic, physics, psych-
ology, history, jurisprudence, and social ethics, and 
emerged with a new, ~portant pragmatic reconstruction 
of' traditional philosophy.... By making philosophy a 
usef'ul instrument in the blazing of' new paths in the 
pursuit of' truth and justice, they put American thought 
in the f'oref'ront of' intellectual and social progress. 
Their intellectual reactions to evolution were marked 
by a farsighted, experimental attitude which freed 
thougbtf'rom the incubus of theological dogma, authori-
tarianism, and a priori rationalism. In short, as a 
result of their studies American liberalism came to 
philosophic maturity. The common dynamic leitmotiv 
of' their discussions of.the meaning of evolution for 
man was their deep respect f'or the inviolable, creative 
character of' individual freedom ••• 
In this concluding chapter I wish to indicate 
summarily the common f'eatures of their method of 
thinking which constitute their legacy to twentieth" 
century philosophy •••• American pragmatism has fostered, 
first, an empirical respect for the complexity of' 
existence requiring a pluralitz of' concepts to do justiee to the diverse problems of mankind in its 
evolutionary struggles. Secondly, it has abandoned the 
eternal as an absolute frame of reference f'or thought, 
and emphasized the ineluctable pervasiveness of temporal 
change in tbe natures of' things. Thirdly, it has re" 
garded the natures of things, as known and appraised 
by men, to be relative to the categories and standards 
of the minds that have evolved modes of knowing and 
evaluating objects. Fourthly, it has insisted on the 
contingency and precariousness of the mind's interactions 
with the physical and social environment, so that even 
in the most successful results of' hard gained experimental 
knowledge, what we attain is fallible. Finally, American 
pragmatism upholds the democratic f'reedom of the individual 
inquirer and appraiser as an indispensable condition for2 progress in the future evolution of science and society. 
].Philip P. Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism, 
Harvard University Press, 1949, p. 172. 
2Ibid., pp. 190, 191. 
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These are brave words, good words, and wmply describe, 
in its most idealistic terms, the inheritance of the good works 
of American pragmatism. Nor can anyone doubt who has read 
widely in the literature of Holmes that this analysis applies 
to bXm and to his legacy for American thought, even one who 
might find himself saddened before the simplifications of 
Weinert s enthusiasm. Yet I think it may be wondered whether 
the sequence of the words which Wiener bas italicized in the 
quotation above--empirical, plurality, temporal, relative, 
contingency and fallible--add up with any logical progression 
to the final great emphasis of democratic freedom of the 
individual, or to the earlier ttinviolable, creative character 
of individual freedom.u Possibly they do, or possibly they 
~ 
have a curiously negative cumulation, curious when compared 
to such a resounding final clause. They could end up somewhere 
entirely otherwise, in quite another world (a slave labor cwmp, 
for instance). =~· ane may paraphrase the title of another book 
Wiener wrote--or edited--selected writings of the founder of 
the Metaphysical Club, Charles Sanders Peirce, a more profrcund 
thinker than any of this group who met with him on uncertain 
occasions and indefinite dates--and paraphrase it in a way ~ 
intended in the title of the book, e::x:.pressing a summary of 
his philosophy:_ nvalues (--if there are any--) in a Universe 
~ -
of Chance (--if that's what it is.)U 
Another great admirer of Holmes, Morton White, has written 
a far less acute book than Wiener's surveying the same social 
effect as impetus left by a group of men wielding the pragmatic 
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ini'luence. In Social Thought in America, White says, rrEven 
be.fore the historians and the philosophers o.f the new liberalism 
came to assert the need .for a revolt against .formalis.m and to 
give it concrete expression in their combination o.f history, 
theory, and practice~ Holmes was .finding another path to the 
1 liberalism which they all cam.e to share~ 11 and his summary 
chapter begins as .follows: 
We have just examined the development of' a group 
o.f ideas which dominated American social thought .for 
.fi.fty years or more and which continues to exert an 
appreciable though diminished in.fluence on our ~ink­
ing. We have concentrated on the work o.f .five men--
Charles A. Beard, John Dewey, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., James Harvey Robinson, and Thorstein Veblen-• 
who supplied the American mind of the twentieth cen-
tury with the concepts of' instrumentalism, progressive 
education, legal realism, the economic interpretation 
o.f politics, the new history, institutional economics 
and political liberalism. Their e.f.fect has been 
enormous, extending .from the university to th~ nursery 
school, .from law courts to political parties. 
Comment by another authoritative critic and great admirer 
o.f Holmes is in order here, in testi.fying to the position o.f 
Holmes as a relativist, and his opposition to any philosophical 
position involving absolute or .fixed values. Since we have 
been considering Jerome Frank's interpretation also, this is 
an additional critique o.f the critic. Max Lerner says: 
To one, Holmes has been a pragmatic philosopher, 
to another a rationalist, to a third a legal states• 
man, to still another a knightlike .figure smashing 
intellectual windmills. The traditionalists have 
been unwilling to .fight him openly, .for there was a 
deep strain o.f traditionalism in him. Yet it is 
lMorton White, Social Thought in America, Boston, Beacon 
Press, 1957, p. 59. 
2Ibid., p. 236. 
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interesting to note that modern writers on the law 
are his most fervent ch~i6UB~. Jerome Frank, for 
example, in his Law and the Modern Mind (1930) sees 
Holmes as i1lusionless, one who l~its h~self to 
the logic of probabilities and is contemptuous of 
certainty, an unsparing thinker who approaches law 
from the angle of wba t the bad man can get away with, 
a 11 completely adult jurist, 11 --in short, a legal Realist •••• 
- The conflict between the realists and the unatural 
lawn theorists, who argue :for an ethical basis of law, 
has .. influenced some of the recent evaluations o:f 
Holmes• work. Thus Lon L. Fuller, in his able lectures, 
The Law in ~uest of Itself (1940), guesses that the 
reason why Holmes le:ft so little influence upon private, 
as contrasted with public, law was the strain of legal 
"positivism" in him which drove h~ to effect an unreal 
separation between law and morality. I agree that 
Holmest influence on private law was relatively slight, 
without agreeing with Fuller's statement of tb.e cause. 
I also agree with Fuller that much of the attractiveness 
o:f the positivist, .or hard-boiled conception o:f law :for 
us may be traced to the glamour and sense of philosophic 
breadth with which Holmes invested this view. But it 
would be attributing too much to Holmes to see his 
influence as the decisive one. The :fact is that Holmes' 
nbad man11 standard, his rejection o:f natural law, and 
his definition of law as what the courts will in :fact 
do, were all congenial to the mood and quality o:f a 
pragmatic America in whose practical business li:fe 
the realm o:f :fact had elbowed out the norms o:f 
morality. Holmes was, in that sense, part o:f a great 
tide. And his triumph in American jurisprudence was 
thus linked ~th the same social forces that brought 
the triumph o:f William James a:nd John Dewey in American 
philosophy and education.l 
Lon Fuller will be quoted directly also, but a comment 
on the above might point out Lerner's definition o:f pragmatism 
as a narrow and narrowing one, certainly one which would be 
rejected by William James and John Dewey, who would be the 
first to hold that "in practical business li:fe the realm o:f 
:fact elbowing out the norms o:f morali tyn is a morality in 
itself. Although. the linking o:f Holmes and James' names in 
lLerner, Mind and Thought o:f Justice Holmes, pp. 367, 368. 
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i~luence is quite legit~ate here, some indication should be 
given, in such linking, of Holmes' disagreement with James 
about pragmatism and whatever values inhered in the method, 
which values he repeatedly stated he did not find. Holmes 
disliked James intensely after their early you~hful con-
geniality, and never missed an opportunity to castigate ~ 
ror obscurantism and turning down the lights on science. 
Discussion of the degree of fixity or relativity possessed 
by values or Value would seemto be one of those great un~ 
answerable interrogations. Are values--justice, goodness, 
truth, beauty, love--to be recorded or symbolized as Absolutes, 
as Infinites, as demiurges, as names, points, shifting lines, 
as fields of force or as the coincidence of opposites? Or 
are they not to be called ttvaluesu at all, but be likened to 
a taste for salt on tomatoes, or the size of a hat? Is God 
to be derined, or circumscribed, in qualities and attributes 
which can be worded in Biblical terms or any ter.ms, is He a 
Ground of Being, or is He a form of social ~- us.age or a super-
stition which alters with the cut or no-cut of men's beards? 
Is He, according to catechism usage, a pure spirit, infinite 
in power and understanding, perfect and unchanging, or is the 
Protestant minister who asks that the words of the hymn be 
changed to noh Thou who changest too •••• n sparking an insight 
. 
of real--if non-absolutist--truth? These matters belong in 
the same category of discussion as that of deter.minism vs. 
~e-will or universal vs. particular, or induction vs. de-
duction--that is they can never be ~inally answered. 
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In examining these categories, it would seem that in 
historical development the techniques and frames of reference 
of determinism, the universl and a priori go with the Absolute~ 
and to the extent that we have a belief in freedom of the will, 
this relative freedom is linked with induction, experimental 
fact-finding and relativity. These relationships are scrambled 
and considerably unclarified by the fact that in any connection 
between philosophy and theology those who prefer absolute 
final and Natural Law definitions, historically have also in-
sisted on free will, or that is as much free will as any 
organized position has ever insisted on, i.e., that reason 
gives the freedom for each human soul to make good or evil 
choices in the interest of his own individual salvation. The 
many variations of materialism, on the other band, or those 
who hold that no truth is final and all values changing with 
the matter which composes them, have usually held that there 
is no dndividual freedom, and that each human life is as cut 
and dried and predetermined, as, in Holmes' analogy, a baboon 
or a grain of sand. S'he .«h~iistian. $hool~gfins who proclaimed 
both the Absolute for God and a limited or absence of freedom 
for man, according to their definitions of »God's willtt and 
"Freedom, 11 would seem to be more logically consistent as well 
.. 
as historically to have occupied positions of the most prime 
importance in intellectual history• The Roman Catholic Church~ 
however, in deciding in its dogma that this was too destructive 
a concept of human life for ethical endeavour, and in keeping 
the door open for 1tworks, 11 and freedom of choice within its 
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theology, was wise in the interests of its own influence and 
growth, but started the scrambling process in ideations, par-
ticularly at the Council of Trent. Each side in the contro-
versy over freedom claims important allegiances which both 
in logic and in history belong in the opposing category. Now 
that determinism seems to be defined as belief in any causation 
at all, and in causes generally, Russell has a semantic argu-
ment which concludes that Determinism does not, therefore, 
destroy the distinction between right and wrong, or good and 
bad, or responsibility in choice.1 Efforts to unscr~ble 
the cognitions here included the amount of praise which was 
bestowed in this century on Pragmatism as a great humanist 
doctrine, unleasfufung to individual freedom, which praise also 
included; unown with the Absolute.u While this was going on 
Josiah Royce structured an entire system of liberalism based 
on the yery word and concept: Absolute. The unscrambling effort 
has frequently rum into complications. 
Holmes and Laski were fighting a rear-guard action against 
clericalism, long after clericalism ceased to be the enemy. 
They called this (what they were fighting) the ltAbsolute,n and 
we do not have to go far back in time to appreciate the re-
pressions, the rigidities, the dogmatic cant Which they meant 
by the designation. The headline of an article by David 
Lawrence in the New York Herald Tribune of December 7, 1961, 
lw. Sellars and J. Hospers (eds.), Readings in Ethical 
Theory (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), p. 21. 
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runs: 11UN Debate on Red Chinese Seen as Issue o:f Moral Law,n 
and criticizes Sweden :for being willing to admit Red China 
into the .United Nations·; _,.Lawrence says: U(Sweden) tragically 
-detaches herself :from moral principle and moral law and 
accepts the course o:f expediency and surrender on the Red 
Onina issue.u Again, how I can hear the old master snortl 
O:f course, aside :from the fact that the human mind has 
a ttnaturaltt opposition to -mrking thatway, when it is 
working at its best, a 11naturaln predilection for consistency, 
~ 
there is no ttabsoluteu standard by which we must rule out 
inconsistency. If inconsistency is admitted on all sides as 
desirable, let's l~t it in. But let us know it :for the short-
cuts, the gaps, the synapses, the contraditions, the lacunae, 
the leaps it takes, :for to confound and blur these with what 
is traditionally called logic or the rational thinking process 
is fatal. 
It is impossible not to admire the Church :for its in-
sistence on both the Absolute and on Freedom. It is also 
possible to :find Catholicism morally wrong on such issues as 
Birth Control and Federal Aid to Education, its political 
. 
grip on nbackward11 .countries, and at the same time, in a 
- . 
nihilistic moral period, when every psychotic and savage emotion 
is ·being :noused and stressed as 11 entertainment,u to be aware 
-
that part o:f Catholicism's superior moral excellence lies in 
\ 
its claim to the singleness o:f truth. But the singleness of 
truth, the absolute and defined quality and characteristics 
o:f God and of religious ritual, again appeals as a psychological 
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buckler to those who are unsune and uncertain, but who cannot 
endure the pa~nfulness of not knowing and so increasingly 
repeat platitudes and verbalizations in the name of faith. 
Over insistence on conformity and persecution of heresy are 
the bad fruits of this hidden insecurity--in any field. This 
Holmes and Laski knew very well, and whether in the Calvinistic 
heritage, or in the Jewish, or in the Catholic, where Laski 
was delving in so many of his early studies, they considered 
this conrormity and persecution wore the face of the Absolute. 
They never saw that to proclaim no Absolute was as dogmatic 
a weakness as to proclaim that all truth must be in that .. 
terminology. Our hatreds and antagonisms often lag a genera-
tion or two historically behind their usefulness or even 
their reality. Our loves and allegiances are commonly more 
pertinent and up-to-date. 
Let us look back now at the comment Lerner made about 
Lon Fuller and Holmes, and go directly to the Fuller quotation: 
Psychological theories now popular are more likely 
to construe a man's sustaining faiths, not as a reso-
lution of an inner conflict, but as a screen to hide 
his inability to adjust himself to a harsh outer 
reality.... In terms of this psychology it is, of 
course, easy to condemn nat~al law as a flight from 
reality.... If the natural law philosopher seems to 
be running in one direction from reality, we must not 
overlook the possibility that the positivist may be 
travelling at equal speed in the opposite direction • 
••• We have a natural hankering for the Absolute.l 
Furthermore: 
lLon L. Fuller, The Law in Q.uest of' Itself' (Chicago: 
Northwestern University Press, 1940), pp •. 107. 
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There are, ••• a number o~ ~actors why American 
legal.scholarship has remained so unseasonably positi-
vistic. There is, first o~ all, the enormous influence 
o~ Ho~es.... Nor has the i~luence o~ Holmes' exrun»le 
as a positivist been diminished by the circumstance 
that he did not always remain ~ait~ul to the program 
~or a rigid separation of law and morals laid down in 
his early essays. The ~act that he occasionally gave 
eloquent i~ somewhat vague expression to the human 
aspirations which prevent the law ~rom ever being 
something which merely nistt actually served, I be-
lieve, to rei~orce the-i~luence o~ his positivism 
by giving it an appearance o~ breadth and philosophic 
grounding.l 
And this about Positivism (which he defines as the ef~ort 
to keep separate law and morals, or what ttistt ~rom what 11unght 
to be): 
A' ~inal factor supporting the positivistic attitude 
toward law is to be ~ound, I believe, in the i~luence 
of a peculiarly modern conception of democracy •••• The 
conception to which I re~er is that which ~inds the . 
justi~ication ~or democracy in intellectual skepticism. 
There is no such thing as justice. Human reason is 
utterly incapable o~ regulating the relations o~ men 
among themselves •••• It must be noted how purely 
negative this conception o~ democracy is •••• 
In my opinion, democracy must be ~ounded not on a 
negation o~ the ~orce o~ ideas, but on a ~aith that in 
the long run ideas are more important than the men -who 
for.m them. The greatness o~ what we call democratic 
government does not liec5 in the mere fact that a numeri-
cal majority controls at election time, but at a point 
~urther removed ~rom the ballot box, in the ~orces 
which are permitted to play upon the electorate. For 
in the world as it is now constituted, it is only in a 
democratic and constitutionally organized state that 
ideas have a chance to make their i~luence ~elt. By 
preserving a fluidity in the power structures o~ 
society, by making possible the peaceful liquidation 
o~ unsuccess~ul governments, democracy creates a ~ield 
in which ideas may ef~ectively compete with one another 
for possession o~ men's minds. In a dictatorship, on 
the other band, the chi&f requisite ~or the success of 
an idea is that it serve the inter~sts o~ those who have 
enough power to make it ef~ective. 
libid.' p. 117. 
2Ibid., PP• 120, 122. 
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It is just because he did "preserve a fluidity in the 
power structures of societyn that Holmes is honored, and has 
. 
assumed the greatness of his position in our national history. 
But just how he did maintain a pragmatic creativity, while 
despising pragmatism, how he did allow for aniencourage what 
are essentially the virtues of pluralistic concepts of the 
state and of society, while insisting in everything he wrote 
and said, on the rigid Hobbesian-Austinian formula in regard 
to absolute power in a single source of sovereignty, how he 
did pronounce for force as ultimately the only arbiter in 
human affairs, and especially as the final ruling element in 
law, at the same time that his career developed into a power-
ful symbol for humane letters, for reason, and justice, for 
the working affirmation of law, and for the great pragmatic 
growth of the United States Constitution--how these fruitf~ 
contraditions took place requires investigation and inter-
pretation as a vital part of our national genius. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HOLMES 1 INFLUENCE ON LASKI 
1. 
In the opening exchange of letters between Laski and 
Holmes in 1916, there is considerable discus'sion of what each 
one means by· "sovereignty. n Laski had already published some 
of his brilliant studies on the subject. Perhaps one of the 
reasons why they seemed oblique to Holmes was because of the 
historical oddities and anomalies~ in event or personality, 
which they so largely examine. 
Herbert A. Deane, early in his study of The Political 
Ideas of Harold J. Laski, comments: 
Laski's earliest political writings are a con-
stant polemic against what he terms "mystic monismn 
in political thought -- the conception that the 
state is to political theory what the Absolute is 
to metaphysics~ that it is entitled to the undi-
vided allegiance of each of its citizen8 ••• He there-
fore attempts to destroy the monistic view by con-
centrating his critical fire on the concept of 
sovereignty~l 
Deane might have said here, ttundivided 11 sovereignty. The 
various essays which compose Laski's Studies in the Problem 
of Sovereignty were gathered together and published at the 
Yale University Press in 1917. The volume opens with a quota-
tion from a speech of Holmes: 
1. Herbert A. Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, 
p. 13. 
Your business as thinkers it to make plainer 
the way from something to the whole of things~ to 
show the rational connection between your fact 
and the frame of the universe. 
In the Preface Laski says: 
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This volume is the first of a series of studies 
in which I hope to discuss in various aspects the 
theory of the state. Its starting point is the 
belief that in such a thlory, the problem of sover-
eignty is fundamental ••• 
In giving thanks and credit to Maitland, Figgis, Mcil-
wain, Fisher, Barker and Frankfurter~ there is this para-
graph: "Nor have I, as I hope, failed to learn the lesson 
to be learned from the constitutional opinions with which Mr. 
Justice Holmes has enriched this generation.~2 
On September 15~ 1916~ Holmes has this comment on one of 
Laski's essays, 11The Political_ ._T_h~orv of Disruption, "which ap-
peared in the American Political Science Review of August~ 
1916~ and was subsequently reprinted in the volume of Studies. 
The essay deals with the Free Church of Scotland and its se-
cession from the Es.tablished Church of Scotland. Says Holmes: 
I should drop pragmatic and pluralistic. Perhaps 
I am the more ready to say so because after honest 
attention I don•t think there is much in either of 
those parts of W. James's philosophy. But in any 
event~ though Pound also talks of pragmatism, the judging of law by its effects and results did not 
have to wait for W. J. or Pound for its existence, 
and to my mind it rather diminishes the effect, or 
checks the assent you seek from a reader, if you 
unnecessarily put a fighting tag on your thought .••• 
1. Harold J. Laski~ Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty, 
p. ii. 
2. Ibid. _, p. iii. 
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The scope d~ state sovereignty is a question of fact. 
It asserts itself as omnipotent in the sense that 
it asserts what it sees fit to order it will make 
you obey •••• if the government of England or any other 
first class European power~ or under a changed Con-
stitution, the Congress of the u.s •... does see fit 
to order them, ·I conceive that order is as much law 
as any other ••• if as would be the case, the govern-
ment had the physical power to enforce its command. 
Law also as well as sovereignty is a fact. If in · 
fact Catholics or atheists are proscribed and the 
screws put on, it seems to me idle to say that it 
is now law because by a theory that·you and I hap-
pen to hold~ •• it ought not to be •••• 
All my life I have sneered at the natural rights 
of man -- and at times I have thought that the 
bills of rights in Constitutions were overworked --
but these chaps remind me if I needed it, and I am 
not sure that Croly doesn't, that they embody 
~rinciples-that men have died for, and that it is 
well not to forget in our histe to secure our no-
tion of general welfare •••• 
Laski replies the next day (the distance was only from BeverlY 
Farms to Cambridge): 
Whatever there was left of my heart that you 
had not won, this letter of today made complete-
ly yours. Your criticisms were helpful, and one 
at least got right in between my ribs •. I think 
it was laziness on my part to talk of pragmatism 
in reference to Jeffrey ••• but I wanted a name· 
that would show the legal theorists that those 
old Scotch boys had the stuff in them nearly a 
hundred years ago, and Pound seemed a good peg 
to hang that discourse upon. It was less James I 
had in mind than an emphasis on what you only --
so far as I have read the decisions of the Supreme 
Court -- just now seem to keep continually in mind, 
and that is the future of law no less than its 
past ••. 
1. Howe (ed.); H-L, I, 20, 21. 
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I want to stick to pluralistic or some such term. 
I am tremendously impressed by the way in which 
this age seems determined to seek for social unity 
at all costs and equally obstinate in refusing to 
recognize a lack of all-togetherness in things; 
social settlements to convince the poor that the 
rich are really with them at leart; negro colleges 
to tell them that it's all a matter of melanin; 
undogmatic Christianity to pretend that religion 
foresaw Darwin. What swoops down on me is the 
barriers.between things 3 not their unity._ I don't 
mind how it 1s described --but I badly want to em-
phasize its significance for political theory. 
Which leads me to remark that I have no quarrel 
with what you say about sovereignty -- though I 
have some footnotes. Of course the sovereign usu-
ally does make you obey; the trouble is that often 
when it does it is hopelessly wrong. My problem 
is to take away from the state the superior moral~ 
ity with which we have invested its activities 
and give them back to the individual conscience. 
Isn't there far too great a dread of responsibil-
ity today -- a tendency to push things on to gov-
ernment as an ultimate reservoir which excuses 
individual thinking? That is why I like Bills of 
Rights -- they said .to me n~heS'e are the things 
we the people of England cared about in 1701; and 
you be careful how you change them. 11 ••• The fight-
ing significance of guarantees -- thank you for 
the phrase -- can be made so big and so pregnant 
with good that I want to strike the sovereign who 
violates them.l 
The issues drawn into opposition here seem to be clear3 
although Laski's adulation might tend to muddle them> and the 
reader can only wonder how he could so gaily give thanks for 
the advice to drop ttpragmaticu and "pluralistic3 11 when much 
• • • f 
of his theory of sovereignty was at this time being built up 
around these concepts. The issue never entirely vanished from 
sight between them3 and although Laski's contentions changed 
radically3 it remains one of the most significant and inter-
1. Ibid.j pp. 22~ 23. 
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esting philosophical threads to trace through the correspond-
ence. Laski is at his best when he writes Holmes on March 
20, 1917: "I don 1 t think sovereignty is anything more than 
a balance of forces and I am anxiOus to stay the implicit 
theocratising of any other attitude. ul He is at his b.est 
here because his statement makes evident the similar absolu-
tism that exists in reactionary religious dogma, oriental 
despotism, the divine-right monarch, and the totalitarian 
state. If the human experience as written ~fi history teaehes 
anything, there i~. one moralizing that it has underscored and 
reiterated into the tragic platitude. The substitution of 
an absolute state for an absolute God means disaster, and 
this, in his first Studies on Sovereignty, I believe Laski 
was trying to say. 
In these early writings, Laski was arguing for the 
11pluralisticn conception of ultimate power. He presented the 
' . 
point of view, with ingenious and varied historical examples, 
that no state power is in itself ultimate, that power is often 
in conflict with itself, that various institutions and organ-
izations and sources represent power within the nation or the 
group, that these founts or foundations have frequently dif-
ferent degrees of weight, and that they are sometimes in head-
on collision. He even came close to declaring in the course 
of these essays, that power itself is a quasi-mysterious en-
1. Ibid., p. 68. 
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tity which is not easily analyzed or caught under a net or a 
microscope, that it frequently defies final or logi~al anal-
ysis, and that sometimes, when it is persistently traced 
down to its final or near-final origin, it even seems to re-
side in that weakest and most inconsistent of manifestations, 
the individual citizen or human being himself. 
In one of these early studies Laski draws the following 
conclusion: 
That is, indeed, the real significance of free-
dom. It alone enables the individuality of men to 
become manifest. But individuality is bound to 
suffer eclipse if power is unduly centered at some 
single point within the body politic •••• For if the 
good life is one day to be achieved by the majority 
of men and women it is only by the preservation of 
individuality that it can be done; and individuality 
in any generous perspective does not mean the rich 
and intense life of a few able men. 
That is why, at every stage in the social pro-
cess, we are concerned to throw the business of 
judgment upon the individual mind •••• It means the 
insistence that liberty consists above all in the 
full opportunity for active citizenship wherever 
there are1men with the will to think upon political problems. 
Commenting on passages such as these in all Laski 1s early 
writings Herbert A. Deane interprets them thus without much 
sympathy: 
To deny the voice of conscience, to bow to the 
contrary dictates of authority -- political, eccle-
siastical, or economic -- is the ultimate sin; for 
obedience to authority, unless it springs from indi-
vidual conviction, denies the essence of the human 
spirit, man's character as a free and responsible 
1. Laski, Authority in the Modern State~ pp. 90, 108, 109. 
... 
moral agent. The individual may attempt to tempo-
rize between the demands of his conscience and those 
of authority; but in the endJ he will discover what 
Lamennais realized at a certain point in his rela-
tions with the Papacy -- 'that) in any final exami-
nationJ he must take for truth and right conduct 
that which his conscience told him he might identify 
with truth and right conduct.' No matter how severe 
the penalties for disobeying the. dictates of auth-
ority and even though his disobedience should 'break 
the heart of the world)' at some point a man must 
take his stand and say with Luther) •Ich kann nicht 
anders. 1 Laski concludes thatJ faced with the com-
mands of the political authority) •an individual may 
decide on a course which enables justice to be done 
even though the state perish in the doing of it. 1 
Laski's thlsis is political Protestantism with a 
vengeanceJ••• 
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Laski in the preface to Authority in the Modern StateJ 
published in 1919J says: 1'But the great obligation of the 
book is to Mr. Justice Holmes. It goes too deep for words; 
and I can only emphasize my consciousness that I shall never 
know how much I have in these years learned from the talks we 
have had and the letters he has written. They are things 
that come but once or twice in a lifetime.i12 It is not sur-
prising that Holmes) however, rejected the whole kit and ca-
boodle of Laski's ideas as expressed in these early volumes. 
His formulations by this time were part of national intellec-
tual history. He was an old man and much quoted. His answer 
to Laski on some of these discussions referred to has long 
been part of that large body of impressiveJ quotable phrases 
1. DeaneJ op. cit., p. 38. 
2. LaskiJ Authority in the Modern StateJ p. x. 
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and sentences which make up his writings. 
Zachariah Chaffee in the Harvard Law Review of June 
1950~ tells us something of the strenuous work Laski did to 
keep that publication afloat during the war years when he 
was its editor. The entire issue~ 192 pages~ of the Novem-
ber 1917 Harvard Law Review is taken up with a project of 
his~ the publication of Leon Duguit 1s article Law and the 
State. Laski, who was enthusiastic about Duguit and about 
what he himself had accomplished in keeping the Law Review 
going, naturally wanted praise from Holmes and had written 
enthusiastically about Duguit. The footnote here tells us~ 
nThe problem discussed by Duguit was whether there exists 
ia jural principle (une regle de droit) superior to the 
•' 
State~ which forbids it from doing certain things and com-
mands it to do certain others.' (31 Harv. L. Rev. 1~ 2 
(1917) ). To this question Duguit gave an affirmative an-
. . 1- ' 
swer." But on December 3~ 1917~ Holmes wrote Laski: 
As to theory I don't get much nourishment from 
it~ my own views being simple and brutal. I don't 
care whether you use or discard the word sovereign-
ty •••• The only limit that I can see to the power 
of the law-maker is the limit of power as a ques-
tion of fact •••• 
When I talk of law I talk as a cynic. I don't 
care a damn if twenty professors tell me that a 
decision is not law if I know that the courts 
will enforce it •••• And I understand by human 
rights what a given crowd will fight for (success-
fully). Old Agassiz (Louis) once said that in· 
some part of Germany if you added a farthing to 
the price of a glass of beer there would be a 
revolution. If that was true~ to have beer at 
the current price was one of the rights of man 
in that place. 
It seems to me all fact -- and this endless 
jaw the blowing of soap bubbles •••• While I 
think it impossible to put the German practice 
in a logical hole~ my objection to it is one 
that admits that there is no superior arbiter--
it is one of taste -- but when men differ in 
taste as to the kind of world they want thl 
only thing to do is to go to work killing. 
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The surprising thing is not that Holmes entirely re-
pudiated Laski's notions. What is odd is~ given the friend-
ship anyway~ his entire lack of any sympathetic understand-
ing of what Laski was trying to say. Beginning Authority 
in the Modern State3 Laski had written Holmes on March 33 
1917: 
I have had two tremendous joys this week. 
Imprimis 3 I have begun to write my book on the 
French Catholics, and I round a joy in the la-
bour of composition which thrilled me. Really 
there is a splendour in the company of great 
men that compensates for everything. They seem 
to live by the mere chance of transferring 
them to the printed page; and when I meet Lamen-
nais in a better world I shall astonish him by 
a knowledge of his intimat·e thoughts .2 
A year and some months later (August 10, 1918), when 
the publication of Holmest Natural Law was first contem-
plated and discussed between them~ Holmes threw out a 
casual comment: 
1. Ibid., pp. 115, 116. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 64. 
I see in Lord Acton and Figgis influences that 
seem to me to have given an undue emphasis to 
your thought in certain directions. It is odd 
that a Catholic and a high church man should 
have succeeded in maki~ you keen about a 
schism in the Scottish lor any) church. The 
principle behind has assumed ao importanc.e in 
your mind that I hardly think it would have 
but for the interest those teachers inspired •••• l 
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Intentionally or not he misses Laski's whole argument 
and waves off his delicate and constructive researches into 
certain historical subt1eties concerning federalism and prob-
lems relative to the degrees of fluidity and the mitigation 
of the rigid and the static in concepts of the state and 
the way political realities dealing with convinced rebels 
and outsiders have been found to evolve in case experience. 
His findings are not unduly obscure and are the more import-
ant because their appreciation does require an unusual angle 
of vision3 and particular flair in treatment3 which flair 
Laski at this time gave promise of developing into a major 
contribution to political theory. ButJ perhaps, that 
Holmes was so ready to dismiss and disparage Laski's schol-
arship, lumping it with all 11 this endless jaw" he contemptu-
ously deprecated) was not altogether his own responsibility3 
but due in part 3 at least3 to Laski himself) who only a 
month after the letter quoted above concerning his joy in 
working on his study of the French Catholics, writes this 
to Holmes: 
1. Ibid., p. 162. 
.. _, '··' 
I 
I take comrort in the thought that my next book 
{i.e., Authority in the Modern State] is bound to 
aonvert you -- for it will make a most intimate 
appeal to your best (the C. J. would say your 
worst) emotions -- it will have a rine rlavour 
or thorough-going atheism about it. No one can 
read Catholic books and still believe in God --
the thing is toolutterly puerile to rit a big 
world like this. 
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The curious thing about such a statement is that Auth-
ority in the Modern State is not atheistic, and it is rail-
ing in with an unseeing disparagement or its material, such 
as Holmes did anyway, to treat it as iconoclasm. Laski 
was right in his first rererence to his joy in writing it, 
ror it has a sympathy and admiration ror the personalities 
he is examining which is very close to ~aith in their raith, 
out or which he is developing his own raith which has cer-
tainly many or the hallmarks of religious belier, both at 
this p0int with its humanistic emphasis on the mystical 
power of the individual conscience, and later when it in-
clined towards Marxist orthodoxy. Evident as it is that 
religious belief can have both good and bad corellaries, 
Laski 1s career exemplified them both. That he always stri-
dently claimed to be an atheist shows how little he knew the 
inner complexities of his own motivations and intensified 
the conrusions which clogged his positions and his inner 
comprehension of his own aims and his own teaching. His at-
tude towards religious belier or towards atheism, since he 
1. Ibid., p. 76. 
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would prefer it that way~ was widely different from that of 
Holmes; for Holmes' faith_, in the area of religion.t inas-
much as it was genuine skepticism_, contained the reverence 
which goes with any sincere philosophical attitude toward 
the unknown and the unanswerable. Then.t too_, Holmes' 
faith was grounded in that tendency towards a bursting mys-
ticism_, even more pronounced as mysticism than was Laski's. 
That mysticism such as his is dangerous when it is directed 
towards emotional kinship withffnature_, 11 or 11warfaren or the 
'!ruture_, u or 11blood and soiltt r~ther th~n it~ classical func-
tion of desiring immediate~erception of an awareness of 
God_, the career of Hitler offers all too much evidence; yet_, 
for all of the exchange on the topic, sparked by Ben Palmer 
in the American Bar Association Journal.t 1 Holmes was no 
Hitler or ladder to or forerunner of such. This goes with-
out saying, and is so far from fact as to be almost embar-
rassing to discuss. For the rest, even in his inconsisten-
cies he had no trace of the childish parade of self-conscious 
atheism which gave so much of the superficial, smart-aleck 
touch to Laski's polemics. The sincerity of Holmes' skep~­
cism, outside of the positions he assumed for the sake of 
his configurations in jurisprudence and political science, 
made his doubts devout and assume the forms.t even thDqggfu his 
occasional slip-shod jeers, of an antique and reverential piety. 
1. See_, Ben Palmer~ ffHobbes, Holmes and Hitler_, 11 American Bar 
Association Journal (November_, 1945)_, 569. And, Charles W. 
Briggs_, liJusti.ce Holmes Was Not on a Ladder to Hitler_, 
American.Bar Association Journal (October 1946), 631. 
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2. 
Holmes' article nNatural Lawn appeared in the November, 
'-1918, issue of the Harvard Law Review, when Laski was the 
Book Review editor. It is unfortunate that several of the 
letters exchanged between the two just before this publica-
tion are missing. Footnotes at this point in the volume of 
published letters refer to those which have been lost or 
state: "Any letters written by Laski in the interval are 
missing."1 "Brief notes from Holmes_, dated August 12_, 19_, 
' 2 
and 24 are omitted.n The reader can only conjecture wheth-
er there was more discussion between the two about the print-
ing of the paper other than the small amount of it which 
appears in publication. 
I am not easily moved [Laski wrote on August 27_, 
1918] •••• I do not mind.the extent of your reflec-
tions_, but I want that piece for the Law Review 
••• I know a good thing when I see it. There are 
only two things of yours that at first sight have 
moved me so much. One is the 'Soldiers Faith;' 
the o.ther the 1913 address to the Law Review 
[sic·] Association. And it is on a level with 
them both. Behind this_, there is the full know-
ledge of how absurd it is for me to estimate 
what you write. Howev~r., judgment is inevitable 
when one loves deeply.j 
Holmes answered: 
Your letter moved me much -- though when one 
has shared the intimacies of thought I attach 
less importance to external facts. That does not 
matter to the effect of your words. 
1. Howe., H-L_, I" 162. 
2. Ibid., p. 163. 
--
-·. 
3. Id. 
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As to my little piece I have copied it in the 
attempt to secure legibility for a cold world in 
which chirography seems to be an almost forgotten 
art. I shall keep it a day or two to see if 
minute tinkerments occur to me -- as few did on 
copying -- and then send it to you at Roc~ort. 
Have you any notion when it would appear?l 
On October 23rd Iaski wrote: ,.I enclose herewith the 
proof of your article. When you have read it will you send 
it back to me here. The only suggestion I have to make is 
that you put in a note saying that it was Geny's book which 
gave rise to the article; I think that is a piece of infor-
mation to which the reader is entitled.u2 
Holmes answered: 
As to the proof~ I agree to the reference to 
Geny but you must put it in as I have not the book. 
How would a note do in this form: 'Suggested by 
reading volume 2 of Geny~ (Title of book.) 1 
As I speak in less confident terms of the re-
sult of the war than now would be natural is there 
any objection to putting 1August, 1918 1 at the 
end as I have. I leave that to you.3 
A footnote at this point tells the reader: "The note 
as published was as follows: nsuggested by reading Francois 
Geny, Science et Technique en droit positif prive, Paris~ 
1915. 11 The second of Geny 1s three volumes was concerned 
primarily with the problem of Natural Law. 114 
. . 
Let us follow through some of these references to writ-
1. Id. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 166. 
3. Ibid.~ p. 167. 
4. Id. 
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are like Duguit and Geny, who in one way or another speak 
for a nHigher Principle 11 or some derivation of Natural Law, 
and who at this time so impressed Laski. The original re-
commendation on Geny had come from Laski, who had written 
Holmes on February 13, 1917, tti began Geny in the train on 
L 1interpretation dans le droit Francais (that's not the ex-
act title) and he swept me off my feet by his wisdom and 
his sanity and his perception. 111 A footnote gives the cor-
rect title: "Francois Geny, M(thods d 1interpreftation et 
sources en droit privef posi tif (1899). tt2 Another recommenda-
tion to Geny had come from Laski on June 24, 1917. 
When you settle down to reading I want to lend 
you a very remarkable pamphlet of Saleilles -- Le 
domaine public a Rome -- that perhaps you have not 
read. There's an amazingly brilliant analogy work-
ed out between the recognition of dominium and that 
of personality which thrilled me greatly. Of all 
continental jurists I put him first. I have anoth-
er volume you might like by Geny -- which discusses 
the systematische jurisprudenz of StammlerJ Duguit, 
Kohler) Hauriou et al and orientates on admirably. 
But you shall decide if you want them.j 
(Of HauriouJ Laski had fashioned another full issue of the 
Harvard Law Review.) 
The whole paragraph is quoted to illustrate the trend 
of Laski's legal admirations, at least theoretically, at 
this period in his life. Howe's footnote refers to Geny's 
( 
Science et technique en droit prive positif and to 
1. Ibid., p. 60. 
2. Id. 
3. Ibid.J p. 90. 
Volume II of Genyts four volume work, published between 1913 
-
and 1924, and tells us, "When Holmes read the volume in the 
summer of 1918 it stimulated him to write his essay 'Natural 
Law. ,ra Another· puff for Geny from Laski had been (May 15, 
1917): 
••• I have been reading furiously this last week--
much of Sainte-Beuve who is the prince of critics 
and a very able book by F. Geny, Science et tech-
nique en droit prive which I think you would 
greatly like. It's a brilliant & critical sur-
vey of the present situation in jurisprudence, 
bien documentee but every page of it thoughtful 
and arresting.2 
At this point in his early acquaintance with Holmes, 
it is evident that Laski in his strong enthusiasm for the 
ideations of Duguit, Saleilles and Geny, expected Holmes m 
share his predilections. Though it is not apparent from the 
corre$pondence, unless in the letters missing, when he sent 
Holmes the Geny volumes, it is clear that he did so with 
the sincere hope and expectation of a favorable reception 
from Holmes. They discussed the sending of these books. 
On July 2, 1917, Holmes said, with characteristic dry cau-
tion (referring to another book he was reading): 11Until I 
,.. . ' 
have broken the back of that I dontt want anything else ser-
ious --but after that welcome Saleilles. The volume by 
Geny (?) excites more doubt, yet perchance I might like to 
see it. You must put a civilized edge on me in some way ••• n3 
1. Id. 
2. Ibid., p. 85. 
3. Ibid., p. 91. 
11 I will send you Saleilles as soon as you give the call,'' 
Laski responds eagerly,l and a few days later the call 
comes, on July 8th. "Now, if you see fit to send on Sal-
eilles, or any othE:r book," Holmes writes, 
not too big, that combines amusement with instruc-
tion I shall be your willing pupil -- not mem-
oirs or French Revolution, etc. but matters savor-
ing more of abstract·ion, looking more in the di-
rection of philosophy, literature, sociology or 
law. I like to feel that in a general way I am 
widening the channel or increasing the flow of 
the stream of my dominant interests. tr2 
Laski answered: 
••• I have been buried in my book, which goes 
finely and is a source of unadulterated joy. I 
have had the chance of a real whack at the found-
ations of the Catholic Church and it has been a 
great joy to give it. This is the last of my 
ecclesiastical adventures and I am taking advan-
tage of it; henceforth my plans send me back to 
politics, impure and complex ••• I agree with Bob 
Barlow who said that apart from theology and sex 
there is really nothing to talk about.3 
With this further quasi-disparagement and lack of under-
standing of his own scholarship as embodied in Authority in 
the Modern State, he continues: "I know you 1 11 like the 
Saleilles and the Faguet; the Bru~tiere I regard as more 
problematical ••• ,n but the very next day Holmes wrote him 
grumpily, ni have read Saleilles with some surprise at your 
' 4 
enthusiasm.n Professor's Howe's biographical appendix to 
1. Ibid., p. 92. 
2. Ibid., p. 91. 
3. Ibid., p. 92. 
4. Ibid., p. 93. 
the letters tells us: ''Philosophically, Saleilles was al-
lied with those like Gierke, Demogue, and Hauriou who be-
lieved in the reality of collective personality and saw in 
the theory that the personality of groups is a fiction of 
the law; danger that private rights would be swallowed by 
public authority. ttl 
All book-lovers have been subject to this kind of damp-
ening response to their ebullience, but Laski experienced it 
with Holmes again and again. He did not give up for a long 
time. On October 3, 1917, he wrote from Cambridge, where he 
was about to begin his editorship of the Harvard Law Review, 
a post he held until June, 1919: 
I am having a very happy time. My lectures this 
year are on the things I really care about and I 
can have to the full limit what you would call my 
anarchistic ideas. But I keep withi~ the limit of 
the law by suggesting merely that there are pos-
sibilities still of inventiveness in the mechan-
isms of government. 
It is going to be a great year for the Law Re-
view. We begin with a great essay by Duguit which, 
apart from a note by me, takes up the whole Number. 
Later there will be papers by Berthelemy of ~aris, 
and Hauriou of whom I have spoken to you. These 
French fellows have so much to say that it's time 
America (and England) put its ea2 to the ground 
and caught the distant rumbling. 
On October 14 came Holmes' cold douche: 11I don 1t think 
so m~ch of Duguit & C?• as you seem to -- though I quite ad-
mit that Duguit is a thinker and an original man." Laski's 
.. 
dander is finally up -- momentarily at least. A week later 
-~owe, H-L, II, 1517. 
2. Howe, H-L, I, 102. 
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after outlining some more or his recent reading~ including: 
11Then some good essays by Charmont on the renaissance of 
natural law which would~ I think~ intrigue you: and a memo-
rial volume on Saleilles which was very impressive," he 
thrusts back-. .ttYour judgments need a comment from me. I 
should say that Duguit is WLthout question the first of liv-
ing political thinkers. With much of his work I quarrel --
but he always seems to me original~ sane and well-based on 
the hard facts of life. But the essay in the November Law 
Review will convince you of this. t~l 
I , 
In the whole issue of the November 1917 Harvard Law Re-
view consisting or Leon Duguit's article Law and the State~ 
Dug~it 1 s name does not appear on it or on any index other 
than on Laski's appended note commenting on his significance~ 
and then his first name is never mentioned. There are other 
indications of hasty publishing. An insight into the prob-
able cause of this appears in Zachariah Chaffee 1s comment 
on Harold Laski and the Harvard Law Review, already referred 
to. Chaffee says: 
Laskits influence upon the Harvard Law Review ex-
tended much beyond the pages devoted to books in 
the concluding pages of each issue. He took a·vali-
ant part in the continual struggle by the little 
board of the war years to keep the ship afloat. By 
November~ 1917, the situation got so desperate that 
an entire issue was devoted to a single article by a 
learned Frenchman, enlisted by Laski, whose annexed 
comment on. the author~ was much more interesting 
than the author himself. Next spring he got another 
1. Ibid., p. 105. 
French thinker to give a shorter article~ to 
which he also appended an illuminating Note.l 
Duguit introduces his own article as follows·: 
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It will then~ it is hoped~ have only greater weight 
in showing that German doctrines of public law in 
the nineteenth century from Kant to Jhering and 
Jellinek were~ for the most part~ mere apologies 
for the use of force; and that under cover of jurid-
~cal theories they had only for their object the 
reestablishment of absolutism of the State~ and 
especially of the prince who represents it at home 
and abroad: while on the contrary~ the persistent 
effort of French juridical doctrine has ever been~ 
from 1789 to the present time~ to find the true juristic basis for legal limitation upon the power 
of the State~ and to insure its sanction. Its con-
ceptions have been diverse. They have varied from 
the purest individualism to the completest social-
ism. But the end in view has always been the same; 
namely, to prove that the powers of the state are 
limited by a jural principle (une regle de droit) 
superior to the state itself.~ _ 
In his Note on Duguit, which contains an ample and enthusi-
astic outline of Laskits own early ideas of Sovereignty~ 
Laski says: 
Roughly speaking, M. Duguit denies at once the 
personality and sovereignty of the state. He de-
nies ·the personality of the state on the ground 
that it is a clumsy fiction. The only realities 
are human beings •.. He denies the sovereignty of 
the state because it seems to him to imply the ex-
istence of rights where he sees only the existence 
of duties .•. For M. Duguit, the state is no more 
than a group of men between whom, through a vari-
ety of historical circumstances, a differentiation 
between rulers and subjects has been introduced. 
It is not, in his view~ an adequate defense of 
sovereignty as exercised by the rulers, to discuss 
1. Zachariah Chaffee, "Harold Laski and the Harvard Law Re-
view", Harvard Law Review" vol. 63, p. 1398, June~ 1950. 
2. Leon Duguit, 11 Law and the State 11 , Harvard Law Review, 
vol. 31, p. 1, November, 1917 . 
. ~ ..... --·- ....... , 
its origins; the only justification of any policy 
is the contribution it ma~es to the social need. 
Upon each one of us~ therefore~ is cast the duty 
of narrowly scrutinizing the action of public 
authority to see if it fulfills this objective 
test. If it does not~ it cannot, for us~ have 
any legal validity whatever ••• l 
Laski points out the intellectual affiliations of Duguit it 
England and America, and of America he says: 
••• the classic home of federalism~ nowhere is 
there ground more fertile for such seed as M. Du-
guit has sown ••• A significant and striking opinion 
of Mr. Justice Holmes has emphasized the confidence 
of the Supreme Court in the federal adventure. 
The pragmatic philosophy of law at which, in the 
last ten years, Dean Pound has so earnestly la-
bored is, at least in its large oatlines3 consis-
tent with M. Duguit 1 s conclusions. In a very 
learned and suggestive work Professor Mcilwain 
has offered a theory of sovereignty full of pos-
sibilities to the student of these French ideas; 
and Mr. Herbert Croly~ one of the most penetrating 
of American observers, has very recently noted 
the decline and fall of the sovereign state~ •• 
The whole background of American constitutional-
ism is a belief in the supremacy of reason. The 
very limitation of the much criticized Fourteenth 
Amendment only means~ as Mr. Justice Holmes has 
repeatedly emphasized, that legislation must be 
reasonably conceived and adopt reasonable means 
of execution •••• We are asking the State to justi-
fy its existence not sa much by the methods i~ uses 
as by the value of the results it can obtain. 
Holmes' answer to this of December 3~ 1917, was in a 
low growl: "Now Duguit in the H.L.R. is read -- with the 
anticipated result."3 Then comes his dictum that the super-
ior arbiter is one of taste, as already quoted: "but when 
1. Harold Laski, 11Note on Duguit"~ Harvard Law Review, vol. 
31, p. 189, November, 1917. 
2. Ibid., pp. 191, 192. 
3. Howe (ed.), H-L3 I, p. 115. 
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men differ in taste as to the kind of world they want the 
only thing to" do is to go to work killing. 11 1 Specifically 
on Duguit he says: 
If Duguit's criterion is a new bill o~ rights 
to be enforced by the Courts it adds nothing to 
juridical theory on the fundamental problem. If 
it is not, then it is merely a counsel of perfec-
tion that if accepted might stimulate a revolution 
at a different point. But the question when and 
where you will revolve is a question-of how a 
given crowd feels at a given time -- not a juridi-
cal question at a11.2 
So far in the correspondence Laski had taken little ser-
ious issue with any of Holmes' pronouncements, although once 
or twice he had put his back up. For instance, he had writ-
ten on May 22, 1917: 
I note your economic trouncings; clearly we have 
to fight it out, for I do not think I quite under-
stand the drift of your remarks and you must tutor 
me by talk. Your conception helps me~ but I want 
to append a warning as to its static character. 
That is my difficulty. It gives me an added rea-
son for wanting to see you again.j 
Now~ however~ his answer to Holmes' slashing destruction 
of Duguit, just given, is quoted at length because it is 
probably from the point of view of his own sincerity, the 
most significant one he wrote Holmes. He was in it taking 
his own struggling development very seriously. He was point-
ing out to Holmes as clearly as he could where Holmes' own 
massive contributions to working theories of government fitted 
1. Ibid.~ p. 116. 
2. Id. 
3. Ibid., p. 87. 
into his own abstractionsJ and whereJ consequentlyJ their 
mutual relationship could have the richest possible future 
satisfaction for them both. There was a period in the be-
ginning of the friendship when he was not the flattererJ 
the time server or even the gay amuserJ but when it is fully 
evident he longed to educate and be educatedJ to enrich 
the insight of an old man, as much as the friendship of 
such an age and experience had shocked him with a sense of 
appreciative wonder for what the exchange could progressive-
ly mean. This attitude did not last long. Holmes himself 
made it impossible with his debunking jeers. And Laski 1s 
own character made even the possibility of success in such 
an attempt very uncertain. It was so easy for him to fall 
back into the insouciant wise-crack and become the careless 
jester of one who goes along for the ride, since the ride 
was really such a brilliant one and the obtaining it such 
extraordinary good luck, and his jests and his clever rumi-
nationsJ faithfully presented as they were over the yearsJ 
were an honest payment for its astounding allottment of 
prestige. 
This is what he wrote Holmes immediately after receiv-
ing the above: 
You seem to me to stop before Duguit (I do 
not swallow him, or anyone else, whole) begins. 
You say that what the courts pronounce,is law. 
So it is; but it is not less important to know 
the sources whence it derives. Now I take it 
that one of the main changes of the last thirty 
years --you are partly responsible for it -- is 
the addition of new elements to its determination 
-- e.g. the considerations you had in mind in 
f •. 
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Coppage v. Kansas could not have been even under-
stood by your brother Field in the old days. Du-
guit says that more and more the courts will have 
to pronounce a law that takes into account the 
modern disposition of economic forces as~ I think~ 
(under correction) the Supreme Court did when it 
decided the constitutionality of the Adamson Law ••. 
The thing means~ I take it~ that courts will more 
and more find that their sovereignty is going to 
be bound by the nature of their decisions. Three 
more decisions like that of the majority in the 
Lochner case would~ after the war~ paralyse any 
organ or organs that attempted its enforcement. 
The truth is that we are witnessing a revival of 
'natural' law and 'natural' is the purely induct-
ive statement of certain minimum conditions we 
can't do without if life is to be decent. The 
working-class today won't acdept decisions or 
statutes that are not based upon the acceptance~ 
voluntary or not~ of these standards -- and law 
and everything else has got to shape itself to 
their determination. That mecns the end of the 
bourgeois state -- and we head fast for what I 
don't think will be pleasant~ the transference of 
economic and political power from the mercantile 
to the working-classes. I agree heartily that 
where there is a difference of taste there can't 
be compromise on conduct -- but the extermination 
is going to be the destruction of things like 
laissez-faire and the like i.e. anything that does 
not correspond to the ideas that are becoming increas-
ingly dominant of what justice means in cash terms. 
It means a state with limited powers siml>ly be-
cause (thank God) the greatest discovery of the 
war is.the relentless bureaucracy involved in state-
socialism and its utter incompatibility with lib-
erty. The things the crowd will die for will be 
the democratic control of industry~ the control 
of prices and profits~ a graduated income tax and 
the like -- and because the crowd will die for 
them as you say they are natural rights. But I 
also think -- what you omit -- that they represent 
a bigger thing than the nineteenth century under-
stood -- the movement towards the inductive reali-
sation of these 'natural' rights into a general-
ised social scheme in which a broad happiness (as 
the Utilitarians would have put it} will be reali-
sed after a hell of a row to get to it. Russia 
has started a movement of which theerolution is 
still only at the beginning. I hope to see the 
best years .of it -- first lean and hungry and then 
a larger fulfillment~ because they will have the 
epic proportions of the sixteenth and early seven-
teenth centuries. But all this is talk for when 
I impinge on the Washington horizon late next 
month ••• 
I hammer at Figgis et al. for a definite (and 
noble) cause~ I am eager to get politics taught 
historically instead of descriptively and I think 
that to push home the weakness of· the second meth-
od and the strength of the first is the one way 
to do it ••• Figgis does that and I know of no one 
else apart from Maitland •.• of real originality 
who does and writes in English ••• l 
Since Laski has here such an outstanding tribute to 
Figgis~ it might be well to review briefly some of the ex-
change between him and Holmes on this topic. It had begun 
long before~ at the very outset of the correspondence when 
Laski' sent Holmes~ in July~ 1916~ two volumes of John Ne-
ville Figgis~ Churches in the Modern State~ and The Divine 
Right of Kings. Holmes was then expressing all his opinions 
with the courteous and urbane reticence which belongs with 
an opening acquaintance~ 
I have begun on Figgis~ Churches in the Modern 
State, with much interest ••. I suspect that you 
and -Figgis are working the personality business 
a little hard, and drawing doubtful conclusions 
from it ••• I reopen my letter for an imbecility. 
I early acquired an anti-Bergsonian conviction 
of the mechanical action of the human mind --
by seeing the self-gratulatory smile with which 
man after man would say ffAchillestr to me when I 
was wounded in the heel •. Each thought he was . 
being and manifesting a personality -- all of 
which is a preface to asking how many you have 
heard apply the converse of the New Testament 
saying, and declare t~at you can't gather 
thistles from Figg's. 
1. Ibid.~ pp. 116, 117. 
2. Ibidq p. 6. 
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A footnote here tells us_, nThe pluralistic thesis of 
Laski and Figgis emphasized the.~eality and freedom of group 
and corporate personalities_, and denied the omnicompetence 
of the state 1s sovereignty. ul 
Holmes' pun is a very good one_, and reminds the read-
er involuntarily of his famous father. Perhaps Holmes was 
even thinking of the same source_, for the reference to the 
Civil War wound of long ago would also call up one of Dr. 
Holmes' old witticisms. Keeping Wendell's injury open for 
healing with a wedge of carrot_, Dr. Holmes once gave the 
heel a pinch and commented something to the effect that 
this would remind the patient of another yegetable a 
ttpa's nip." From the evidence it would seem that the young-
er Holmes never took warm-heartedly to this type of jesting. 
Laski responded warmly_, however_, to this one. 
Your letter was a challenge no less than informa-
tion ••• ! am under agreement with Croly not to in-
troduce your phrases more than twice in any article 
and thrice in any number ••• Felix is teaching the 
growing youth ••• that cases like Adair v. U.S. and 
Lochner v. U.S. [sic] have really got a philosophy 
within them. 
I think your 'imbecility' had more truth than 
we like. If you read the religious work Figgis 
has turned out since he started in 1911 to justifY 
the ways of God to man_, you would admit that it is 
not only possible -- Christ notwithstanding -- to 
get thistles from Figg 1s but even to find the 
Figg 1s nothing but thistles. I take your comment 
on 'pushing personality too hard' to heart and 
mind. I wonder though if the kind of polyarchy 
it politically represents isn't as a fact the real 
1. Ibid. _, p . 6. 
salvation for democracy. It seems to me that 
groups -- even if we have later to read them in 
a state context -- are simply basic and I am 
human enough to read sovereignty in terms of 
their consent. Yale is publishing a little 
volume ••• in which I 1ve tried to show the sig-
nifican1ce of this as a working theory of the 
state. 
In Churches and the Modern State Figgis has said: 
Now the State did not. create the family, ·nor 
did it create the churches; nor even in any real 
sense can it be said to have created the club or 
the trades union; nor in the Middle Ages the 
guild or the religious order, hardly even the 
universities or the colleges within the univer-
sities: they have all arisen out of the natu-
ral associative instincts of mankind~· and should 
all be treated by the supreme authority as~ 
having a life original and guaranteed) to be 
controlled and directed like persons, but not 
regarded in their corporate capacity as mere 
names, which for juristic purposes and for these 
purposes only are entitled persons. As a matter 
of fact, in England at least, it is these smaller 
associations which have always2counted for most in the life of the individual. · 
It can readily be seen what Laski owed to Figgis, and 
he did not easily give up his allegiance to him. The refer-
ences continue in the letters. Even a·year and a half later 
he was writing, "The comfort I get from Maitland and you and 
Figgis is that you do demand your texts; and not the easy 
flow of winning sentences will seduce you. 113 But unfortun-
ately for him, as he moved further and further from his 
early Figgis-Barker-Duguit-Geny influences, he·himself began 
to demand his texts less and less. Whether it was the easy 
1. Ibid. , p . 7. 
2. John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, p. 47. 
3. Howe, H-L, I, 125. 
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flow of his own winning sentences or not, the sterile 
cliches of economic determinism eventually became enough. 
His many later books in this vein are written almost en-
tirely witho~t footnotes. 
Of Figgis we are told in Howe's appendix: "Gencerned 
primarily with assuring churches adequate freedom, Figgis 
insisted, wit& Gierke, that each group in society has a 
personality of its own and an inherent liberty of growth. 
He had great influence on the movement in English political 
theory tewards plaralism.n1 Of F. W. Maitland% uRis 
eontributiens to the legal and institational history of 
_ England were of une~ualed brilliance, mingling literary 
style, philosephic insight, and detailed learning with such 
graceful ease that few of his readers have failed to fall 
victims to his charm. He influenced Laski's political 
thought principally through his Introduction to a substan-
tial portion of Gierke's Political Theories of the Middle 
AH&.. tt2 And of Geny: 11 A realist te some and a neoseholastic 
to others, Geny attacked the assumption that logie was a 
sufficient instrument of interpreting the code, insisted that 
the solution of legal questions requires 'free scientific 
research, 1 and urged that the creative responsibility of 
judges necessitates frequent reference to the law of nature 
and to standards of justice and utility. n3 
1. Ibid.,cx~ 1498. 
2. Ibid., II, 1511. 
3. Ibid., p. 1500. 
.·.-~: 
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Charles G. Haines in his Revival of Natural Law Con-
cepts has a longer analysis of Genyts position. He says: 
Geny> who like Duguit ranks as one of the fore-
most jurists of France> has been laboring many 
years to have his countrymen value more highly 
the superior law concepts~ which he conceives 
as the source and sanction of positive law ..•• 
Man~ considered as he is~ living amidst nature 
and society~ finds himself~ according to Geny~ 
surrounded by an ensemble of 11necessary rela-
tions which are derived from the nature of 
things." ••• From these faetors arise.natural laws, 
some of.which are transcendent to all experience. 
Man can acquire a knowledge of these transcen-
dent rules and can be guided by them~ though 
he cannot successfully resist them. To Geny 
these natural laws have a distinct relation to 
the religious and moral life of man. The fun-
damental problem of the jurist~ no matter un-
der what forms it may be disguised~ Geny thinks~ 
is ''the eternal problem of natural law (droit).'·' 
And while the doctrines of natural law have . 
taken various forms, some of which continue to 
hold sway today, one no longer pretends to 
build through reason an ideal system of law, 
eternal and immutable> which is .e~ually applic-
able to all times and all countries. 
Though Geny recognizes a theoretical suprem-
acy of natural law and suggests that in the case 
of an absolute conflict natural law must be su-
perior to the written law he realizes the im-
practicability of this conelusion •••• The main 
obstacle, he thinks~ which prevents the main-
tenance of the principles of natural law when 
they eome into conflict with the positive W~X~7 
ten law is that these principles of natural law~ 
however firm their basis~ eonsist only of gen-
eral directions of conduet •.. It is his belief 
that this vagueness can in part be overcome by 
bills of rights in written constitutions wherein 
are expressed the essential principles of immut-
able natural law •.• 
It is necessary, Geny believes> to find the 
source of the law in natural law, whieh has de-
veloped from ancient times and has persisted in 
spite of all opposition and eritieisms. He 
thinks it is not~ as is often suggested, a means 
of supplying omissions in positive legal rules 
but the very foundations upon which positive 
rules rise and develop.l 
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Haines gives a thorough analysis of Geny's work3 whose 
three slim volumes (followed by a fourth3 1924) 3 Science et 
technique en droit prive posi tif (Paris 3 19143 ~1915L have 
not appeared in English. Geny's aim 3 in some measure like 
ether Freneh theorists who are impressed by varied inter-
pretations of Natural Law, or versions of Higher Law3 is to 
explore the legal and teehnieal basis for implementing the 
ethieal abstraotions 3 the intuitive perceptions of fair 
play and justice, which in one form or an0ther move all men. 
In the opening pages of his work he says: 
/ / . / Aussi bien, quand on y refleehit, en se rend aise-
ment compte, que, la philosophie generale n'ayant 
pour objeet que les raisons supremes et universelles 
des choses, et le philosophe n 1etant rien de plus 
qu 1un homme qui medite sur les dennees de la na-
ture, en vue d'organiser methodiquement le savoir 
et de diriger rationnellement 1 1 aetion, ehaque , 
speeialiste doit philosopher a son heure3 et, apres 
aVoir degage des faits Soumis a son observation les 
lois de sa discipline, harmoniser eelles-ei avee 
les prineipes superieQrs, aecessibles, dans leur 
teneur essentielle3 a tout homme qui consenta 
s 1assujettir ala ferme domination de la raison.2 
That Genyts work has net been entirely forgotten cur-
rently in discussions on jurisprudence is indicated in an 
article by Roscoe Pound in the 1960 Natural Law Forum. 
Of those who have professed to expound natural 
law in recent times I rate highest Francois Geny. 
1. Charles Grove Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Con-
cepts, pp. 289~292. 
2. grane0is Geny, Science et technigue en droit prive · 
positif, I, 5. 
To the Continental jurists. of the seventeenth and 
the eighteenth century~ natural law (or perhaps 
we should say the law 0f nature) meant an ideal 
development of precepts of the modern Roman law 
in which they had been trained and taught to 
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find authoritative principles. Geny saw the im-
portance of technique along with precepts and 
ideals -- put in better order~ he considers 
ideals~ preeepts 3 and teehniqae •••• Thus we get 
an ideal plan of a legal system' a regime of i-
deals, precepts -- prineiples 3 rules 3 eoncep-
tiens3 and standards -- and teehniques 3 for making 
effective the ideal of justice. Geny has given us 
an idea of the first importance: the idea ef 
measuring of legal preeepts ••• by a reasoned tech-
nique guided by the ideal of the end of law in 
action.l 
One more quotation from the beginning of the exchange is in 
order to show the direction of Laski's thinking when he 
first knew Holmes3 the way that Natural Law, the association 
theory of the state and pluralism in sovereignty were een-
eepts extraordinarily fertile and exciting to him. Way 
back on December 13 19613 he wrote Holmes: 
1. 
Which reminds me ef an intellectual hemby I 
have at the moment. Have you ever noticed that 
French legal speculation from 1870-1900 exhibits 
on the whole a dissatisfaction with tae state3 
and that men like Duguit and Charment try te 
make it no more than a great public service cor-
poration with a renascent nataral law behind --
whereas in Germany me-n (Kohler3 Stammler are no-
table) have been content. with it and hav~ striven 
to analyse society in a state-context. I am 
driven to wonder if the cause of this is not to 
be found in 1870. The State failed the French 
and they felt driven te look outside it for sal-
vation; but the Germans were we 11 served hy it 
and their victory is written large across the face 
of their jurisprudenee. Is this all wild? 
I have had a glorious time working out my his-
tery ef eerporations -- now nearly done. There 
Rescse Pot:m.d3 11Natural Natural Law and Pesitive Natlll.ral 
Law"3 Natural Law Forum_, Vol. 53 pp. 703 71~ 1960. 
are one or two interesting things -- as that~ fer 
instance~ r®yal control ever foreign trade preb-
ably gees back te the write ne exeat regno; and 
that the idea of majority action in due ferm be-
ing eerperate aetien is intelleetUI.al theft from 
the Dominieans. It is really a very thrilling 
story and I wish that Maitland were alive to tell 
it. ~he whale thing~ tee~ throws light on the 
origins ef parliamentary sovereignty. I am 
quite clear that the prerogative in the.middle 
ages is simply the peliae power and the meaning 
of Cremwell and 1688 is that Parliament and not 
the king shall exercise it. One day I'll work 
this out in full~ but it ~eems to me to illumin-
ate a let of dark plaees. 
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Wh.ile it is net evident just when Laski sent Holmes 
the velumes ey Ge~Y~r. it is abe.:ndantly evident that they-: 
_, 
were discussing his ideas _and the ideas ef other politieal 
scientists elosely eonneeted with him fer almost two years 
before Holmes wrote his essay on Nataral Law~ and that 
Laski was~ on the whole and to say the least~ favorably 
impressed and considerably stimulated by these ceneeptions. 
Helmes never responded to this enthusiasm and always re-
garded the whole constellation of these ideas of Laski's, 
together with everyone else whom Laski was reading as rela-
tive to the whole subject in some direction or another --
D~guit~ Chamont~ Gierke~ Stammler, Saleilles, Figgis, and 
Geny, as well as many others -- with dry disfavor. It may 
seem redundant to stress again Laski's extreme youth at a 
time in his eareer of whieh Zaehariah Chaffee has written, 
Like Bishop Berkeley's visit to Rhode Island 
in the middle of the Eighteenth Century, Harald 
Laski's sojurn at Harvara trem 1916 until. 1920 
1. Rowe, H-L, I, p. 39. 
came at just the right time to stimulate the 
growth or new strains in American thought. 
Though only twenty-three~ he was already at the 
height of his powers. He possessed an immense 
range of reading~ an intense curiosity to learn~ 
n~t only from books~ but also from talking with 
individuals of all tyPes~ and consummate skill 
in debate.l 
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His unusual promise as of this date was strongly mark-
ed by his enthusiasm for the men who had already influenced 
him~ partic~larly in English political theory and jurispru-
dence~ Barker~ Figgis and Maitland~ all proponents) eaeh in 
his own fashion~ of some position upholding Higher Law as a 
divergent bas±s for such Widespread realities as have figur-
ed in our own Constitutional development~ as Natural Rights~ 
the inviolability of Contract~ the Personality of Corpora-
tions~ and Judicial Review. Whatever Holmes thought of 
these concepts as historical racts~ and it is quite uncer-
tain just what he did think of them~ differing~ conflicting 
but closely related as they all are~ he had scant use for 
their theoreticians and constantly told Laski so. It seems 
clear that this disparagement eventually penetrated to some 
of the deepest levels of Laski's intellectual comprehension) 
that for mentor and master he began to substitute in this 
period Holmes for the earlier men he had worshipped. This 
is not to say that Holmes intentionally influenced him or 
influenced him for any consistent length of time. Holmes' 
prestige was experienced both mightily and subtly by the 
yeunger man~ and in a way which Laski never put in words or 
1. Chaffee~ op. cit., p. 1398. 
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allowed in his conseious thought. It is evident rrom the 
letters that ror awhile and sporadically he sincerely 
rought back in derence or these bodies or thought~ whieh 
had up to this time shaped his thinking~ but by the time 
Natural Law was published whatever basie right-about-race 
was due to happen in Laski's mind had already happened~ 
and it seems signiricant that ror six months berore the 
publication or Holmes' artiele they did not discuss or even 
rerer to any or this reading matter. Ir there was any rur-
ther talk or Geny at this time it must be in the brier notes 
whieh are lost. Long~ long arterwards in a letter dated 
August 6~ 1931~ Laski made a casual and disparaging remark 
about Geny which indicated al~ the old rire was gone and 
rorgotten: 
Then I read the rinal volume (some years old) 
or Geny's Science et technique en droit privee ~ 
rrom which I gather that the natural law or the 
Thomists is.the essential postulate on which all 1 law is based. And I read a novel by Clemenee Dane ..• 
1. .Howe~ H-L~ II~ 1322. 
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On January 24_, 1918_, Laski wrote, ''Your two letters 
thrilled me ror they gave proor -- ir proof were needed --
that the agreement we have is making me a not inapt disci-
ple,'' and he adds_, further on_, 11Do you think our feeling 
or the danger involved in over-centralized administration 
t t ~ul needs rur her commen ary ••. ~ This letter happened to 
'· . 
cross with one wherein his elderly rriend was doing both 
an extraordinary and a characteristic amount or philoso-
phizing. Holmes wrote: 
... I respect a tall hat or the cult or monogamy 
not.rrom the internal selr-justirication or the 
accidents or space and time but rrom considera-
tion that the inward necessity or man to idealize 
must express itselr in inadequate and transitory 
symbols of no value in themselves but reverent 
ror the eternal movement or which they are the 
momentary rorm. 
Well -- the universe may be contemplated in 
two ways -- one our usual one_, at the point or 
contact where it is rinite_, measurable_, predict-
able --- the other as a whole_, as an inexplicable 
mystery_, which one can help oneselr to realize 
by thinking that a roomful or men would take us 
back to the unknown. If 0ne dwells on that and 
becomes emotionally possessed by it one very 
well might accept any cult that he round at hand 
never troubling about its finite rallaoies but 
taking it as the momentary expression of the 
eternal wonder.2 
Laski answered: 11 •• • So long as we have a veneration 
ror reason and a scepticism in eommon there can be little 
2. Ibid._, p. 181. 
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ground for serious disagreement between us. I have spent 
the week on Hegel. •• nl 
The subtle ehange which was about to take plaee in 
Laski's orientation would seem to begin right here~ in 
sentiments like this of February 10~ 1918. 
I take my hat off to your remarks on Hegel. 
I am all for the aperqu. I think this world 
is far too big.for one man to get enough vis-
ion to reduee it to a system and as a faet I 1m 
pretty sure that every philesopRY is really no 
more than the brilliant hypostatisation of an 
individual temperament ••. But seriously it 
strikes me that the only two theoretically pos-
sible attitudes are to deny the world like a 
solipsist or to aecept it like a pluralist and 
either way ought really to land one in prison. 2 
On February 22~ 1918: 
~· •. a little medallion of Jeremy Bentham tells 
me to beware of 'Nonsense on stilts! 13 
And on February 22~ 19i8: 
I am glad that Merz gave you some comfort. 
He makes me feel all the time an immense regard 
for his c~mpetenee, a respect for his critical 
judgment~ but an angry sense that he is in 
reality searching for some 1 ~gher synthesis' 
that I could not understand. 
Merz·; . History of European Thought in the Nineteenth 
Century, he had just recommended to Holmes ten days before--
who had requested some reading -- in this sentence t 11Merz 1 s 
(I expect you know it) is in four volumes~ but it reads like 
1. Ibid., p. 131. 
2. Ibid., p. 135. 
3. Ibid., p. 138. 
4. Ibid.~ p. 137. 
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a great novel and thrilled me. 11 Holmes had answered a week 
later (February 18): "I began.volume 3 of Merze ••. I doubt 
~ 
if he is very pungent but that is not necessary -- and I 
infer that he would be down on our-scepticism as barren, 
which I don't think it is. Also I got fed up with his anti-
thesis of creative and critical moments. If any thought 
is creative all fresh insights are. Sum total, I am pleas-
ed at the chance to get a general view in the place of my 
partial knowledge.:n So Laski answered, as quoted above, 
with a crack at the 11higher synthesis". 
In the letter following Laski's reminder of the famous 
words of Jeremy Bentham on Natural Rights, Holmes says, 
following a sharp comment about William James: 
••• So, to see pragmatism grouped with other vol-
untarist systems, etc. etc. The man's own philo-
sophy or desire for one strikes me as unimportant. 
T~e eternal demand for the superlative degree --
the unwillingness to accept less than being in on 
the ground floor with God -- don't impress me 
much, except as a fact in psychology. Why should 
we not be humble -- why not willing to admit that 
the primordial wiggle of the first churning of 
chaos came before our time? Not that I shouldn't 
like to have an angel abou~ a. span long light on 
the top of my inkstand here and say, 1 God directs 
me to tell you that it's you and He, and He made 
the rest but you made yourself and He desires 
your friendship' --or other encouraging message ---
that was warmeD than the tepid concession of life 
as it is.l 
••. My reading ends with this week. I think I shall 
reread Fatten's pevelopment of English Thought to 
see how good a ease he makes out for the origin of 
eaeh new system in some ehange of the environment --
1. Ibid., p. 139. 
a healthy skeptical corrective to Merz.l 
Laski answers immediately: 
Your speculation in re Merz was even truer 
than y~u know. He recently published an essay 
on the relation between soienee and religion 
which seemed to me utterly unimportant and full 
of that insidious optimism which I loathe so 
in Coleridge: yes there is a lot of pain in 
the world but God is hard at work for good 
gentlemen so obey him and keep quiet. I be-
lieve nothing so surely as that this facile 
faith in design is· the tap-root of most indif-
ference to reality.2 
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On April 7th hecgain affirms his lack of insight about 
his own recent work~ Authority in the Modern State% as he 
appeals to Holmes to criticize plans for his next book: 
I have finished my book and I feel alter-
nately triumphant and desperate. The triumph 
comes when I think of the neat piles of manu-
script devoted to the dissection of people and 
ideals I do not like; but the desperation comes 
from losing an old friend who really gave me 
much joy and from the kind of intellectual fati-
gue due to the release from a fit of energy. So 
I am like a collapsed balloon and wait with 
eagerness the time and occasion to begin afresh. 
My plan really can 1 t get going until the term 
ends; though I want to submit it to the judicial 
mind i.e. to have your criticism.3 
pn April 21st~ following a comment about Voltaire~ he says: 
••• I like a man who thumbs his nose at the chur-
ches. We are too damned respectful to them in 
general) with the result that theology as a study 
gets an entirely undue preeminence. I can see 
Christianity as a problem in history; but when 
I am told that the incarnation and the atonement 
may be spiritually true while they are historic-
1. Ibid.) p. 139. 
2. Ibid., p. 141. 
3. Ibid.~ p. 14J. 
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ally false I can only see an excuse fer the pre-
servation of vested interests ••• I can't for the 
life of me see that a hundred years of scienti-
fic criticism has undermined the ecclesiastical 
influence in politics. I think the power of the 
churches has probably weakened~ but I doubt if 
they could be defeated in ~n open fight ••• It 
seems to me that there is really need for a big 
man to attempt the analysis of ecclesiasticism 
with all its subterfuges -- a kind of Book of 
Church Fallacies. They have it all their own 
way at present; and oily parsons like the Arch-
bishep of York nonintellectually convinced cart-
loads of Americans that the Church of England is3 
after all~ a great national institution it would 
be desecration to disestablish. 
This is .the line of argument which his correspondence 
with Holmes is strengthening. Holmes writes~ as he says~ 
a very self-revealing letter on May 8th • 
••• This last reminds me that I have attended two 
Catholic funerals 3 where high mass was said for 
South American diplomats~ with a mixture of awe 
and amazement that grown men could do such things 
that I always feel. I thought I was original in 
saying that I didn't believe in.Hell but was 
afraid of it.until I saw it quoted in a newspaper 
from Madame de Stael. Our early imp:r_essions 
shape our later emotional reactions and when one 
adds the experience of having been cocksure of 
things that weren't soJ I can't help an occasion-
al semi-shudder as I remember that millions of 
intelligent men think that I am barred from the 
face of God unless I change. But how can one 
pretend to believe what seems to him childish 
and devoid alike of historical and rational foun-
dations? I suppose sueh theughts would be as 
likely to occur to you abo~t Valhalla or the Ma-
hometan hell as about this. Felix said so him-
self the other night -- but I was brought up in 
Boston -- and though I didn't get Hell talk from 
my parents it was in the air. Oh -- the ennui of 
those Sunday morning church bells3 and hymn tunes3 
and the sound of the citizen's feet on the pave-
ment --not heard on other days. I hardly have 
reeovered from it now. I am glad to remember 
1. Ibid., p. 150. 
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that when I was dying after Ball's Bluff I remem-
bered my father's saying that death. bea repent-
ances generally meant only that the man was scared 
and refle·cted that if I wanted to I ceuldn't, be-
cause I still thought the same. ~he last is the 
point, for I see ne virtne in being brave against 
the universe -- against the source of the power 
that enables yeu to raise your defiant fist. For-
give this theological padding. It happened to. 
come into my head -- and is a self-revelation 
like anything el~e -- and one end of letters is 
self-revelation. 
Laski's enthasiastie response is by return mail: 
That was a glorious letter of' yours for which 
I am even more than erdinarfly grateful. That I 
sympathize with your theological reflexions, I 
do not need to tell you. If' there is one thing 
of which I become more convinced as I have gone 
on with my work it is that religious.eonvictions 
that are even remotely orthedox stand in the way 
of' any rational political system. They always 
imply somewhere a larking conviction that God 
has a hand in the business, and that will come 
eventually to mean an insistence upon the unre-
ality of evil. I'm not indeed certain whether 
theology is reconcilable with any philosophic 
system except idealism which, for me, would be 
fatal to its acceptance. Did yo~ ever read B. 
Russell's rather striking piece of rhetoric ~­
"Free Man 1 s Worship u (Mys tie ism and Legic) • I .. 
think that is the religion of' all sensibl~ men.2 
It is a long letter, One needs hardly pause at the 
inconsistent distinction between his idea of theology as the 
unreality of evil and Holmes' objection to it as emphasis on 
hell. Tfle ending contains a prospectus of' his next book. 
It is an outline of' Grammar of' Polities which, as projected 
here, did not develop in faat anything at all like its ab-
stract and which saunds like the synopsis of' a much better 
1. Ibid., p. 154. 
2. Ibid., p. 154. 
and sounder b0ok than Grammar turned eut to be. He ends 
his outline: 
••• That leads to working eut the relation be-
tween the state and government. The rule of Law 
is estahlished whish involves a diseussion of 
sovereignty. That leads to talk of federalism 
and the separation of powers. We pass easily 
thereby to the state and the official thence 
the theory of parliamentary demecraey upon whieh 
grave note I conclude. It gives.me a sense of 
wild excitement to be on the threshold of a 
book, and especially one where the data~e not 
merely historical but also around about us. I 
want badly to ask yeu many questions.l 
It takes Holmes until the fall to eomment on Bertrand 
Russell: "I finished B. Russell Mysticism and Logic with-
out much profit. He seems to me in the emotional state not 
unlike that of the abelitionists in former days, which then 
I shared and new mueh dislike -- as it eatehes postulates 
2 like the influenza; n but he has an immediate Sf!U.elch f0r 
Laski's book, the prespeet c:>f whieh he says he nlikes,n but 
"only fear that yau may run yoar hell>by a little hard. I 
think that it has beeeme somewhat ef a prepossessian and.may 
be disproportionate if yeu den 1 t mind yeu.r eyes.u3 He ends 
this letter of May 25: 
••• I respect your ideal. Idealizing is necessary 
to man -- and I can conceive his ceneentrating all 
his energies en sainthood. Eut I also ean eoneeive 
another man's saying with e~ual right I would rath-
er be Jim Blll or Rockefeller than any.saint. Or 
I would sacrifice a million lives fer empire -- or 
1. Ibid., p. 157. 
2. Ibid., p. 164. 
3. Ibid., p. 158. 
if I could came 0ut en a pieture that she~ld 
meat Rembrandt and Rafael I weald eensent never 
to t~ink ®f morality while I lived. There are 
a good many ways of getting the superlative 
out of men -- and I think it a parson's preju-
dice that we all ought to be thinking of morals 
all the time and giving all p~rts of it the 
right of way over everything. 
1~ 
It is interesting that HGlmes speaks of ideals and 
sainthood here, in relation to Laski's outline for his next 
book, the Grammar of Polities, after they have just had 
considerable exchange, eaeh one oatdoing the other to ttshow 
up" religi®n and take it apart, for it reveals the older 
man's aewmen in really understanding the young one's temper-
ament, and also his persistent opposition to that tempera-
ment even while, or perhaps because, it spoke to him. It 
spoke to him with the strength it did, I think, in order 
that he might oppose it and reshape it in another direction, 
as is often the ease i~ friendships of this sort, where one 
side has all the dignity of position and reputation, and 
where separate elements of reverence and leneliness give 
the connection its emotional heart. It is very easy to ae-' 
cept the role of mentor. Almost every forceful person takes 
j~· 
to i$ easily, and some, due to certain lacks in a given per-
sonal situation, hunger for it, although the hunger may be 
~el& concealed from the one experiencing it. Holmes took on 
this role again with the young John Wu, and an effective mo-
tion picture about his life has been filmed showing repeated-
1. Ibid., p. 158. 
ly a similar impetus-effect he had on the yearly law-clerks 
that eame down to him frem Harvard~ the bright yaung Law 
School graduates chosen especially for this honor. I think 
Laski serieusly missed striki~ out in the direction most 
congenial to his personality~ that of idealist and enthusi-
ast based on a bent toward meditation and a contemplative 
religious or philosophical existence. He by nature had a 
scholarly devout temperament~ and his early works show this. 
Justice~ righteousness~ 11 the good" were all important to him. 
. . 
So he struggled with Holmes at first about these concepts: 
sovereignty~ democracy~ justice~ natural law~ and the prior-
ity of the individual conscience. When Holmes repeatedly 
told him it was all just so much hog-wash~ Laski lacked the 
ability~ the matur±ty~ the slanted experience~ to construct 
a synthesis out of the salty scepticism which Holmes himself 
had developed~ scepticism which~ sometimes near a total in-
consistency~ sometimes close to genuine nihilism~ and full 
of a mysticism~ half-frowzy~ half-beautiful with flashes of 
phrasing and insight~ could always "work" for Holmes. For 
Laski it could not work~ and as he moved away from the plu-
ralistic concepts where the individual and his conflicting 
interests was the final arbiter~ where sovereignty was amor-
phous and open~ under Holmes• continuous bombardment of dis-
paragement~ he let Holmes' authoritarian concepts of sover-
eignty move him to his detriment. But still he kept the 
11 idealism"~ which became partly based on authoritarianism~ 
partly on an imitation of Holmes' ineonsisteney~ and partly 
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on very ill-considered logical lapses. It would take a brave 
commentator today~ looking b~ck on this se~uence~ to feel 
. 
I 
that Laski's substitution of Mar.xist determinants for the 
11 higher synthesis 11 of a pragmatic Natural Law or an abstract 
justice or the pluralism of individual groupings based on 
sovereign conscience improved either his writing or his so-
cial effectiveness. 
In the Preface to Foundations of Sovereignty~ a collec-
tion of essays appearing in book form in 1921, but written 
earlier~ Laski says: 
For we have found that a state in which sovereign-
ty is unified is morally inadequate and administra-
tively inefficient .•. 
The pluralistic state is an attempt to remedy 
these defects by substituting coordination for a 
hierarchical structure ••• We must start from the 
admission that the allegiance of man is diverse 
and that where his loyalties conflict it is ulti-
mately both safer and better for the community 
that this instructed conscience should be the 
source of his decision. It would follow that 
there is no such thing as the sovereignty contem-
plated by law in any sense which admits of practi-
cal political application. In actual fact what 
we meet is a variety of interests, functional 
and territorial; and the way in which they are re-
lated suggests the necessarily federal character 
of all government. The main advantage of this 
federal structure is that it affords better chan-
nels fer the operation of an active consent upon 
the part of citizens than any other method •.. 
Liberty~ in short~ is incompatible with the 
present system of property for its result is a 
concentration of power which makes the political 
personality of the average citizen ineffective 
for any serious purpose •.• I believe profoundly 
that no attempt at reconstructions is likely to 
be successful save in so far as it is deeply 
rooted in historic knowledge. For that purpose 
we must go~ not merely to men like Maitland and 
Gierke, Figgis and Mr. Justice Holmes,but to the 
actual texts themselves. In things like the Con-
cilliar Movement~ the marvelous eaifice of .Edmund 
Burke~ the struggle for tne Charter~ the early 
history of American federalism; in lesser men 
like John ~aYlor of Caroline no less than in the 
great .thinkers like Hamilton himself will the 
clue to our problems. be found.l 
165 
The change of vista in Laski's approach is ma~ng its 
appearance here. But the earlier avenues which he in these 
paragraphs expounds had~ I believe a finer and more fitting 
perspective for the long view than he knew himself. It 
might even turn out that he was deeply right and that this 
is an analysis~ a critique and a prognosis of the state of 
the future~ to which man in his struggle to avoid ~lation 
finally will evolve and ultimately accept. 
When the Natural Law essay appeared in the November 
Harvard Law Review~ comment was brief. Laski wrote (Decem-
ber 1, 1918): 
I have just read over the Law Review piece. It 
is insolent in me to praise -- but I do think it is 
splendid and I am proud that it came in the year 
that I have been trying to run the Review. Thank 
you over and over again. 
I have been spending the days reading and writ-
ing. The Law Review piece is a third done; and 
what emerges so far is the extraordinary rightness 
of D1eey on the merits of the rule of law and his 
demerits where he speaks of droit administratif. 
But I am paepared to go to ball for him as a very 
great man. 
Holmes answered at once. 
1. Laski~ Foundations of Sovereignty, pp. vi-x. 
2.. Rowe~ H-L, I, 173. 
Your most welcome letter suggests two or three 
things that I must say right off. Imprimis --I 
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am relieved to hear that you still like my piece 
and in return must tell you, what I omitted at the 
moment~ that I admired your Smith College lectures 
while I wondered how far your audience could follow 
you in your references to English problems that 
sometimes got~ up a stwmp. I really wonder at 
your being able to turn out so mueh fine work --
and when I add your voluminous reading I am simply 
flabbergasted. I can't help fearing that you are 
running the machine too hard and discounting fu-
ture years~ but you do easily what eomes hard to 
most of us and I hope that you are discreet. Se-
cundo -- I am delighted at your praise of L. --
Stephen's 18th Century. He was in labor with it 
when we mountaineered together •.• Tnat Stephen 
blood is a powerful one. It also accounts for 
Dicey. He certainly also is a big chap, but tak-
ing the Stephen manifestations en bloc while I 
greatly admire them_, I think that as is apt to 
be the ease with the voluminous_, they sometimes 
miss the most exquisite apercus. L. S. and Dicey 
seem to me the flowers. > 
This ends for the year the correspondence. It eloses 
both with the publication of Natural Law and with this ex-
change of mutual compliments_, and still and always the dis-
cussion about those who write on the philosophy of law goes 
on ardently between the two as a continuing_, basic interest. 
In the praise for the Stephen blood (Leslie Stephen was the 
friend of Holmes' youth), one might note the omission of men-
,. 
tion here of Leslie Stephen's daughter_, Virginia Woolf·~, 
Later, much later_, when she is mentioned by Laski it is with 
a scurrilous mockery. 
As for Professor Dicey_, the student of Laski's peregrina-
tions ean only.pause in amazement at the latter's praise. A. 
V. Dicey's sentiments on labor and social legislation give 
to his readers today the acute embarrassment of facing the 
1. Howe (ed. L H-L_, I_, 175_, 176. 
2. Howe (ed.)_, H-L_, II, 1299. 
paleolithic. And even in 1918~ it is difficult to under-
stand how the man who was even then plotting out the outline 
(which he subsequently did not follow) for work on A Gram-
mar of Politics could have had any pleasant commendation at 
all for another who expressed sentiments like these) pub-
lished in 1905: 
••• An old.age pensioner) therefore) may even now 
in conceivable circumstances be entitled to vote 
for a Member of Parliament and join with friends 
who are counting on old age pensions. after the 
age of 70) in voting that the title to a pension 
shall commence With the age of 60. Nor does the 
evil end with such an exceptional ea~e. It is 
reasonable to anticipate the establishment in 
England~ as'now in our self-governing colonies~ 
in the United States of Ameriea~ in France~ and 
in the German Empire of Manhood or Universal 
Suffrage. Now the Old Age Pensions Act is the 
bestowal by_ the State of pecuniary aid upon one 
particular class of the community~ namely~ the 
poorer class of wage-earners ••• Surely a sensible 
and a benevolent man may well ask himself whether 
England as a whole will gain by enacting that the 
receipt of poor relief~ in the shape of a pension~ 
shall be consistent with the pensioner's retaining 
the right to join in the election of a Member of 
Parliament?l 
Or these: 
The National Insurance Act admits the so-called 
11right to work. n There are men still .living whose 
political memory carries them back to 1848. They 
will recollect that the droit au travail was then 
one of the war-cries of French socialists) and was 
in England deemed to be one of the least reason-
able of their claims. Nor is it easy to forget 
the saying attributed to Archbishop WhatelyJ "When 
a man begs for work he asks not for work but for 
wages." However this may beJ the statesman who 
have introduced unemployment insurance supported 
by the State have) whether they knew it or not~ 
1. Albert V. Dicey~ Law and Public Opinion in England~ p. xxxv. 
Or: 
acknowledged in principle the droit au travail 
for the sake of which solialists died behind the 
barricades of June 1848. 
.•• Whether the Education Act~ 1891~ which prac-
tically relieved parents from the necessity of 
paying for any part of,their children's ele-
mentary education~ would have been approved of 
by the statesmen who passed the Education Act~ 
1870, may be open to doubt. It is certain 
that they would have condemned the Edueatien 
(Frovision of Meals) Act~ 1906. No one ean 
deny that a starving bey will har~ly pr®fit 
much frem the attempt to teach him the rules of 
arithmetic. But it does net necessarily follow 
that a local authority mast therefore provide 
every h~ngry child at seheol with a mealJ still 
less does it seem morally right that a father 
who first lets his child starve~ and then fails 
to pay the price legally due from him for a 
meal given to the child at the expense of the 
rate-payers should~ under the Act of 1906~ re-
tain ~he right of voting fer a Member of Parlia-
ment. 
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It is of genuine interest to take note of these antedi-
luvian sentiments fi~ty-five years after. It is even compre-
hensible that Holmes called their author a "big chap"J for 
. . 
this is the line a governmental contempt for its citizens 
wklicl;l,_ :Ls_-in the sequence of the Poison Po(l)l decision~ but 
how 1ia.rG>1d Laski could state that he was prepared to go to 
bail for this representative example of the Stephen blood 
"as a very great mann is not to be u.nderstood in any terms 
at all, even those of inconsistency or flattery~ since these 
are the kind of o~inions whioh might inflame even a conserva-
tive to the disgust which leads directly to the communist 
1. Ibid • , p • :x:xxix • 
2. Ibid., p. L. 
1~ 
sympathies which eventuallY attracted Laski. In Widener 
Library at Harvard is Holmes' copy of this volume by Dicey~ 
autographed by o. W. Holmes and presented to him by the 
author. 
In summary it is evident from the material published 
that a great deal of discussion of a most fertile sort had 
taken place between Holmes and those in contact with him 
during the period immediately preceeding the writing of 
the Natural Law essay. We have seen the battledore and shut-
tlecock of these references between Holmes and Laski on mat-
ters of jurisprudence. There is an exchange of letters also 
between Judge Learned Hand and Holmes in the summer of 1918 
which is further evidence of the great jurist's continuing 
tendency to hammer discussion on these choice specific sub-
jects. Justice~ sovereignty~ the nature of law -- these 
topics were always present in his mind as requiring the in-
sistent needling comment and observation. That this comment 
and observation is almost invariably derogatory and dispara-
ging to Laski's viewpoint is not indication that its center 
was any the less important as a topic to Holmes. On the con-
trary~ he seemed really driven to discuss these related sub-
jects as ideas of the first magnitude~ so that he could ex-
press his negations about them. And this is where Laski 
could meet his need. For the freshness~ the idealism~ and 
the then originality of Laski's yo~thful attitudes toward 
government~ society and law~ provided just the opposing sound-
ing board which Holmes' mental slants deeply desiderated. 
Laski's enthusiasms were the contrary stimulus Holmes wanted, 
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as the young man's hopes and eptimistic radicalism filled 
the old one at times With a wistful admiration. 
It also is evident that Laski, by the time Natural Law 
appeared, has almost entirely given up the effort to be sin-
cere in his exchange with the Justice. Holmes' perpetual 
detraction and disparagement of every book for whose ideas 
Laski had enthusiasm would have worn down or turned aside 
much hardier convictions than Laski's. The magnificent 
friendship was too wonderful a windfall for the aspiring 
young man to find a repetitien of a continued head-on argu-
ment either satisfying or expedient. The friendship would 
not have lasted if Laski had gene on insisting on his own 
visualizations of justice and sovereignty, his basic and 
lasting oppositions to Holmes' might-makes-right formula. 
Very few friendships do last in the face of a continued ex-
pressicm of fundamental differences in weltanschauung_, and 
the only time, it is clearly evident, thErtr Laski· subSer:J.uent-
ly allowed himself a sharply formulated opposition to Holmes' 
concepts was over the Saeco ana Vanzetti case, and then 
very briefly. 
Yet it seems evident also that Helmes' absolutisms (much 
as he hated the word) did decidedly affect the developing in-
r 
tellectual position of the younger man. The repetitious 
rigidities of Laski's analyses of society, the state and 
elass struggle, in largely Mar.xist term~ began after the 
pQblication of Natural Law~ and with his own work at that 
time on Grammar of Politics. It is an example of those iron-
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ies frequent in intellectual histery that this man who hated 
the absolute and the a pri@ri generalization should have 
turned to find truth in·saeh absolute a priori generaliza-
tions as these of Mar.x and Lenin. I have already referred 
to the literary fact that Holmes' ideational lineage with 
Hobbes and Bitler has been pointed out and argued in a sig-
nificant debate. I have already commented on the specific 
"Americanisms" -- the combination of inconsistency with a 
. . 
sort of working experimentalism3 a liberal pragmatism (that 
other word Holmes hated) which makes this tracing3 as I see 
,.. 
it3 deeply speeious3 and yet many, if not the majority, of 
Holmes• philosophic pronouncements are not either far or 
clearly remeved in the way he expressed them from what a 
little later became totalitarian ideology. This is perhaps 
especially true in those passages of his which have been 
particularly praised as expressing a bursting, mystical 
f'aith in the cosmos 3 or "lifett or 11destiny." It is not that 
I 4 • f 
this kind of generally pro~ane mysticism is fascistic, but 
linked closely with a praising of the militaristic virtues 
as it so eften is3 it would net take very mueh of' a shift in 
emphasis to become so. 
To conclude, that this brand of quasi-totalitarianism 
of the right influenced the formation of Laa~'s own brand 
.. 
of totalitarianism of the left seems to me to be unavoidable 
deduction. There is, of cou~se, no way to prove it, sinee 
Holmes so earnestly hated Laski's subse~uent line of develop-
ment and since Holmes was not a tetalitarian3 aut was an in-
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dividualist~ an aristocrat and a censervative. But we ean 
at least say that it was the influence of a similar strain 
in personalities by the stronger on the more malleable at a 
erueial time in the latter's budding enthusiasm for his re-
f'orming vision. So perhaps Laski~ in his own way and by his 
own circuitous route reaching a position so anathema to 
Holmes~ under the awe-inspiring splendor of' this remarkable 
eontaet~ was obs.erving his own kind of' worship and did give 
te the aged sage, in his final aeeeptanee of' Leviathan~ an 
imitation whieh ~the tribute of' sincerity. 
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eHAF'fER FOUR 
HOIMES' ESSAY 0N NA'I'URAL LAW 
1. 
What is it that Holmes actually says in the Natural 
Law essay~ and how does he say it? What is his arg~ent 
that sa wen Laski's praise and hew does he substantiate and 
reinforce his points? Let us examine these paragraph by 
paragraph) er even sentence by sentence) and find out. For 
reference I shall use the Rhinehart paperback~ American 
Thought: Civil War to World War I, edited with an introduc-
tion by Perry Miller~ eepyrighted in 1954 and dedicated: 
11For the Memery of Harald J. Laski." 
The first paragraph contains the topic of Helmes' defi-
nition of Natural Law and his opinion of it in two analogies: 
It is not enough for the knight of romance that 
you agree that his lady is a very niee girl -- if 
you do not admit that sae is the best that God ever 
made or will make~ you must fight. There is in all 
men a demand for the superlative) so much so that 
the poor devil who has no other way of reaching it 
attains it by getting drunk. It seems to me that 
this demand is at the bottom of the philosopher's 
effort to prove that truth is absolute and of the jurists's search for criteria of universal validity 
which he collects under the head of natural law.l 
The two analogies are the knight of medieval romance) 
with his unrealistic eode of chivalry) and the poor devil who 
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes_, Jr.~ 11Natural Law 11 _, in American 
Thought: Civil War to World.War I (ed. Perry Miller)_, 
p. 207. 
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so demands the superlative (i.e. a characteristic of the en-
tire human race) that he expresses it by getting drunk. The 
search for the superlative~ getting drunk~ the belief that 
truth is absolute~ and the knight's pugnacious assertion 
that his girl is the best ever are thus all equated~ by di-
rect~ but unclear implication~ with mankind's search or de-
mand for justice. nJustice" (or natural law) is also equated 
somewhat more realisticallY with "the jurist's search for 
criteria of universal validity." The method of point-winning 
by correlating the idea of justice with getting drunk~ the 
"learning by associationn principle and the "conditioned re-
flex11 of Pavlov's dogs is familiar. The suggestion seems to 
be also that justice or 11natura1 law", like the knight's in-
sistence on defending his girl as the best ever, is the basic 
reason why he wanted to fight all comers, yet historicallY 
the point is thin. For all of the songs of the troubadours 
and the Tristan and Arthurian cycles~ the actual tourneys 
and jousts of the Middle Ages were fought for the high materi-
al rewards involved in the taking of prizes and the horse and 
armor of the loser~ although in some relativelY few cases the 
champion figured in the fight for the clearing up of guilt or 
innocence as was the legal use of the ordeal. The same error 
lies in equating the philosopher's effort to prove that truth 
is absolute with the poor devil who gets drunk. A man does 
not get drunk to prove the superlative. Men fight and get 
drunk for a variety of reasons -- sometimes because justice 
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in the concrete is denied them, but the implication that 
the principal reason for both is because they are trying to 
establish philosophers' abstractions is indeed open toques-
tion. 
The second paragraph continues: 
I used to say, when I was young, that truth 
was the majority vote of that nation that could 
lick all others. Certainly we may expect that 
the received opinion about the present war will 
depend a good deal upon which side wins (I hope 
with all my soul it will be mine), and I think 
that the statement was correct in so far as it 
implied that our test of truth is a reference to 
either a present or an imagined future majority 
in favor of our view. If, as I hav.e suggested 
elsewhere, the truth may be defined as the sys-
tem of my (intellectual) limitations, what 
gives it objectivity is the fact that I find my 
fellow man to a greater or less extent (never 
-whollY) subject to the same Can't Helps. If I 
think that I am sitting at a table I find that 
the other persons present agree with me; so if 
I say that the sum of the angles of a triangle 
is equal to two right angles. If I am in a 
minority of one they send for a doctor or lock 
me up; and I am so far able to transcend the to 
me convincing testimony of my senses or my rea-
son as to recognize that if I am alone probably 
something is wrong with my works.l 
Holmes begins here with one of his many favorite aphor-
isms and ends with another. If he really does believe that 
truth is the majority vote of the nation that can lick all 
the others, it is strange indeed that he has such a hatred 
of pragmatism as a word and a technique. The fallacy is in 
stating that the "truths 11 (i.e. the 11results 11 ) of history 
shift and slither all over the map and over every conflict-
ing position depending on whether Henry IV kneels at Canossa 
1. Ibid., P• 207o 
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or Phillip the Fair's strong men beat up Boniface VIII. The 
facts are multiform and infinite. The long view of time 
alone either sorts them out into developing sequence and 
clusters of pattern or relegates them to limbo. So in talk-
ing about Christianity~ for instance (if we were)~ Calvin 
~ 
and Wesley and Emerson would have to come into the whole pic-
ture (as we have it so far)~ and the long view~ and very 
likelyJ even from the eventual angle of the Roman ChurchJ 
the long view that includes all the other losses and victor-
ies would also have to come into it~ in order to secure the 
Catholic position. AlsoJ eertainlyJ the Greek Orthodox 
Church in Russia with its historic schisms would have to be 
part of any story which dealt with the growth of Communism 
and its conflict with Rome. Who wins whatJ when? Was Hit-
ler expressing truth when he cremated the Jews? Or would 
he have been expressing it if he had remained unchallenged 
for a thousand years? Since he did not remain unchallenged) 
should we then take an incident in history where a mass cru-
elty has remained a neat sueeess packa~e~ wrapped up by 
time: Were the Spaniards "better 11 and more 11 truthfu111 than 
. ' . , 
the Incas? They seemed better eqaipped for survival in the 
. 
temporary contest~ but Charles V finally retired to a monas-
tery~ and Philip II lost his ArmadaJ while the New World gold 
created the economic conditions in Europe that contributed 
to the English emigration to America and the eclipse of Span-
ish power. And at the present time in Peru what evidence 
would be conclusive in the population and social conditions 
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of prevailing fltruthtr? 
Holmes states that he believes that the received opinion 
about World War I will depend on who wins it. It is rather 
intriguing to have such a bland, Olympian detachment express-
ed about German militarism, and recall now the fashionable 
intellectual opinion of the isolation which pretended that 
it didn't much matter who won that war. At least such spi-
ritual equivocation never seemed to become part of the after-
math of World War II. In fact, it has become one of the 
saving arguments for American capitalism, and the new brand 
of it, the 11 Big Chap,gen and the nimage of American develop-
ing since World War II, that it could and did win that war 
with such a tremendous dispatch and the transforming power 
of its productive capacity into a fighting engine. If we 
were in doubt at one time of the world value of flsaving" 
Western civilization from German Militarism under the Kaiser, 
there are no sane dissenting voices now on the value of de-
feating it decisively under Hitler, nor does the present 
threat of Communism change the significance of that victory. 
Recalling that he suggested to Laski: 11 As I speak in 
less confident terms of the result of the war than now would 
be natural is there any objection to putting 'August, 1918 1 
at the end? ••• "1 it seems legitimate to find his parenthesis 
"I hope with all my soul it will be mine, 11 of an incredible 
naivete. Yet once more his amplification of his own defini-
1. Howe (ed.), H-L, I, 167. 
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tion of truth as "a reference to either a present or an ima-
gined future majority in favor o.f our viewn is quite accept-
able provided one is thinking in utilitarian terms~ but I 
ca~ot find m~ch evidence that Holmes ever liked that word 
any more than he liked 1tpragmatism"~ for all of Leslie Ste-
phen's book. 
Holmes .finds his fellow men to a greater or less extent 
(never wholly) subject to the same Can't Helps. It does not 
occur to him in using this very favorite and often repeated 
saw thatfuis would be a fair definition of a pragmatic Natu-
ral Law. Yet Holmes 1 writing is shot through with barely con-
cealed (even from himself -- if he wishes to conceal it) Na-
tural Law expressions. In answering the argument of his last 
two sentences in this paragraph ("If I think that I am sitting 
at a table I find that the other persons present agree with 
me ••• if I am in a minority of one they send for a doctor or 
lock me up;" etc. L we have already referred to a discussion 
of this point in Chapter Two as 11a desperate point of view."1 
This previous reference of Bertrand Russell's also in-
cludes a careful exposition o.f inductionJ and what Harne sup-
posedly finds faTiacious in its logic. But Russell has his o~ 
argument to answer HumeJ and concludes: 
••• What these arguments prove-- and I do not 
think the proof can be controverted -- is that 
induction is an independent logical principle~ 
incapable of being inferred either from experi-
1. See Chapter 2J p. 77. 
ence or from other logical principles, and that 
without this principle science is impossible.l 
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Induction, then, is one of Holmes 1 Can't Helps also, even 
though he would reduce it to simply knowing that he was sit-
ting at a table only because the others present agreed with 
him. Induction is a universal, then, which Holmes. accepts. 
But what Russell is really ref~rring to here is such things 
as the Law of Statistical Regularity and the Law of Sufficient 
Sample, and these concepts relate too to the Calculus of 
Probability. Probability (or prediction), as I have already 
commented in Chapter Two?is one of those loaded concepts as 
far as Holmes was concerned, for he used it without precise 
systematic meaning, sometimes as synonymous with prophecy, as 
basic in his favorite definition of law. It is interesting 
to consider that flprophecy 11 in definition deviates on the one 
hand in the direction of a religious meaning, "visionary 
revelation," even eschatalogy, and in the other direction 
toward meaning the calculated risk a gambler can take. Holmes 
uses "prediction" and "prophecy" widely as though none of 
these several loaded meanings cluster about the term. Pos-
sibly, in defining ''law" with "prediction", he would accept the 
calculated risk definition, but then_he would have to admit 
as a logical sequence that the idea of the Calculus of Prob-
ability (even in .the J. B. Rhine version of Extra Sensory 
Perception) is a good working definition of Natural Law. 
1. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p. 674. 
2. Se'e p. 107. 
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A commentator cannot leave this paragraph without anoth-
er rererral to Holmes' reeling that a minority or one means 
that "they" always send .for a doctor or lock him up. "Theyn 
rrom time to time do leave the minority or one ailione and he 
turns out to be a genius and a mutation occurs~ though the 
usual course is as Holmes states it. Yet ir it were univer-
sallY so Man would never have lert the cave~ and in most or 
his pieces and articles Holmes again and again shows that he 
thoroughly appreciates this fact~ and credits the sacred and 
creative peculiarity of the individual as one of the few real 
reasons -- and causes -- which make civilization worth its 
effort. 
Paragraph Three is a long one: 
Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have 
been cocksure of many things that were not so. Ir 
I may quote myself again~ property~ friendship 3 and 
truth have a common root in time. One can not be 
wrenched from the rocky crevices into which one has 
grown for many years without feeling that one is at-
tacked in one's life. What we most love and revere 
generallY is determined by early associations. I 
love granite rocks and barberry bushes, no doubt be-
cause with them were my earliest joys that reach 
back through the past eternity of my life. But while 
one's experience thus makes certain preferences dog-
matic for oneself, recognition of how they came to 
be so leaves one able to see that others~ poor souls3· 
may be equally dogmatic about something else. And 
this. again means scepticism. Not that one's belief 
or love does not remain. Not that we would not fight 
and die for it if important -- we all~ whether we 
know it or not3 are fighting to make the kind of -~a 
world that we should like -- but that we have learned 
to recognize that others will fight and die to make a 
different world3 with equal sincerity or belief.· Dee~­
seated preferences can not be argued about -- you can 
not argue a man into liking a glass or beer -- and 
therefore~ when differences are surriciently far 
reaching we try to kill the other man rather than let 
him have his way. But that is perfectly consistent 
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with admitting that, so far as appears, his grounds 
are just as good as ours.l 
Holmes is here again attractively wording some common-
place platitudes. Certitude is indeed not the test of cer-
tainty. We need to be reminded of this even if we remember 
from our Introductory Philosophy courses that the first ques-
tions of the problem of knowledge ask if a fact is true, if 
we know it to be true, and if we have the right to know that 
it is true. Since Holmes is writing for the Harvard Law Re-
view he is writing for educated people, but educated people 
too often fail to distinguish between truth and their emo-
tional opinions. 
The reference to granite rocks and barberry bushes is 
very pleasant, and has been much quoted. Stylistically it 
strikes a glow in anyone from New England who liked to wander 
on hill pastures. So we are dogmatic about such predilections. 
The implication is that we will fight at the drop of a hat 
with anyone who prefers coconut palms and the Florida keys. 
In another much quoted passage he refers to the likelihood 
that men in some parts of Germany woUld fight if the price of 
beer were raised a half-penny and that revolutions are based 
on such small matters. Possibly he has that in mind here with 
his comment that you cannot argue a man into liking a glass 
of beer, and that it is deep-seated prejudices about minutfuae and 
that alone which causes us to fight. So we try to kill a man, 
he states, when differences, such as liking beer are sufficient-
1. Holmes_, "Natural Law," loc. cit., pp. 207, 208. 
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ly far-reaching, rather than let him drink or not drink his 
beer. Somehow this seems very naive to 1960. The genera-
tion that fought the Spanish-American war could apparently 
hear this and consider it profound. 
Yet this paragraph is essentiallY a plea for the tolerant 
and open mind, for the attitude which is productive of peace 
because it says it doesn't much matter what you or I believe 
for it is all inconsequential. To look back on the horrors 
of the religious wars is to cause every intelligent person to 
dread the approach of any overmastering or extreme ideology. 
This scepticism -- or indifference -- has its place, and per-
haps if a form of it were applied in part to the differences 
between capitalism and communism the dangers to the world of 
the head-on conflict between them would be less ominous. But 
the ancient questions is here -- at once moral, realistic and 
unanswerable (even in terms of nclear and present danger") 
which Holmes makes no attempt to posit: How long can the 
tolerant be tolerant of those who wouldrestroy tolerance? It 
is with the curiously obsolete factors in Holmes' lack of 
discrimination here that we quote Peter Drucker: 
Two essential and unique attributes of man -- know-
ledge and power -- have changed their very ~eaning. 
As a result the meaning of man is changing. And yet--
as in our philosophical systems and our social and po-
litical institutions-- our ideas,eun methods, our pre-
occupations, our rhetoric, are still those of an ear~i­
er age which is fast becoming obsolete ••• Twentieth-
century man has achieved the knowledge to destroy him-
self both physically and morally. This new absolute 
has added a new dimension to human existaace.l 
1. Peter F. Drucker, Landmarks of Tomorrow, p. 257. 
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Paragraph four seems to me to admit the whole premise 
which the essay is written to oppose. 
The jurists who believe in natural law seem to 
me to be in that naive state of mind that accepts 
what has been familiar· and accepted by them and 
their neighbors as something that must be accepted 
by all men everywhere. No doubt it is true that, so 
far as we can see ahead, some arrangements and the 
rudiments of familiar institutions seem to be neces-
sary elements in any society that may spring from 
our own and that would seem to us to be civilized --
some form of permanent association between the sex-
es--some residue of property individually. owned --
some mode of binding oneself to specified future con-
duct -- at the bottom of all, some protection for the 
person. But without speculating whether a group is 
imaginable in which all but the last of these might 
disappear and the, last be subject to qualifications 
that most of us would abhor, the question remains 
as to the Ought of natural law.l 
Holmes begins again by relating categories which have no 
basis in fact to relate them. The reason that we study the 
opinions of the Hebrew Prophets, the Greek philosophers, the 
Renaissance scientists with such attention and respect today 
as fundamental to our history and civilization is not because 
at any time the people who held them first found them to be 
so familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors that they 
must be projected through a sort of conforming acquiescence 
on all people everywhere. Quite the contrary is true. We re-
vere Isaiahs cry for justice, Socrates' quest for truth, St. 
Paul's "The greatest of these is love, 11 Galilee's "But still 
it moves!" because they stood for something the world has 
found of the highest importance, of a value which is more than 
that of survival although it is not unrelated to that too, but 
1. Holmes, "Natural Lawn, loc. cit., p. 208. 
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which was in opposition to what most men everywhere accepted, 
then or now. What really is justice and righteousness, truly 
wise conduct, or the understanding and recognition of an ob-
jective, scientific fact in its relationship to other such 
facts is as rarely accepted or comprehended today by those to 
whom we teach the humanities as these things were accepted 
twenty-five hundred, a thousand, five hundred years ago. We 
teach these examples. We hope their effect has modern impli-
cations, and to some extent this is so, but to a greater ex-
tent, as every educator knows, mass prejudice, ignorance and 
bigotry remain. Yet the great examples are studied and fol-
lowed, because the truth they express has spoken to mankind 
of something which is as un-natural as it is universal, in a 
real way transcendental even though it comes completely from 
human experience and even though, at the time it first ap-
pears, it seems to go against human experience. 
In their letters, Holmes and Laski again and again had a 
pleasant time bandying about the idea that truth is nothing but 
the custom of a people and varies with the habit or the clima:be. 
I have quoted from one of b~s early letters,l in one of his mare 
thoughtful presentations of this theme, where Holmes refers to 
"a tall hat or the cult of monogamy," and goes on in a burst of 
mysticism to say that one could become so emotionally possessed 
by the unknown that "one very well might accept any cult that 
he found at hand never troubling about its finite fallacies." 
1. See page 155. 
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It is interesting to note the repeat of the word "cult" 
here~ with the implication that the second use also might ap-
ply to the 11cult11 of monogamy -- or perhaps he means too the 
"cult" of the tall hat. Laski~ writing a long while later~ 
January 6~ 1925~ is even more emancipated from men's silly 
sense. He has been arguing with the philosopher Hobhouse • 
••• I was amused to find how angry it made him when 
I urged that the only adequate test of good we had 
was social utility and that the latter meant re-
sponse to demand by persons. I saw that e.g. in-
fanticide was only bad when it was considered bad 
in intent and results; that there was no unchang-
ing goodness in the act, true both for the Greeks 
and ourselves. But he was convinced that reason 
can establish a criterion independent of time and 
space. I add that in the hours I was there I did 
not further discover it except to glean that it was 
somehow connected with the principle of har.mony.l 
non-
It is doubtful if the ancient peoples themselves would 
have argued that there was any goodness in exposing their 
children. Mary Renault 1s perceptive and terrible novel, The 
Last of the Wine can convince the modern reader through art 
of how devastating and dreadful the practice was to hhem. 
Yet Laski must have meant this, that for good or ill there 
is nothing established or unchanging in the custom of in-
fanticide, and that social useage alone makes it good or 
bad. His example is a very poor one for his point~ for 
there seems to be no question among historians of authority 
that infanticide along with slavery and the general decline 
in the standard of living for the mass of people bred the 
1. Howe (ed.), H-L, I, 697. 
186 
despair and social disorganization which went With the fall 
of classical civilization. Whether infanticide was a cause 
or a result of the lack of interest in living which attended 
the population decline in the late Roman Empire~ the connec-
tion is incontestable. Possibly Laski might argue that sur-
vival in itself is no objective criterion either as a mea-
sure of goodness over its opposite~ destruction, as a mea-
sure of. badness. If he did so, he would be going against 
every criterion that philosophy, religion or common sense 
has established for judging the human experience. 
~o return to Holmes' definition of Natural Law in the 
fourth paragraph of his essay, as just quoted, i.e.~ 11ac-
cepting what has been familiar and accepted by them and 
their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all 
men everywhere," one wonders what actually is being defined 
here. Isn't this, rather than any Natural Law definition, a 
definition of Holmes' own old love, the Common Law, or at 
least close to a Common Law definition, based on custom, 
habit, tradition and precedent as it is? Or is it an indi-
cation perhaps that even with Holmes himself there is an ack-
nowledgment that Common Law and Natural Law are not separate 
by definition, but falling under .. the larger heading of Law 
as an abstract generalization have many basic elements to-
gether to be described in a common terminology? Many writers 
' 
on jurisprudence have pointed out the same elements in both 
Common and Natural Laws. 
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Charles Mcilwain in The High Court or Parliament says: 
Thus it appears that the law which we find en-
rolled among the records or the English medieval 
Parliament is in the main a body or custom of 
which the Parliament's enactments are only declara-
tory. 
That certain great principles or this law were 
believed to be beyond the power of Parliament or 
or any other body or men to changeJ 
~at though this law was often identified With 
the law or nature, its inviolability was due in 
the first place to its universality as a custom.l 
And again: 
••• Thus though it is only the law or reason which 
can overcome a statute 3 it is easy to see howJ in 
the hands of the common lawyers 3 this reason could 
become identified with the fundamentals or the 
common lawJ the flartificial reason" which might 
neither be known.nor tampered with by the unlearnedJ 
even by a king. 
Thus for Coke the greater principles of the 
Common LawJ whether they were in origin custom-
ary or intuitiveJ could be looked upon in their 
entirety as sacred and unchangeable.2 
I feel he begs the <t_~S:iblam in the sentence which fol-
loWS3 since he admits that ttno doubt" for any "society that 
may spring from our own and that would seem to us to be civi-
lized'' some common norms would be in effect as to the rudi-
ments or conduct in social institutionsJ standards necessari-
ly as universal where they apply to propertyJ sexJ contractJ 
and the preservation or life. We have alreadY ~uoted Marga-
ret Mead on this point.3 What else is this but Natural LawJ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Charles Howard Mcilwain, The High Court of Parliament, p. 99. 
Ibid., p. 108. 
See page 82. 
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as Margaret Mead puts it: 11 The recognition of natural rights_, 
to life., to property_, and reproduction ••• for.med in all soci-
eties, although with profound variations in interpretation." 
Holmes_, in the paragraph just given_, has acknowledged an al-
most exactly similar series of universal necessities though 
he gives them a somewhat bleaker gloss. 
The next paragraph is another long one. In it we may 
see again his loose use of 11 prophecy. tt ( 11 ••• a right is only 
the hypostasis of a prophecy. 11 ) 
It is true that beliefs and wishes have a trans-
cendental basis in the sense that their foundation 
is arbitrary. You can not help entertaining and 
feeling them_, and there is an-end of it. As an ar-
bitrary fact people wish to live, and we say with 
various degrees of certainty that they can do so 
only on certain conditions. To do it they must eat 
and drink. That necessity is absolute. It is a ne-
cessity of less degree but pretty general that they 
should live in society. If they live in society_, 
so. far as we can see_, there are further conditions. 
Reason working on experience does tell us_, no doubt_, 
that if our wish to live continues_, we can do it only 
on those terms. But that seems to me the whole of 
the matter. I see no a priori duty to live with oth-
ers and in that way, but simply a statement of what 
I must do if I wish to remain alive. If I do live 
with others they tell me that I must do and abstain 
from doing va:rious things or they will put the screws 
on to me. I believe that they will, and being of the 
same mind as to their conduct I not only accept the 
rules but come in time to accept them with sympathy 
and emotional .. affirmation and begin to talk about 
duties and rights. But for legal purposes a right is 
only the hypostasis of a prophecy -- the imagination 
of a substance supporting the fact that the public 
force will be brought to bear upon those who do things 
said to contravene it -- just as we talk of the foree 
of gravitation accounting for the conduct of bodies 
in space. One phrase--'adds no more than the other to 
what we know without it. No doubt pehind these 
legal rights is the fighting will of the subject to 
maintain them, and the spread of his emotions to the 
general rules by which .they are maintained; but that 
does not seem to me the same thing as the supposed 
a priori discernment of a duty or the assertion of 
a preexisting right. A dog will fight for his 
bone.l 
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In the above~ Holmes seems as far off from the actual 
facts of the historical development of the limitations of 
rights and duties in history, in time~ as the fathers of 
the Social Contract were, in their picture of the origin of 
Government by Consent. Once more in the correlation of 
"transcendent" and 11arbitraryn two words or two associations 
of meanings are brought together in a fashion that has no 
connection except through another repeat of the aphorism 
about 11 can 1 t helps." "There is an end to it~" Holmes says. 
Once you ncan 1 t help it" that's all there is to it. Yet in 
speaking of the "arbitrary fact that people wish to liven he 
surely knows he is talking about one of the most rooted of 
Natural Law ideas~ the human will to live and right to exist, 
whether it 1s in the Hobbesian expression of this or in Cath-
olic dogma. He says -- and he has na right" to -- that he 
sees nothing a priori about this will or right to life. A 
priori or not, historically it got into the Declaration of 
Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, 
where it caused considerable commotion as a result~ and alter-
ed and shaped the course of history. Since, in talking about 
the 11 rules 11 by which men permit other men to live, he comes to 
the conclusion that in time everyone accepts these rules with 
emotional affirmation and changes these simple rules into 
1. Holmes~ "Natural Law"~ loc. cit., pp. 208, 209. 
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"rights" and "duties." Yet rights and duties always develop 
historically in juxtaposition to the current "rules" of some-
body's privilege. "Rules" and "rights and duties" are not 
originally synonomous historically. As the Utilitarians 
claim, rights and duties do eventually become rules that 
work, but Holmes rejects this argument for the independent 
existence of rights and duties along with every other, other 
than (and here is the old dictum) that they are the "hypo-
stasis of a prophecy, 11 only to be granted reality because 
or a•:rorce" -- the public force, which he then lines up with 
talk of.the "force of gravitation." How the force or gravi-
tation is likened to a "right" would seem on his logic to be 
a parallel quite incomprehensible, but perhaps there I8 an 
obvious Natural Law analogy there -- one which he does not 
intend. He then says the phrase 11 force of gravitation" adds 
nothing to what we know of the conduct of bodies in space. 
The space age bursting about us contradicts him. Gravita-
tion is in itself one of those great universals which at 
this point, though not by any means always, he decries. 
As for his linking of rights with prophecy, playing 
down and disparaging the one into the other, science also 
has prophecy as a basic test of truth, so has theology, and 
so has Natural Law. Once more we have the many-sided mean-
ings of a portmanteau word. But last of all, "A dog will 
fight for his bone," disposes of the matter. From being 
equated with the vast mathematical abstraction of gravita-
tion, the preexisting right has now become the casus belli 
of a bone to a dog. We have indeed covered the field. 
Let us continue: 
The most f-undamental of the supposed preexist-
ing rights -- the right to life -- is sacrificed 
without a scruple not only in war but whenever 
the interest of society, that is, of the predomi-
nant power in the community, is thought to de-
mand it. Whether that interest is the interest 
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of mankind in the long run no one can tell, and as, 
in any event, to those who do not think with Kant 
and Hegel it is only an interest, the sanctity 
disappears. I remember a very tenderhearted judge being of opinion that closing a hatch to 
stop a fire and the destruction of a cargo was justified even if it was known that doing so 
would stifle a man below. It is idle to illus-
trate further, because to those who agree wi'th me 
I am uttering commonplaces and to those who dis-
agree I am ignoring the necessary foundations of 
thought. The a priori men generally call the 
dissentients superficial. But I do agree with 
them in believing that one's attitude on these 
matters is closely connected with one's general 
attitude toward the universe. Proximately, as 
has been suggested, it is determined largely by 
earlY associations and temperament, coupled with 
the desire to have an absolute guide. Men to a 
great extent believe what they want to -- although 
I see in that no basis for a philosoppy that 
tells us what we should want to want.l 
The opening sentence of this paragraph leaves the read-
er wondering just what are his cases. Yes, war sacrifices 
life without scruple, but when else is life "sacrificed" 
by the predominant power in the community in any civilized 
society? He did not know of the extermination camps, and 
if he had would not have used them to make his point, for 
the society which used the extermination camps as the core 
of its avowed policy did not last very long on the pragmatic 
1. Ibid., pp. 209-210. 
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test. I cannot think of any normally organized society 
insisting on the killing of groups or individuals other 
than on the basis of the use of capital punishment for 
criminals, including whatever bases the society has for de-
fining treason. The next sentence where it is not ambigu-
ous seems irrelevant. In what sense is Kant and Hegel 
brought in here, and what is the sanctity of what interest? 
11 The interest of society" in what way? At no point in the 
entire essay are illustrations more decidedly needed. The 
one he gives of the "very tender-hearted judge 11 hardly 
proves any point. On the contrary, it is such a departure 
from accepted legal principles and customary social action 
that it is completely an anomaly, as the myriad of TV pro-
grams and news items today testify to in dealing with super-
human and complicated efforts to save some individual life 
trapped in a perilous hazard, where an enormous amount of 
effort, money, equipment, property and other human lives are 
expended to release or save the person in danger. This is 
done even in the case of animals -- in line with a recent 
news program about a race-horse on a transport plane who 
broke loose and got into such a frenzy that he was endan-
gering everyone's lives, and the effort to avoid the des-
perate solution of destroying him was accomplished at much 
peril but to the great satisfaction of all concerned. As 
for the case of the 11 tender-hearted judge," to stop a fire 
at sea would seem to be an absolute necessity not only to 
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save the cargo but the rest of the crew~ though it is not 
completely clear from the context that the fire was at sea. 
"It is idle to illustrate further~" Holmes says., and 
we wonder what he has illustrated~ while agreeing with his 
s ta temen t tha-t to those who disagree with him he is way off 
base. We agree too~ as we note the usual poke at the 11a pri-
ori men" that "one's attitude on these matters is closely 
connected with one's general attitude toward the universe." 
The Natural Law men do regard the solution of the human pre-
dicament in a certain fashion~ or perhaps one might say that 
it is their particular prejudice that there is a solution. 
They are patterned~ Holmes goes on~ by the desire to have 
an absolute guide., and so he disparages a philosophy that 
fftells us what we should want to want.u Again~ the word nab-
solute11 seems to Holmes to smell of the Natural Law camp., al-
though he is as absolute a proponent of his own brand of be-
lief., enlightened scepticism., as anyone who has ever written. 
As for telling other people what they should want to want., no 
one does that with more evident longing than Holmes does in 
all his correspondences with younger intellectuals~ Laski~ 
Cohen and Wu. 
The next to the last paragraph in the Natural Law essay 
is as follows: 
Now when we come to our attitude toward the 
universe I do not see any rational ground for de-
manding the superlative -- for being dissatisfied 
unless we are assured that our truth is cosmic 
truth., if there is such a thing -- that the ultimates 
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of a little creature on this earth are the last word 
of the unimaginable whole. If a man sees no reason 
for believing that significance, consciousness and 
ideals are more than marks of the finite, that does 
not justify what has been familiar in French sceptics: 
getting upon a pedestal and professing to look with 
haughty scorn upon a world in ruins. The real con-
clusion is that the part can not swallow the whole 
that our categories are not, or may not be, ade-
quate to formulate what we cannot know. If we be-
lieve that we come out of the universe, not it out 
of us, we must admit that we do not know what we 
are talking about when we speak of brute matter. We 
do know that a certain complex of energies can wag 
its tail and another can make syllogisms. These 
are among the powers of the unknown, and if, as may 
be, it has still greater powers that we can not 
understand, as Fabre in his studies of instinct 
would have us believe, studies that gave Bergson 
one of the strongest strands for his philosophy and 
enabled Maeterlinck to make us fancy for a moment 
that we heard a clang from behind phenomena -- if 
this be true, why should we not be content? Why 
should we employ the energy that is furnished us 
by the cosmos to defy it and sh!ke our fist at 
the sky? It seems to me s~lly. 
Holmes derides the concept of the ultimates of a little 
creature upon this earth being the last word of the unimagi-
nable whole. Again, this is a distorted definition of Natu-
ral Law. This is dismissed with the familiar assertion 
the absurdity of believing that.there could be any such a 
thing as cosmic truth. Reiterating that significance, con-
sciousness and ideals are no more than marks of the finite, 
he follows with an obscure reference -- obscure to me-- to 
French sceptics who look with haughty scorn upon a world in 
ruins or who are familiar with this attitude. What writers 
1. Ibid., p. 210. 
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does he mean, and how does this tie in with his thesis of 
no absolutes, no cosmic ultimates? The reader, however, 
unconsciously at this point is already gathering himself 
together, and from here on in he is being actively groomed 
though he may not know it yet for the quick shock of the 
volte face. For Holmes is beginning his usual and yet al-
ways surprising deep plunge into the kind of mysticism in 
which he takes delight -- the undisciplined, emotional,god-
less piety before immensity, before the vast unknowabilitY 
of everything, the eternal awfulness of the universe~ As it 
begins, science and objectivity drop rapidlY away. The part 
cannot swallow the whole, he says, oblivious to the law of 
statistical regularity. We can onlY agree completely that 
our categories are not, or may not be, adequate to formulate 
what we cannot know, believing as we must that we came out 
of the universe, and therefore even an antique Stoicism 
would teach us the principle of trusting it. Holmes says 
we must admit that we do not know what we are talking about 
when we speak of brute matter, but we do not know what he 
is talking about in using such a phrase. "Brute matter, 11 
indeed! All the complicated terms and mathematical language 
of atomic and nuclear formulations, including the original 
famous equation of Relativity, E = MC2 , make such an expres-
sion nonsensical. Holmes is already beating a dead dog, 
here, much less attractive than that one of his whose com-
plex of energies so frequently wags its tail at syllogisms. 
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In the next and nearly the last sentence in the paragraph 
we suddenly come to Fabre, Bergson and Maeterlinck, and are 
clearly at the point where for Holmes science and mysticism 
coalesce. We particularly wonder at the relevance of Maeter-
linck with his Monna Vanna and Blue Bird at this point, al-
though it is evident that the life of the bee ties in with 
Fabre, and that they all tie in with the Life Force, the 
Elan Vital, somehow. If this be true,_ Holmes says -- that 
man has still greater powers that we cannot understand and 
that there is perhaps a clang behind the phenomena -- why 
should we not be content. It seems silly to employ the en-
ergy furnished us by the cosmos in shaking our fist at the 
sky. If this, however the fist-shaking at the sky -- is 
in some way considered to define or relate to Natural Law, 
as I would suppose &t was intended to be~ it would seem even 
more silly to me, as there is no possible similarity in 
definition. Holmes is quite clearly here advocating in his 
arguments -for the acceptance of the universe and all its 
phenomena the antique Natural Law of the Stoics, already 
referred to. 
As already indicated we are now also face to face with 
Holmes• mysticism, the value or nature of which has not been 
adequately evaluated. This is the last paragraph to the 
Natural Law essay. 
·--That the universe has in it more than we under-
stand, that the private soldiers have not been told 
the plan of the campaign, or even that there is one, 
rather than some vaster unthinkable to which every 
predicate is an impertinence.s has no bearing upon 
our conduct. We still shall fight -- all of us 
because we want to live.s some 3 at least~ because 
we want to realize our spontaneity and prove our 
powers, for the joy of it~ and we may leave to 
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the unknown the supposed final evaluation of that 
which in any event has value to us. It is enough 
for us that the universe has produced us and has 
within it, as less than it~ all that we believe and 
love. If we think of our existence not as that of 
a little god outside, but as that of a ganglion 
within, we have the infinite behind us. It gives us 
our only but our adequate significance. A grain of 
sand has the same.s but what competent person sup-
poses that he understands a grain of sand? That is 
as much beyond our grasp as man. If our imagina-
tion is strong enough to accept the vision of our-
selves as parts inseverable from the rest, and to 
extend our final interest beyond the boundary of 
our skins, it justifies the sacrifice even of our 
lives for ends outside of ourselves. The motive, to 
be sure, is the common wants and ideals that we find 
in man. Philosophy does not furnish motives, but 
it shows men that they are not fools for doing what 
they already want to do. It opens the forlorn hopes 
on which we throw ourselves away, the vista of the 
farthest stretch of human thought, the chords of a 
harmony that breathes from the unknown.l . 
In his American Thought, Civil War to World War I Perry 
Miller includes two of Holmes' essays, 11 The Path of the Lawn 
and "Natural Law". In the Introduction he says: 
••• Holmes's discourse [i.e., "The Path of the Law'!] 
has become a battleground; his critics have decried 
it as making an unreal and pernicious separation 
between law and morality. In recent years the re-
action against so hard-boiled and ruthless an ob-jectivity has become considerable; wherever one's 
sympathies may lie, the fact remains that his reduc-
tion of the toplofty platitudes of textbooks to 
the simple assertion that a law is nothing more, in 
actual fact, than a prediction of what the judge 
will do is in the spirit of Wright, Peirce, and 
James. In order that he may further and clearly 
1. Ibid. 3 p. 211. 
stand in the light to which his opponents most 
object3 but in which he would most wish to ap-
pear, I have reached forward as far as 1918 to 
include his "Natural Law." The debate as to 
whether Holmes's doctrine is no more than po-
lite brutality continues, just as his students 
are never entirely sure that this nliberal" was 
not in reality a rock-bound 11conservative." It 
shculd·, however 3 be said that in the opinion of 
those best acquainted with him personally, as 
also in the opinion of this editor, the charge 
that Holmes had no concern for 11valuesu and that 
he took the side of the 11 bad manu as easily as 
that of the good is nonsense. 11Natural Law" 
shocks those who want to 11believe" that the uni-
verse is governed by an ideal and universal jus-
tice3 who need· such consolation in the face of 
11 The Problem of Job. n Too often they do not 
stop to read, or to sound the depths of, the 
conclusion of the essay, where the deeply reli-
gious dedication which carried Holmes through 
his amazingly productive and serviceable life 
comes into the open. The mixture in him of 
scepticism and belief, of frivolity and high 
seriousness, along with his prodigious open-
mindedness, his hospitality to all ideas, makes 
him indeed an authentic spokesman for one of 
the profound traits of the American mind.l 
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Perry Miller is a perspicacious critic. The last sen-
tence above does sum up the reasons for Holmes' greatness, 
and his lasting significance in American life and letters. 
Yet in pointing out the 11 deeply religious dedicationn of 
the conclusion of the essay, Miller does not indicate that 
this kind of religion or religious dedication remains con-
vincing only to the non-religious mind. He accepts too 
easily the contradictions and gaps. Yes, there are plenty 
of mystical words3 phrases and ideas in this last paragraph 
1. Miller, American Thought, p. xxxvii. 
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all ~altly contradicting the main body o~ the paper, and 
let us list them in part: "the universe has in it more 
than we understand", "some vaster unthinkable", 11we have 
the in~ini te behind us•1, 11what competent person supposes 
that he understands a grain o~ san<ft", 11 the vision o~ our-
selves as parts inseverable ~rom the rest", 11 the motive ••• 
is the common wants and ideals that we ~ind in man", "the 
vista o~ the ~arthest stretch of human thought, the chords 
o~ a harmony that brea thea ~rom the unknown 11 • And through 
this almost orgiastic sensibility runs the ~amiliar somber 
military tramp: 11 the private soldiers have not been told 
the plan o~ the campaign 11 , nwe shall still ~ight", nit 
justi~ies the sacri~ice even o~ our lives ~or ends outside 
o~ ourselves", "it opens the ~orlorn hopes on which we 
throw_·;oursel ves away ••• " 
Well, what is it? We might call it Stoicism, which 
is quite possibly the nearest to a religion Holmes would 
endorse, i~ it were not ~or the decided sceptical-cynical 
cast. Yet Stoicism is the great parent and source o~ Natu-
ral Law and the benevolent i~ incomprehensible universe, 
in which man must play the part o~ the duti~ul son and 
citizen. Actually, o~ course, Holmes is, consciously or 
unconsciously, claiming Natural Law concepts here at the 
end. For what else is: "The motive, to be sure, is the 
common wants and ideals that we ~ind in man"? The other 
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one of Holmes' essays included by Miller in this collection, 
fiThe Path of the Law" ends with this statement: 
The remoter and more general aspects of the law 
are those which give it universal interest. It 
is through them that you not only become a great 
master in your calling, but connect your subject 
with the universe and catch an echo of the in-
finite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a 
hint of the universal law.l 
Is Holmes laughing up his sleeve at us all the time? 
There is of course that possibility, for humor takes sur-
prising guises, and there may well be in him the touch of 
the Shavian showman. In fact, he does give just this as-
pect of the show away in a letter to Morris Cohen, dated 
September 3, 1918. 
I have been moved by a book on Natural Law 
(which)I don't think much of) to write a few 
words for the Harvard Law Review, i.e. Laski 
impounded them to that end. I say nothing 
that I haven't said a thousand times in conver-
sation, but one rather likes to see one:!~s fun-
damentals in print. So I wound up with a nice 
twist at the tail of the cosmos -- agreeing 
with the· Natural LawYers that we have to come 
back to them~ I should like to read it to you 
it is short. 
Yet even with this evidence of clear and self-conscious 
insight, it is difficult to credit too much the Voltarian 
paradox in his inconsistencies for they are too insistent, 
and their formulations over the years too steadily repe-
1. Holmes, 11The Path of the Lawn quoted in Miller, Amer-
ican Thought, p. 206. 
2. Felix s. Cohen (ed.), The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 
pp. 11, 12. 
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ti tious. 
The mystery of a grain of sand is indeed the hall-mark 
of mysticism. Blake spoke of seeing a world in a grain of 
sand, and Thomas Traherne: 11You never enjoy the world 
aright, till you see how a sand exhibiteth the wisdom and 
power of God. 11 And the grain of sand was another cliche of 
Holmes, yet usually in a semi-contemptuous sense, to the 
effect that a man is no more important to the universe than 
a baboon or a grain of sand. And yet, on the other hand, 
"some vaster unthinkable to which every predicate is an 
impertinence" is even a powerfully expressed description of 
the meaning of God. 
It remains difficult to call this kind of mysticism re-
ligion, unless_ poetry and ecstatic insight, the emotion of 
rapture, the Elan Vital itself, can be so called. One of the 
most repulsive (to me) of Holmes' essays, uThe Soldierts Fa:tth," 
is particularly lush with this kind of feeling. Another_, "The 
Class of 1 61 Fiftieth Reunion Address"_, ends thus: 
When one listens from above to the roar of a 
great city, there comes to one's ears --almost 
indistinguishable_, but there -- the sound of church 
bells_, chiming the hours_, or offering a pause in 
the rush, a moment for withdrawal and prayer. Com-
merce has outsoared the steeples that once looked 
down upon the marts, but still their note makes 
music of the din. For those of us who are not 
churchmen the symbol still lives. Life is a roar 
of bargain and battle, but in the very heart of 
it there rises a mystic spiritual tone that gives 
meaning to the whole. It transmutes the dull de-
tails into romance. It reminds us that our only 
but wholly adequate significance is as parts of 
the unimaginable whole. It suggests that even 
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while we think that we are egotists we are living 
to ends outside ourselves.l 
Readers of the letters to Laski will remember as quoted 
some pages baekt 
••• Eut how. can one pretend to believe what seems 
t~ him childish and deveia alike of historical 
and rational feundations? I suppose such thoaghts 
would be as likely te> e>cc:ar to yGu. abeu.t Valhalla 
or the Mohometan hell as about this ••• but I was 
brought up in Boston -- and though I didn't get 
Hell talk from my parents it was in the air. Oh --
the enn~i of those Sunday morning church bells, . 
and hymn tunes ••• I hardly have recovered from ±t:.oow~ 
Yet disregarding this even as bearing on the sincerity 
of his liking chureh bells for any reason, the Memorial Day 
Address of 1895, ealled 11 The Soldier's Faith", and the Class 
of •61, Fiftieth Anniversary Address (June, l911), with the 
- , 
paragraph as quoted above, is clear evidence of what is 
wrong with this if eonside'red to be religion. As religion 
it is as mushy, as pagan and as liable to pernicious warp-
ing to demonic ends as solstice worship or possession about 
blood and soil to whieh many of the expressions and senti-
ments in these essays are close. Religion here is the second 
hand and second rate symbol, the fake romance, as far from 
hard-tack, as the ignoranee about St. Augustine which could 
lead him to write facilely in another plaee: 0 In the uni-
versity are pictured the ideals which abide in the City of 
God. h n3 Many roads lead to that aven ••• It is in the same 
1. Lerner, The Mind and Faith of Jus.tice Holmes, p. 27. 
2. Howe (ed.), H-L, I, 154. 
3. Lerner, op. eit., p. 35. 
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Fiftieth Reunion Address that Holmes says, "It was a good 
thing fer u.s in eur cellege days ••• that we were all poor. 11 
That the son of Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes eould refer to 
himself as being 11 pooru in his college days coincides with 
. . 
these farraeious touches and the pseudo-remant1c slant. 
Actually, he is here like many famous post-war young 
persons, the nlesttt generation, and the 11'beatniks 11 included, 
. . . 
who rely on the power of Christianity and look fer its pre-
cepts to protect, enlighten and stabilize them and their so-
ciety, Without having the insight, the courage or the integ-
rity te support its concepts as such and incisively know 
where gratitude and responsibility is ewed. And yet when 
these standards fail, for whatever reason, with what an im-
mediate cynicism do these yeu.ng people cry out that society, 
or histery, or something has betrayed them: This was so 
universally evident in the 1920's. Needless to say there 
is nothing manifest in Holmes' character which suggests the 
lost generation. Yet sinee in his youth he was 11 teuehed with 
firefl it would seem evident that the syndrome whieh usually 
attends that experience was, in part at least, responsible 
for the off-centredness which both enriched legal history and 
_also kept him from the scrupulosity, let as say, whieh would 
lead him to base his intellection on and give his eredit 
where the credit was due. 
Max Lerner also is an editor who has a good deal to say 
about Holmes' 11Natural Law" essay, anc!l his opinions may be 
quE> ted here without comment. In his The Mind and Faith E>f 
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Justice Holmes he says: 
- ••• "Law and the Court_,n "Ideals and Doubts_,n and 
"Natural Law" are Holmes!s best writing on legal 
pl1il0sephy_, and en_ them his repntation as a legal 
Philosopher_, as distinguished from a judge_, rests •••• 
''Ideals and Donbts n and "Natural Law11 were written 
out of an impulsive reaction against.some Conti-
nental writers who made law out to be too ration-
al_, idealistic_, and absolute for Holmes t0 stomach. 
In each ease_, Holmes says he wrote the article 
uourrente calamo, in a kind <:>f rage of writing 
one day. n The essays have a quality of passion 
and even.indignatien. In them_, ••• Holmes is es-
sentially the conservative ••• He hits at the theme 
of law as absolute and at the idea that certainty 
is obtainable and expressible in law ••• But although 
his general positi0n in these essays is that of 
one who has been through the wars of ideas and 
is ready to thrust his rapier through the sawdust 
warriers of both camps_, Holmes •s most explicit 
attention is given to what he considers the 
naivetes of the reformers ••• 
Pollock did not like Holmes' essay on "Natu-
ral Law. 11 ••• 
The essay on 11Natural La.wf1 is thus as good a 
summary of Holmes's maturer views on the nature 
of law as one can.find in his writings. nA right_, 11 
he says in a famous phrase, nis only the hypostasis 
of a prophe~y ••• And then he adds that this does 
. not exclude "the fighting will of the subject to 
maintain" the rights: "A dog will fight for his 
bone.n We have here the behavioristic definition 
of law, squeezing it dry of all morality and senti-
ment; and we have also the attempt to bring in 
~he element of faith and energy as a natural part 
e>f'the human mind. I tend to agree with Fuller 
.-and some others that Helmes did not adequately 
·bridge the gaps between the two worlds. There 
was in him a deep conflict between skepticism 
and belief, between mind and faith, ••. but he 
made a going coneern out of it. And because he 
did he leaves with us the sense of a full-statured 
person far more than do those who sought to trim 
their energies to the n!rrow confines of one or 
the other partial view. 
1. Lerner, op, cit., pp. 371, 371, 373, 373. 
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It is in Lerner's collection of Holmes' letters at the 
end of his volume that one comes across a curious similarity 
between a letter Holmes wrote to William James on March 24, 
1907, and the Natural Law essay of 1918. Holmes' relation-
ship with James, as With so many of his friendships, had 
been a development over the years, but, in this case, the 
connection lost warmth and contiguity with time until, as 
wferences in his letters to Laski show, his feeling about 
James, out of the youthful "Wendell of my entrails!n scar-
cely stopped short this side of enmity. The likeness to 
certain thoughts and phrases here, even the repetition of 
ideations from this letter into the essay mean nothing in 
particular except what any consistent reader of Holmes would 
know -- that he did not develop anything new in his thinking, 
but went on chewing the cud of phrases and vaguely formed 
concepts over the years. So that this Natural Law paper 
might as well have been given any one of a dozen· other names 
which would have been just as relevant to it, or a good deal 
more so, than the one it did receive, having deluded many 
people apparently into thinking that it was about Natural 
Law. As Lerner says, this is the "behavioristic definition 
of law, squeezing it dry of all morality and sentiment," but 
most of the critics of pragmatism would have used just such 
comments about it. Yet here is Holmes using many of his 
anti-Natural Law figures and metaphors against pragmatism, 
even though he ends with a conventional endorsement and 
praise of James' paper. It seems easily deducible that there 
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was no clear plan or anything sharply organized or intended 
in the production of the Natural Law piece. Here is the 
letter to James. 
Dear Bill: 
I have.read your two pieces about pragmatism 
(pedantic name) and am curious to hear the rest. 
Meantime I will fire off a reflection or two. 
For a good many years I have had a formula for 
truth Which seems humbler than those you give ••. 
but I don't know whether it is pragmatic or not. 
I have been in the habit ef saying that all I 
mean by truth is what I ean't help thinking. The 
assumption of the validity of the thinki~g pro~ 
cess seems to mean no more than that: I am up 
against it -- I have gone as far as I can go --just as when I.like a glass of beer •. But I have 
learned to surmise that my can't helps are.not 
necessarily cosmic can't helps -- that the uni-
verse may not be subject to my limitations; and 
philosophy generally seems to me to sin through 
arrogance. It is like the old knight-errants 
who proposed to knock your head off if you didn't 
admit that their girl was not only a nice girl 
but the most beautiful and best of all possible 
girls. I can't help preferring champagne to 
ditch water~ --I doubt if the universe does. 
But a reference to the universe seems to let 
in the Absolute that in form I was expelling. 
To that I answer that I admit it to be but a 
guess. I think the despised ding an sich is all 
right. It stands on a faith or a bet. The 
great act of faith ·is when a man deeides.that he 
is not God. But when I admit that you are not 
my dream~ I seem to myself to have admitted the 
universe and the ding an sieh -- unpredictable 
and only guessed at~ as ssmewhat out of whiea I 
eome rather than coming out of me. ·But if I did 
come out of it~ or rather~ if I am i~ it~ I_see 
no wonder why I can't swallow it ••• It seems to me 
that the only promising activity is.to make~ 
universe coherent and livable~ not to babble 
about the universe. Truth then~ as one~ I agree 
with you~ is only an ideal -- an assumption that 
if everyone was as educated and clever as I h~ 
would feel the same compulsions that I do •. ~o a 
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limited extent only do men feel so in fact~ so 
that in fact there are as many truths as there 
are men. But if we all agreed~ we should only 
nave formulated our limitations ••• I think the 
attempt to make these limitations compulsory en 
anything outside our dream -- to demand signifi-
cance~ etc., of the universe -- absurd. I simply 
say it contains them~ and bow my head. To defy 
it would be equally absurd, as it would furnish 
me the energy with which to shake my fist. Most 
of us retain enough of the theological attitude 
to think that we are little gods. It is the regu-
lar position of sceptical French heroes -- like 
the scientific man in Maeterlink's Bees •••. 
••• ~o act affirms~ for the moment at least, the 
worth of an end; idealizing seems to be simply the 
generalized and permanent affirmation of the worth 
of ends ••• As to pain, suicide~ ete.~ I think you 
make too much row about them, and have had 
thoughts on the need of a society for the promo-
tion of hard-heartedness. It is as absurd for 
me to be spearing my old commonplaces at you as 
it would be for an outsider to instruct me in the 
~heory of legal responsibility~ but you see, ~ 
vieux although it is years since we have had any 
real talk together, I am rather obstinate in my 
adherence to ancient sympaihies and enjoy letting 
out a little slack to you. 
If not all there, at least many of the main ideas and 
figures of speech are: the knight who will knock you in the 
head over his girl, truth as the ttcan't helps", the glass of 
beer, the general ttpromotion of h~rd-heartednessn, even the 
mysterious French skeptics, shaking one's fist at the cosmos 
and Maeterlinck 1 s bees. As he haS\': said before, the field 
is covered~ and there is nothing very new under the sun ex-
cept the stunning impact that most of Holmes' major commen-
tators ha,ve purported to receive from nNatural Law". 
. . 
Pollock, however, as Lerner reminds us, did not like 
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his old friendfs essay one little bit and said so. Pollock 
himself was no uncertain authority on Natural Law. His ar-
ticle, condensing somewhat other writings, on The History of 
the Law of Nature in the Columbia Law Review for January, 
1901, is frequently referred to in scholarly footnotes. In 
this paper, referring to various applications of the term 
Natural Law which have been in use ever since the Roman Em-
pire, Pollock said: 
••• Variety and apparent diversity have tended to 
obscure the central idea which underlies them all, 
that of an ultimate principle of fitness with re-
gard to the nature of man as a rational and social 
being, which is, or ought to be, the justification 
of every form of positive law. Such a principle, 
under the name of reason, reasonableness, or some-
times natural justice, is fully recognized in our 
system, but the difference of terminology has tend-
ed to conceal the real similarityffrom English law--
yers during the last century or more .•• 
Modern aberrations have led to a widespread be-
lief that the Law of Nature is only a cloak for ar-
bitrary dogmas or fancies. The element of truth 
in this belief is that, when the authority of natu-
ral law was universallY allowed, every disputant 
strove to make-out that it was on his side. But 
such an endeavour would obviously have been idle 
if the Law of Nature had meant nothing but indivi-
dual opinions.l 
And again: 
It was no less inevitable that the appeal to 
the Law of Nature as the ultimate ground of deci-
sion between conflicting claims should often be-
come indistinguishable, to modern eyes, from a 
pretty frank appeal to expediency. We find even 
the language of modern utilitarianism anticipated, 
for communis utilitas is a quite current term. 
If Bentham had known what the Law of Nature was 
reallY like in the Middle Ages, he would have had 
1. Frederick Pollock, 11The H1story of the Law of Naturen, 
Columbia Law Review, p. 11, January, 1901. 
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to speak of it with more respect. It has been 
pointed out before now that in any ease utilitarian-
ism is just as much a system of natural law as any 
other dogmatic system of ethics or politics. In-
deed the political principles of the Imperialist 
doctors came very near to the well-known theist 
form of utilitarianism~ according to which utility 
is the test of right conduct because God wills the 
happiness of his creatures.l 
And still again: 
••• Further~ and this comes very near modern meth-
ods~ it [i.e. the Law of Nature] was sought to 
assure t~e sanctity of prpperty and contract, in-
eluding the supposed original contract itself~ 
by representing those institutions as part of the 
immutable Law of Nature; this view was. substanti-
ally adopted by G~otius~ and has largely entered 
into modern economic doetrine ••• 2 
And lastly: 
••• But there is a real link between the medieval 
doctrine of the Law of Natare and the principles 
of the Common Law. It ~s given by the use --
correct in both systems_, though constant_, indeed 
exclusive, in the Common Law_, and rather sparing 
in the Canon Law -- of the words nreason11 and 
"reasonable •" This was pointed out in the first 
quarter of tne 16th century by that very able 
writer_, Christopher St. German, ••• {in] Doctor 
and Student ••• student gives the law of reason as 
the first of the general grounds of the law in 
England_, and_, in answer to the Doctor's inquiry 
where he puts the Law of Nature, explains that 
in the Common Law that te~ is not in use, but 
that where the canonist or civilian would speak 
of the Law of Nature_, the common lawYer speaks 
of reason. On~e pointed out, the analogy is ob-
viously just ••• Yet this striking passage of St. 
German has been completely overlooked in modern 
times ••• 3 
1. Ibid._, p. 22. 
2. Ibid._, p. 25. 
3. Ibid., p. 26. 
t 1 
210 
The interested reader may note that there is a long 
and very able discussion of St. Germain's Doctor and Student 
in Mcilwain~ High Court of Parliament, pag~s 98 to 108~ in 
which these same-points-of Pollock's are brought out in de-
tail. Further amplifying analysis is in Edwards. Corwin's 
Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law. As 
for Pollock~ one wonders if some of this~ even-if unconsci-
ously so~ is written with his old friend Holmes' opinions in 
mind. It is impossible to know~ other than to see from the 
correspondence between them that Pollock frequently had a 
good word to say for pragmatism whenever~ as a concept~ 
Holmes derided it. -Yet when "Natural Law" appeared, Polloek 
'·- , 
vigorously repeated some of the above sentiments. The ex-
change between them on the topic is as follows. On October 
31~ 1918~ Holmes wrote: 
I hope in a few days to reciproeate for your 
verses by sending you a few remarks suggested by 
reading volume two of Geny~ on something or other 
I forget what, that leads him to give an account 
of the views of a lot of modern jurists on Natural 
Law, etc. in which Geny believes. I don't ~nd 
have taken the occasion to state a part of my 
creed. I wrote them as [sic] some years ago a 
little piece for the Illinois Law Review & Wig-
more~ currente calamo, in a kind of rage of writ-
ing one day, and Laski when I showed them to him 
impounded them for-the Harv •. Law Rev.~ which I 
had not intended. After I sent back the proofs 
the other day I was depressed to think that one 
little phrase ttfor the joy of it" was an echo of 
Ruskin. I hate to drop into something ready 
made that is not1the immediate expression of one t s thought_ ••• 
1. Howe (ed.), H-P~ I~ 271. 
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Pollock replied to this on December 20, 1918: 
The Harvard Law Review is to hand with your re-
marks on Natural Law as set forth by Geny. Not 
knowing w~at he says I cannot fully apprecia~e your 
criticism, but if you.mean to imply that no one can 
aeeept natural law (= natural justice = reason as 
understood in the Common Law) without maintaining 
it as a body of rules- known to be absolutely 
true, I do not agree. 
See my studies in Journal of Comparative Legis-
lation 1900, 1901, of.which I think I sent you 
separate prints at the time.. · 
The Roman lawyers made no such assertions about 
ius.gentium, whieh was simply general custom and 
for most purposes equivalent to ius naturale. As 
to the exceptional divergences, see opening of 
the Institutes • · · · 
In the Middle Ages natural law was regarded 
as the senicr bra:p.ch of divine law and there-
fore had to be treated as infallible (but there 
was no infallible way of knowing what_it was.) 
r 
If you deny that any principles of conduct at 
all are common to and admitted by all men who try 
to behave reasonably -- well, I don't see how you 
can have any ethics er any ethieal background 
for law. 
Apparently the ex-German Emperor will have to 
be tried by a wholly new jurisdiction, if at all, 
and by some standard which all medieval and not a 
few medern doctors would refer to as natural law. 
A eemmittee of which I am a member is now hard at 
work trying to inform.the conscience of the At-
torney General at the re~uest of the War Cabinet 
on this group of problems (there 're problems 
with regard to lesser folk .. also). 
~ 
In his answer te this Holmes goes rather far afield, and 
makes subtle if relatively unimportant points to uphold his 
contention that no common standards are possible or at least 
feasible. Yet what he has to say in this letter to· Pollock 
1. Ibid., p. 271. 
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is not altogether a non se§n~tnr, or a shift in subject mat-
ter, even though superficially-it might be considered so. 
He writes a month later: 
Your studies in-Natural Law are not forthcom-
ing on a rapid look __ around •. I remember your writ-
ing on the subject but I couldn't recite on what 
you said, although of course I read whatever I 
know of yours. But I didn't expect you to agree 
with me altogether •. As to Ethics I have called 
them a body of imperfect social generalizations 
expressed in terms of emotion. Of course I agree 
that there is such a body on which to a certain 
extent civilized men would agree -- but how much 
less than would have been taken for granted fifty 
years age~ witness the Bolsheviki. John M. Zane 
walks into me in the Mich. Law Rev. and later in 
the Ill. Law Rev. and thinks I am hopelessly-pre-
eluded from the place I should occupy by accept-
ing the old notion of a sovereign being superior 
to the law that he or it makes and by believing 
that judges make law ••• But there is a real dif-
ference expressed by him in a tone of dogmatism 
upon which I should not venture, although I 
think I could smash him if he would say what he 
thought and not only what he didn't believe ••• 
My brother Brandeis, Okakura, a Japanese writer 
on art, and a dame who showed me.early Chinese 
paintings that she thought showed spiritual 
heights never reached by us, have happened to 
concur in assuring me in their several ways of 
the superiority of the oriental mind to ours ••• 
I can show you any number of books that I believe 
touch life and the world more profoundly, more 
exquisitely, and at more points than anything I 
know of or believe exists in the East. As to 
the Jap writer I content myself with the_contempt 
of the dame for.the whole Jap1lot as an inferior offshoot from the Chinese •••• 
Pollock was quite ready to be mollified by this apparent 
shifting from the attack on the Natural Law subjeet to some-
thing not completely unrelated but not related, so that th~y 
can apparently meet on neutral ground. On February 17, 1919, 
1. Ibid., II, 3,4. 
he wrote: 
I share your feelings under talk abiDut the 
superiority of ••the Oriental mind, u or art or 
most things to ours. There are many schools of 
Eastern thought and Eastern art agreeing to-
gether in very little except that their several 
assumptions and conventions are different from 
ours, and there is no cemmen standard to enable 
one to talk of superior or interior •••• on our 
part we have to remember that the Bible is Ori-
ental before we talk of ~superiority. There 
is one thing eommon to the thoughts of the.far-
ther East, a certain contempt for transitory 
matters of faet ••• 
Zane's beiliated storm in a teacup is almost 
eomic. Any medieval man would have said that 
of course the king'! judges can't sit in judg-
ment on the king ••• 
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Holmes' anger at Zane was a sere point with him and one 
to which he recurred repeatedly in his correspondence with 
Laski, even long after the original controversy was dead and 
gone. Sometimes he even had to remind Laski who Zane was, 
although Laski's original defense of Holmes in the matter had 
been extreme and passionate. Actually, the long forgotten 
Mr. Zane had referred to Holmes only by tke way_ and in pass-
ing in the two offensive articles, which are rather prolixJ 
historical surveys of German legal philosophy somewhat in 
the manner of Duquit 1s artiele, in which, for different rea-
sonsJ he defends a basis for Natural Law. He says: 
Since the sense of justice is an original mo-
ral idea closely connected with the sense of 
right, it is certain that the rules of law which 
have any moral significance must conform to the 
moral ideas. Therefore, it is plain that the 
great part of the law which is dictated by moral 
1. Ibid. , p • 6 . 
~ ..... ,. . 
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ideas may properly be called na ural law. As a 
part of natural law must come as a necessary re-
sult of a developing sense of so ial solidarity 
an international law regulating he relations of nations 
to each other.l 
Of Holmes~ denouncing his pronou cement on the nature 
of law for a sovereign3 he says: 
In the case of a judge at thi 
ture to say that it is at least 
but when it lends support to the 
man.theory of law and justice wh 
much of the wor~d3 it becomes a 
its hollowness. 
It would seem to the casual read 
out of his way to be angered in this 
raised to flavor of arrogance, is exe 
the next quoted letter in his series 
since it relates to such a famous 
is worth quoting to round off the 
Pollock over Natural Law. It 
1. 
2. 
••• I am beginning to get stupid 1 
test against a decision that Debs 
tator, was rightly convicted of o 
recruiting service so far as the 
cerned. I wondered that the Gove 
press the case to a hearing befor 
evitable result was that fools, 
rant persons were bound to say he 
because he was a dangerous agitat 
structing the draft was a pretens 
with the Jury of course I don't 
course the talk is silly as to us 
lot of jaw about the free speech3 
with somewhat summarily in an ear 
Schenck v. U.S •••• also Frohwer~ v 
happens I should go farther proba 
John M. Zane, 11 German Legal Philos 
Review, 16 (1917-1918), p. 311. 
John M. Zane, 11 A Legal Heresy"3 
(1918-1919)3 p. 431. 
day we may ven-
n indiscretion~ 
atrocious Ger-
ch has desolated 
udy to expose 
that Holmes went 
This touchiness, 
Pollock~ which 
American history3 
1919 • 
tters of pro-
a noted agi-
structing the 
aw was eon-
nment should 
us, as the in-
aves and igno-
was convicted 
r and that ob-
. How it was 
ow, but of 
There was a 
which I dealt 
ier case --
u.s .... As it 
ly than the 
and 
Michigan Law 
Law Review~ 13 
majority in favor of it~ and I d resay it was 
partly on that account that the .J. assigned 
the ease to me.l 
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Whether or not Holmes' present dangern formu-
la which upheld the Schenek convictio was really the triumph 
for free speech that most liberal co entators have held it 
to be seems at least debatable~ but a worst it was notre-
actionary. There is considerable dif in the result 
of Holmes' opinillons in the Schenck ca e and the Abrams dis-
sent~ although the glamorized of an emotional cru-
sader which Catherine Drinker e to her reading of 
Holmes 1 part in the latter gether factitio~s. 2 
nThe best test of truth is the powers f the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition he market,n --it is 
in the Abrams dissent that Holmes' rtant contribution to 
the legal aspect of free speech is ind cated. 
Yet Pollock's objection to Holmes essay on Natural Law~ 
clear as it is~ only makes more obscur the reasons for Las-
ki's enthusiastic praise ( 11 There are o ly two things of 
yours that at first sight have moved m so much") and the 
reader wishes again that there were mo e evidence in the 
correspondence of just how Laski got hold of the piece and 
became so interested in publishing it. If~ as Holmes said 
to Pollock, 
1. Howe (ed.)~ H-P, II~ 7. 
2. Catherine Drinker Bowen, Yankee fro 
391. 
pp. 390~ 
I wrote them as [sic] some years ago a little 
piece for the Illinois Law Review & Wigmore, 
currente calamo, in a kind of rage of writing 
one day, and Laski when I showed them to him 
impounded them for the1Harv. Law Rev., which I had not intended, ••• 
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the only amplification or verification of this is in Laski's 
brief: 11 I want that piece for the Law Review."2 
It had never appeared in the Illinois Law Review, al-
though that it might have been written years before, at 
least in summary form or outline, is evidenced in what has 
been already quoted from the exchange with William James. 
Yet the reference to the crusty Dean Wigmore of the Law 
School of Northwestern University is interesting. In 1920 
Wigmore published (in 14 Illinois Law Review) a fierce dis-
~ 
sent from Holmes' dissent in the Abrams ease, entitling it: 
ttAbrams v. United States: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of 
Thuggery in War-Time and Peaee Time." Laski was of course 
interested in this and commented on it, as he did on all 
matters relating to Holmes' work or theories of jurispru-
dence. If Holmes had written the Natural Law piece because 
of some argument with Wigmore in mind and which he was ex-
panding upon in an account to Laski when they met in the 
summer of 1918, visiting at each other's summer homes, it 
is possible that his position did take on to Laski and to 
himself an aspect which is not apparent in it now. Since 
1. Howe (ed.), H-P, I, 271. 
~ ~ 
2. Howe (ed.), H-L, I, 163. 
-->;· .~!~ t""'\ 
l' t .... .-~; 
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Wigmore was such a superpatriot and conservative, Holmesr 
snide shooting of hOles in the indignant mantle of righteous-
ness of the Old School might very well have appeared to Laski 
as a healthy enfranchisement, away from the hide-bound tradi-
tional position of Natural Law as Sacredness of Contract and 
so as the Divine Right of Property and the Personality of 
Business Corporation, which it was Holmes' great historic 
function on the Supreme Court to correct. Since Laski, aboe 
all, appreciated this reversal, it is an explanation of the 
continuing tie of their friendship and possibly also, partly 
at least, of his first enthusiasm for the essay on the basis 
of supplementary and explanatory conversations unknown to 
us, in which he already saw the Great Reversal as endemic in 
the paper, and Natural Law became the Old Dragon of the Old 
Guard to be gallantly done to death by Holmesr knight-
errantry, even if actually that wasn't exactly what Natural 
Law was or exactly as Holmes saw it to be. 
Nevertheless, in summary conclusion, the fact remains 
that Holmes did not know what he was writing about when he 
entitled his article fiNatural Law11 • He might as well have 
called it, 11My General Attitude Toward Life", or something 
like.that, for it means no more as dealing with its supposed 
subject. Of course, he was right in saying he was only re-
stating what he had said before many times. It might have 
been published almost in toto fifteen or twenty years be-
fore under any other heading. As analysis or even as a 
relevant comment it is unimportant, for all of the 
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high praise that has been heaped upon it as successfully 
demolishing its subject. It does not demolish its subject, 
for it does not deal with it. 
As for Laski, his enthusiasm and adulation for the 
paper calls for an even more severe comment, for, as appa-
rently manifested, it can be explained on no other basis 
but insincerity. Laski did know something about Natural 
Law. Previous to this period, he' was vi tally and--creative-
ly interested in it, and had been delving in research in 
several of its more obscure phases in politics as connected 
with the State and the source of ultimate sovereignty. As 
the correspondence shows, when he met Holmes, and at least 
for a year and a half thereafter, he was working out his 
own version of Natural Law as the Rights of Man, imbedded 
in each individual and sovereign conscience in a pluralistic 
and necessarily divided political community. If he had con-
tinued in this line his early brilliant promise might well 
have come to a productive and long-lived maturity, for as a 
teacher these same qualities carried him through the years. 
But the inaccuracy and irrelevance of Holmes' presentation, 
the flattery of Laski's fawning, required a price to be paid 
under natural law itself, and this price, in the deteriorated 
caliber of his own work, as he accepted Holmes' definition 
of single and all powerful monolithic sovereignty, gave it 
the Marxian bent, and relinquished to the greater power of 
the group the conscience of the individual as final arbit~ 
of choice and decision# Laski b~~an to pay. 
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But throughout this harsh critique of both men in re-
lation to the Natural Law paper it must be kept clear that 
Holmes' presentation was essentially a plea for the open 
mind and the open society. If he based this plea and this 
affirmation of tolerance on scepticism and indifference 
rather than on either a charitable or incisive understanding 
of normative values nevertheless the open mind in itself~ as 
a characteristic Americanism~ is evidence of that wisdom 
more precious than rubies. And as for Laski~ in any last 
word on this matter:, do not l-et us forget that just about 
the time he met Holmes~ he was writing opinions like the,fol-
lowing in what~ for my taste~ is his most permanently worth-
while contribution to political thinking~ Authority in the 
Modern State, published soon after the appearance of the 
Natural Law essay: 
And: 
But~ in fact, the effort made by the theorists of 
natural law enshrined a truth of which too great 
a neglect is possible. The truth consists in the 
realization that one of the great main springs of 
human effort is the realization of a good greater 
than that which is actually existen$. The 18th 
century theorists made the error of regardingfuat 
good as unchangeable. The facts~ of course~ proved 
too strong for so rigid an outlook. But this in-
sistence upon idealism in law is not open to the 
same difficulty if, with Stammler~ we regard the 
ideal of natural law as continually changing in 
content. 1 
And this~ it is clear, envisages a pluralistic 
conception of society ••• It sees a man as a being 
1. Harold J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State, pp. 63~ 64. 
who wishes to realise himself as a member of soci-
ety. It refers back each action upon which judg-
ment· is to be passed to the conscience of the in-
dividual. It insists that the supreme arbiter of 
the event is the totality of such consciences •••• l 
1 • Ibid. , p. 65 • 
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CRAFTER FIVE 
HOLMES AND THE THREE LEARNED PROFESSIONS 
l. 
Build thee more stately mansions, 0 my soul, 
As the switt seasons roll1 
Leave they low-vaulted past! 
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Let each new temple, nobler than the last, 
Shut thee trom heaven with a dome more vast, 
Till thou at length art tree, 
Leaving thine outgrown shell by lite's unresting sea11 
The Chambered Nautilus 
What did Justice Holmes inherit from his i'amily' s past 
in this matter o:t: Natural Law? What of' bis i'ather, the doctor, 
his grandi'ather, the minister, his great-grand-i'ather, the 
judge? In his characteristic attitudes how much was he affirming, 
evolving :from, denying, rebelling against, or over compensating 
for New England? We have seen a great deal, in recent years, 
o:t: psychoanalytic studies o:t: the great. P~obably _one o:t: the 
most impressive and stirring of' these is Young Man Luther, by 
Eriek H. Erickson. Nothing remotely o:t: that lineage could be 
suggested here, requiring as it does highly specialized pro-
:t:essional skills and insights. Yet certain questions in regard 
to Holmes' family relationships can be asked and answered, and 
loliver Wendell Holmes, Poems, Tickner and Fields, Boston, 
1862, 358\1' 
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can shed illumination on his rejection of Natural Law, or 
rather, his psuedo-rejection. Though biographers have not 
told us much about Mrs. Holmes, and the Justice's marital 
life and childlessness seem decently veiled from either 
curious or scholarly comment, there is much information on 
the lives of his grandfathers and father, and his entire 
family heritage. 
Catherine Drinker Bowen says, in her over-flowery way, 
in her biography of Holmes, Yankee from Olympus: 
Over his shoulder one glimpsed somehow his 
ancestors ••• They left Oliver Wendell Holmes, Junior., 
a superb inheritance, one that balanced him as the 
nine-tenths of the iceberg we do not see balances 
that giittering pinnacle •••• it is well to have 
acquaintance with his Calvinist grandfather, Abiel 
Holmes, with his handsome, wordly great-grandfather, 
Judge Wendell, with his mother from whom he in-
herited, he said, tta trace of melancholy.u Above 
all it is well to know his father, the sturdy 
Yankee who wrote bad verse and good books -- pro-
fessor of anatomy, talkative five-foot-five Auto-
crat of the Breakfast-Table who lived upon applause 
and said so with engaging frankness.l 
Mrs. Bowen's biography, which both helped to found and 
to exploit the Holmes' legend, is a poor one, and this last 
sentence quoted givesak~?note of bar book: -- disparagement 
of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Senior, in favor of his son. Con-
temporaneous with the steady increase of praise and frume for 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the praise and fame of Dr. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes has declaned. Compared with the chorus 
of laudation for the Justice, tribute in writing about the 
lcatherine Drinker Bowen, Yankee from Olympus, Boston, 
Little, Brown and Co., 1944, P• xi. 
.I 
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Doctor can be called meager, ~or all o~ the ~act that in his 
generation he was an even more eminent personality than his 
son in his. In considering the causes o~ the relative down-
grading o~ Dr. Holmes, one might begin at just this point~ --
with Mrs. Bowen's book. 0~ it, Mark DeWol~e Howe says: 
Yankee ~rom Olympus ••• has popularized the notion that 
Dr. Holmes, the justice's bouncing ~ather, was an insig-
ni~icant ~igure o~ such.consuming personal vanity and 
petty conceit that his son gained no signi~icant pro~it 
~rom growing up in his household. This is a misleading 
picture o~ the doctor and an altogether inadequate 
interpretation o~ the relation between ~ather and son ••• 
Dr. Holmes throughout his whole li~e was struggling 
to break away ~rom the oppressive traditions by which 
American thought and morality in his ~ather's generation 
were smothered with respect to basic intellectual and 
moral issues o~ his day. He stood invariably with those 
men o~ vision who insisted that the questions which the 
advance o~ science had put to man should not be answered 
by the outworn ~ormulas o~ Calvinism and the threadbare 
precepts of Protestant morality ••• An alert young man, 
brought up in a household presided over by· a -~ather whole-
heartedly dedicated to the cause of free inquiry, could 
scareely ~ail to start his life with the conviction that 
the first consequence of the scienti~ic revolution must 
be the development of a skeptical mind. Nurtured in 
that belief~ Holmes must have ~ound many, if not all, 
of the aspects of the Harvard College whi~ he entered 
in the fall of 1858 hopelessly benighted. 
This quotation is from~'s article, The Positivism of 
Mr. Justice Holmes which was written to refute or modi~y the 
criticiam of Justice Holmes in Lon Fuller's The Law in Quest 
of Itsel~, a criticism already quoted in this paper. In exe 
plaining whz the young Holmes developed the ways of habitual 
thougrtwhich he did and his characteristic attitudes towards 
lMark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 
HLR, 64:533· 
224 
what is true and towards society, Howe has the advantage o~ 
thorough knowledge o~ the material he had already published 
in Touched With Fire, which deals with Holmest Civil War 
experience. The Doctor's article in the Atlantic Monthly, 
My Hunt ror the Captain, is ramous, as well as his son's 
reluctance to be so publicized. But what really was the 
relationship between ~ather and son, and how did the rather's 
opinions inrluence the son's? 
Certainly there is no indication that at the 
opening of the war, Holmes had become a skeptic in 
matters of morality •. His father's inrluence had 
carried him rar on the way to emancipation from 
tradition ••• It had not led him seriously to doubt 
that the accepted standards of behavior had an 
external or preordained validity.l 
It is interesting to speculate to what extent Natural 
Law concepts or their derivatives figured here in the intel-
lectual forming of the three distinguished representatives 
in one family of New England's three learned professions. 
Howe shows the manner in which the main impact in his develop-
ment came from war for the younger Holmes, and wrenched him 
loose from all the certainties of his background. And yet 
the end Of his college course, and still under the already at 
h he was far from the moorings of the influence of his fat er, 
New England faith of his ancestors. 
nfidence that moral convictions may 
Having lost.all ~o ti~ication in the dogma of religion, find suffic~ent JUS ~ • h Holmes' search was for a system of ph~losop y, or, 
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perhaps, for a way of life, which would give some 
assurance that a sense of duty had validity in a 
universe which must be explained in scientific terms. 
Where the normal processes of intellectual growth would 
have led him had tranquility not been shattered by the 
Civil War no one could say.~ 
Howe's definitive The Shaping Years contains enlightenment 
on the relationship between father and son. The first chapter, 
11 Childhood and Inheritancett deals in large part with this 
subject: 
When Dr. Holmes asked Henry James, Senior, whether 
he did not .find that his sons despised him, the question 
was laden with implications ••• The elder Henry James was 
scarcely speaking for the average father of average boys 
when he answered Dr. Holmes' inquiry with the somewhat 
complacent assurance that, 11no, he was not bothered in 
that way.n Some may see in-Dr. Holmes' suspicion that 
his sons despised him a reflection of his vanity. 
Others may take it as evidence of his alert perceptive-
ness. Whether it revealed a failing or a gift, it 
bespoke a quality quite different from the easy confidence 
of the elder Henry James.2 
And further: 
Dr. Holmes sadly doubted whether he could eve: get 
lithe iron of Calvinismn out of his soul ••• The des~re 
to free himself from the rigidities of his .father's 
recepts and inheritance was intense bu~ never fully 
p 1 . ed ur show the e.ffects of a traJ.ning too o.ften rea J.z. • •th all my instincts." In this admission 
at varJ.ance.WJ. · ll lie a partial 
that the effects were visi~le ~ayt~: elder James that 
explanation of. his.su~§e~~on ~ 1908 when Justice Holmes 
his children despJ.sef h·s father's papers he wrote to ~a~r!~~~~ o~~rf:~~eaoh~~rous fi~;~; hi:t~~t~~~,t~Yhi~e 
by, chuckled on a ~etter or two he saiB dull terms that 
at school inculcatJ.ngi;i~t~:di~ !on I wonder i.f I shou~d 
he passed on to me. . t t addle in my turn.u CertaJ.nly 
yield to the tem~t~t~~~fe~en:es in temperament .. and times 
it is possible t at d the Justice from repeating the 
would have preven e 
:_. 
libid., 534· 
---- J stice Oliver Wendall HolmeS5 The 11 
2Mark DeWolfe Hosea ~ vard University Press, 19 ?, p. • 
Shaping Years, 1841-1 7 , ar 
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mistakes of his father and grandfather, yet one cannot 
help wondering •••• l 
Q.uoting further: 
In suggesting to Morris Cohen what influences had en-
couraged his own basic skepticism, Justice Holmes in 
1919 spoke of the predominant influence as 11 the scientific 
way of looking at the world •••• My father was brought 
up scientifically. • • Yet there was with him, as with 
the rest of his generation, a certain softness of attitude 
towards the interstitial miracle -- the phenomenon with-
out phenomenal antecedents, that I did not feel ••• Of 
course my father was by no means orthodox, but like other 
even lax Unitarians there were questions that he didn't 
like to have asked ••• u · . 
Recognizing that .. the son found his father 1 s emanci-
pation incomplete, it would nonetheless do an injustice 
to overlook the fact that his intellectual loya+ty was 
dedicated to free ~nquiry. He saw the American's obliga-
tion to reexamine every article of faith, whether 
political or religious, as persistent and inescapable. 
n ••• rr to question everything be unlawful and dangerous, 
we had better undeclare our independence at once; for 
what the Declaration means is the right to question 
everything, even the truth of its own fundamental pro-
position.11 When a household's presiding officer is of 
that conviction and when his greatest pleasure is conver-
sation, any tension which may have existed between the 
alert-father and the emancipated son must have been 
somewhat alleviated by intellectual companionship.2 
To continue Howe 1 s analysis: 
••• The son's disappointment that 11 independent audacitytt 
was.frustrated by the Doctor's unwillingness to concan~ 
trate all his energy on a single subject was a Puritan 
judgment with respect to character... It may not be an 
exaggeration to suggest that, however rebellious t~e son 
may have been against his father's liking for the ~nculca­
tion of virtue in dull terms, the standards of morality 
by which in the end the son judged the father were as 
puritanical as the father's preceptso In.any case, the 
son's disappointement in his father's ac~~evements.was 
surely a factor contributing to the .. Just~ce 1 s ~ers~stent 
resolution to direct his own efforts and energ~es to one 
libid., 14, 15. 
2Ibid., 17, 18. 
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end-- achieving distinction in the law ••• If example 
had that effect, the Doctor's contribution to his 
son•s moral education, however ineffective it may have 
been when he yielded to the tttemptation to twaddlelt on 
virtue, may have been more substantial than the son 
realized. The father's nfailuren stirred the embers of 
those Puritan instincts in the son which demanded 
seriousness, industry and direction of effort.l 
He goes on with this fruitful comparison: 
To the Doctor, skeptical as he was of the faith of his 
father, tta faith which breeds heroes is better than an 
unbelief .. which leaves nothing worth being a hero for,u 
and as for the Justice 11high and dangerous action _ 
teaches us to believe as right beyond dispute things 
for which our doubting minds are slow to find words of 
proof. · Out of heroism grows faith in the worth of 
heroism,. 11 The Doctor was not reluctant to express 
serious convictions in light verse, and if it is fair 
to readt "The Deacon's Masterpieceu ·-- The One-Hoss Shay _,.. 
as an attack, not simply on Calvinism, but on the 
sufficiency of logic for the mastery of human problems 
one may even read its concluding line, nLogic is logic. 
That's all I say, 11 as the condensed forerunner of the 
son's most famous_utterance: 11The life of the law has 
not-been logic; it has been experience • 11 
At the highest levels of their common interest one 
can discern a striking s~ilarity. Each was, in 
intellectual matters, essentially radical, yet the 
radicalism of neither led h~ so far as to repudiate 
the conventions or traditions of his own time and place. 
Dr. Holmes carried his scientific methods to the outer-
most point at which his temperament ·told him that they 
were serviceable ••• The son, perhaps because his 
training was not in science, came to believe that if the 
methods of science at some point failed as tbe instru-
ment of curiosity it was there that inquiry should 
cease •••• what he substituted for his father's religion 
and his father's morality was a romantic conviction that 
his own standards needed no other justification than 
their vividness. Those standards were not in their 
essentials different from those prevailing in the 
community where he grew up; they were not, in other 
words, significantly different from his father 1 s ••• 2 
libid., 20, 21. 
-
228 
2. 
Others besides Mrs. Bowen have lent themselves to the 
invidious comparison. Say Max ~mer: 
I venture~the belief that the son or Dr. Holmes 
turned out to be more of a poet than his father~ 
if by poet we mean SDmeone who pierces the appear-
ances of1life and expresses his vision in moving symbols. 
Silas Bent~ in his biography~ Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, which appeared when Holmes was nearly ninety-one, also 
follows Vernon Parrington in a disparagement of the Doctor~ 
in using phrases like 11The Authentic Brahmin~n and the fiReign 
of the Genteel. 11 Bent speaks of the ntroubadour tinkie 11 of 
the Doctor's verse and summarizes by saying that Doctor Holmes 
became what Randolph Bourne stigmatized as "the tired radi-
cal.112 Yet he quotes with approval the letter from o. W. 
Holmes~ the first~ to his parents~ writteaiin 1833 from Paris 
where he was studying medicine~ and certainly it would be 
hard to interpret the sentiments expressed therein as those 
of pompous stuffy-mindedness~ the favorite allegation of this 
school. In this letter Holmes wrote: 
Merely to have breathed a concentrated scientific 
atmosphere like Paris must have an effect on any 
one who has lived where stupidity is tolerated~ 
where mediocrity is applauded and where excellence 
is deified •••• I have more fully learned at least 
three principles since I have been in Paris: not 
to take authority when I can have facts; not to 
guess when I can know; not to think a man must 
take physic because he is sick.3 
1. Lerner~ The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes, p. xlviii. 
2. Silas Bent~ Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, p. 31. 
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes~ quoted Ibid.~ p. 31. 
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On the credit side for Bent's interpretations, however, 
is the notice he takes of Holmes• speech on February ~2, ~866 
at the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the First 
Church in Cambridge where his grandfather had been minister 
for so many years. In this speech Holmes spoke of himself 
as the po~itica~ heir of Thomas Shepard, founder of the church, 
even while he denied any spiritual kinship, and in it he gives 
credit to the Puritan's influence on democratic polity. Bent 
quotes from this speech of Holmes: 11Even if our mode of 
~ 
expressing our wonder, our awfu~ fear, our abiding trust in 
face of life and death and the unfathomab~e wor~d has changed, 
yet at this day, even now, we New Englanders are still leavened 
with the old Puritan ferment. Our doctrines may have changed, 
but the co~d Puritan passion is still there. 11 1 Bent offers 
-
evidence here of the deep and abiding debt Holmes owed to his 
grandfather, Abiel Holmes, the Calvinist minister and historian, 
and shows that Holmes knew and recognized this debt, both in 
his own slants and characteristic drives and in the traaitional 
institutions of the developing nation, democracy and self-
government. As his biographers point out, there is much in 
Justice Holmes which can be traced to the Puritan, and this 
address for the First Church anniversary is evidence of the 
strong and indissoluable connection in this fwnily between 
the three learned professions -- theology, medicine, law. 
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For all or my criticism of Mrs. Bowen's style and 
approach, she bas a summary in her Foreword which is apt. 
uThe greater part or his story lies in Boston -- the nine 
tenths that balances him. At sixty-one,he left Boston for 
the larger arena of Washington and national life. By that 
time his character and aims were set ••• Much has been made 
of Holmes's 'escape' from the limitations of Boston. But ••• 
this is no break and no escape. It is a development as 
inevitable -- and as incomplete as his father's 'escape' 
from the Calvinism of Abiel's day. These Holmes men did not 
stand still, they grew.nl 
1. Catherine Drinker Bowen~ Yankee rrorn Olympus, p. xii. 
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3. 
Mrs. Bowents material on the Reverend Abiel Holmes agrees 
with Eleanor Tiltonts portrait of him as a gentle scholarJ in 
the latter's fine biography of Dr. Holmes, Amiable Autocrat. 
It is clear from all the evidences of his life that Abiel 
Holmes had a kindly, self-effacing mildly liberal intellect, 
which led him to be not onlY a theologian by calling, but an 
historian by avocation. Why then are these sharp black and 
white crusading differences between the generations made so 
much of so inaccurately by so many of the Justice's admirersJ 
as they disparage the traditions of his background either 
because of his father or grandfather? That there was some-
times a disgruntled, even sour note in the way the Junior 
Holmes referred to family relationships is true, brief and 
few as these recorded referrals are, and this could readily 
lead to this kind of misconception. Also, success came 
comparatively late to Holmes. He was forty before he pub-
lished The Common LawJ and moreoverJ as a married man he 
lived for years under his father's roofJ because Dr. Holmes 
was alone, and no other arrangement seemed either humanely 
or economically feasible. It may well be that this single 
and simple fact, belonging as it does to all old New England 
mores in regard to the duty of the generations to each other, 
can explain almost every aspect of the frustration and fric-
tion. The day by day irritations of the same old personality 
traits, from which ther·e is no escape for those forced 
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to live together, can very orten be more grueling than out-
right characteristics or sin or weakness, but rewer and rewer 
ramilies know this today, ror the social and rinancial 
pressures which required the elderly to live with their married 
children have so rad~cally altered since the 1930's. 
or the Reverend Holmes, Tilton says: 
In a setting predominantly liberal and Unitarian, 
Abiel Holmes was an anamoly, but because his interests 
were antiquarian, scholarly rather than theological, he 
had not yet begun to reel any particular discomrort in 
his position. He was not disposed to quarrel with those 
whose theology difrered from his own; he agreeably 
exchanged pulpits not only with men of his own raith but 
with preachers suspected of leaning toward Unitarian 
heresy, even with such men as Willi~ Ellery Channing. 
He simultaneously served as trustee of Andover Seminary, 
and as overseer and teacher or ecclesiastical history 
at Harvard, hotbed of liberalism. 
In his historical writings he shows himself to be 
reasonably rree from prejudice about matters with which 
his religious beliefs might be expected to be in conflict ••• 
He had none of the conservative theologian 1 s suspicion 
of science. To his record of the comet or 1680, he adds 
a long footnote expressing similar rationalistic views, 
and, further, his respect for scientists as correctors 
of superstition •••• 
Altogether, the Reverend Abiel Holmes, in his 
scholarly love for history, his devotion to charitable 
and educational projects, his avoidance of evangelical 
or polemic theology, appears as a rather mild kind of 
Puritan, a lukewarm Calvinist. But the militant members 
of his sect were already on the march; the Boston Recorder, 
orthodox paper, was urging its subscribers to act against 
the rapidly growing heresy of the Unitarians. In a few 
years C~bridge would be the scene of one engagement in 
the battle, and Abiel Holmes would be the principal acbr 
and victim. 
At the time of his father's death in 1837, the Doctor wrote 
of the minister, in opposing the writing of his biography: 
lEleanor M. Tilton, Amiable Autocrat, New York, Henry 
Schuman, 1947, pp. 26, 27. 
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The time having come when he stood in the way of 
the theological tacticians then managing the church 
militant, he was sacri:ficed.--His course as a clergy-
man, peculiarly delicate and difficult amidst the 
conflicting opinion which raged about him, showed all 
the aimiability and some o:f the weaknesses o:f his 
character •••• 
His religious life, in any considerable detail 
cannot be wanted by the more liberal members o:f our 
vicinity and our city, for his principles o:f :faith 
were o:f the old orthodox standard-- nor by the present 
orthodox party -- :for it was by their agency that he 
was torn in his old age :from his people, and finally 
rejected and supplanted in his authority ••• the two 
great parties which divided our community crowded against 
him each :from his own side-- one pressing upon his 
Calvinist :faith, the other upon his liberal principles 
o:f intercourse and orderly habits o:f public ministration, 
with much care and policy for their own interests, and 
too little anxiety with regard to him. 
The life of such a clergyman and o:f such a time 
may perhaps deserve to be written. But God forbid that 
at this period the machinery of modern Jesuitism should 
be ~olded as it was brought to bear upon my father's 
happiness. The history of some of his last, but not 
the very last of his years, would reveal a series of 
Machiavellian contrivances to delude and beat down a 
simple-hearted man and his opposition, worthy of a 
better nest of conspirators than a deacon's fireside •••• 
In quoting this directly from Holmes' letters, Tilton comments: 
That this outburst was not enough to release all 
the young man's inward :feeling became apparent later 
when the professional life he was now trying to make 
:for himself was pushed into the background and he took 
to writing again. Deacons would be ridiculed, high-
toned Calvinists exposed, and kind-hearte~ clergymen 
honored when he came to write his novels. 
And here is a further bit of comment :from M. A. De Wolfe Howe: 
It needs no gimlet eye o:f a Freadmam tp detect in 
Holmes himself the effects wrought by each of these 
parents in what was most characteristic of him. Like 
his eminent son, Mr. Justice Holmes, he was a champion 
of extended boundaries in thogght~ With the son these 
boundaries were legal, with the father theological. 
Not only throughout his youth, but through many years 
lTilton, ~., 147, 148. 
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of his life the conflicts of theological belief were 
matters of intense interest -- to him and to the 
whole society of which he was a part. His father 
would apparently have welcomed him into the minis-
terial profession. A mild Calvinist himself he 
seems not to have realized what baleful effects his 
brother-Calvinists~ less mild~ might produce in a 
sensitive, warm-hearted boy ••• l 
To Judge Jackson~ his maternal grandfather~ Justice 
Holmes probably owed much of his decision to follow the law~ 
and he sometimes referred to the influence of his mother's 
family on his inheritance as though from them he obtained his 
questioning and lack of comfortable acceptance. Yet I think 
the evidence would indicate the opposite. Mark De Wolfe Howe 
analyzes it thus: 
••• Mrs. Holmes, on the other hand~ had grown up in a 
household where religion and scholarship were, at most 
peripheral. Mrs. Holmes's father, Charles Jackson, 
had been an Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court for some ten years~ but the central concern of 
his professional· career had been with the private af-
fairs of men of power and. position rather than with the 
public affairs of the Commonwealth ••• The natural inti-
macies of Dr. Holmes were with men of letters and of 
science, perhaps one might say with the unfashionable 
scholars of Cambridge rather than With the fashionable 
merchants of Boston. Those of Mrs. Holmes were pre-
cisely the opposite. The two worlds met, of course~ 
at many points and their fusion often came about by oth-
er means than mixed marriages, but the children of such 
marriages grew up, if not with divided loyalties~ at 
least with a division of alternatives. The young Holmes 
was as much at home with the children of merchants and 
bankers as with the offspring of ministers and profes-
sors. Perhaps it is not a distortion to suggest 
that when he traced his own skepticism to his mother's 
influence he implied that a part of him found the 
worldliness of men of affairs more attractive than the 
somberness of the clergy ••• The family of Dr. Holmes~ 
1. M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Holmes of the Breakfast Table, p. 9. 
associated by blood and friendship with tho~e who 
were giving direction to the economic destiny of 
their region and their nation, succeeded in sepa-
rating themselves from the tumultuous expansion 
which surrounded them. Clearly they were among 
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the privileged of their time and place, but they 
used their advantages for the preservation of a way 
of life which had its roots in other soil than 
that of privilege, which found its nourishment in 
the traditions of scholarship rather than the acci-
dents of power. As a result of this isolation from 
the pressures of the world of affairs and of Ameri-
can commerce, Holmes always found ~imself to some 
extent a stranger in his own land. 
Howe comments on the historical coincidence which made 
both his grandfathers prominent contestants in Abiel Holmes' 
litigation over the property of the First Congregational 
Church where he had been so long the pastor: 
••• The conflict between the shepherd and his flock 
not only concerned the spirit but involved the hard 
realities of property. Should the meetinghouse in 
Cambridge remain in the control of the pastor and the 
faithful minority or should it be transferred to the 
emancipated majority? The victo~.was with the Uni-
tarians and went to them because the Supreme Judicial 
Court, with Holmes' maternal grandfather among its 
concurring members, had determined that the property 
of a Congregational church was subject to the control 
of the majority of the parishioners, even though that 
majority had abandoned the faith in which the church 
had been founded. 
To suggest that when the faith of the Puritans was 
subjected to the law of the land New England's spiri-
tual tradition had fallen victim to Boston's worldli-
ness would be to distort the elements in the conflict. 
Yet it is fair, perhaps, to see in the positions of 
Justice Jackson and Abiel Ho-lmes a reflection of those 
contrasting strains which made up the inheritance of 
their grandson. The Jackson Court believed that no 
faith, no matter how deeply rooted it might be in the 
soil of New England, should enjoy an irresponsible and 
perpetual tenure. Abiel Holmes, on the other hand, be-
lieved that the law should support the truths of Cal-
vinism against the variable whims of democracy. 
1. Howe, The Shaping Years, pp. 29, 30, 31. 
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••• Though Dr. Holmes had joined the heretics he was 
the son of orthodoxy; Mrs. Holmes, by contrast was 
the daughter of heresy. It was, perhaps, for these 
reasons among others that Holmes thought of his 
skepticil inclinations as an inheritance from his 
mother. 
It seems evident that the Doctor's attitude toward his 
father, the minister, and in pa~ticular toward the points of 
difference between them, was more kindly, more gentle and 
more filial, than the Justice's attitude was toward his fath-
er, the doctor. Here is another quote on the comparison in 
this matter from M. A. DeWolfe Howe which begins with a re-
mark of Holmes, Senior: 
' ••• I know I might have made an indifferent lawyer,--
I think I may make a tolerable physician,--! do not 
like the one, and do like the other. 1 More than 
fifty years later his son, risen to eminence in the 
legal profession, was addressing the Harvard Law 
School Association on the two hundredth and fiftieth 
anniversary of Harvard, and alluded, in these slight-
ly condescending terms, to his father's abandonment 
of law for medicine: 'Perhaps, without revealing 
family secrets, I may whisper that next Monday's 
poet also tasted our masculine-diet before seeking 
more easily digested, if not more nutritious, food 
elsewhere. t2 
The picture of Dr. Holmes as a pompous old fuddy-duddy, 
a man whose fatuous self-esteem and unbuttoned loquacity han-
dicapped and hampered his genius and straight-thinking son 
persists. It was the theme of the portrait: Autocrat and 
Son on television, the American Heritage hour on March 19, 
1960, although it must be confessed the characterization drawn 
then of the younger Holmes who so earnestly insisted he must 
1. Ibid., pp. 31, 32. 
2. M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Holmes of the Breakfast Table, p. 21. 
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discover truth and justice and legal reality in some sort of 
a social or socializing usage far beyond and in complete con-
flict with his father's verbosity must have been distinctly 
confounding to any average viewer who could have gained from 
the portrayal not the slightest inkling of what was the real 
nature of the issues at hand, of either Holmes' or his father's 
actual interpretation of jurisprudence or social justice. The 
picture of Holmes as the earnest young reformer, crusading 
against and yet enveloped in the strangling pretenses of his 
home-life as exemplified by his father is so painfully inac-
curate as to cause acute dismay, and points out a grim moral 
in the intellectual dishonesty involved in presenting judgments 
based on a drastic reduction of subtle and complex interweav-
ings of motives and pressures. Yet it is so much the accepted 
belief that one finds the average well-read person of the 
opinion also that Dr. Holmes wanted his son to follow in his 
professional footsteps and campaigned for this with invidious 
sarcasm, and that he opposed his son's study of law with a 
bitter dogmatism which caused a life-long estrangement. Yet 
there are no sources for such a supposition, widespread as it 
. is, though perhaps such scenes as this, manufactured by Mrs. 
Bowen, could take the place of legitimate facts: 
At home he said nothing of his plans, aware that 
his father had long ago studied the law and hated it. 
Dr. Holmes liked philosophy no better, having the scien-
tist's mistrust for abstract speculation. It seemed to 
him that lawyers went about solving their problems --
and what dreary problemsl-- in a manner both unreal and 
devious. He had a quotation from Gulliver about lawyers 
that he loved to air. ttrt is a maxim among ••• lawyers, 
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that whatever hath been done be~ore may legally be done 
again: and there~ore ••• u Recollection o~ it kept 
WendellTs lips sealed. He had no wish to be preached 
at concerning the uselessness o~ lawyers and philo-
sophers in a hard, practical world. 
11What are you going to do?u Dr. Holmes asked 
continually. nwhat about science? Science is the 
coming thing. -What about teaching? It's true the 
pro~essor's chair has an insulating quality that cuts 
it o~~ ~rom contact with reality. I've said that rather 
well in the Autocrat. But combined with writing or some 
more practical application, teaching is a very satis-
~actory way to make a living.u ••• 
Next morning Holmes knocked on the door o~ his 
~ather's study. 11 I am going to the Law School,n he 
said without preamble. -
Dr .. Holmes looked up ~rom his desk. nwhat is the 
use o~ that?11 he said. nwhat' s the use o~ -~that, 
vlendell? A ·lawyer cant t .. be a- great man.u 
The remark was instinctive. But i~-he had tried, 
Dr. Holmes could not have devised a statement more 
provocative to his son ••• When he was ninety, Wendell 
Holmes would quote that phrase, adding that his ~ather 
had kicked him upstairs into the law and he supposed 
he should be grate~ul.l 
This kind o~ debased history goes on and on: 
Dr. Holmes, helping himsel~ to butter ~rom the 
dish on the table, paused, kni~e in hand. 11 Sawdust 1 u 
he murmured. nsawdust without butter. 11 He-looked up. 
The old gleam was in his eye. nwendell, have you heard 
what the English judge said to the young man who asked 
how a person could recognize a real vocation ~or the 
law?n 
. _Under the table Neddy kicked his brother swi~tly. 
Across the table Amelia watched, her brown eyes quick 
as a bird•s ••• Wendell looked at his mother; their eyes 
met without expression.2 
And again: 
11 If you would wax thin and savage, like a hal~-~ed 
spider,--be a lawyer. 11 ••• So Dr. Holmes had written, 
long ago. Observing his son, the. doctor was reminded 
o~ this light-hearted remark, tossed of~ when he himsel~ 
lcatherine Drinker Bowen, Yankee From Ol~~us, Boston, 
Little Brown & Co.,_ 1944, pp. 200, 201, 0 • 
2Ibid., 209. 
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had just given up trying to be a lawyer. Dr. Holmes at 
present was in a spasm or pleasure over his new house. 
He had bought land on Beacon Street, west, in the new 
filled-in Back Bay area, and was building on it. The 
yard behind led down to the river, his study upstairs 
would look out to Cambridge spires and eastward to 
Bunker Hill itselr. A view over all creation, the 
doctor said. What more could man aspire to? His son's 
reaction to all this was so apathetic as to be, in the 
doctor's eye, downright disagreeable.l 
It is a relief to know that not all the older writers 
join in this kind of denigration. Louis Mumford, f'or instance, 
expressed a change of heart in the new edition of The Golden 
Day: 
••• Happily t±me has scaled that particular cataract 
f'rom my eye. How could I have been blind to the 
authentic indigenous note that is sounded in Holmes's 
entire series of Breakfast Table papers? Though this 
was plainly not the highest product of the. New England 
mind, it still was a singularly original contribution. 
Did Holmes not make imperishable the homely urbanities 
of the oldtime American boarding house, that training 
school in psychological discrimination, with each 
individual the center of an unwritten novel: did he 
not, with his mixture of shrewd observation and worldly 
wisdom, create an image of our past as poignant and 
irrecoverable as that of the clipper ship and the 
covered wagon? ••• That the Golden Day produced Oliver 
Wendell Holmes is in itself an important sidelight on 
the period.2 
Perhaps the force of contrast helps to give the satis-
faction which the reader feels in turning completely from 
Bowen to Tilton. Chapter Twenty of Amiable Autocrat is 
entitled Poet at the Breakfast Table, (1870-1872). It is 
headed, as is every chapter, with a quotation from Boswe11 1 s 
libid., 253, 254. 
2Lewis Mumford, The Golden Day, Boston, Beacon Press, 
1957, x:xiii. 
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Lif'e of' Jol:mson: uBesides, Sir, there must always be a 
struggle between f'ather and son. 11 Tilton tells us that Holmes 
read Johnson, born in 1709, annually, and that he was a kind 
of' ghostly companion f'or Holmes who was born exactly a hundred 
years later. This chapter has an altogether dif'f'erently 
slanted material on the :rather-son motif'. 
The dinner table of' 296 Beacon Street was a lively 
place, the talk quick and brilliant as each of' the 
:family in good-natured rivalry tried to score of'f' the 
other. Amelia could talk :raster than her f'ather; she 
was said to be the only person in Boston who could out-
talk the popular minister Phillips Brooks. The doctor, 
ttwith a mind quick to perceive analogies~ u moved by 
f'lashes of' wit. The elder son liked to keep an argument 
open; Ned, the younger son, of'f'ered humor and intelligent 
observation to the talk. 
All three of' the young people in the f'amily were on 
the verge of' marriage; •••• 
The Autocrat of' 1857 had been bold and eager, con-
f'ident of' his cleverness, delighting in paradox and 
surprise. The Prof'essor had shown an unexpected earnest-
ness, and a.less unexpected vulnerability ••• The Poet 
of' 1872 is, sign~f'icantly, a very modest and retiring 
man, chastened if' you like ••• 
In The Pro:f'essor, Holmes had brought one alter ego 
on stage; in The Poet, he brings three... Holmes now 
appears not only as the Poet, but also as the Young 
Astronomer and as the Master. The Astronomer is a 
melancholy young man, absorbed in his work in a lonely 
way •••• he also owes a great deal to the spectacle the 
doctorts older son was then presenting. It was at this 
time that the younger Wendell Holmes was so engrossed 
in his work that he could not let his notes out of' his 
sight and carried his brief' case in to dinner with h~. 
Nearly :forty years earlier, the elder Holmes had been as 
devoted to medicine as his son was now to law; the simi-
larity could hardly escape the doctor, preoccupied as he 
was with the question of' heredity. 
It is the Young Astronomer who writes the too 
liquid blank verse, 11Wind-Clouds and Star-Drif'ts," that 
comprises most of' the poetry of' the book. One of'.his 
poems -- they hardly deserve the name -- develops the 
theme of' the relations between youth and age, f'ather and 
son ••• 
241 
The doctor had the subject very much on his mind. 
At Mrs. Field's one evening, Charles Sumner indignantly 
objected to the criticism being heaped upon Agassiz by 
a younger generation of scientists. Holmes offered an 
explanation: 
11 It means just this. _Agassiz will not listen to 
the Darwinian theory; ••• Now Agassiz is no longer 
young, and I was reading the other day in a book 
on the Sandwich Islands of an old Feejee man who 
had been carried away among strangers but who 
prayed that he might be carried home that his 
brains might be beaten out in peace by his son 
according to the custom of those lands. It flashed 
over me then that our sons beat out our brains in 
the same way •••• They have a new standpoint of their 
own. n 
Holmes had committed 11moral parracide" himself, or 
so the indignant orthodox press had told him, when he 
wrote Elsie Venner and in it protested the evil effects 
of a too rigidly orthodox training upon children. ·Even 
as he wrote The Poet at the Breakfast-Table, he picked 
up his father's copy of Calvin's Institutes with its 
notations in his father's hand. Not given to marking 
books, Holmes did enter in pencil on the rear end-paper 
a page reference for the passage in which Calvin upholds 
the doctrine'of infant dwmnation. In ink he entered, 
initialed, and dated, March 31, 1872, a Latin note under 
one of his father's. Abiel Holmes's note read: ttsee 
two pages in index at the end.u The doctor added: 
npreserved in place by the son!s care.n 
. In reading The Poet, one cannot help thinking that 
the doctor is feeling, as doubtless his own father had 
felt before him, the 11 bite of the serpent's tooth ••• " 
Expressed obliquely, the father-son motif is one 
of the inner stories of The Poet. In the persons of 
the Poet and the Master •••• Their dialogues offer his 
apologia for his life. As he knew and said in the book, 
his writing was a means to liberate his soul.l 
... 4., 
•. -
Analyzing this same subject of the father-son relation-
ship, Malcolm Buist has a very interesting study in the New 
Zealand Law Journal of November 9th, 1954, entitled ~· 
Oliver Wendall Holmes, Reflections on Law and Lawyers by the 
Author-Father of Mr. Justice Holmes. In this article he uses 
material from the Autocrat, the Professor and the Poet to 
maintain the thesis that Dr. Holmes finally became deeply 
involved sympathetically and emotionally with the development 
of his son's legal career. 
Buist comments that both the Autocrat and the Professor 
are unfavorable toward law and lawyers in general, but in the 
Poet an actual representative of a branch of the Law is intro-
duced in the person of a Registrar of Deeds, who has a chang-
ing and a significant role in the book. He says: 11But let 
us try Holmes with the historical yardstick of his contemporary 
Sir Henry Maine, to see whether some renewed link with the 
Law refreshed the hidden memories in his mind and gave them 
creative force in his later literary life. 11 l From the ency-
olopedia he ascertains an interesting correlation of dates. 
The Autocrat and the Professor have been introduced by Holmes, 
Senior, made their bow, and departed, before Holmes, Junior, 
had entered the Harvard Law School, 11 and upon the latter's 
lMalcolm Buist, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Etc., New 
Zealand Law Journal, Vol. 30, 341. 
entering the Brahmin caste (his ratherts phrase, in another 
context) or legal literature, the living rigures who attend 
the practice· of the Law appear again in the father's mind. 
What if Holmes, Senior, is now some sixty-three years of 
age? Forty years is not a great span when age begins to 
gleam youtht s memories. nl 
Discussing the Professor at the Breakfast ~able, Buist 
says: 
••• Installment Five contains the Professor's only other 
mention of the Law, and again, like Macbeth's three 
witches, he conjures up the doctor, the lawyer and the 
priest. There is something of an idee fixee here. It 
is a pity.Freud was not available to enlighten us 
regarding the hidden link. In their inferences of pre-
natal influences, the psychologist and the astrologist 
tread the one fatalistic path, and maybe it was written 
:±nethe stars that Holmes should in his own life have so 
much to deal with these three professions? What is the 
effect? LHe then ~uotes from The Professor at the 
Breakfast Table:? 1 The three learned professions have 
but recently emerged from a state of quasi-barbarism. 
None of them like too well to be told of it, but it 
must be sounded in their ears whenever they put on 
airs. 11 2 
Buist continues: 
Looking back then, over the chronological table, 
we may group the Autocrat and the Professor in a period 
of strong feeling against law and lawyers, a consistent 
antagonism in which no good points can be admitted and 
no benefits allowed. Both the lawyers and their creed 
are rascally, and the criticism persists in a well-
informed stream until its crest overflows the banks of 
fair and balanced comment. With this in mind, we may 
well wonder how it was that the younger Holmes, at the 
age of 23, was permitted to enter the Harvard Law School, 
or that he ever desired to. Perhaps it was a commendable 
libid., 341. 
2Ibid., 356. 
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urge in ~ather and son to bring about a re~orm. I~ so, 
it brought remarkable ~ruit in the work and writings o~ 
Mr. Justice Holmes. Was the decision, then, the o~~­
spring o~ desperation and opportunity: desperation 
over the ~ather's constant battle with pro~essional 
prejudices, and.opportunity in the son's outstanding 
ability? Part o~ the answer may be ~ound in the ensuing 
twelve years, during which the genius o~ Holmes, Jr., 
began to make its mark; and Dr. Holmes could, in renewed 
hope, speak through the mouthpiece o~ his next character 
with continued criticism; where needed, but with at 
least benevolent irony.l 
Finally, when we come to the ~' a~ter a lapse o~ 
twelve years, old co~licts here begin, in Buist's opinion, 
to be resolved. The Landlady o~ the universal boarding-house 
which some critics glori~y into the United States o~ America, 
has ngot up in tbe world.u Says Buist: 
-
••• The lawyer, in the author's mind, has perhaps done 
the same to some extent, ~or-it is with a measure o~ 
commendation that the third person in tbe much-separated 
trinity o~ monologues ~irst speaks o~ the pro~ession 
now, more than ornamented by his already distinguished 
son.2 
He then quotes directly ~rom The Poet, giving the opinion 
o~ "I" as he converses with na retired college o~~icer, a man 
-o~ books and observation, and himsel~ an author.n This Master 
o~ Arts, or the Master, as Holmes re~ers to him, is one o~ the 
many sel~ disguises Holmes uses ~or himsel~, thus he is carrying 
on a dialogue with his own ideas. 
One-story intellects, two-story intellects, three-
story intellects with skylights. All ~act-collectors, 
who have no aim beyond their ~acts, are one-story men. 
libid., 357. 
2Ibid., 357. 
... 
Two-story men, compare, reason, generalize, using the 
labors o~ the ~act-collectors as well as their own. 
Three-story men idealize, imagine, predict; their best 
illumination comes ~rom above, through the skylight. 
There are minds with large ground-~loors, that can 
store an infinite amount o~ knowledge; some librarians, 
~or instance, who know enough o~ books to help other 
people, without being able to make much other use o~ 
their knowledge, have intellects o~ this class. Your 
great working lawyer has two spacious stories; his mind 
is clear, because his mental ~loors are large, and he 
has room to arrange his thoughts so that he can get at 
them, -- ~acts below, principles above, and all in 
ordered series; poets are o~ten narrow below, incapable 
o~ clear statement, and with small power o~ consecutive 
reasoning, but ~ull o~ lighti i~ sometimes rather bare 
o~ ~urniture, in the attics. 
Buist comments: 
The unconscious nexus that bound doctor, lawyer, 
and priest into one bundle o~ dislike was at last 
dissolved, and a new trio, librarian, lawyer, and 
laureate, is soberly analyzed and even applauded. What 
is o~ special interest is that the lawyer continues in 
the center o~ the triad-~or.m. 
This change o~ attitude is consistent ••• The 
Master has been asked to compare the doctor, the lawyer, 
and the minister-- the group has reappeared one-third 
o~ the way through the book -- and he says, nThe lawyers 
are quicker witted than either o~ the other professions, 
and abler men generally ••• They are apt to talk law in 
mixed company ••• As I once had occasion to see when one 
of 'em and a pretty ~amous one, put me on the witness-
stand at a dinner party once." (Does the cap still fit?) 
The extract suggests that some acute and not unfriendly. 
observation has taken place, and that there has been 
some close social contact with the legal fraternity. 
What indeed would be more likely than that the rapidly 
rising son should from time to time introduce to his 
well-known father wealthy professional friends, and, 
maybe, that the court-room manner of able and successful 
barristers should for the moment intimidate the ageing 
Dr. Holmes. Being now editor of the American Law Review 
••• Holmes Jr. would naturally attract the company of the 
elite of his profession, and he was also preparing a new 
edition of Kent•s commentaries ••• So, then, to discover 
lo. w. Holmes, The Poet at the Break~ast Table, Houghton, 
Mif~lin &: Co., 1891,. pp. 42, 43. 
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late in life that behind the law lie great social, 
moral, philosophic, and even cultural generalizations, 
would be the result only of meeting a new type of legal 
mind, far removed from the narrow mould he had first 
encountered. Thereafter, the Poet is able to write: 
nnoctors ••• theirs is the least learned of the professions 
••• They have not half the general culture of the lawyers, 
not a quarter of that of the ministers. 11 The cultured 
lawyer -- this is the novelty brought to the Breakfast 
Table for dissection.l 
Buist concludes his argument with a resumes of a con-
cluding incident involving the Registrar of Deeds. It seems 
as the end of the book The Poet at the Breakfast Table draws 
near, that the Registrar who up to this point has represented 
ttlaw as meaningless roten, is really of use. He forms a 
" 
friendship with the nLadyn, a cultured, tthigh-bredn woman, 
living in genteel but rather stringent circumstances, and 
manages to dig up a flaw in a title in an old deed whereby 
ownership of accumulated property refers to the Lady, since 
a previous condition in a will had not been met. The 
Company which owned the property was willing to pay the Lady 
a great sum for a clear title; and so ttthe lady very justly 
attributes her change of fortunes to his LI.e. the Registrarti? 
sagacity and his activity in following up the hint he had 
come across by mere aocidnet.n2 Holmes, as the ~ concludes: 
So my supernumerary fellow-boarder whom I would have 
dispensed with as a oumberer of the table, has proved 
a ministering angel to one of the personages whom I 
most oared for ••• If it had been private property, so 
that another person must be made poorer that she 
libid., 358. 
2Ibid., 359. 
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should become rich, she would have lived and died in 
want rather than cla~ her own •••• l 
Whether or not the reader feels that this aspect of Dr. 
Holmes' conclusion is a little casuistical in regard to some 
of the technical processes of capitalism, he is likely to be 
impressed by the insight Buist shows in his paper in inter-
preting the Holmesian father-son relationship, and the whole 
Holmes menage. The Freudian formulas seem to fit into this 
matter of Justice Holmes and Natural Law, for Natural Law is 
a major part of his father's intellection which the younger 
Holmes rejected. Whether one takes Edmund Wilson's analysis, 
already referred to in Chapter One, of the father-son gestalt 
in analyzing ~he relationship of Holmes and Laski, or whether 
one looks at the symbolic destruction of the male parent in 
the case of both the poet and the lawyer, the deep wells of 
the subconscious seem to explain much. To recapitulate 
Wilson's argument, Laski was disinherited by his father. 
Holmes, Junior, felt a deep estrangement from everything his 
father represented. Since he did not have a son, the transfer 
to the young brilliant rebel, the radical, whose Jewish race 
linked h~ with the Old Testament Calvinism of the first of 
New England's three learned professions, represented in his 
own paternal grandfather, was swift and spontaneous just as 
Laski transferred paternity to him. Yet in this symbolic 
Freudian murder of each generation by the succeeding one,--
lrbid., 360. 
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referred to so directly by Dr. Holmes h~self, in the passage 
recently quoted,l-- the t'm.oral parracide, 11 which Holmes, 
Senior committed in his writing of Elsie Venner, was actually 
a creative vitalization of his thinking, as perhaps, in a 
different way, the destruction of his father was also with 
his son. As suggested, the younger Holmes appears more cold-
hearted than the poet toward the older generation, or possibly 
he feared more. He was less free, so it could be said his 
parracide came closer to hatred, where his father's remained 
affectionate and indulgent toward his cast-off delimitations. 
Yet for all of his revulsion before Calvinist doctrines of 
inherited sin, damnation and predestination, in a medical 
sense Dr. Holmes applied these concepts superbly. He did not 
reject them absolutely, but reinterpreted them into doctrines 
about human life, guilt, and responsibility which are widely 
understood and accepted today. He did not then really cast 
off the del~itations of his background, but accepted and 
recreated them. In so doing, he certainly remained a Natural 
Law man, although his Natural Law was of his own faahioning 
and .fostering. .Compare The Chambered Nautilus with Elsie 
Venner and the reader sees the two poles of Natural Law 
thinking: the poem expressing the traditional religious 
point of view, ( nThanks .for the heavenly message brought by 
thee, Child of the wandering sea ••• 1 n~) tieing in morality and J 
1~·:page 241. 
2Ho'lmes, Op. Cit., 359. 
' 
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the individual responsibility of the person with God's will 
and so with the allegory in nature, the Natural Law, ( 11Still 
as the spiral grew, he left the past year's dwelling for the 
new ••• ttl) the other, bad novel that it is, taking a stand for 
deter.minism in the life of the individual for the inexorability 
of fate and its crippling decrees within the happenings of 
nature, or Upredestinationn, or another kind of "Natural Law.tt 
In these two points of view, centering around the opposite 
charges of an equal insight into the awfulness and essential 
incomprehensibility of the ways of God to man, one can almost 
watch the shift in emphasis in the meaning of tragedy, to our 
modern ethos:-- away from the classical concept as pertaining 
to the downfall of the heroic individual with his responsible 
and defiant will, his hubris and his fatal flaw, and toward 
the present day portrayals, by Tennessee Williams and Arthur 
Miller, for instance, of the pathetic emptiness of the 
ordinary little cog in the wheel of chance, where, at most, 
society (or one's mother) is responsible for the blighted 
life of the weak, but painfully meaningful, average. 
Dr. Holmes' novels are not good novels. They are wordy, 
stilted, ~possible. Yet ·one can call them Victorian only in 
style. In matter they go probing way forward into the world 
to come. And this was Holmes always, in every capacity and 
every disguise. The Poet asks how we would address a man of 
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of the future if he cam to us from a time when the memorial 
shaft of Bunker Hill is as old as Marathon. 
Isn't it like splitting a toad out of a rock to 
think of this man of nineteen or twenty centuries hence 
coming out from his stony dwelling-place and speaking 
with us? What are the questions we should ask h~? 
He has b-ut a few minutes to stay. Make up your own 
list; I will set down a few that come up to me as I 
write. 
--What is the prevalent religious creed of civiliza-
tion? 
·--Has the planet met with any accident of importance? 
--How general is the republican form of government? 
--Do men fly yet? 
--Has the univer&al language come into use? 
--Is there a new fuel since the English coal-mines 
have given out? 
--Is the euthanasia a recognized branch of medical 
science? 
--Is the oldest inhabitant still living? 
--Is the Daily Advertiser still published? 
--And the Evening Transcript?l . 
~uite a listl (I give it in such entirety because I 
recall the first evening the Boston Evening Transcript no 
longer appearedl) The Master speaks even more prophetically: 
••• Sir, I believe that we are at this moment in what 
will be recognized not many centuries hence as one of 
the late watches in the night of the dark ages. There 
is a twilight ray, beyond question.. We know something 
of the universe, a very little, and, strangely enough, 
we know most of what is farthest from us. We have 
weighed the planets and analyzed the flames of the sun 
and stars. We predict their movements as if they were 
machines we ourselves had made and regulated. We know 
a good deal about the earth on which we live. But the 
study of man has been so completely subjected to our 
preconceived opinions, that we have got to begin all 
over again. We have studied anthropology through 
theology; we have now to begin the study of theology 
through anthropology. Until we have exhausted the human 
element in every form of belief ••• we cannot begin to 
lo. w. Holmes, The Poet at the Breakfast-Table, Boston, 
Houghton, Mifflin, 1891, pp. 166, 167. 
deal with the alleged extra-human elements without 
blundering into all imaginable puerilities.l 
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There is absolutely nothing of the pretentiousness of 
the closed mind here. Time and time again Eleanor Tilton's 
biography brings out the progressive and enfranchising aspects 
of Dr. Holmes' life. His fight to establish the contagious 
nature of puerperal fever is history, as is the part he played 
in the development of the first uses of anaesthesia (which 
name he coined himself and contributed to medical science). 
But she gives us some other evidences of his enlightened 
disposition and influence, the first of which, his interest 
in changing the motto of Harvard College back to its original 
Veritas, (ttwhich, 11 _he said, ttincludes the other and everything 
else worth having11 ) from the Mather instigated Christo et 
Ecclesiae, of 1700, is particularly appealing. His establish-
ment of a medical library in 1874, organizing a movement for 
public parks in 1876, of founding the Boston Microscopical 
Society in 1877 are further instances of his progressive 
public spirit .. 
Dr. Clarence P. Oberndorf has a very interesting book 
entitled, The Psychiatric Novels of Oliver Wendell Holmes. 
This author feels there is a close connection or parallel 
between Holmes• discoveries in the unconscious and Freud's • 
••• It is the philosophic quality of Holmes's mind that 
led him to the discovery of postulates which Freud, 
libid., pp. 182, 183. 
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nearly a quarter of a century later, offered to a 
ridiculing group in the Vienna university where Semmel-
weis had in 1850 met his discouraging rebuffs. 
Holmes's psychological pronouncements and his 
unremitting fight :for liberality and generosity in the 
estimation of mental aberration encountered relatively 
mild opposition in a milieu where the abolitionists 
had long been battling for the physical freedom of all 
men •••• 
The year 1871 has been selected in our orientation 
of Holmes because it was the date when he delivered an 
address entitled "Mechanism in Thought and Morals, 11 
before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard. It was 
carefully revised, expanded, and annotated before it 
was printed in Pages from an Old Volume of Life. So 
far as I can determine it has lain there unnoticed •••• 
The Phi Beta Kappa address was considered notable 
by contemporaries for two reasons: namely, that in the 
brain there persists a material record of thought; and 
secondly, that this transmissible record is not at all 
times available to tbe person ~or the control of his 
actions. Among the foundation stones of Freud's 
psychoanalytic structure one of the most important is 
an analgous indestructibility of infantile thought and 
impressions. Others are tbe importance and influence 
of unconscious mentation; the value of the contents of 
dreams in revealing this unconscious thought; and the 
effects on behavior of the repression of emotion •••• 
Holmes's regular use of tbe word 11 unconscioustt is 
of interest. Although William J~es mentioned the, 
term 11unconscious cerebration, 11 he decided that 
"unconscious11 is better replaced by the vaguer term 
1~subconscioustt or ttsubliminal.u Freud, like Holmes, 
insisted upon_the term unconscious, whereas, in the 
writings of most of his predecessors and contemporaries, 
subconscious had been used to signify mental operations 
which occurred below the level of consciousness. Other 
important pillars in psychoanalysis noted by Holmes are 
the free association of ideas, the role of the censor, 
and, in the first work or Breuer and Freud, the recog-
nition of the existence of several personalities in the 
s~e individual. 
Holmes wrote his earlier psychiatric novels with 
the direct purpose of demonstrating that there is no 
inherited guilt. In the uMechanism in Thaght and Morals, 11 
he has much to say on processes which might account for 
personal guilt. He expounds his ideas clearly, force-
fully, and unequivocally. The object of his thesis is 
now never in doubt -- namely, that such a thing as 
absolute freedom of the will cannot exist because of 
unconscious processes which are affecting the individual's 
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conscious activity all the tlme. I~ ~or this reason 
alone, Holmes a~~irms that we must regard with charity 
and understanding many deviations in conduct which are 
asocial and antisocial •••• l 
There is much more o~ this analysis. Dr. Holmesr under-
standing o~ the ~ree association o~ ideas, the ~unction o~ 
dre&ms as expressing wish ~ul~illment, the buried depth o~ 
instincts and tastes beyond the reach o~ the will, psychic 
dualism, the solving o~ problems in sleep, the ~orce o~ 
childhood memories, the unconscious ~actors in plagiarism, 
the ~unction o~ censorship, the di~~erences in the type o~ 
thought in males and ~emales, the e~~ects o~ sexual ~rustra-
tion in producing physical symptoms and character traits are 
pointed out and discussed~ Continues Oberndor~: 
••• Also in his novels we ~ind textbook examples o~ 
common psychoanalytic mechanisms such as displacement, 
sublimation, over compensation, and the like ••• 
Holmes at the time his novels appeared was a 
pro~essor o~ anatomy, a subject o~ dry bones and dead 
bodies, and as an anatomist his opinions on psychiatric 
disorders would not have been considered lmportant 
to the practicing physicians and psychiatrists. He 
there~ore deliberately and probably shrewdly chose 
narrative as a medium through which to bring his views 
before the public. His three stories are poor ~iction 
when judged by modern critics or compared with the 
masters o~ his time.... The novels are Elsie Venner (1859), The Guardian Angel (1867), and A Mortal 
Antipathy (1884). Their plots are simple, almost juvenile.... In the light o~ the development o~ modern 
psychiatry they remain as testimony to his medical 
acuity, his knowledge, and his pro~ound psychiatric 
understanding ••• 
In Elsie Venner the circumstance that her mother 
was bitten by a snake during pregnancy is held 
lclarence P. Oberndor~, The Psychiatric Novels o~ Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Columbia University Press, 1946, pp. 8, 9. 
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responsible for the reptilian traits which Elsie showed. 
This is not psychoanalytic thinking. Yet few would 
dispute that the case is interpreted with the insight 
of analytic psychiatry. Moreover, the interesting 
question of the influence of very early, even antenatal, 
damage on later anxiety has recently been reexamined in 
the light of observations made during the psychoanalysis 
of patients ••• l 
Oberndorf 1 s concluding summary is significant both in 
the attempt to assess Dr. Holmes' importance in our cultural 
history, and in weighing at once the relation between the 
differing values emphasized by him and his son -- to what 
degree they were differing -- as well as what degree of 
emphasis should be given to the antagonism between them, and 
the true implication of that antagonism and that difference. 
He points out: 
The theme of determinism with its variations --
whether antenatal, directly inherited, or psychic --
is repeated in all the novels. It seems as though 
Holmes may have been under a compulsion to write off his 
father's Galvinism and predestination, but never quite 
succeeded. As he advanced iri years, the determinism, as 
in A Mortal Antipathy, assumed individualistic and personal 
aspects-- conditions which fitted a type of.causation 
more in harmony with scientific criteria. But it is not 
my intention here to interpret these novels psychoanalyt-
ically as a reflection of any personal unconscious 
conflicts which their author may have had. Certainly, 
whatever these conflicts were and however deep they may 
have been, they were transformed by him into the highest 
type of human productivity and helpful cooperation ••• 
Oddly enough Holmes's ideas lay in abeyance for 
twenty-five years after his death, but the scientific 
link which Holmes established between Cambridge and 
Vienna in 1840 LI· e. the demonstration of the contagious 
nature of puerperal fever was shared by Holmes and 
Semmelweis of Austri~ appeared again in 1909 ••• And so 
Sigmund Freud came to an intellectually alert, but still 
really conservative, New England. He came at Putnam's 
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instigation and at the invitation o~ Stanley Hall, 
President o~ Clark University at Worcester Mass. These 
lectures by Freud have become a milestone in the history 
o~ psychoanalysis, but I think that Freud himsel~ could 
not have conveyed the essence o~ his theory better and 
more convincingly to the distinguished yet skeptical and 
critical audience he ~aced than do these words: nThere 
are thoughts that never emerge into consciousness, which 
yet make their i~luence ~elt among the perceptible 
mental currents ••• Old prejudices, that are ashamed to 
co~ess themselves, nudge our talking thought to utter 
their magisterial veto ••• u The reader may surmise this 
was written by Holmes. 
One wonders why Holmests ideas did not receive 
greater attention when they-were written. Probably 
society at large was ~ar less prepared to entertain them 
in 1870 than it was to accept Freud reluctantly in 1910 ••• 1 
When did ttconviction o~ sinn creep into Natural Law? 
Somewhere in the seventeenth century when its Puritan marriage 
took place. ~ one o~~spring o~ this connection was the 
Covenant and the Constitution, Dr. Holmes and Freud could 
well be another. 
Dr. Holmes was, par excellence, a Natural Law man. If 
his version o~ Natural Law, as Oberndor~ shows, lay in an 
anticipation o~ the Freudian ~ormulas, it was no more o~~­
beat in the long development o~ history in the subject, than 
his ~ather's Calvinism, o~ which perhaps it is a hybrid by-
product, or collateral descendent. Even the mani~estations 
of rebellion in themselves show us the strange bed-~ellows in 
our cultural heritage. And as Dr. Holmes owed these shaping 
concepts to his ~ather, the Justice equally owed to his the 
same values which he trans~or.med and transmuted into his own 
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idiom of monolithic sovereignty in the concatenation of New 
England's three learned professions. There is a family tree 
here, is there not, of all the changes to be rung on the 
sources of Authority? 
Elsie Venner a~s to refute the doctrines of inherited 
guilt, Original Sin; but, if anything, how much gr~er and 
more terrible a premise of absolute cause and effect, 
irrevocable determinism and supernatural and incomprehensible 
doom (reckoning, judging, justice) does it set forthl What 
scholar on the subject of Natural Law, seeing its protean 
shapes through the ages, seeing it both rend and defend 
slavery, noting its base in Constitutionalism and Divine 
Right, in the absolute majesty of God and in human rights, in 
optimistic Lockean and pessimistic Hobbesian views on the 
nature of man and of government, in Marcus Aurelius, in Occam 
and Aquinas, in Stoic brotherhood and in Calhoun's or Hitler's 
master race, in Newton, in Darwin, in Marx, in Freud, in the 
Paulist Fathers, in Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Til~ich, in 
Jacques Maritain and Billy Graham, would quibble at Dr. 
Holmes• version and say it was not ttreally11 Natural Lawl 
Wendell, Junior, formed his opinion of Natural Law in 
his youth at Harvard, but his father was only the emblem and 
wrongly symbolic representation of his rebellion against the 
cant and platitudes, the hypocritical sanctimony of a burgeon-
ing industrial society, an unrestricted capitalism with the 
Grant administration as the Ur-spring, for which he felt the 
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kind of contempt suavely working itself out into Constitutional 
history in his famous: nThe Fourteenth Amendment does not 
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer•s Social Statics. 1• If this was 
Natural Law to him, (and it was) it was not because this 
smugness and this meretricious morality was forced upon him 
or presented to him by his father, but because of the rejection 
he early formed for the whole visualization of the law of God 
as an inextrieable part of laissez-faire economics, so as an 
old man he gave his allegiance -- (or at least his ear, and 
possibly, for a while, something of his heart} -- to the 
young one who stood for an opposite and a diametrically 
opposite theory of the state and society. But it was not his 
father who remotely stood for the characteristics he rejected 
and resented, and if his coldness and the unsympathetic rela-
tionship between this father and son was a fact, this was due 
to the normal differences which always exist in two strong-
minded, opinionated and talkative generations in the same 
family, intensified and magnified by the abnormal experiences 
and dislocations of war and by the fact that they lived 
together in the same house until the lawyer was in his fifties. 
Alan Grimes says of this period which so stirred a young 
man's questioning and contempt: 
While American political economy in practice 
developed along the lines of Hamiltonian theory, classical 
economics became deeply embedded in the schools and 
colleges. The economics textbooks of the post-Civil 
war period were largely restatements of the economic 
theory of Smith, Ricardo, and Mill. In the name of 
liberalism, laissez-faire was emphasized as the only 
economic theory fit for a free society ••• Because, 
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it was argued no greater good was really possible there 
was no adequate ethical case against laissez-faire. 
Furthermore, classical economics had the honorific 
distinction of being acclaimed a science, which made its 
attackers adjudged as mere sentimentalists who had not 
adequately disciplined their minds to the stern edicts 
of reason. One economist of this period recounts in his 
autobiography that economics was then considered a 
"finished product." 
11 It was held that natural laws established 
certain fundamental principles for all times and 
places. It was only necessary that we should 
study these natural laws and follow them to 
attain the highest state of economic felicity· 
possible to mankind.n (Richard T. Ely, Ground 
Under- Our Feet) 1 
It would not be at all difficult for most middle-aged 
people at the present time to recall the dreary hodge-podge 
of supply and demand, marginal utility, wage funds, land-
rents, pools and trusts and Gresham's law (along with a 
great deal more of double talk) which they were forced to 
11 taken in college under the requirement of what they were 
supposed to believe was an exact science, Economics. Grimes 
speaks further of one of young Holmes' teachers at Harvard 
in this period • 
••• To attempt to alter these laws or their consequences 
was thus to revolt against science, nature, and indeed 
the Deity. It was thus not only futile but blasphemous. 
Francis Bowen, Harvard professor and author of the 
economics text American Political Economy, noted that 
the principles of economics 11manifest the contrivance, 
the wisdom and beneficence of the Deity, just as clearly 
as do the marvellous arrangements of the material uni-
verse ••• " Further, he noted: ••• 
11Laissez-faire, ttthese things regulate themselves,n 
in common phrase; which means, of course, that God 
regulates them by his general laws, which always, in the 
long run, work to good. 11 2 
lAlan Pendleton Grimes, American Political Thought, New 
York, Henry Holt & C~ 1955, p. 300. 
2~., p. 301. 
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Howe in The Shaping Years quotes the same passage of 
Bowen's in chronicling the difficulty Holmes encountered 
in this course. He tells us that the Harvard Faculty on 
April 12, 1861: ttvoted that Hackett and Holmes, Seniors, 
be publicly admonished for repeated and gross indecorum in 
the recitation of Professor Bowen.ul 
Howe has some noteworthy things to say here in view of 
the Holmes-Laski friendship later as a receptacle for Holmes' 
rejection of Natural Law • 
••• Bowen's tendency to nourish his hopes with comforting 
interpretations of the decrees of Providence and his 
confidence that nature respects the rules of Christian 
morality would hardly have been sympathetic to a young 
man who found Providence ~mpersonal and Christian morality 
debatable. Furthermore, Bowen's entire willingness to 
dismiss as ttmonstrous" a scientific theory which seemed 
inconsistent with the_religion of Harvard must have been 
peculiarly distasteful to a student who was coming to 
doubt that the happiness of pious and instructed men was 
the end toward which all nature moved. It was the 
optimism of Bowen's belief which gave it what significance 
it had as an influence (perhaps wholly negative) in the 
development of Holmes' thought. In his later years 
Holmes was often to find himself in disagreement with 
younger friends whose hopes were greater than his own. 
Their hopes, of course, were not founded on the pre-
suppositions of Francis Bowen, but it is not impossible 
that an early revulsion against the tendency of the 
Harvard which educated him to see pious men as masters 
of a favorable fate survived in Holmes as distrust of 
social optimism.2 
It is a difficult thing to be an eminent man. It is 
manifestly much more difficult to be the eminent father of an 
eminent son. The great man is responsible -- (whatever that 
lHowe, The Shaping Years, 62. 
2Ibid., 64, 65. 
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means) for only his own greatness. The distinguished father 
must play some part -- (and how much a part that is, the 
psychiatrists increasingly agree to tell us) in his son's 
distinction. This dual distinction is rare in history, and 
can be counted briefly on the fingers of the hands. Philip 
and Alexander of Macedon; James and John Stuart Mill; Dumas, 
Pere et Fils; Holbein, Elder and Younger; John Adams and 
John Quincy; Johann Sebastian Bach and Karl Emmanuel. There 
are a few others, but not the least in the list are the two 
men named Oliver Wendell Holmes. 
To recapitulate, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Senior, was a 
Natural Law man. If the pattern of his version of Natural 
Law, in turning from the predestination of his father's 
Calvinism, built up a predestination of its own, based on a 
scientific mechanism that tended toward the Freudian discoveries 
of the subconscious, this was no greater variant on the theme 
of Natural Law than history has already done a hundred times 
with this great creative matrix. If his son in turn totally 
rejected -- (as he always did) -- anything to do with Freud 
as rather nasty obscurantism, he could still make such state-
ments as this about his grandfather's calling: 11 These men 
~ 
and their fellows planted a Congregational Church, from which 
grew the democratic state. They planted something mightier 
even than institutions •••• the democratic spirit. 11 1 
lAddress made by Holmes as Judge on the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court in celebration of the 250th Anniversary of the 
Gathering of the First Parish Church in Cambridge. 
261 
Is not all this the £amiliar interplay between ortho-
doxy and heresy, antiphonal not only to the generations but 
to the £ruitful dialectic and mutation of generation itsel£? 
As we have seen, Elsie Venner was only one variant of the 
Doctor's Natural Law ideation, even if the most original and 
so the most heretical, just as the main stream version is in 
The Chambered Nautilus. But the Justice also had his heresies 
and his main stream to make the strong interweaving of that 
masterful inconsistency which revitalized American Constitu-
tional Law. The evidence points to the conclusion that the 
Natural Law variants, vagaries and off-centered versions of 
the subject as held and projected in the lives afid work of 
Abiel Holmes and Dr. 0. w. Holmes affected the course of 
the American Constitution within the impact of the judicial 
decisions and opinions of their eminent grandson and son, 
u Justice Holmes dissenting ••• tt 
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CHAP'fER SIX 
Other Relationships and Natural Law: 
Cohen, Wu and Brandeis 
1 
To what extentJ and with what particular indications, 
Holmes recognized the debt which his thinking owed to his 
ancestry can be debated. When and whether he resentedJ or 
took pride in, this debt is perhaps a matter of only rela-
tive importanceJ for conscious and articulated acknowledge-
ment of sources in intellectual history are of less weight 
than the buried stresses. It is also a restatement of what 
was said in the last chapter to point out that opposition 
and antagonism on the part of the individual, the gathering 
together of the personality to object, deny, veto, re-anal-
yze or re-define, marks as great a point of influence as 
intentional) whole-hearted support and affirmation would be. 
' Yet that Holmes was preoccupied all his life with the actu-
al definitions of the Justice he refused to acknowledge in 
the abstraction of the Natural Law of his father and grand-
father is evidenced again and again throughout his long and 
great career. It is the recurring thread and theme of all 
his intellectual, social and legal development, not always 
consistently present, but running nevertheless throughout 
all his intervening social friendships, his correspondence, 
his dissents and decisions. Even when he said, as he did 
so often, that it was the law he was interpreting and not 
justice, the point is, his inconsistency had a self-consci-
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ousness about it which is not at all ingenuous. This con-
stant preoccupation of his life with standards~ norms and 
values in juriaprudence is brought out further in his re-
lationship with two other friends, Morris Cohen and John 
Wu. These friendships were rather like his relationship 
with Laski in that they concerned two much younger men, and 
the connection was carried on almost entirely bY letter-
writing. 
We have quoted previously a rather surprising state-
ment (the phrase italicized below for editorial emphasis), 
which Holmes wrote to Morris CohenJ dated September 3J 1918; 
we re-emphasize it now. 
I have been moved by a book on Natural Law 
(which I don 1tthink much of) to wr~te a few words 
for the.Harvard Law Review,~i.e. Laski impounded 
them to that end. I say nothing that I haven't 
said a thousand times in conversation but one 
rather likes to see one's fundamentals in print. 
So I wound up with a nice tWist at the tail of 
the cosmos -- agreeing with the Natural Lawyers 
that we have to come back to them1 I should like to read it to you -- it is short. 
The friendship between Cohen and Holmes began in 1915 
with an exchange of letters between them instigated by Holmes, 
in regard to a reference to Holmes in one of Cohen's articlesJ 
and the correspondence flowered and developed into a valuable 
record over the yearsJ quite in line with Holmes' old-fash-
ioned e:-<and now almost obsolete -- talent for such letter-
writingJ exhibiting his~ taste for a continuity of re-
1. Cohen (ed.), The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, pp. 11J12. 
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lationship with all sorts and conditions or people. It con-
tinued until his death in 1933. This Holmes-Cohen corres-
. . 
pondence ranks next to the Helmes-Laski and the Holmes-
Pollock, in what it reveals or Holmes' opinions, and also 
marks his rather groping loneliness, which made him in ad-
vanced old age open up these possibilities or human contact. 
Again, two persons could scarcely be more dissimilar in 
commencing a long rriendship, though they were not quite so 
great a contrast as were Holmes and Laski. Felix Cohen com-
ments on this in his introduction to this collection or his 
rather's letters: nBeyond this eommon recognition or the 
rrailty or human.claims to omniscience was a world or disa-
greements between these two·men,n1 and he rerers to the li-
. 
beral raith whieh drew together in 1915 an obscure young 
teacher or philosophy and America's most distinguished ju~ 
ist. One or these men, he says, was a Republican capitalist, 
a believer in the survival or the fittest and the iron laws 
or Ri~ardo; the other, an inridel in politics and economics, 
who probed continuously what seemed to him the railures or 
capitalism, militarism, nationalism and the worship or evo-
lution or success. In the vital dirrerences in their back-
grounds, Holmes, Coh~n remarks, was born into the New England 
intellectual aristocracy in that Golden Day when it still 
:combined the Puritan discipline or plain living and high-
thinking with cosmopolitan interests and contacts. He was 
1. Ibid • , p • 4. 
265 
exceptionally favored in brain and body. The first twelve 
years of Morris Cohen's life in Russia were dominated by 
the intellectual framework of Talm~dic learning~ circum-
scribed by poverty and hunger which weakened his health for 
the rest of his life. He summarizes: 
••• It was only in the last years of the century 
when Holmes was already a great legal scholar and 
a distinguished judge~ that the youthful immi-
grant~ Morris Cohen~ made his way into the lang-
uage and intellectual currents of American life. 
It was an immigrant Scottish teacher~ Thomas 
Davidson~ who launch~d his East Side pupil upon a 
life-long quest •••• dominated by the urge to bring 
together two visions. Like many thinkers of ear-
lier ages~ Morris R. Cohen sought to unite the in-
sights of the Hebraic tradition~ with its passion 
for a social justice that is never wholly achieved3 
and the values of the Hellenic tradition~ with its 
pervading quest for a truth that is never wholly 
caught. 
In the field of jurisprudence~ this became a 
struggle to bring a scientific outlook into the 
law~ and thus to make of law a more effective 
tool in the cause of social justice. Fellow sol-
diers in this struggle~ Harold J. Laski~ Felix 
Frankfurther, and Louis D. Brandeis~. were.devoted 
friends of Morris R. Cohen and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes. The interplay of these friendships 
offers a bright page in the development of Ameri-
can legal thought ••• 
Holmes and Cohen~ each in his own way~ were 
loyal to the values of a great cultural he~itage 
w1 thou.t succumbing to its provincialism. Two 
civilized men who valued the challenges that save 
thought from stagnation could disagree on issues 
so basic that meat of the conflicts of.our.time 
seem pe~ty in comparison~ and could yet submit 
their differences to the court of reason and en-
shrine them in warm affection ••• 
Such a relationship between man and man offers 
heartening demonstration of the potential zf ~nder­
standing that is carried by genuine humili Y· 
1. Ibid.,pp. 5, 6. 
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Morris Cohen's own aeeount of this friendship~ and 
others that had an important bearing on his philosophical 
development~ is told in Book Six of his autobiography~ A 
Dreamer's Journey. He wrote a great deal en logic~ philo-
sophy and social and historical problems. While many of 
his books are no longer in print~ a therough perusal of his 
writing and ideas well repays the thoughtful reader. On 
modern logic he is an authority. His persistent and eelec-
tic vita~ity make him a coherent and comprehensive exponent 
of liberalism~ with all facets of that portmanteau word vig-
orously and clearly understood. Cohen is so singularly free 
from prejudice of any kind~ his thought is so stripped down 
to the bone of probity~ and all aspeets and shadings of 
varying eoneepts are so completely grasped in historieal 
and philosophic meanings~ that even the most objeetive of 
other liberals -- John Dewey~ Herbert Croly~ Lincoln Steffens~ 
. . 
Walter Lippmann~ Heyw~Cd Broun~ Josiah Royce~ Woodrow W~lson~ 
Franklin Delano Reosevelt~ Ralph MeGill (what names are 
-
there ove~ the past fifty years?) -- on oceasion seem to be 
,,... 
more partial or more dogmatic than he. In fact~ it can also 
be said that here really was the friend and the friendship 
werthy of Holmes and whieh Holmes sought~ in the sense that 
Laski was not and could not be. ~rue~ it was just this lack 
of balance and the incongruity of tone whieh~ probablY~ made 
Laski's friendship the more compelling~ but~ -nevertheless~ 
this is the relationship of dignitY and worth which gives 
stature to whatever it was Holmes was seeking~ and which 
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lends importance to Holmes' own opinions in a way Laski could 
never do. It is probably ror this reason, as well as ror 
brierness and comparative compression, that the reader rinds 
their correspondence so worth reviewing. 
In regard to the quotation just given from Holmes, Cohen 
answered: 
I received your note and the extract from the 
Harvard Law Review on Natural Law which I read with 
pro~ound admiration ang delight. All of the things 
you say I agree to, though I could never say them 
as well;.and if I rind certain logieal qualirica-
tions necessary, to put a beard on your doctrine (to 
use your own words), that only means that you and.I 
have somewhat different styles or fighting ror the 
same good cause. I hope you are not avelse to my 
regarding myselr as a companion in arms. 
It is impossible not to wonder just what Cohen meant by 
his admiration here, for G>ne cannot -- a.s one does with Las-
ki -- doubt his sincerity. He meant it. He, also, knew about 
Natural Law and had written on it in a well-known article Jus 
Naturale Redivivum, a paper read before the Conrerence on 
Legal and Social Philosophy at Chicago University on April 10, 
1914, and then published in the November, 1916, issue of the 
Philosophical Review. In A Dreainer 's Journey he .tells the 
reader that this paper was the keystone of the rirst book he 
published, and in many ways his ehef d'oeurve. 
Nature, which he dedicated to Justice Holmes. 
Reason and 
He says t 
My own paper at this confereng.e was an out-
growth of my reading in European legal philo~ophy, 
which led me to appreciate that the idea of natu-
ral law" is not an outworn superstition based on 
1. Ibid., p. 13. 
false history, but rather a perennial effort to 
appeal from the idolatrous worship of the work 
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of men's hands to a higher ideal of righteousness. 
My defense of the concern with social justice em-
bodied in the doctrine of "natural law," pub-
lished two years later in the Philosophical Re-
view under the title Jus Naturale Redivivum, be-
came one of the blocks for the building of my 
first philosophical treatise, Reason and Nature. 1 
He continues telling how this volume was finally writ-
ten, and what he owed to Holmes in the writing of it. 
My dream of publishing a treatise on scientific 
method had taken on new life in 1911, when Justice 
Holmes, Judge Mack, Jacob Billikopf and other 
friends helped me over a period of vast discourage-
ment and financial difficulty by subsidizing a sab-
batical year in which I was able to devote myself 
to reading and writing without the distraction of 
college classes. In the early 1920's the outlines 
of my projected volume on scientific method began 
to take shapeJ As a prospective chapter of this 
volume I had donE? a brief study in political sci-
ence, "Communal Ghosts in Political Theory," in 
1919 ••• In 1925 I published a series of papers on 
reason as the basis of sc~entific method, and on 
the rivals and substitutes for reason ••• There were 
still large gaps in my treatise ••• 
.•• But I had made the mistake of telling Justice 
Holmes back in 1923 that I was hoping to get .out . 
my book within a year and that it would be dedicated 
to him. The years had stretched out ••• Finally, two 
summers in the company of my eldest son served to 
bring the book to completion ••• So it was that in 
March 1931, I saw the fulfillment of one of the 
driving dreams of my life when I presented the first 
copy of my first book, Reason and Nature, to the 
courageous thinker and loyal friend whose faith in 
reason had never faltered in the winds of the pass-
ing years.2 
Did Holmes' "faith in reason never falter 11 ? This again 
• J • 
· t f to the discussions between seems a questionable way o re er 
1. 
2. 
Morris Raphael Cohen, A Dreamer's Journey, P• 179. 
Ibid., pp. 186, 187. 
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them. Cohen knew that Holmes~ officially at least~ dispar-
aged reason frequently~ and often~ as his son reminded us~ 
Cohen wrote in strong criticism of Holmes for this. Yet he 
expressed himsel~ so here~ as well as giving his great ad-
miration for the paradoxical qualities in the Natural Law 
essay~ I believe~ because of two motivations. First because 
he took as the real heart of Holmes' meaning in the Natural 
Law essay his significant phrase in the letter to him about 
it: n ••• so I wound up ••• agreeing With the Natural Lawyers 
that we have to come back to them«~ and this was the essen-
tial core of the essay to him~ as well as explaining much 
that seems so illogical and contradictory in the paper it-
self; and second~ because like so many others whom Holmes 
stirred to admiration -- Laski~ Wu, Max Lerner~ as examples 
he used Holmes' writings again and again as themes for his 
own works, critiques of Holmes' thought, critical articles 
about Holmes~ while mention of Holmes and quotations from 
him dot along through all his books. Law was the source 
and theme of a great proportion of his own work, as many of 
the titles o~ his books show: Law and the Social Order~ Law 
and Reason) Readings in Jurisprudence and.Legal Philosophy. 
Sometimes, with Holmes as the spark, he interpreted one side 
of Holmes' beliefs~ sometimes another, and sometimes he con-
tradicted himself in the course of the years~ on whieh aspect 
of a gloss on Holmes' words and meanings he chosem stress. 
In the Natural Law section which is so basic a part of 
Reason and Nature, he states his alignment with Natural Law 
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thinking unequivocably~ and sets up and demolishes all the 
arguments and categories of objections which are customarily 
used against the philosophical position of Natural Law. 
Here are some quotations: 
There are~ of coUrse~ important differences be-
tween the new and the old brands of natural law~ 
which show that the attack on the old natural law 
was not without some justification. Yet the name 
"natural law" is not inappropriately applied to 
the new doctrines~ which are~ in essence~ a reas-
sertion of the old in a form more in harmony with 
modern thought. That this reassertion is scien-
tifically possible I shall try to show by a criti-
cal examination of the four usual arguments against 
the theory of natural law~ namely~ the historical~ 
the psychologic~ the legal and the metaphysical • 
•.• But while a shallow mechanical intellectualism 
did colour all the speculation of the Enlighten-
ment~ there is no necessary connection between it 
and the theories of natural law. Certainly the jural views btl &rotins:/ Hobbes~ and Spinoza~ or 
even those of-Locke and Rousseau cannot be so 
easily condemned. Moreover~ a great-deal may be 
said for the view that would prefer the shallow 
intellectualism of the Enlightenment to the roman-
tic distrust of human reason~ which denies (as do 
Hegel~ Karl Marx~ and~ in part~ Savigny) that re-
flective thought can aid in the t2ansformation of jural and political institutions • 
••. If the work of our courts in applying maxims 
of natural law has proved unsatisfactory~ it does 
not follow that principles of justice cannot or 
ought not be worked into the law. Legal history 
shows that they always have been the life of the 
law. So far as the use of the moral maxims of 
our bills of rights has actually proved unsatis-
factory~ the causes are to be sought in the spe-
cific conditions under which our courts have done 
their work. Of, these conditions not the least 
harmful is the belief that jurists need no special 
training in the science of justice (either because 
1. Morris R. Cohen~ Reason and Nature~ pp. 401~ 402. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 4o4. 
law has nothing to do with justice~ or else be-
cause what constitutes Justice under any given 
condition is something which any one can readily 
determine by asking a magical arbiter called con-
science. )1 
The essence of all doctrines of natural law is 
the.appeal from positive law to justice~ from the 
law that is to the -law which ought to beJ and un-
less we are ready to assert that the concept of a 
law that ought to be is·for some reason an inad-
missible one~ the roots of natural law remain un-
touched •.•• Thrasymachus's definition of justice 
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as the interest of the stronger~ finds ~modern 
form in the definition of right as the will of the 
sovereign, of the people~ or of the dominant 
group. But few of these radical positivists have 
had the courage of their convictions; they smuggle 
in some normative principle~ such as harmony with 
the tendency of evolution~ social solidarity~ etc., 
as the valid ideal •••• Our analytical school of 
jurisprudence~ pretending to study only the law 
that is, has been repeatedly s~own to be permeated 
with an anonymous natural law. 
It seems to me evident that in these paragraphs Cohen 
is definitely challenging and opposing certain well-known at-
titudes and concepts of Holmes. The same is true when he an-
swers some of the objections to Natural Law, specifically 
-
the one often advocated by Holmes and Laski, that different 
peoples' concepts of morality and justice differ as much as 
their taste in clothes or diet. 
The metaphysical objection to the possibility 
of a theory of natural law or justice runs this --
nQuestions of justice are relative to time, place, 
and the changing conditions of life. Hence there 
cannot be such a thing as a definite science of 
these matters. 11 The widespread prevalence of this 
view, even in bigh places, shows how woefully un-
familiar is -the logic of science ••• 
1. Ibid., p. 4o8. 
2. Ibid., pp. 408, 409. 
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Moreover~ there are indications that the varia-
bility of social judgments~ such as those with 
regard to justice~ has as a matter of fact been 
greatly misunderstood. T.he first impression of 
savage life as gathered from the reports of sci-
entifically untrained travellers and others inter-
ested in noting striking.differences~ t0gether 
with the intellectual intoxication produced by 
the frenzied acceptance of the principle of uni-
versal evolution~ have combined to produce an over-
emphasis on the diversities of human culture. As 
soon~ however~ as we get over the disposition to 
run wild with the concept of evolution~ and examine 
the matter somewhat soberlY~ the fundamental re-
semblances of all human races and modes of life 
will be seen not to have lost significance •••• cri-
tical ethnologists like Boas are pointing out that 
the scientific~ uncritical reports of untrained 
observers as to so-called primitive life have pro-
duced false impressions of radical moral differ-
ences~ and that the actual variations of moral opin-
ion are largely explicable by the variation of so-
cial conditions. In ordinary affairs and in public 
discussion we all do undoubtedly assume a large 
amount of agreement as to what constitutes jus-
tice. And while such agreement is not conclusive) 
it offers a sufficiently definite starting point 
for a critical science~ which~ according to the 
Platonic method) consists in positing ideals (or 
hypotheses) and criticizing or testin~ them in 
the light of ascertained social fact. 
This important~ basically common-sense judgment has never 
been better put. It is a norm as natural as the air we breathe 
and the sun that shines on us~ and if it were not for the 
period of the disparagement of reason and the intellectual 
process wbieh the last half century has seen, its obvi0usness 
would not have to be,:.stated. The nonsense of supposing that 
law can be discussed or dealt with in omitting all cGnsidera-
tions of justice, hypothetical or actual, would seem to be 
axiomatic in any society. And yet here is a quotation from 
1. Ibid., pp. 411, 412. 
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from Holmes~ the nature of which we present again~ in order 
to give the evidence for continuing to stress this point: 
For my own part, I often doubt whether it would 
not be a gain if every word of moral significance 
could be banished from the law altogether~ and 
other words adopted which should convey legal 
ideas uncolored by anything outside the law. We 
should lose the fossil records of a good deal of 
history and the majesty got from ethical associa-
tions~ but by·ridding ourselves of an unnecessary 
confusion we should ~ain very mueh in the clear-
ness of our thought. 
From first to last in all his writings~ Morris Cohen in-
sists on the necessity of a science of justice~ of the press-
ing need for defining the word according to methods of logic 
and rational inquiry~ so that we have common meanings and 
norms attached to the useage of the word. Here are some quo-
tations from the series of essays~ Law and the Social Order, 
which emphasize this attitude. This chapter, following a 
long discussion on Justice Holmes and the nature of law~ is 
on "The Behaviouristic Theory of Lawn: 
1. 
After many years at the bar and on the bench 
Justice Holmes declared~ in 1897~ that "we have 
too little theory in the law rather tha~ too 
much. 11 But legal theory~ if it is to be worth-
while~ must be closely reasoned and thoroughly 
tested. Will the new efforts at a legal philo-
sophy now arising in this country meet this re-
quirement? ••• But the gravest peril perhaps is 
that in reacting violently against our former 
isolation of law we shall neglect the results of 
centuries of legal scholarship and slavishly imi-
tate other social sciences or borrow from them 
methods and results that are not suitable to our 
subject ••• To call a decision the behaviour of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes~ Jre) "The Path of the Law"~ Lerner~ 
The Mind and Faith of Justice.Holmes~ pp. 78~ 79. 
the judge is to confuse physically organic with 
social-teleologic categories.l 
This is from an essay nPhilosophy and Legal Seience 11 : 
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In thus viewing normative jurisprudence as de-
pending on~ or even as a part of~ ethics~ we are 
in no way confusing legal seienee and ethics. On 
the contrary, to insist that laws may be ethically 
bad is to insist that that which is contrary to 
good ethics may still be law. The law that Justiee 
Holmes' "bad man" uses to work ethical iniquity 
may und~ubtedly be the law of the land. If that 
were not the ease~ the whole of human striving 
for the abolition of unjust laws would be mean-
ingless. The seeming parad~x in urging that nor-
mative jurisprudence thus ultimately depends on 
ethics and yet is relatively distinguishable from 
it ought not to puzzle us if we use the federal 
rather than the imperialistic analogy as to the 
relation of the various sciences, that is, if we 
recognize the element of pluralism and relative 
independence of different domains. wi·thin the unity 
of knowledge ••• There can be no normative or criti-
cal legal science without a thorough knowledge of 
the actual facts of human eonduet. But such a 
knowledge of actual conditions is not sufficient 
for all.purposes. We must consider the question 
of the goal or value of legal rules, and keep on 
asking whether certain practices should be re-
pressed or strengthened. The study of what is de-
sirable may be as scien~ifie as any branch of 
logic or mathematics ••• 
Here is a paper~ tfThe Place of Logic in the Law": 
••• The law dr~ws its sap from feelings of justice 
and.soeial need. It has grown and been improved 
by sensitively m~ded judges attending to the con-
flicting claims of the various interests before 
them, and leaving it to subsequent developments to 
demonstrate the full wisdom or unwisdom of the de-
eision ••• Like other human efforts~ the law must 
experiment, which always involves a leap into the 
dark future. But for that very reason the judge's 
feelings as to right and wrong must be logically 
1. Morris Raphael Cohen, 11The Behaviouristie Theory of Lawn, 
Law and the Social Order, Essays in Legal Philosophy, 
pp • 215 , 216. 
2 •. Morris Raphael Cohen, nPhilosophy and Legal Sciencen, 
loc. cit. supra, pp. 245, 246. 
and scientifically trained. The trained mind 
sees in a flash ef intuition that which the un-
trained mind can succeed in seei~ only after 
painfully treading many steps •••• 
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"'Real' and 'Ideal' Forces in Civil Law" is reprinted 
from the International Journal of Ethics (19i6). 
If, thus warned, we look for the realistic 
and idealistic motives in legal thought we find 
them in the conflicting views that law is rea-
son or justice, and that law is force, the will 
of the sovereign, or the interest of the strong-
er or dominant class ••• It must be granted that 
ethical ideas as to right and wrong are somewhat 
plastic, that men readily convince themselves 
that what is to their interest is just ••• Yet for 
all that, it is absurd to deny the fact that 
ethical ideals have been powerful factors in 
making the law. Indeed, when we survey the his-
tory of the law, it would seem that religion has 
moulded the gr2atest part of the law under which 
mankind lives. 
And here is a critique of Jerome Frank's Law and·the 
Modern Mind, already discussed herein. 
1. 
2. 
If the natural human craving for certainty be 
childish, the complete denial of it would be com-
plete madness. Mr. Frank is impressed with some 
of the harm of the pretended certainty of the law. 
He should reflect that modern life would be com-
pletely paralyzed without the constant effort to 
make the law more certain, so that people can know 
on what to rely in their enterprise. Uncontrolled 
discretion of judges would make modern complex life 
unbearable. Rightly does Mr. Frank hold up Justice 
Holmes as a mature mind on the bench. But that 
great jurist believes not only that there is cer-
tainty in the law but also that it can and ought 
to be increased. At any rate his greatness as a 
judge lies precisely in the preeminant way in which 
he distinguishes between the legal rule that limits 
Morris Raphael Cohen, 11The Place of Logic in the Lawn, 
loc. cit. supra, pp. 182, 183. 
Morris Raphael Cohen, 11 'Real 1 . and 'Ideal 1 Forces in Civil 
Law"_, loc. c:nt. supra, pp. 249, 255. 
the scope1of his function and his own personal opinions. 
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These quotations show again how seminal Holmes' opinions 
were in Cohen's thoughts on jurisprudence and legal philo-
sophy. They also show how much disagreement Cohen had with 
many of Helmes• most characteristic attitudes. It can be 
said that having stimulated Cohen to develop some of these 
points~ Holmes then would be in many of them at the opposite 
position from Cohen. This is true on definitions of justice, 
reason and Natural Law. Yet also, Cohen frequently expressed 
the great admiration he had for Holmes in terms which showed 
he also regarded Natural Law and natural rights in their very 
limited and almost colloquial sense as meaning only the sane-
tity of property and Contract in nineteenth century useage, 
when those defending private property and vested interests 
fell back on these claims. Early in the correspondence be-
tween them, Holmes had referred with much commendation to two 
articles of Cohen's which take this point of view: The Bill 
of Rights Theory and The Legend of Magna Carta. In the first 
Cohen had written: 
••• Thus the bills of rights, originally intended 
to protect men against political oppression, have 
become the legal basis of economic exploitation. 
The principal device by which this has been achiev-
ed is the invention of a new legal doctrine previ-
ously unknown to jurisprudence~ to wit, that the 
right to make contracts is itself property. The 
blind acceptance of this new dogma has led to the 
conclusion -- a veritable reductio ad absurdum --
1. Morris Raphael Cohen, loc. cit. supra, p. 362. 
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that a minimum wage law which prevents a human be-
ing from working under conditions of starvation is 
a taking away of his property ••. 
The dreadful results of the English attempt to 
put.a regieme of free labour contract into prac-
tice~ the atrocious degradation of men3 women3 and 
children that resulted therefrom 3 shocked the hu-
mane sense of a Christian nation and soon led to 
the beginning of factory legislation. To insist 
on freedom of contract where one party is under eco-
nomic pressure or compulsion is a cruel mockery •.• 
No one acquainted with the history of American 
idealism can be blind to the high sentiment of loyal 
devotion that our bills of rights have evoked. And 
no one should fail to acknowledge the noble role 
that the theory of natural rights has played in the 
historic process of human liberation. It may well 
be contended that~ reinterpreted in the light of 
our present conditions 3 that ancient theory can 
still offer us light in our passionate struggles. 
But the lawyer cannot adequately serve his high 
calling so long as he regards it as h!s duty sim-
ply to defend the established system. 
In Reason and Law, his last work, published posthumously~ 
Cohen has a chapter, nAbsolutisms in Law and Morals"3 which 
recapitulates the varieties and richness of the various char-
acteristic positions he worked out in response to the stimulus 
Holmes gave him. He defines absolutism: 
The first manifestation of absolutism that suggests 
itself is the complacent assumption that there can 
be only one true or correct definition of any ob-ject .•• The vice of absolutism to be eliminated here 2 
as before is the undfie simplification of the issue; ••• 
and begins the chapter thust 
1. 
2. 
Morris Raphael Cohen3 nThe Bill of Rights Theory", loc. 
cit. supra, pp. 149, 151, 155. 
Merris Raphael Cohen, Reason and Law, p. 65. 
In the reaction against mechanical jurispru-
dence, against the complacent manipulation of le-
gal concepts in utter disregard of the facts of 
social life, it is well to be on guard against 
throwing out the baby with the bath. Granted 
that traditional concepts like rights. titles, 
contracts, etc., have been grossly abused, it 
ought still to be clear that without the.use of 
concepts and general principles we can have no 
science, or intelligible systematic account, of 
the law or of any other field ••• l 
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He takes up again here "the classical-controversy as to 
whether the law rests on reason or on force, 11 saying, 
Now it cannot be denied that a great deal of obe-
dience to the law is brought about through sheer 
fea~ ••• Nevertheless, it is obviously not true that 
the sta~e rests2 on the policeman's elub or sol-dier's bayonet. 
He discusses throughout the necessity for and the difficulties 
in the way of developing a real science of justice, and again 
indicates that he agrees with Holmes largely in his interpre-
tation of the bills of rights as playing into the hands of 
those who would defend the statie and the stationary and the 
status quo. 
In our own country the morally absolutistic 
view of the law is embodied in the orthodox theory 
of our bills of rights and of the nature of our 
common law which, as has been frequently pointed 
out, rests on the classical theory of natural rights. 
The law is a body of principles laid down by nature 
or the author of nature. It has been revealed in 
the free institutions of the Anglo-Saxons since 
they inhabited the German forests •• ~These principles 
are often referred to as the unwritten law, the 
unwritten eonstitution, or the law behind the law, 
revealed in the conscience of mankind ••• 
1. Ibid. , p • 63 • 
2. Ibid., pp. 82, 83. 
In its classical form, the theory finds few 
defenders today among those who call themselves 
political scientists, and there is an almost 
universal condemnation of it among our progres-
sive thinkers ••• 
This criticism, however, is obviously too 
sweeping and overreaches itself ••• 
The term 11Natural lawn has been identified by 
Dean Pound and others with the idealized law of 
the time and place. Now, our ideal is, as we 
pointed out before, always conditioned by the 
circumstances under which we live. But let us 
note that natural law is often also an idealiza-
tion of the opposite to that which prevails. 
Where inequality or privillge exists, natural 
law demands its abolition. 
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As always when he discusses the need for objective stan-
dards for what is just, he must admit that there are more ob-
stacles in the way of establishing such than there are easy 
solutions. 
Since the dawn of history the bitter cry for 
justice has filled the human scene. But though 
in every discussion of any social question, all 
parties appeal to it, we rarely come across sys-
tematic attempts to answer the question, What is 
justice? ••• 
This diversity of views as to justice has bred 
a certain despair) that there is no such thing as justice and that the word conveys onlY diverse emo-
tional opinions. But such a negative atti~ude is 
so contrary to the currents of practical l~fe that 
the reaction to it intensifies the authoritarian 
view The latter often takes the form of a claim 
to ~ow by an immediate super-rational intuition 
or revelation what is absolutelY right. Is there 
of avoiding this dilemma between the ab-!~u~~!m of denial and that of brute affirmation? 
I suggest that there is. 
1. Ibid., pp. 85) 86. 
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Suppose that we start with admitting that ques-
tio~s of justice are largely matters of opinion. 
Does it follow that all opinions are equally bad? 
••• And is it not the quest of science to find ev~­
dence to enable us to choose the best available 
opinion? ••• It is a radical error --indeed an es-
tablished superstition -- to suppose that science 
is concerned only with brute facts of existence ••• 
I do not therefore wish to minimize the difficulty 
in the formulation of a theory of justice in the 
law ••• Nevertheless~ it is a task which is as una-
voidable as it is of vi tal importance •.• Clearly~ 
therefore, we may start with theories or opinions 
as to what is just, and by submitting them to the 
critical tests of logic or scientific method dis-
criminate between their more and their less ten-
able elements. In this way we may not attain ab-
solute truth, but we can make progress at least 
in the clarification of our ideas.l 
Examining many categories and brackets of definitions 
of what is just and criticizing them all~ Cohen ends up as 
always with positive affirmations. 
Agaipst this pessimistic view of the inevitable 
injusti.ce of man-made law we may urge the same ob-jection as that against other forms of absolutism 
or undue simplicity. In actual life the fact that 
different classes have conflicting interests does 
not prevent their also having interests in common 
••• Still, human history shows that no government 
can last very long if it does not render the people 
some service. When governments become intolerable 
men cease to obey or the government is overthrown. 
The actual state of society, therefore, is in fact 
never one of mere conflict or pure opposition but a 
combination of both war and peace. In time of cri-
sis we are apt to forget the common basis of human 
life, the touch of nature that makes all men kin. 
We ~ight without compromise and without doubts, 
and if anyone suggests that the other side might 
have some rights that we ought at least to inves-
tigate, we regard him as2an enemy or perhaps a paid agent of the other side. 
1. Ibid., pp. 89, 90J 91. 
2. Ibid.J p. 99. 
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And in summary 1 
It is well~ therefore~ before concluding~ not 
only to recognize the natural funevitability of the 
craving for the absolute~ but to pay tribute to 
its necessary function in maintaining intellectual 
and moral sanity ••• But although this craving for 
undue simplicity is a fatal snare~ it is folly to 
try to banish absolute or rigorous logic ••• The ab-
solute denial of all constancy or identity in the 
world of change and variety would make all asser-
tions meaningless ••• In any case we cannot maintain 
sound intellectual procedure by turning our backs 
on critical logic ••• But by our very endeavor to 
rise above the struggle of the market place and to 
cultivate a wider visionJ we can soften the rigors 
of fanatical conflicts and thus help in a measure 
to bring about that peace based on understanding 
which is the essence of liberal civilization. Ra-
tional reflection is itself a natural expression 
of human energy without which human life would be 
brutish and devoid of outlook and genuine inspira-
tion. It is only when law is thus seen as part of 
the life of reason that the ideal of just lay can 
become a real force for genuine beneficence. 
While obviously no attempt is being made here to be ex-
haustive about Morris Cohen's thoughtJ enough quotations have 
been given to indicate that in the system of Holmes' most 
characteristic friend (or perhaps we should s~y most worthy} 
- ' 
many of Holmes' own most characteristic ideas --those rela-
ting to Natural Law in particular -- are altogether denied. 
Stimulating as Holmes' typical iconoclasm was to Cohen in 
building his own edifice of beliefJ and in part even as he 
accepted his dicta that bills of rights and eighteenth cen-
tury constitutionalism defended the static and the status quo 
of property and privilege, it is evident that in analysis of 
Natural Law and in advocating abstract justice and the preemi-
1. Ibid.J pp. 103J 104. 
. . ----.. _., 
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nence of reason as a necessity for the betterment of human 
.· . ,.. 
affairs, he and Holme~_in what· they said were at opposite 
poles. As already quoted, Felix Cohen indicated such dif-
ferences in the preface to Reason and Nature. 
The final chapter, or Epilogue, of this work is entitled 
••rn Dispraise of Life, Experience, and Realityn. FolloWing 
.. 
this through, it would be difficult for the reflective reader 
to believe that Cohen wrote it for any other reason than to 
answer with a direct negative one of Holmes_' favorite and 
most quoted aphorisms: nThe life of the law has not been 
logic; it has been experience." Cohen says: ffFor life de-
void of logic is confused, une~lightened, and ~ften brutish.na 
•The use of the word experience without any ascertainable mean-
ing is perhaps the outstanding scandal of recent philosophy.n2 
11 To identify the substance of the world with the fact of our 
experience of some part of it is to set up an anthropocentric 
universe, compared to which the medieval one is sane and re-
spectable. n3 And his concluding paragraph is significant. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
I~tead of life we want the good life. Instead 
of accepting experience, science discriminates be-
tween the experience of truth and the experience of 
illusion. Not all reality, but only a reality free 
from ugline~s and confusing incoherence is the aim 
f t Rational philosophy tries to meet this need ~y ~~fining the good, the true and the beautiful. ~he essence of the romantic use of the terms life, 
experience, and reality is that it avoids this 
Morris Cohen, Reason and Nature, p. 450. 
Ibid., p. 452. 
Ibid., p. 453. 
necessary task~ and is therefore flattering to 
those to whom the use of reason is irksome.l 
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In summary~ then~ it seems evident then that Morris 
Cohen was a Natural Law man. Like Dr. Holmes in his way~ 
like Sir Frederick Pollock in his~ like Harold Laski~ like 
John Wu~ each in his own version~ Cohen upheld and advocated 
Natural Law concepts. Holmes' principal associates all his 
life~ from the major relatives of the shaping years~ through 
the mature-friends and colleagues who were most congenial to 
his philosophical formulations~ down to the last of the ardent 
young men who so touched his imagination and his heart~ were 
those with whom Natural Law in some form or other was a part 
of their deepest weltanschauung. All this verifies the main 
contention of this thesis~ that Holmes was not actuallY 
writing about Natural Law in his paperJ that the arguments 
he then advanced against Natural Law had little to do with 
the subject~ and that the friends who then so eagerlY praised 
his writing and his thought were actuallY praising something 
else: a turn of phrase, a flight of fancy~ an attitude~ 
sceptical or heroic, urbane or immediately enfranchising, 
but not a clearlY defined statement which could speak in 
terms of logic or verifiable evidence to their convictions. 
1. Ibid.~ pp. 456~ 457. 
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2. 
To use Jehn Wu as a part of the argument that those who 
were close to Holmes were Natural Law men is to stress the ob-
vious to the point of redundancy. Yet just because John Wu 
does so perfectly illustrate all the principles herein dis-
cussed, a brief resume of his relationship with Holmes is in 
order. The correspondence between these two started in 1921 
a little later than the one with Laski. Like Laski, it was 
a very young man approaching a very old one, an unknown bow-
ing before the pinnacle of success, a foreigner and even 
more of a foreigner, since this was an Asiatic and a Chinaman 
rather than a Jew and an Englishman awestruck before the 
dignity and fame of the United States Supreme Court. 
Wu was twenty-two and Holmes eighty when their corres-
pondence began. Wu wrote to Holmes asking his opinion on an 
article he.had published in 1921 in the Michigan Law Review, 
at which Law School he was- a graduate student. Holmes answer-
ed cordially before he read the article, giving some of his 
customary good advice to the young, but after he did read the 
article, Readings from Ancient Chinese Codes and Other Sources 
0~ Obinese Law and Legal Ideas, again and immediately he wrote 
with enthusiasm. "I perceive I am addressing a scholar who 
much that he probably smiles at elementary already knows so 
counsels. I trust that you will take my ignorance in good 
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part."1 It was indeed gracious or him~ and Wu, as he records 
in his autobiography, was overwhelmed. 0 What humility! I 
thought, only America could have produced such a truly demo-
cratic judge. The letter continues to discuss my article 
and the art or translation in general. 112 
The correspondence went on from then until 1932~ a rew 
years before Holmes 1 death. Holmes' expressions of affection 
are general and continuous~ and while many of his old sayings 
and cliches are very much in evidence~ so also is his wish 
to know and love this young man from a far country and to 
give him all the encouragement, help, counsel and friendly 
communication possible. Excerpts like this appear again and 
again in the letters from him: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
I 4. 
On December 31~ 1923 
Your b~uly remarkable letter leaves me speech-
less so far as it refers to me. I only hope that 
I shall manage to die before I disappoint those 
who think so kindly of me .•• 3 
On March 6, 1924 
The friendship of a young man like you is dear 
to me. We all need encouragement~ the old as well 
as the young. I shall keep your sonnet ••• The fi-
nal gift, I think, is insight ••. one of the greatest 
fields is that of abstract thought, and in that + 
have hopes and expectations for you, if you will 
nourish your abstrnctions with the particulars that 
give them value ••• 
John G. H. Wu, Beyond East and West, p. 89. 
Ibid., p. 89. 
Justice Holmes to Doctor Wu. An Intimate Correspondence~ 
1921-1932, pp. 21, 23. 
Ibid., p. 23. 
On September 6~ 1925 
You give me very great pleasure by telling me 
that all is going well with you. The vague news 
that I get -- especially as I don't read the 
papers -- had made me a little uneasy lest you 
should be affected by disturbances. You give 
me no less pleasure by the continuance of your 
affection. I hope it will keep on while I last.l 
On January 27, 1927 
Your letter gives me the happiness that you 
anticipated in telling me that you have been ap-
pointed Judge of so important a court. To have 
everything exactly as I could have wished I 
should like you to have had a little experience 
in practice, but you will get hold of the actu-
alities, and that is what I want to see happen 
to you. I would much rather see you deciding 
cases and realizing how the law takes hold of 
people in life than continuing to speculate be-
fore you have taken in a lot more raw material.2 
On March 33 1930 
Your letter is all that I hoped it would be~ 
but I could not help feeling anxious till I heard 
from you. The anxiety is gone and I don 1 t be-
lieve that I ever shall feel it again. I under-
stand well the effort to help one's inner want 
of self-confidence by some outward show and I 
sympathize keenly with the trials that you go 
through. I had many black yearsJ and find myself 
often thinking that I was sav~d by successive 
moments of great good luck •.• 
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Like Morris Cohen with Dreamer's Journey~ John Wu has 
told his spiritual and intellectual growth in Beyond East and 
West. Two chapters in it are devoted to a detailed account 
of his friendship with Holmes: 11The .Story of a Friendshipu, 
and uraw Is My Idolf'. But there· were not many actual meet-
1. Ibid., p. 32. 
2. Ibid., p. 41. 
3. Ibid., p. 54. 
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ings between the two -- even fewer than with Laski~ with 
whom also physical visits to Holmes were seldom. Sometimes 
there is much evidence of a far less than perfect under-
standing between them. Holmes was very much opposed when WU 
gave up his judgeship in Shanghai to return to this country 
for lecturing and study in 1929~ and he .wrot~ everything pos-
sible to dissuade him from this~ even bringing the distant 
Laski into the argument. 
On September 13J 1928 
Perhaps you remember my friend LaskiJ at all 
events you know who he is. I have just received 
a letter from him from which I copy a passage. "A 
Chinese friend of mine came in to tea yesterday who 
saw Wu only six weeks ago. He says Wu is very well 
and doing excellent work both in the court and on 
some codification job to which he has been assigned. 
The man says WU talks of a year at HarvardJ but 
prays me to urge the friends of Wu to impress on him 
the need to stay in China. He says Wu is getting a 
real reputation there as one to whom important work 
can be confided and that he will forfeit this if he 
goes off to some interim research which he does not 
really need to do. 11 And Laski who knows all the 
values of academic.study agreed with the view and 
wanted me to press it upon you. I think you have 
known from the beginning that I found it hard to 
believe that you would be wise to come here and the 
above confirmed me in the opinion that if YO"': do 
you will be yielding to the weakness of incl~nat~onJ 
not governed by a llear~ hard view of your oppor 
tunities and duty. 
his Pos t and came back to the Nevertheless) Wu gave up 
United States. Holmes seems to have been right) and Wu re-
gretted the move almost at once. 
My spirits were very JowJ and mY mind was blank. 
Somehow I felt I had made a mistake in leaving my 
1. Ibid.~ p. 49. 
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work in China. And I was homesick. So contra-
dictory was my mind! ••• Although I was near Holmes 
now, I did not go to see him until some time in 
April. We were or ceurse very happy in seeing 
each other again. But I was not all myself, be-
cause in the back or my mind was the uncomfortable 
thought that I should have accepted his advice by 
sticking to my job in China, but I could not bring 
myself to admit it to him. On his part, I could 
observe that while he was in good health his 
cheerfulness had ebbed with age, though his friend-
ship had grown even deeper.l 
The friendship was never quite the same again. Holmes 
was increasingly aged, and Wu was struggling to find what he 
needed philosophically. It was in 1937, after Holmes' death, 
that he became a Roman Catholic convert. It's possible to 
note certain elements or peevishness in Holmes' letters arter 
this difference between them. One incident where this is 
marked is at a time when Wu had sent three Chinese young men 
to visit Holmes, and Holmes seemed to resent it. "I don't 
know what I can do ror them as I am so busy With my duties 
and have ceased to entertain ror some years •.•• I don't see 
how I can help them Without giving more time than I can sp~re 
i d • d 112 ••. It has really worr e my m~n. But this is all under-
standable. The amazing thing is how the friendship happened 
to bloom and grow in the first place. 
~ published articles about his idol's Like the others, V~tU 
ideas. The first of these, The Juristic Philosophy or Just:ioe 
appeared in the Michigan Law Review·in MarchJ 1923. Holmes J 
1. 
2. 
wu, Beyond East and West, pp. 123, 124. 
Justice Holmes to Dr. Wu.J P· 52. 
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Like Laski, Lerner, and Cohen under similar inspiration, this 
paper is principally a glowing encomium, but there is this 
difference. From the very first contact with Holmes, Wu had 
announced and made plain his Natural Law interests. The very 
first paragraph of the first article he had sent him (his 
own first published work in jurisprudence) had begun: 
, 
With the legal profession today there is a grow-
ing interest in the study or universal legal ideas. 
Legal ideas, it would seem, gain strength by exten-
sion both in time and in space. As jus gentium is 
necessarily more congenial to human reason than jus 
civile, so it may be said that the laws of all ages 
are more deep-seated in human nature than those or 
a particular generation.l 
In his article on Holmes (which Holmes highly approved) 
he has a quotation from him (from his speech, The Path or 
the Law) t 
The remoter and more general aspects of the law 
are those which give it universal interest. It is 
through them that you not only become a great.mas-
ter in your calling, but connect your subject with 
the universe and catch an echo or the infinite, a 
glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of uni-
versal law. 2 
The article discusses Holmes in the usual way of his admir-
ers, and does not contribute anything very original, but 
there is a second article by Wu, published by the Brandeis 
LawYers Society, in Philadelphia, which I find undated, but 
from J.·ts tone many years later, and al-which must have been 
J d th In this paper, Justice 
most certainly after Holmes ea • 
1. 
2. 
Wu, Beyond East and W!:ts].., P • 89 • 
h of Justice Holmes", John c. H. Wu, ttThe Juristic Philosop Y 
21 Michigan Law·Review, p. 529. 
· ... (]$ . 
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Holmes: A New Estimate, he strikes a much more critical 
tone, and takes Holmes to task for certain attitudes, ex-
plaining too his own partial or seeming endorsement of them 
earlier. 
As a strategist on the Bench, he tended to fol-
low the line of least resistance. In many of his 
opinions in the cases of social legislation, in-
stead of basing them on a positive judgment as to 
the reasonableness of the statute, he resorted to 
what I call a doctrine of judicial tolerance of 
legislative activities. This strategy served his 
immediate purposes; but if such a doctrine is push-
ed too far, it may easily lead to a virtual abdi-
cation of the judicial function of reviewing the 
substantial constitutionality of a statute. Even 
a dominant public opinion may be instrinsically 
wrong. 
To my mind, one of the least successful things 
he ever wrote was the paper on "Natural Law," es-
pecially the following words: "I used to say, when 
I was young, that. truth was the majority vote of 
that nation that could lick all others~ •• This 
equating of truth with majority vote seems to me 
extremely naive and untenable. If that were the 
cas~_,.what w~i the use of writing dissents to any 
declslont ••• · · 
When he discusses in this paper Holmes as a Sociologic-
al Jurist he quotes at length from his own past letters of 
praise: 
In this light, one can easily understand the 
well-known ijibes of Holmes against natural law 
and logic. However, even then I thought that his 
reaction went a little too far. In a letter to 
him (January 8, 1922, from Berlin), I wrote: 
"You say that the two little pieces 'Ideals and 
Doubts' and 'Natural Law' indicate some of your 
starting points. I am glad to tell you that I 
have adopted them as mine. Thus, what you have 
by nature I incorporate into myself by choice. 
1. John C. H. Wu, Justice Holmes: A New Estimate, pp. 18, 
19. 
But there is one thing I cannot digest very easi-
ly. In your 'Natural Law' you state that 1the jurists who believe in natural law seem to me ••• 
must be accepted by all man everywhere.' This 
is true. You did not hint~ however~ that what 
makes jurists~ or any other menJ for that matter~ 
believe such things to be natural law is itself 
a natural law~ which is very real and which we 
may term 'psychological natural law.' And psy-
chological natural law is not the highest form 
of natural law either ••• When the jurists --I 
mean the sociological school -- say that there 
is no such thing as an immutable~ unchangeable 
natural lawJ they are unconsciously proclaiming 
a principle which is itself valid in all times 
and places. In other words~ their statement 
denYing existence to the pseudo natural law is 
really establishing the genuine Natural Law~ 
which requires change and growth .. in human insti-
tutions and makes possiblethe evoaution --the 
conscious evolution -- of mankind! 
And he summarizes: 
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It seems to me more clear than ever that just 
as the elder jurists were naive in exalting what 
is essentially relative to the position of the 
absolute~ so Holmes was naive in his wholesale 
denial of natural law~ thus degrading what is es-
sentially absolute to the position of the rela-
tive. This explains why on the one hand his re-
action was productive of good results in the prac-
tical way~ such as his successful fight for the 
constitutionality of social legislation; but, on 
the other hand, it was not at all sound in its 
philosophical basis ••• 2 
As a Catholic~ John Wu has written Fountain of Justice, 
A Study in the Natural Law. The dust cover account of the 
book traces its·· argument to Holmes. It says: 
Readers familiar with the interchange of let-
ters between Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Dr. 
John c. H. Wu.will recall that one of the points 
at issue. in. _this extraordinary correspondence 11 on 
1. Ibid., p. 21. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 22. 
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questions belonging more to eternity than to timen 
was the problem of the Natural Law. Already the . 
lines were drawn for th~ most important legal 
controversy of our time. Justice Holmes's influ-
ence has been immense, and.the Positivist philo-
sophy of which Holmes was one of the leading expo-
nents is still dominant. Until recent years, this 
dominance was unquestioned, but now those who look 
thoughtfully-Upon the legal and sociological prob-
lems of the post-war world have turned to the re-
examination of this philosophy, with a view to re-
evaluating it in detachment from the mind of 
Holmes -- detached in fact from the deep moral be-
liefs on whieh Holmes's judgments were often 
founded.l . 
The work is a study of the Natural Law from the Roman 
Catholic point of view, somewhat on the order of Heinrich A. 
Rommen's The Natur&Law. Its content is treated systemat-
ically and historically. Much could be quoted from it to 
show Wu's feeling that the Common Law of England, particu-
larly in its transferral to America, is nthe common-law 
rhythm of the law of God, the law of nature, and the law of 
the land, n2 but perhaps this one selection expresses as well 
. 
as any the point of view from which Wu writes: 
The common law is too deeply rooted in Chris-
tianity to be cut loose entirely from the natural-
law tradition. It has a noble idea of man, of 
the human person. It sets the highest value on 
human life and human liber~y, on the rational and 
social nature of man. It has not worked out an 
explicit scale of values J but if we look at it as 
a whole, we should see that it sets a much higher 
value on the interests of personality than on the 
interests of property.3 
1. Johri c. H. Wu, Fountain of Justice, A Study in the Natu-
ral Law, Publisher's Dust C~ver. 
2. Ibid., p. 102. 
3. Ibid., p. 105. 
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Wu writes with a freshness~ simplicity and enthusiasm 
that do net give the impression of much originality. He 
had adopted dogma, and though the wholesomeness of his be-
liefs and the wideness of his reading are great assets, his 
Natural Law is of the Catholie tradition whieh allows little 
variation in its interpretation. 
Toward the end of their correspondence, Holmes spoke 
of how greatly he was impressed with Benjamin Cardozo: 
Cardozo I am sure that I should really love if 
I knew him better ••• All who know him seem to give 
him superlative place. I have seen him but once, 
and then his face greatly impressed1me. I believe he is a great and beautiful spirit. 
The acquaintance flourished and, though it would take 
us too tar afield to explore Cardozo's brand of belief in 
Natural Law, he also is a case in point for our chapter the-
sis: i.e., the e~tent to which Holmes' main friends and 
influences were in one way or another exemplifiers of Natu-
ral Law. Here~ for example, is one quotation from Cardozo's 
The Growth of the Law: 
You may find in the end, when you pass to high-
er problems, that instead of its being true that 
the study of ultimates is profitless, there is 
littl~ that is profitable in the study of anything 
else. 
1. Justice Holmes to Dr. Wu., p. 53. 
2. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, p. 23. 
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3. 
In view of the detail of the present treatment of this 
chapter's theme -- as just stated above -- it would hardly 
be strictly fair if mention were not made of one of the most 
important of Holmes' associates in later years who was not 
·a Natural Law man3 and this was Louis D. Brandeis. Holmes 
and Brandeis had known each other for a lifetime 3 but when 
they came together on the Supreme Court3 the acquaintance 
ripened into deep and abiding admiration. Holmes was great-
ly influenced by the methods and approach of the other Jus-
tice. The story of much of this can be gleaned from the 
Holmes-Laski correspondence3 together with much petulant 
comment which Laski leveled in Brandeis' direction3 but which 
was never taken up or encouraged by Holmes. And yet~ final-
ly3 at the end of his life~ Laski3 in referring in his writ-
ings to the accomplishments in modern American sociology 
sometimes did not mentiqn Holmes at all, but only Brandeis, 
as though he alone were responsible for all enlightened re-
1 
·form in legal process. 
Holmes admired Brandeis so greatly and the two were so 
-
close that Chief Justice Taft said of Holmes in 1928: 
I am very fond of the old gentleman, but he is so 
completely under the control of Brother Brandeis 
that it gives Brandeis two votes instead. of one. 
He has more interest in3 and gives more attention 
to, his dissents than he does to the opinions he 
1. See Harold J. Laski 3 Faith. Reason and Civilization~ p. 120. 
writes for the court~ which are very short and 
not very helpful.l 
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There seems to be no connection with Natural Law think-
ing in Brandeis' jurisprudence~ for all of the many varieties 
and ramifications of this subject. Brandeis appears to ig-
nore ultimates~ as far as theory goes. The Brandeis brief 
was too factual an approach for abstracts and universals. 
He perfected the case method in his approach to pleading: 
the technique where every aspect of the problem situation is 
examined in statistical and minute detail~ in a marshalling 
of all facts and every figure which might have a bearing on 
the controversial question involved~ so that the decision 
will follow as inevitably as a flower opens from the given 
situation itself~ when seen in its entirety. This is the 
famous Brandeis brief which was so effective in changing the 
attitude of the courts and the country to.wards labor legis-
lation. 
Felix Frankfurter~ after Brandeis had completed fifteen 
years of service on the Supreme Court~ wrote of his. 11distrust 
of generalities 11 as though it were a unique gift and a great 
asset for "the discharge of the Court's most difficult and 
delicate tasks~"2 but Morris Cohen had a different judgment 
on this: 
1. Henry F. Pringle~ The Life and Times of William Howard 
Taft~ II~ 969. . 
2. Samuel F. Konefsky~ The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis~ 
p. 156. 
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..• Great men have the defects of their qualities~ 
and the very strength of Justice Brandeis's mind 
in concentrating on the ease before him is natu-
rally associated with an absence of what is gene-
rally called "the philosophic mind_," the gift of 
clearly grasping ultimate issues~ so beautifully 
exemplified by Justice Holmes. Having been brought 
up-:,on the Continental Liberalism of 1858_, which 
was also the liberalism of Jeffersonian democracy~ 
Justice Brandeis naturally speaks in its individu-
alistic terms. But his devotion to it is_, in fact~ 
not consistent and thoroughgoing ••• But though the 
absence of an adequately coherent formulatien of 
fundamentals is not a defect in a judge who'has to 
decide the specific cases before him_, it is a limi-
tation on one's ability to guide or to give illumi-
nation to others on the way out uf the morass of 
the difficulties in which we are sunk.l 
Samuel J. Konefsky says in The Legacy ·or Holmes and Brandeis: 
-
The contrast between what has been eal.led "the 
factual method of Brandeis and the philosophical 
approach of Holmes" stands out in practically ev-
ery instance in which the two had occasion to dis-
cuss the issues before the Court •.• Brandeis was 
looking to the future to vindicate the positions 
he was voicing in dissent; hence the highly didac-
tic character of many of his utterances. No such 
sense of mission is discernible in Holmes'. opinions~ 
unless it was to bring his Court back to "first 
principles" of the law. 
Yet there is also good ground for believing 
that it was the attitude and methods of some of 
their more conservative colleagues which helped 
to forg& the unique responses of both Holmes and 
Brandeis. The tendency of the Court's conserva-
tives to think in absolute terms and to exalt le-
gal concepts as ends in themselves~ it is fairly 
obvious~ served to release Holmes' deeply ingrain-
ed skepticism and propelled him to espouse a le-
gal relativism. Similarly_, the treatment of great 
public questions on the basis of inadequate infor-
mation may very well have stirred Brandeis to un-
dertake to fill the vacuum. By nature an empiri-
cist_, he was appalled by the failure of some of 
his colleagues to heed the lessons of social ex-
perience; hence his repeated admonition that nun-
1. Morris Raphael Cohen~ The Faith of a Liberal_, p. 33. 
derlying questions of faet may londition the con-
stitutionality of legislation." 
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Konefsky goes on to an interesting examination of the 
question of whether Holmes or Brandeis were ultimately right~ 
each one with his altogether different view of what would be 
the eventual outcome for American economic life. Was Holmes 
correct with his detestation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law~ 
and his belief that growth and efficiency postulated ever 
larger consolidation of business in the direction of monopo-
ly~ as the only outcome possible in view of our national re-
sources and the history of industrial development~ or was 
Brandeis right with his emphasis on 11 Curse of Bigness,u his 
study of corruption in the handling of 11 0ther Peoplets Mon-
ey~ n and his Jeffersonian aim to keep or restore individual 
competition and the small business man as the key to sound 
American past and future praetiee? Whatever the answer (and 
perhaps they were both right~ and perhaps we can see enough 
in the field of Federal controls of business today to see 
both trends emerging as the operating fact of American capi-
talism under increasing government supervision)~ can it be 
~ 
said in a larger and more important sense that Brandeis was •' 
not motivated by ultimate and abstract considerations? What 
else was his effect on labor legislation~ for instance~ but 
to earnestly bring about as close an approximation~ as he saw 
it, of Justice? As Konefsky says again~ in commenting on 
1. Konefsky, The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis~ pp. 141, 
142. 
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Holmes' opinion in the Tyson case: 
The Justice's viewpoint in the case was said 
to be just one more application of his 11oft re-
iterated test -- the importance of the ends and 
reasonableness of the means adopted to reach the 
ends." And yet, on a closer look, it would seem 
that the suggested "test" is a better description 
of Justice Brandeis! approach to the problems of 
governmental regulation than it is of Holmes'. 
It was Brandeis whose opinions conveyed the defi-
nite impression that he personally attached the 
same uimportance n to the 11 ends u as did the legis-
lators who were seeking to implement them. 1 
But these questions in regard to Justice Brandeis' final 
relation to theories of jurisprudence can only be indicated, 
not answered. Whatever the individual's attitude toward Jus-
tice -- skeptical, affirmative, or with whatever means of 
implementation for bringing about the desired state in what-
ever situation or quality it is defined to be 
relate to the deepest problems of human destiny. 
1. Ibid • , p • 162 • 
these issues 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
The End of the Correspondence: 
Laski and Plural Sovereignty 
1. 
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It is a remarkable fact that the Holmes-Laski correspond-
ence continued at its high tempo until almost the day of the 
Justice's death. In its final years the lette~s were written 
by Laski. Holmes died on March 6, 1935, just before his 94th 
birthday. Laski's last letter is dated February 17, 1935, 
and on January 3rd he speaks of receiving a telegram from 
Holmes which "warmed my heart. 11 On January 29th he wrote: 
flit was good to have news of you from your young man. I 
hope he will not mind every few weeks sending me a word. I 
value it greatly. 111 This mention of the fact that Holmes was 
keeping in touch with him through letters from the young sec-
retary law-students who came to him every year, has continued 
through all the last years of the correspondence. With Holmes' 
extreme age he himself gave up writing. The last letter frcm 
him in the collect~on is dated Washington, D.c.,' November 
23rd, 1932, and begins:. "If you keep a list of your chari-
ties --my name should lead all the rest. 112 Yet even as early 
as July 4, 1926, he was saying: "I want to write but not al-
ways. The languor of age I suppose makes one lazy. I have 
had various odds and ends of a business nature, including pay-
1. Howe (ed.), H-L, II, 1477. 
2. Ibid, p. 1420. 
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ing bills, that have taken time and energy. To draw a single 
check-and dispatch it properly takes an appreciable moment. 11 1 
This is a sentiment with which many persons even in the prime 
of life would sympathize! 
Thus the hard-pan facts of the friendship maintained 
themselves to the end. The effort of writing constant long, 
chatty, informative letters, the task of finding and re-
counting cheerful and witty anecdotes, the duty of remember-
ing the obligations of youth to age, of constantly calling to 
mind gratitude and affection for the past, above all the bur-
den of facing the mortal deterioration of the proud mind and 
the stately flesh, which is the inevitable accompaniment of 
extreme longevity -- these tasks and duties, burdens and ob-
ligations were assumed and carried through by Laski with a 
cheerfulness and unflagging thoroughness which can only be 
described as great-hearted. Whatever the advantages to him 
of knowing the famous Justice until the day he died, and later 
of turning over their voluminous correspondence to Harvard, 
these advantages had little weight throughout all Holmes' de-
clining years in view of the enormous, cloying, dull task 
which maintaining a steadY stream of letters under these ci~­
cumstances could have become to the younger man. A permanent, 
continuous correspondence for years and years between two emi-
nent persons who are not related, an exchange which is not 
perfunctory but which is warm with feeling and interest, is a 
1. Ibid., p. 855. 
301 
rare thing in letters~ perhaps the rarest of all literary 
forms or historical records. There is a great humanitarian-
ism in this maintained expression. All the warm~ generous~ 
noble virtues and qualities which go with the word "humanity" 
associate themselves with this account and with this rela-
tionship and its carrying through. The thought which runs 
all through Felix Frankfurter's foreword to the correspond-
ence is rightly expressed by Felix Cohen in his own introduc-
tion to his father's exchange with Holmes: 11Such a relation-
ship between man and man offers heartening demonstration of 
the potential understanding that is carried by genuine humi-
lity.111 
Yet when all this tribute is granted and amply granted~ 
when the reader's respect~ admiration~ gratitude and semi-awe 
is~ as it must be~ laid in offering on the last pages of the 
two volumes of these published letters~ with the printed state-
ment of Holmes' death~ in 1935~ the insistent question still 
remains: "What is or was the intellectual value of this?n 
Overwhelming and continuously scintillating as the effect of 
the letters is~ why does the nagging cynicism of a skeptical 
doubt in evaluation still remain? Or is it not a sadness~ 
rather than _a cynicism~ before the pretension of human effort~ 
even effort in the direction of friendship? Or if npreten-
sion" is too harsh and inaccurate and vague a term here~ is 
"folly11 as melancholy .Jaques used it a better one? Not much 
1. F. Cohen~ The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, p. 6. 
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better. Certainly "falsity"~ 11 feigning" or "emptiness" are 
even worse and further away from truthful summary. 
The fact is~ Laski was so wrong in so many of the most 
persistent of his judgments, if they are to be viewed~ as 
they must be, as part of the great humanitarianism of his na-
ture, his position and influence in American, English and 
world politics, and the supreme significance of his calling 
as a great teacher. His wrongness strikes out through the 
pages, his summaries, his analyses of this and that. He has 
the wrong picture, in varying degrees of frivolity, of the 
League of Nations, of Winston Churchill, of Woodrow Wilson, 
of Gandhi. His disparagements are so in evidence of all old 
friends: Graham Wallas, Arnold Bennett, the Webbs, Lord Hal-
dane, Bertrand Russell~ Roscoe Pound, Ramsay MacDonald~ H. G. 
Wells, George Bernard Shaw, Albert Beveridge -- while towards 
those who have not even the claim of long-standing acquain-
tance he is merciless in his gossip. Laski seems to say of 
every person of good report or eminence in affairs: he or 
she exists in order to be criticized, and criticized in a man-
ner which would seem to partake of a particularly repellant, 
denigrating chit-chat. One feels like asking Laski earnestly 
again and again, nBut what is it you really believe?" or "What 
do you really hold that you yourself are loYa-l to?" or even 
more~ uDon't you see that if you say your first premises are 
so and so, you have no business at all, any more than an old 
fuddy-duddy of a washerwoman who doesn't know tit from tat, 
in making a statement like that? 11 
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For instance~ his dislike of Asiatics seems particularly 
evident throughout the second volume of the letters. Anec-
dote after anecdote dot the pages on the stupidity or venal-
ity~ ignorance or laughable pretensions of the Indian who 
visits him~ or the Japanese who asks him for a favor. If 
there are fewer accounts of these ignoble but somehow funny 
qualities as related to Chinamen (though they are there also)~ 
this may be because of his recognition of Holmes' concern for 
his friend Wu~ for this is often a topic between them; and 
Laski sends comments and quotations and information about Wu's 
whereabouts or about what Wu should do with his own problems 
which seem patterned after Holmes' own expressions to him on 
these matters. In fact~ it is evident that the only people 
whom Laski consistently speaks well of throughout the whole 
course of his letters are those persons to whom Holmes himself 
is loyal~ either for reasons of auld lang syne, like Freder-
ick Pollock or Leslie Stephens~ or because they are mutual 
friends of both writers~ as Felix Frankfurter and Morris Co-
hen. Even toward Justice Brandeis3 Laski is occasionally 
unplea~antly critical. 1 
In the matter of race~ it seems evident that one~ at 
least~ of the essential hall-marks of the liberal~ a peculiar 
1. See Howe (ed. L H-L, ·II~ 1299: 11 I did not realize before 
how curiously suspicious a nature Brandeis hasu3 or 1301: 
11He digs himself in on what are really matters of no con~ 
sequence with the passion of a tiger defending his cubs;' 
or 1302: nHe gives orders like an omnipotent sultan ..•. 
Moreover3 he treats his fellow Zionists who differ from 
him almost as criminals •.. 11 
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and particular crawling or the skin at the idea that anyone 
should be damned or handicapped to start off with because 
they happen to be born of this or that pigmentation or ethnic 
background, is altogether lacking to Laski. A member of a 
persecuted race himself, this fact gave him no sense or iden-
tification with other racial underdogs. The funny and derog-
atory stories about the dark-skinned people go on and on and 
on. He takes an unconscionably long time to gather any ink-
ling of what Hitler is up to. Holmes, with his conservatism, 
his rejection of what he is pleased to consider his sympathy 
with the abolitionists of his youth, is far nearer the liberal 
position here than is Laski, since there is no mockery or 
disparagement in Holmes' attitudes towards Orientals but rath-
er a quiet understanding of dirferent and foreign attitudes·~ 
Wonderful as Laski is as a teacher -- and there can be 
no mistake about this -- again and again he makes the most 
astonishing mistakes in relation to what he is teaching. ~ere 
is one of his passages on Gandhi, with whom he had been work-
ing in 1931 at the India Round Table Conference . 
•.• It was fascinating to see Gandhi at work and try 
to penetrate his secret. It comes, I think, from 
what the Quakers call the inner light -- a power of 
internal self-confidence which, having established 
its principles, is completely impervious to reason. 
At bottom it is an incredible egoism -- what I 
think Canon Sheehan once described to you as the 
arrogance of humility -- sweetened by an indescrib-
able sweetness or temper. He is also an amazing 
casuist, with a Jesuitical love of dubious formulae 
which would be amusing if it might not so easily 
become tragic. But the drama of this ·wizened little 
man with the whole power of the empire against him 
is a terrific spectacle. The basis of it all is, I 
think, the power of an ascetic over Eastern minds 
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who resent the feeling of inferiority they have had 
for 150 years. And to watch his people hang on his 
wordsJ he who has neither eloquence nor the gift of 
verbal artistry) is fascinating ••• But at least I 
understand now why Christianity in the first cen-
tury appealed to the poor and the oppressed. Through 
Gandhi the Indian ryot feels himself exaltedJ he 
embodies for them their own impulse to self-affir-
mation .... the crowd goes out to see him arrive in 
his loin cloth and blanket as they might want to 
see Charlie Chaplin •.. I don 1t think that even the 
prospect of losing the empire would disturb the 
sang-froid of the man in the street.l 
Although a few pages later there is a thorough and more 
earnest expression of admiration for GandhiJ it seems evident 
that Laski's preoccupation here is that of the empire-builder) 
and that he has some of the characteristic blindnesses of 
such -- that no other point of view but that of maintaining 
of the British Empire in its traditional sense can possibly 
' be correct. Political scientist as he isJ the true import both 
:in .. ·.~ nationalism and in self-determination and the growing 
independence of colonial peoples seems lost to him) and he is 
blindJ tooJ to all the subtle values and differentiations· 
which could be made in a sound discussion of what future pos-
sibilities Gandhi's influence represented. 
This characteristic of being unaware of the 0 wave of 
the future" is even more amply and sadly represented in a long 
analytical passage he wrote to Holmes regarding his vacation 
in CochemJ Germany) in the summer of 1930. His comments on 
the average German citizen must be quoted in entirety to get 
the effect of how far off Laski was in understanding the 
1. Howe (ed.)J H-LJ IIJ 1330. 
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forces which were shortly to erupt in Europe . 
••. Then he takes his pleasures very simply. They 
walk a littleJ drink a littleJ take obvious and 
obviously whole-hearted joy in music and the theatre; 
but there are no signs of the complicated pursuit 
of complex pleasure such as you see so widely nowa-
days. ThisJ for instanceJ is the most important 
place between Coblentz and Treves. There is no 
movieJ two public housesJ a village orchestra (quite 
admirable)J endless fishingJ and a Saturday market 
which patently is an event in the lives of its par-
ticipants. There is quite a good book-shopJ and 
an even better music-shop; and the 17th century 
Town Hall is kept about as admirably as one coulq 
wish. The only disappointing feature is the 
Church •. This is CatholicJ and a quite charming 
18th century building is ruined by the most vulgar 
collection of cheap statues I have ever seen in a 
public building ••. Then their organization is re-
markable. Whether it's the little steamer.; or the 
ferryJ or the village threshing machineJ the people 
seem to fit into one another's needs remarkably. 
There are, of course, faults. There is a certain 
drab sameness about the talk you get. You don't 
find the individuality you always tumble upon in 
an English or American village. The peopleJ like 
good GermansJ are a little too respectfulJ and a 
little too neat and orderly. But they are full of 
common-sense. There is little or ·no bitterness 
about the war. The Republic is clearly firmly 
established; the only man who mentioned the Kaiser 
to me spoke of him as a figure of comic opera, 
and thought it a relief to be done with his the-
atrical gestures. They don 1tJ indeedJ like the 
French; but everyone to whom I speak takes the 
sensible view that one must either ~ight them or 
live with themJ and that there is everything to 
be said for living with them. Let me -add that 
the most impressive building in the town is the 
School, and that each morning at 7:30 two buses 
arrive to take the children to the nearest secon-
dary schoolJ and you will see why I am impressed 
by the communal virtues of these people. Th~y 
know how to make defeat into victory by those 
solid virtues of patience, sobernessJ and hard 
workJ which are, I think, about the best general 
qualities in the world.l 
1. Howe (ed.), H-L, II, 1275-76. 
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Laski seems to have been fond of these well-expressed 
cliches) yet how could a man of his reat insight find them 
sympathetic) in view of his so frequfntly expressed drive 
for individualism and the daringly rrdical approach to men 
and affairs? In the summer of 1930 ~itler was only about 
two years from the Chancellorship. ~ein Kampf had been writ-
ten for five or six yearsJ the stree1 brawls of the young 
and growing Nazi bands of toughs wer1 daily occurrences. Yet 
here the picture Laski draws of the Germans is so unaware of 
what is ahead it might have been wri ten in 1895. In factJ 
it has all the platitudinous innocence of stereotYPe on the 
German personality of the turn of the century. This same 
curious opacity) this not knowing what was coming, is evi-
dent in the same way in a letter he 
in 1927. After a week in Paris 
ote about the French 
he wrote 
for the New Republic) 11 A Little Tour f France 11 ) he sent in 
March to Holmes one of his chatty not\s on many men and af-
fairs he had encountered there. He mentioned meetings with 
JusserandJ Andre Gide and BriandJ and then goes into a great 
deal of comment on his own obscure scJolarship regarding 
minor French writers. Then he says t~s: 
.•. One gets the impression that the Church gains 
ground -- specially among the yo th in the uni-
versities. The world in general so confused 
that they cling to it as an anch r. Also the de-
gree of discredit into which par iamentary insti-
tutions have fallen is as remark ble as it is 
painful •.• On the other hand I am quite clear that 
France is on the verge of a grea intellectual 
renaissance. Granted the confusions of the mo-
ment, it is the confusion of big~ess. Valery the 
poetJ Gide the nove~istJ one or two younger men 
very 
like Dauden~ Giradoux [sic]~ La u~ are I think~ 
the precursors of a great peri • It may be 
that I respond·quickly to as athetic environ-
ment; but I should say that the next ten years 
will give France a different , lleetual pres-
tige from that of any other co . And in her-
self she is more at peace. Mos of the war hate 
is dead; they laugh at us and u instead of 
sneering; they dislike only Mus lini. Him they 
flagellate in the comic press the music-hall 
and~ interestingly enough~ a as a threat to 
peace. I believe that they ge ly desire Euro-
pean appeasement.l 
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The nuances of the reference solini are as obli-
vious as his ignorance of Hitler; 
ness of his use of the word rrappeasem 
pressive. The next ten years would 
War and then Occupied France. 
al renaissance~ 11 in case some 
existentialism was about to be just 
it is certain~ even without 
despised and condemned this 
unconscious ominous-
here is sadly im-
the Spanish Civil 
"great intellectu-
might agree that 
t~ at least in part~ 
that Laski would have 
movement as deea-
dence and weakness. But we don't need to guess. Before he 
died Laski was writing: nThat~ in our own day~ was the case 
with France; its intellectuals had 
generals courted the opportunity of s 
specifically: 
••• Quite obviously there emerges 
ism and the paralysis of collec 
are typical of the French exis 
loathe the decadent France which· 
the Nazis in a pitiful surrender. 
1. Ibid.~ p. 932. 
2. Laski, 
er~ 112 and more 
the nihil-
e action which 
alists. They 
ld itself to 
But their 
p. 128. 
loathing is paralleled by the h rror of what a 
revolution may mean if it cuts down to the roots 
of that decay. It would compel\the intellectual 
to act instead of leaving him alone~ contemplat-
ing with loathing the spread of \decay~ content~ 
like Sartre~ to bemoan a situat~on in which 'it 
is absurd that we are born and nbsurd that we 
shall die.' It thus emphasizes the irrational-
ism of the world and the resulta t folly of be-
lieving that revolutionary actio can rid that 
world of its fundamental contrad ctions.l 
But perhaps 
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Laski's complete 
the most pathetic si le short example of 
inability to read ant straws in the wind~ 
I and~ with a.ll his endless analysis~ tm have no idea in the 
I 
world of what was coming up~ lies in ihe following reference 
be a defendant in tJe Nazi War Criminals to one who was to 
Trials at Nuremberg in 1946~ Hjalmar 
is dated September 21~ 1930 • 
This letter 
1. 
2. 
••• One day at least I shall brig ten before you. 
I have given a note to you to my riend Schacht~ 
the late President of the German eichsbank~ and 
possibly~ the next President of t e German Repub-
lic. He is a brilliant and attraptive creature 
and I think will really interest you.2 
Of Schacht's acquittal at Nurembe~g~ Rebecca West writes: 
But the acquittals of von Pape_l and Schacht 
were richly positive. The two ol~ foxes had got 
away again. They had tricked andlturned and 
doubled on their tracks and lain doggo at the 
right time all their lives~ whichltheir white 
hairs showed had not been brief; Jnd they had 
doiie it this time too ••• But, allJhe same~ these 
Harold J. Laski~ The Dilemma of 0 Times~ p. 146. If 
any reader is interested further i~ just what Laski 
thought of exis tential:i..sm~ as 11 th. e lbreat intellectual 
renaissance" when it did take place in France~ it will 
be found in Chapter VIII of The Dil mma of Our Times. 
Howe (ed.)., H-L~ II~ 1285. 
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were not children of light~ and the association1 of innocence with their names was entertaining. 
Comment on the second volume of the letters should not 
end without reference to the Sacco and Vanzetti case. There 
is a good deal of discussion about the Sacco and Vanzetti 
case here~ and it becomes the only serious point of dissen-
sion between Holmes and Laski since their initial arguments 
about sovereignty. During the summer of 1927~ the exchange 
on the subject was acrimonious~ and Holmes showed plainly 
- -
that he thought Laski had become too radical. Just at the 
time of the execution of the two men~ when Holmes had re-
fused to grant a stay on the grounds that the Supreme Court 
had no jurisdiction~ he wrote: 
••• I also appreciate what I believe was the gene-
rous knight-errantry of Felix in writing his book. 
But I see no adequate available reasons for the 
world outside the U.S. taking up the matter and I 
think your public and literary men had better have 
kept their mouths shut ••• my prejudices are against 
the convictions~ but they are still stronger a-
gainst the run of the shriekers~ The lovers of justice have emphasized their love by blowing up 
a building or two and there -are guards in all 
sorts of plac~s~ including one for this house for 
a few days ••• 
Laski expressed himself on the issue with extreme bitter-
ness~ but finally realized that he must rein in his feelings 
for the sake of the old man and for the sake of their old 
friendship~ which seemed strained ~ere. But he made it clear 
that he considered the case a thorough miscarriage of justice~ 
1. Rebecca West~ A Train of Powder~ pp. 56~ 57. 
2. Howe (ed.)~ H-L, II~ 974. 
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and a tragedy £or Ame~ican prestige all over the world. Much 
later in 1932, when Holmes had written to Governor Ely o£ 
Massachusetts recommending Felix Frankfurter warmly £or the 
State Supreme Court, and ex-Governor Fuller had charged that 
Pro£essor Frankfurter was ttan open sympathizer with murder-
ers," Holmes showed again how little comprehension he had 
ever had £or the world-shaking implications o£ this matter. 
Naively he wrote to Laski then: trrt is curious that the 
Sacco and Vanzetti business has le£t such deep prejudices. I 
dare say you know more than I about the whole matter."1 
1. Ibid., p. 1396. 
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2. 
The above has been an indication of some of Laski's 
characteristic attitudes~ opinions~ prejudices and states 
of mind. They must be pointed out again and again in any 
serious examination of his significance as a political theo-
rist. 4s Herbert A. Deane says of him~ in analyzing his 1945 
position on the nature of the state: 
••• How is this emphasis on the freedom of the in-
dividual conscience to be reconciled with Laski's 
view that socialists must be realists about poli-
tical power~ prepared~ if-necessary~ to suppress 
the liberties of those who do not accept the so-
cialist faith? First~ he obviously did not find 
it difficult to hold contradictory positions at 
any given moment. He superimposed a layer of 
Marxism on top of his earlier neo-Benthamite lib-
eralism and never seemed to·realize that the two 
strata could not be fused into a consistent philo-
sophy. Depending on the circUmstances and on his 
audience~ he was·capable of moving rapidly from a 
collectivistic to an individualistic position. 
He may well have been unconscious of the major 
inconsistencies in his position; he was so fluent 
in speech and in writing that-he could move down 
any of several paths-with equal ease~ and there 
was never the time nor~ perhaps~ the will to dis-
cover the extent to which they diverged.l 
To recapitulate) Laski had published his Studies in the 
Problem of Sovereignty in 1917. This was followed in 1919 by 
Authority in the Modern State, and in 1921 by The Foundations 
of Sovereignty and Other Essays, all fro~ the Yale University 
Press. Political Thought in England, from Locke to Bentham 
appeared in 1920~ Oxford Press. A Grammar of Politics) his 
first major work in terms of popularity~ appeared in 1925. 
1. Herbert A. Deane~ The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski) 
p. 245. 
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By that time) as a serious scholar he was through. Let us 
develop this proposition. 
Much has been said in Chapter Three of this essay) 
Holmes' Influence on LaskiJ on Laski's political development) 
his changing ideas on sovereignty and the state) but it seems 
interesting and significant to examine here~ finally) how he 
stood in relation to the most characteristic and fruitful 
idea he propounded~ the concept about which all his early 
writings centered: the Plural Theory of Sovereignty. As an 
advocate of Pluralism and Corporate Personality he establish-
ed a reputation for scholarship) originality and keenness~ in 
a permanent contribution to the development of political sci-
ence. That he did so lastingly contribute) in these early 
writings) is the opinion of this writer alsoJ but unfortunate-
ly even in his most carefully prepared and worthwhile stud-
ies -- these early works on sovereignty -- there is the fatal 
taint of gaps in logical development~ the misunderstanding of 
sources and direction) the peculiar mushiness of (or absence 
of) intellectual acumen) which were eventually to vitiate and 
then negate the real power he possessed. 
What is this theory of Pluralism) and how does Laski work 
it out) and in what way did he mix up what is expedient) plaus-
ible or fallacious with much he proclaimed which was profound-
ly thoughtful and permanently true? 
Plural Sovereignty is a· point of view he developed from 
his reading of) and the influence upon him) of such political 
thinkers) theorists and writers as Otto Gierke) F. W. Maitland) 
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Ernest Barker and J. N. Figgis~ who also~ in one way or anoth-
er~ held to this concept or the basic nature or what the state 
is or ought to be. In general this view denies that the state 
exercises a monolithic control over its citizens. It holds 
to the doctrine that true sovereignty also belongs to many 
other groups or which the individual is a member -- church~ 
club~ trade-unionJ corporation~ business partnershipJ and so 
forth -- and that these groups under the state and sometimes 
even in defiance of the state possess a real sovereignty of 
their own. Plural Sovereignty is very closely connected his-
torically with the corporate theory of society or the state~ 
and the two are often confused. Laski tended to use the i-
deas as interchangeable~ and to engraft on both the separate 
theory of legal personality of groups. 11The Personality or 
Associationsn is the title of one of his early and reputable 
papers. These theoriesJ that the state is a corporate bodyJ 
or that corporations have personalities~ have had great ef-
fects on our own system or Federalism and the trend of our 
Constitutional development. nFiction" or 11Concession11 are 
names also applied to these general concepts. 11Fictionn re-
fers to the 11Tiction11 of personality and so the rights of the 
person~ which is supposed to be granted by the state to other 
groups. In the same way 11Concession11 indicates that the state 
has conceded certain degrees of sovereignty to subsidiary as-
sociations or rormations within itself. The School of Natural 
Law is held by Otto Gierke and his followers to be in opposi-
tion to corporate theories~ whether of sovereignty or person-
315 
ality~ but like Natural Law itself~ these theories from the 
early Middle Ages to the present~ have an accretion and an 
increment about them of many diverse and conflicting inter-
pretations. In Gierke's treatment in his major work~ Natu-
ral Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 to 1800~ Natural Law 
advocates and enhances only an absolute sovereignty~ either 
of the state itself~ as in the divine right of kings doctrine~ 
or of the individual against the state~ in the. belief that 
every single conscience is answerable to God only. If Gierke's 
slant on this is sound~ (and we shall examine his theories 
presently)~ it might be noted that Holmes~ with his defini-
tion of the absolute and undivided sovereignty of the state~ 
based on force~ should have been the most unquestioning sup-
porter of Natural Law. However~ Gierke's interpretation of 
Natural Law~ so stimulating to Laski~ lacks much of the rich-
ness of increment and ramification and historical interweaving 
which Gierke is so successful in bringing to bear on what he 
feels is an opposing theory to Natural Law -- the Corporate 
or 11 German 11 theory of the development and meaning of the 
state. 
Again~ let us recapitulate~ and look at some of these 
early significant beliefs of Laski's: 
.•• sovereignty~ rightly regarded; ought not to be 
defined as omnicompetence at all. Sovereignty is~ 
in its exercise~ an act of will~ whether to do or 
to refrain from doing. It is an exercise of will 
behind which there is such a power as to make the 
expectation of obedience reasonable ..•• it is clear 
that the sovereignty of the state does not in real-
ity differ from the power exercised by a church or 
a trade-union •..• Sometimes wills~ whether individu-
al or corporateJ conflict and only submission or 
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traisl of strength can decide which is superior. 
The force of command from the State is not~ there-
fore~ bound to triumph~ and. no theory of value 
which would make it so .1 · 
It is really difficult to understand what spe-
cial merit attaches to unity. Germany points 
proudly to .the complete absence of differences 
among her citizens •.•• In fact~ there is a real mo-
ral insufficiency in any theory of the State which 
impresses upon its members the need for any consis-
tent uniformity of ,.outlook .••. We prefer a country 
where the sovereignty is distributed~ where the 
richness of corporate lives is insurance against 
such sterility of outlook. The Austinian theory 
of sovereignty~ uncongenial enough even in its ab-
stract presentation~ would as a fact breed simply 
servility were it capable of practical application 
••• The price of liberty is exactl2 divergence of 
opinion on fundamental questions . 
.••• the ethical side of political pluralism •.• is 
a denial that a law can be explained merely as a 
command of the sovereign for the simple reason 
that it denies~ ultimately~ the sovereignty of 
anything save right conduct. The philosophers 
since~ particularly~ the time of T. H. Green~ have 
told us insistently that the state is based upon 
will; though they have too little examined the 
problem of what will is most likely to receive obe-
dience. With history behind us~ we are compelled 
to conclude that no such will can by definition be 
a good will; and the individual must therefore~ 
whether by himself or in concert with othersJ pass judgment upon its validity by examining its sub-
stance. That~ it is clear enough~ makes an end of 
the sovereignty of the state in its classical con-
ception. It puts the state 1s acts --practically~ 
as I have pointed ~ut~ the acts of its primary or-
gan~ government -- on a moral parity with the acts 
of any other association. It gives to the judg-
ments of the State exactly the power they inherent-
ly possess by virtue of their moral content~ and no 
other .•• It therefore becomes a moral duty on our 
part to examine the foundations of state-action. 
The last sin in politics is unthinking acquiescence 
in important decisions .••. it is necessary to assure 
1. Laski~ Studies in the Problem of SovereigntyJ p. 269. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 273. 
the attainment of those conditions against the en-
croachments of authority ..•. it is obvious enough 
that freedom of speech, a living wage, an adequate 
education, a proper amount of leisure... the power 
to combine for social-effort, are all of them in-
tegral to citizenship. They are natural rights in 
the sense that they do not depend upon the state 
for their validity. They are inherent in the emi-
nent worth of the human personality. Where they 
are denied, the state clearly destroys whatever 
claims it has upon the loyalty of men. 
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Rights such as these are necessary to freedom 
..• we have put them outside the power of the state 
to traverse; and this again must mean a limit upon 
its sovereignty ••• It is surely, for example, signi-
ficant that the movement for the revival of what 
we broadly term natural law should derive its main 
strength from organized trade-unionism ••• what, 
otherwise, must strike us most in the modern state 
is the inert receptiveness of the multitude •.. The 
only hopeful way of breaking down this inertia is 
by the multiplication of centres of authority.l 
In holding that sovereignty belongs ultimately with the 
individual will as conditioned and determined in the human 
being by the attributes of reason or the moral imperative, 
implanted in the race by the Creator, or the nature of things, 
Laski followed here the classical tenets of Natural Law. He 
does not appear to know this. Instead, he pursues his own 
enthusiasm ror the personality-of corporations without, appa-
rently, the slightest inkling of the reactionary position to 
which this doctrine will lead him. He has before him certain-
ly the historical evidence years before of what Roscoe Conklin 
and others have done with this theory, in perverting and 
twisting out or context the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet this 
does not come up into his recognition to strike out the 
1. Laski, The Foundations or Sovereignty, pp. 245-247. 
318 
slightest warning or caution in his endorsement o~ the the-
ory~ .for all of his constant~ ready indignation about the 
abuses and uses o.f power in the hands of industry and big busi-
ness~ which indignation makes him increasingly socialistic. 
When he writes in Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty 
such observations as the .following~ the reader has every rea-
son to .find them confusing: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Clearly the reality of the Statr's personality is 
a compulsion we may not resist. 
What the Absolute is to me~aphysics~ that is the 
State to political theory. 
We are not taking up the position that the State 
has no relation with these groups. We are simply 
denying that the parts must be judged by the State 
••• So in the pluralistic view o.f the State~ there 
are~ as James said o.f the pluralistic world~ 'real 
losses and real losers~' in the clashing o.f its 
parts; nor do these add mysteriously to the splen-
dour o.f the whole.3 
We have~ therefore~ to .find the true meaning of 
sovereignty not in the coercive power possessed by 
its instruments~ 4but in the .fused good-will .for which it stands. 
Then law is clearly not a command. It is simpl? a 
rule o.f convenience. Its goodness consists in_~ts 
consequences •••• Where sovereignty prevails_, where 
the State acts_, it acts by the consent of men ••• • 
It is a will to some extent competing with other 
wills_, and~ Darwin-wise_, surviving only by its abi-
lity to cope with its environment. Should it ven-
ture into dangerous places it pays the penalty oft 
its audacity. It finds its sovereignty by consen 
Studies in the Problem o.f Sovereignty, p. 
4. 
Laski_, 
Ibid.~ p. 6. 
Ibid.~ p. 11. 
Ibid._, p. 12. 
transformed into impotence by disagreement. 1 
Such a view of sovereignty means no more than the 
ability to secure assent~ •• There is no sanction 
for law other than the consent of the human mind.2 
We have only to look at -the realities of social 
existence to see clearly that the State does not 
enjoy any necessary preeminence for its demands. 
I shall find again and again that my allegiance 
is divided between the different groups to which 
I belong.3 
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In view of the political realities which were ahead of 
Laski as of the rest of the human race in the twentieth cen-
tury, all this has a certain bitter sadness. These quotations 
could be continued indefinitely, eaeh With a certain over-sim-
plification of approach and a blurring together of the moral 
and the factual. As above, he several times brings William 
James into his argument, although Jam~s' philosophical terms 
about what ~ calls the pluralistic world has almost no con-
nection with what Laski means politi~ally by pluralism. When 
he quotes James: nThe pluralistic world is thus more like a 
federal republic than an empire or a kingdom,tt
4 
he is confus-
ing his own argument beyond recognition.- It can be seen he 
is cont~nuing here another basic ~eries of misconceptions 
hi own reading of Otto 
which he seems to have gleaned from s 
tt n of cross refer-This fundamental criss-cross pa er 
ence of 
meanings which somehow got thoroughlY entangled with 
Gierke. 
1. Ibid., p. 13. 
2. Ibid., p. 14. 
3. Ibid., p. 15. 
4. Ibid., p. 9. 
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cognitive opposites or tangents in this process~ he was never 
to· properly or logically disentangle arterwards~ and so much 
of his ineffectiveness~ his paradoxical welter of analysis 
and purpose sinks slowly into this illogical swamp. 
In rorming his early theories on the pluralistic state~ 
as stated~ Laski was greatly influenced by Otto Gierke~ whose 
Political Theories of the Middle Ages was translated from Ger-
man to English with a ramous introduction by F. W. Maitland 
in 1900. Gierke seems to have been the source~ or at least 
. . . 
the authoritative coordinator of much or the early modern em-
phasis on the importance and reality of minor and secondary 
groups having their own jurisdiction (or having a historic 
right to claim such quasi-sovereignty) within the body poli-
tic. Yet it seems that Gierke's analysis in itself is strange-
ly unclear. As the student reads through Gierke's Political 
Theories of the Middle Ages, wi~h Maitland's introduction) and 
his Natural Law and the Theory of Society. 1500 to 1800~ trans-
lated with an introduction. py Ernest Barker in 1934~ he feels 
id f Unity in the state far that Gierke is extolling the ea o 
more than diversity. Yet with some writers -- as Laski and 
his favorable commentators -- the picture of German Gesell-
schaft, the historical and political implications of which 
Gierke is tracing, seems~ in proving the personality of groups 
t therefore~ from the central and within the State~ to detrac ~ 
final authority of the State. Gierke in no way intends or ad-
vocates this conclusion, so that his readers~ like Laski and 
those who follow Laski, have actually misinterpreted and mis-
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understood his meaning and its intellectual implications. 
Gierke's-treatment of Natural Law is sometimes on one 
side of the fence and sometimes another -- the fence being 
the realistic rightness of ultimate State authority. Natu-
ral Law -- as the theory of the supremacy of reason imbedded 
in man's nature by God -- is the source of group and church 
sovereignty against the State. Yet~ in its earlier versions, 
as being closer to the Roman theory of the State and Roman 
Law, it proclaims -- says Gierke -- the absolute and single 
organ of potestas, the State, denying at once both any sub-
sidiary or any superior sovereignty below or beyond the State. 
In a significant passage Gierke says: 
If the theory of Natural Law were to remain true 
to its conception of sovereignty, it could never ad-
mit a federal combination of particular States {any 
more than it could admit a general society of all 
States) to the position of a Super-State. -The con-
ception of a federal State~ •• ~derived ••• from the posi-
tive public law of the Holy Roman Empire~ could not 
grow on natural-law soil; indeed we may even say that 
it has only maintained its existence in modern thought 
by dint of a constant and bitter struggle with Natural 
Law. The natural-law theory held-rigorously to_ the 
principle that it was only the whole or the part (of 
a federation) which could ever be a State, and that 
both could not be simultaneously States. A federation 
must therefore be a case either of a single unitary 
State with a corporative structure~ or of a system 
of contract between sovereign St~tes resting on the 
same basis as international law. 
Perhaps this is what Laski had in mind when he quoted 
James that pluralism (or rather~ James' 11plural worldn meta-
physically speaking) is more like a federal republic than an 
1. Otto Gierke~ Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 
to 1800, p. 86. 
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empire3 but the average reader is likely to feel that the 
above quotation from Gierke bestows with one hand what it 
takes away with another. It appears narroW3 limited and am-
biguous in what it declares Natural Law to be. But this limi-
tation and ambiguity seem to be characteristic of Gierke's 
treatment of his theme. In general he treats of Natural Law 
as though it were completely opposed. to the development of 
. . . 
groups3 associations~ fellowships~ corporations within the 
State~ which development he regards as a German or altogeth-
er non-Roman evolution. Yet he goes on treating of Natural 
Law as the source of all rights for the individual, of natu-
ral rights and the equality of man also3 and so of the great 
force which overcame the belief in the divine right of kings. 
Gierke's treatment of Natural Law shows its double de-
velopment historically -- both as the basis for the absolut-
ist theory of the state, and as the basis for individualism 
and the theory of popular sovereignty. Yet he himself~ while 
he advocates the personality of associations theory, and the 
idea of group and fellowship as being the basis of the commu-
for Uni ty as the background_ and base for all nity, also longs 
He has t he paradoxical position of feeling both sovereignty. 
moral Persons and that the state has ab-that groups are real 
t He does not make it clear how solute and final sovereign y. 
these two apparently diverse concepts fuse together, but he 
feels that it is in German thought3 history and genius that 
In a quite oblique and sinister waY -- qualities they do. 
in the article by Ernst Troeltsch 
of indirection apparent also 
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on Natural Law and Humanity contained as an appendix to Gierke 1 s 
long work on Natural Law and the Theory of Society -- this pe-
culiar matrix of theory has much that suggests and is remini-
scent of Fascism and the Nazi concept of Society and Folk. It 
is not entirely this by any means~ but it has aspects that 
could lead directly to Hitler~ and with both these German poli-
tical thinkers~ Gierke and Troeltsch~ Natural Law is somehow 
the villain in the piece in destroying the concept of the folk-
community~ made up of participating groups as moral persons 
in the composition of the unified State of unquestioned auth-
ority. Natural Law with its emphasis on reason~ equality and 
humanity~ would somehow in its long process of purposeful af-
firmation eventually eliminate the State and the absolute and 
unitary concept of sovereignty inhering in it. To do this~ 
it has brought to their logical conclusions the ideas of in-
dividual rights and the individual as the source of govern-
mental power~ a~ well as the concept of balance of power in 
the mixed form of the State. 
Says Gierke: 
This was the end of the natural-law theory otf 
S ti the cause of the consti u-~~~n!ia~~~te~ui~0~nd~~ so ~ari~swt!~ ~~~c:i!~~~ 
of sovereignty :;s ~on~e~~ee~ded~ so far as the 
unconcealed b~t u;fc~he State-personality was 
idea of the u Y lute disintegration. Not until conce~n~d~ ~nt~~s~ndividualistic theory of the 
the w o e o th S h 1 of Natural Law had 
State evolveddb~ ~ ~h~oconception of a living 
bGeen ~r~~~nh:d~b:en elaborated by a schoohlio~ 
roup 11 d the organic idea of . s 
thought which fo owe it possible to restore the 
torical evolution~ was lit 
idea of a sovereign State persona y. 
Yet the School o£ Natural Law had rendered a 
real service. It had re£ined the idea of the 
unity of the body·p~litic into that of a single 
persona moralis .••• 
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This appears to be the point exactly at which Laski's 
confusions begin on sovereignty~ the plurality and personal-
ity o£ groups and the basic power of the individual as final 
arbiter. He accepts Gierke's argument against Natural Law 
without at all being clear what Gierke~ Troeltsch~ and others 
of the peculiarly German cast o£ thought~ meant. He seems to 
find in the theory of the Personality o£ Associations proof 
for multiple sovereignty and the eventual will of the parti-
cipating and consenting individual as the ultimate source o£ 
power; but Gierke intends by his insistence on the personal-
ity of groups to build up a theory of the community which by 
any standard of the way that words are used as designations 
today~ would be considered reactionarY. Gierke means a denial 
of reason~ an opposition to the concept of equality and a 
point of view altogether in coo£11ct with what is meant bY 
f h ·t GJ.·er1re means an intensifi-the internationalism o uma~ y. ~ 
German Community and state as a welded unity cation of the 
adv. ocates. "fellowship" and the flpersonality of even while he 
groups." Troeltsch explains what is sound and morally attrac-
tive in this aspect of his theories far better than Gierke: 
1. 
f Ge n thought in the form The peculiarity o rma h ph~sized both 
in which it is nowadays so m~~ ~~marily d~rived 
inside and outside Germap~J hi~h itself is simply 
from the Roman~ic Movemen ~ w 
and the TheorY of Society, 1500 to Gierke~ Natural Law -1800~ pp. 159~ 160. 
a development~ a progressio ad infinitum~ of the 
classical spirit of antiquity. Romanticism too 
is a revolution~ a thorough and genuine revolu- .. 
tion: a revolution against the respectability of 
the bourgeois temper and a revolution against a 
universal equalitarian ethic: a revolution~ above 
all~ against the whole of the mathematic-mechan-
ical spirit of science in western Europe~ against 
a conception of Natural Law which sought to blend 
utility with morality~ against the bare abstrac-
tion of a universal and equal Humanity. Confront-
ed with the eruption of western European ideas of 
Natural Law~ with the revolutionary storms by 
which they were accompanied; Romanticism pursued 
an increasingly self-conscioUs trend of develop-
ment in the opposite direction of a conservative 
revolution. In the spirit of the contemplative 
and the mystic~ the Romanticists penetrated be-
hind the rich variety of actual life to the inward 
forces by which it was moved~ and sought to en-
courage the play of those forces in·a steady move-
ment towards a rich universe of unique and indivi-
dual structures of the creative human mind. From 
this point of view Romanticism too connects itself 
naturally with historic tradition --not~ it is 
true~ with the theological and scientific elements 
in that tradition which magnified the idea of Natu-
ral Law~ but rather with mystical and poetical ten-
dencies~ which were entirely free from the influ-
ence of any such idea. The thought of Romanticism 
is directt~r to the particular; the positive: to 
what is eternallY productive of·new variety~ ·con-
structive, spiritually organic: ••• The basis of 
the whole scheme of thought is ultimately a meta-
physic in which individuality~ plurality and pan-
theism are combined ••• It is a metaphysic w~ch 
equally stands in contrast to Christian The~sm and 
also to naturalistic Deism. Here we ultimately 
come upon the final and deepe~t difference between 
Germany and western Europe... . 
3~5 
here r elevant to Troeltschrs argument There is much more 
to which the interested reader can be referred. It is the 
clearest and most complete statement I have come across of 
Cons"'dered the ngoodll aspect of theory which is what might be _,_ 
1. Ernst Troeltsch, "Natural Law and Htimanit!", Append~~9~n Gierke~ Natural Law and the Theory of Soc~ety, pp. 
212. 
3~6 
back of or which develops into political Fascism. This at 
least is the npositive thinkingu of Fascism rather than its 
hates~ prejudices and cruelties. The reader is at liberty --
or is free to have as much intellectual independence as the 
rest of us~ whatever that may be -- to read and run~ to make 
what he will of the above. It is not the first time that 
this essay has commented on the subtlety~ fertility and com-
plicated richness of intellectual cross-fertilization. It 
would seem that it is all to the good to know that there is 
an off-beat~ historical alternative to the crass bourgeois 
ideas~ bitter anxieties~ the hypocricies and inhumanities of 
what is worst in our Buy-Now culture~ where progress is aimed 
and centered at mass conformity to a mechanical material com-
fort~ where there is only a utilitarian morality~ with no 
alignment with either the natural forces or the spiritual 
meanings that underlie the vast increasing pressure of world 
population and human tensions. Such is the way i~s enemies 
regard what we consider to be democracy~ equality and capital-
ism. And it is interesting to know that there is an alterna-
tive which is not the Marxist one~ or that there are creative 
cultural ideals apart from our own of capitalist democracy~ 
which do not point to the development of the Marxist world 
community. 
The ideals of Communism~ both in regard to materialism 
and equality~ are only a further extension of those of part 
of our own tradition~ developed in extremis and in disregard 
of certain other aspects of capitalist and democratic heri-
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tage -- specifically~ those relating to Christianity and 
Natural Law. Private ownership and state ownership do not 
seem to be principles in themselves at present too widely 
apart~ as the Welfare State moves into the Warfare State. 
In this respect~ it has been pointed out that it is the schiz-
ophrenic aspect of our age which is actually destroYing it-
self in the factitious struggle between the "West" and Com-
munism. Whatever the ideas are here to be so carefully sort-
ed out for ultimate aim~ consequence and direction~ it is 
evident that they were confusing enough to Laski as he read 
Gierke· ·et al. He appeared unable to see that what Gierke 
intended or advocated in the personality of groups would es-
tablish~ not the freedom of the individual, but a theory of 
the State in direct opposition to what Western democratic 
thought means in its tradition by personality. Gierke's and 
Troeltsch's stand on the State ends up~ far beyond their ap-
parent intention or foreseeing, in that amalgamated mysticism 
of blood~ soil~ folk-geist and resurgent action and submis-
sion which finally erupted in Germany under Hitler, and which 
is, in theory, not altogether separate from some of the mani-
festations of mysticism evident ~rom time to time in Holmes' 
writings. 
If Laski had only read Troeltsch with thoroughness and 
perception and self-questioning of his own, he would have 
found himself referred to in a way that might have cleared up 
for him the ambiguities and dangers in his own stand on Natu-
ral Law -- particularly if he had linked up his own position 
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with the statement on Positivism~ Socialism and Natural Rights 
which immediately £ollowed the re£erence to himselfJ as all 
part o£ the whole constellation of Natural Law. For Troeltsch 
puts Laski in the following context: 
In the Anglo-Saxon world the new idea of Natu-
ral Law·is essentially a demand for personal lib-
erty; ••• in France~ it is a proclamation of the 
theory of direct sel~governmentJ the principle of 
political equality •••• A deep division is here 
evolved-- the-division between democracy proper 
and a system which should be designated as Liber-
alism rather than democracy. Besides this cleav-
age~ and in addition to -i tJ the practical appli-
cation of this new natural-law-idea of Humanity 
has produced~~~a great number of other antinomies 
and problems •••• The difficulty can be traced in 
the ••• exposition of James Bryce •••• He is consci-
ous throughout his book (Modern Democracies) that 
he is describing the main political forces behind 
a development extending over a century·and·a half~ 
and covering the greater·part of the world •••• on 
the other handJ the jurist Laski~ in his Founda-
tions of Sovereignty~ believes that the modern 
idea of parliamentary democracy is in a state of 
collapse; but what he is really attacking in that 
idea is the relics of the old natural-law theory 
of absolutismJ and he is attacking them in the 
cause of a higher Humanity and real Progress. 
In spite of what has been said about its anti-
nomies and its problems~ this general body of 
thought remains something in the nature of a con-
sistent whole •••• The reaction against it which 
appeared in Positivism has made no essential 
change in its nature. PositivistsJ in the last 
resortJ are equally anxious for the unity of·man-
kindJ and they equally desire its organizations 
on the basis of natural lawsJ with due recogni-
tion of the individual's human rights and his claim 
to happiness. Socialism itselfJ in western EuropeJ 
is willing to dress its demands in the terminology 
of Natural Law and Humanity •••• We need not be as-
tonishedJ thereforeJ to find that this system of 
ideas ••• was able to form a eommon fr6nt ••• against 
German ideology~ or that it could evokeJ to meet 
the challenge of 'German barbarism'~ the enthusi-
astic instincts of all who believed in universal 
ends common to all mankind -- in Humanity~ the 
cause of Natural Law~ and the moral rules of Na-
ture. Pacifism~ and a belief in the League of 
Nations ••• are tendencies which readily originate 
in this general scheme of thought; they can be 
viewed as1the dictates of God~ of Nature~ of Humanity. 
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Is there any buried explanation here for such little-un-
derstood attitudes on Laski's part as his coldness towards the 
-League of Nations~ his half-contempt for Asiatics? I do not 
know. At this date the matter is probably beyond analysis. 
All the threads of so many different ideas 3 depending on dif-
ferent origins and different outcomes~ were so tangled up in 
Laski 1s thinking that one can only repeat: It is evident he 
did not know what his own position was~ what were its sources 
and roots~ to what it owed allegiances~ where it came from or 
where it was going. 
It was Morris Cohen who finally made Laski see the light 
on the matter of corporate personality~ and years later (1948) 
brought about a public recantation from him in an article in 
the University of Chicago Law Review: Morris Cohen's Aporoach 
to Legal Philosophy~ but this recantation did not really clari-
fY the issue very much. To say that he repudiated Gierke in 
this matter~ without any reference to all the other aspects 
of the Gierke-Troeltseh argument which were built around Na-
tural Law~ was hardly even a simplification~ since he had 
never known in the first place which side of the Gierke-
Troeltsch argument he was on3 or what they meant by each side 
of the argument. 
1. Troe 1 ts ch~ 11Na tura-1 Law and Humani ty1', pp. 208-209. 
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Cohen's critique or Laski.on this point is contained in 
his article on Communal Ghosts and Political Theory. This 
article first appeared in the Journal of Philosophy in 1919J 
but Laski apparently did not see it until it was reprinted as 
Chapter III, Book Three, of Cohen's Reason and Nature. first 
published in 1931 as a birthday present to Holmes, and dedi-
cated to him. 
Cohen is not as clear or incisive as he might have been 
in calling Laski to task in this paper. He blamed Laski ror 
his Pluralism, without pointing out the real moral power of 
the concepts Laski was advocating. He made Laski's Plural-
ism the point of error, and not Laski's deep misconception of 
Natural Law in following through Gierke's long argument in 
sounding the praisBs or that peculiar growth: the German 
State and German statecraft and the naerman11 theory of poli-
tical science. This is an omission on Cohen's part, especi-
ally because the chapter rollowing this in Reason and Nature 
is the chapter on Natural Law and Natural Rights, so largely 
quoted rrom here earlier. 1 Cohen's argument runs as rollows: 
The doctrine of a real communal soul in the 
form of a Folk Ghost (Volksgeist) seems first to 
have received prominence in the romantic reaction 
against the French Revolution and the doctrines or 
the E~~ghtenment as to the rights and powers or 
reasonabl~ man. Against the doctrine that we can 
make laws on the basis of reason or a· priori prin-
ciples, Savigny and his disciples urged that the 
laws of any community are and should be·the histor-
ic product of the national ghost or its people. 
1. See Chapter Six or this paper, "Other·Relationships and 
Natural Law: Cohen, Wu and Brandeis 11 • 
But while Savigny and his Romanist disciples at-
tributed a real ghost only to the State~ the Ger-
manist Beseler and his disciple Gierke extended 
it to other associations -- though not, be it 
noted~ to all business associations. Gierke's 
theory has been introduced into Anglo-American 
thought mainly by the brilliant work o~ Maitland 
and Figgis and is now represented by Mr. Laski. 
It would take us ~ar a~ield to attempt here 
an adequate account 6~ the enormous literature 
that has grown up'around the question'as to wheth-
er the legal personality 0~ associations denotes 
something real or ~ictiona~··· 
The de~enders o~ the real personality of groups~ 
like Gierke and Laski~ distinguish~ o~ course~ be-
tween the personality o~ groups and the personality 
o~ natural persons. The two kinds o~ personality~ 
they admit~ are di~~erent and are called by the 
same name only because there are real analogies be-
tween them ••• 
••• This confusion seems to me to show itsel~ in 
Mr. Laski's contention that a corporation (as a 
mind distinct from that o~ its o~~icers or members) 
can have the feeling of gratitude (or perhaps even 
the capacity to eat dinners). 
Apart~ however~ ~rom the practical question o~ 
stretching words to include unusual meaning and 
thus confusing our intellectual currency~ there is 
between the adherents o~ corporate personality and 
their opponents a fundamental philosophic issue: 
the extent to which the principle o~ unity should 
be hypostatized or rei~ied (I wish.the use o~ the 
word thingi~ied were more common) •••• 
Gierke~ Figgis~ and other protagonists of cor-
porate personality are ••• too much in reaction 
against social contract theories to think highly 
o~ voluntary and possibly dissolvable unions. 
They think more highly o~ states and churches 
into which individuals are born~ and in which 
they necessarily inhere as qualities inhere in a 
substance •••• Gierke~ who has become a sort o~ pat-
ron saint of political pluralists~ goes to the 
greatest extremes in this hypostatizing of the 
principle o~ unity. But the history o~ philosophy 
~rom Aristotle to Bradley has ~ully shown the vici-
ous infinite regress which ~ollows when our sub-
stance becomes an additional quality~ or when our 
uni~ying reality becomes an additional thing ••. 
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The reaction against social contract theories 
has led to absurd denial of the voluntary element 
which plays a part in all associations~ even in 
that of the state. History~ United States history~ 
especially~ shows many examples of voluntary forma-
tions of states; and recent events show that such 
unions m~y also break up and new ones be reconsti-
tuted ••• 
Cohen then goes on to discuss Group Responsibility and 
the errors of political pluralism. After admitting that the 
plural sovereignty theory of Laski and others has tended to 
shake "political philosophy out of its torpid or somnambulant 
worship of the omnipotent State as god on earth~ 11 and~ 11The 
newer political philosophy has already rendered a great ser-
vice in pressing the need for decentralizing our vast modern 
states~ 112 he says: 
Nevertheless it seems clear that political plu-
ralism is open to s-erious practical and theoretic-
al objections. The partisans of pluralistic sove-
reignty ignore or minimize two ·dangers which human 
experience have shown to be very grave. 
The first danger is that small groups or commu-
nities may be far more oppressive to the individu-
al than larger ones ••• 
The second danger is that if the state gives up 
its sovereignty over any group there will be noth-
ing to prevent that group from oppressing the rest 
of the community; ••• this attempt reallY breaks down 
the wholy theory of plural sovereignty since in the 
last analysis some one will have the last word as 
to where that line is to be drawn~ and it is logic-
ally impossible where groups conflict that each 
shall draw the line.3 
1. M. Cohen~ Reason and Nature~ pp. 387~ 389~ 390~ 391. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 396. 
3. Ibid.~ pp. 396~ 397. 
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Between the two printings of Cohen's paper> 1919 and 
1931> is quite a gap> and there is more of a gap until 1948 3 
when Laski answered or commented in his article in the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review: Morris Cohen's Approach to 
Legal Philosophy. In this well-written tribute to Cohen, 
Lask:i says: 
The second example I take is one in which I was 
myself converted by Professor Cohen's power of lo-
gical analysis to see the error of my ways. The 
history of the long struggle to obtain recognition 
of the reality of corporate personality is well-
known. My generation was deeply influenced by 
learned jurists like Gierke and Maitland and Sal-
eilles as well as by political thinkers of the 
quality of J. N. Figgis, ••• I can still remember 
vividly the enthusiasm With which> as a young in-
structor some thirty years ago, I set out to prove 
this view in the pages of the Harvard Law Review 
(29 HL Rev 4o4 [1916], Personality of Associa-
tions) the more enthusiastic because it seemed to 
me a powerful weapon in the hands of those who 
viewed in any but a formal sense> the claim of the 
state to sovereignty as a dangerous threat alike 
to peace and freedom •. There linger in my mind 
vivid memories of long argUments with Professor 
Cohen in which he sought to convince me that_I 
was, in fact, taking a view which was boun~ to 
have reactionary results, in the·ancient struggle 
between nominalism and realism, .•• For long, I was 
impressed but unconvinced. But when I read Profes-
sor Cohen's remarkable paper on Communal Ghosts, 
I realised that I had lain under a·dangerous 
spell> woven; above all> ·by-the exquisite charm 
of Maitland ••• and that bottomless pit of Gierke's 
learning which so easily overawes tne young stu-
dent who works his way, gasping,tbriough its in-
credible pages for the·· first time. Looking back, 
I can see that Professor Cohen r s· paper was, for 
me, at least, an-intellectual emancipation of no 
mean importance ••• The affirmation that corporate 
personality was real, which led, in Gierke's ar-
gument; to the exaltation of the state personal-
ity above all others in typical Hegelian fashion, 
was, as Cohen saw, not only built upon a meta-
phor which was itself an illogical analogy, but 
was also a means to the diminution of man's in~i-
viduality by making him important only in the com-
bat of the relations in which he was involved.l 
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It can be seen at this point that it is not by any means 
Pluralism which Laski is here describing as supposedly found 
in Gierke~ or what he thought he found~ but just the opposite--
absolute sovereignty~ which actually is~ in a circuitous fash-
ion~ Gierke's idea. The confusion in Laski's statement con-
tinues: 
When Professor Cohen insisted that the corpo-
rate person was a 11conimunal ghost 11 he cleared the 
ground~ I think~ for a clearer understanding of 
social organizations~ as well as for a deeper in-
sight into the functions of the law. A group of 
human persons is not a person~ in the·sense that 
each member of the group is a person •• ·.I do not 
think the importance of this·approach can be ex-
aggerated. It makes us see~ •• that behind all col-
lective entities ••• are always individual men and 
women) and that it is the will of each of those 
that lends to the collective 11 person 11 whatever · 
strength 11 i t 11 has. All of us are free in a com-
munity to give or to withhold our consent to ac-
tion that is taken in our name by some organiza-
tion of which we are a part •..• The danger of the 
doctrine that corporate personality is real is 
the danger that we give our consciences into the 
keeping of some national government~ some church~ 
or some other association and that their operation 
is then organized from without until we fail to 
realise that we have become nothing more than an 
automatic instrument in the hands of men into the 
validity of whose power it never occurs to us to 
inquire •2 
Again~ it is precisely the opposite of this giving over 
of the conscience which Pluralism is supposed to mean in Las-
ki's terms) although this is a clear enough statement of what 
1. 
2. 
Harold J. Laski~ 1Morris Cohents Approach to Legal Philo-
sophy11~ University of Chicago Law Review~ Vol. 15 (Spring 
1948)~ pp. 577) 579. 
Ibid.~ pp. 580) 581~ 582. 
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actually does happen under ucorporate personalityrr. Laski 
makes no reference to what was the fulcrum and main point of 
Gierkers discussion) as contained in the title of his main 
work itself: Natural Law and the Theory of Society. As 
Gierke showed) it was exactly the Natural Law school) as op-
posed to the Corporate Personality Theory) which did stand 
for the individual and his natural rights) as opposed to ab-
solute government; but Laski would never credit it that way) 
whether in first mistake in analysis or in later recantation. 
And when he goes on to discuss Cohen's ideas further) on 
judge-made law) for instance -- that concept so dear to 
Holmes -- and quotes Cohen: ffTo be ruled by a judge is) to 
the extent that he is not bound by law) tyranny or despotism. 
It may often be intelligent and benevolent) but it is tyranny 
just the same) 111 he reveals the same confusion as to what he 
himself really does think is the value of an objective stan-
dard of law behind law. He has no clear idea of what he 
means as he discusses it. Sometimes he points to it as de-
sirable) and sometimes he rejects it and almost in the 
same paragraph. 
Sir Ernest Barker was one of the political theorists 
whom Laski) in his youth) greatly admired,. and who helped him 
develop his view on Pluralism. Since Barker's introduction to 
Gierke was not published until 1933) Laski did not have that 
available for his early studies) but he must have read it by 
1. Ibid., p. 582. 
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the time he wrote his answer to Cohen's criticism. He could 
have round here the analysis he really needed. Here are a 
few of Barker's comments: 
••• It is one thing to plead the cause or liberty 
or associations: it is another thing ••• to plead 
that associations are beings or minds or real 
persons •• ~.We may-say that the modern State~ which 
is based on the consent of the governed and re-
spects the liberty of individuals~ is bound by 
its very nature to acknowledge the liberty of in-
dividuals to associate with one another~ provided 
that the purpose of such association is compatible 
with its own purpose and well-being as the general 
and comprehensive association of all individuals.l 
If the personality of associations is still urged beyond 
this, Barker concludes that organizations are not organisms, 2 
and that even admitting group personality, this does not es-
tablish the autonomy or sovereignty of groups.3 The right 
name for this latter theory is syndicalism: 
Syndicalism is a theory of French parentage. 
In its more extreme form, it is a theory which 
would eliminate the State in favour of groups --
economic groups -- on the ground that economic 
groups are anterior~ and-should be superior, to 
political organization ••• In its more-moderate 
form~ it is a theory ••• on the basis of some sys-
tem of 'plural' sovereignty-which will divide 
its attributes between both ••• ~we find such an 
approximation in the writings of Dr. Figgis~ and 
particularly perhaps in his Churches in the Modern 
State, published in 1913. Here the authority of 
Gierke is invoked to support a line of theory 
which runs counter to the idea of the unitary 
State and the unity of its sovereignty ••• 
1. Ernest Baker, urntroduction"_, Gierke~ Natural Law and 
the Theory of Society, pp. lx, lxi. 
2. Ibid.~ p. lxxvii. 
3. Ibid.~ p. lxxxi. 
Now it is only just to Gierke to begin by ad-
mitting that such an interpretation of his views 
(which, by the way, is by no means peculiar to 
Dr. Figgis) is re~lly alien to the logic of his 
general theory.~ •• Gierke's doctrine of the real 
personality of groups is, ·as we have already ob-
served, a rarified and a qualified doctrine. 
But it is also easy to see how-the rarity and 
the qualifications may be forgotten ••• A fate of 
this order seems to have befallen the theory and 
writings of Gierke ••• l 
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Barker then shows explicitly what this fate could be, 
and one wonders why, accordingly, Laski did not become aware 
of this long before Cohen pointed it out to him • 
••• The theory of the real personality of groups 
may not only trend towards syndicalism. It may 
also keep other company; and it may trend towards 
that very doctrine of the absolute State from 
which it is supposed to be our rescue. We can 
only make the theory a defence and buttress 
against the State if we suppose that it does not 
apply to the State, and if we say that there is 
no real person standing behind the State, as there 
is behind other groups. ·But are we-justified in 
making that supposition? ••• on the contrary, if we 
once accept the theory of the real personality of 
groups, we are bound to see behind the State the 
figure of the greatest-and most real of all groups--
the figure of the nation and Folk itself ••• If the 
claim of the great national group, incarnate in 
the national State, calls aloud wlth a greater and 
more resonant voice, the result will be·some form 
of absolutist or dictatorial politics ••• 
The experience of our own day goes to corrobo-
rate such hypothetical fears. -· Italy has embraced 
the theory of real Group-personality, 1the organ-
ism superior to the individuals of whom it is com-
posed.' The Corporative State is a structure of 
many elements ••• But there seems to be little per~ 
sonality, and no autonomy, in the corporate groups 
contained in the Italian State; and if we read La 
Dottrina del Fascismo we can hardly doubt that the 
one Group-person which is really intended to act 
is the Italian nation as 'integrally realised' in 
1. Ibid.J pp. lxxxi, lxxxii, lxxxiii. 
the Fascist State of Italy. ·'The higher personal-
ity ••• is that of the Nation ••• For Fascism the State 
is an absolute, in whose presence individuals and 
groups are relative •••• rl 
But even if Laski missed Barker in 1933, he could not 
possiblw have missed F. W. Maitland's introduction to Gierke's 
Political Theories of the Middle Age, first appearing in 1900. 
Maitland, even more than Barker, was one of his idols, exem-
plars and models as he states again and again. There is no 
historical coverage of what the corporation has meant to West-
ern civilization like Maitland's. That Maitland believed, on 
the basis of his enormous scholarship, in the developing real-
. . -
ity of personality as applied to the corporation and corpora-
tive law, is a very minor point beside the wealth of insight 
and discussion he brings to his knowledge of what lies-behind 
the historical use of the words and concepts in Gierke's study. 
This scholarship in itself, if Laski had carefully considered 
it, would have been sufficient to bring him, since he already 
had the left-wing liberal cast of mind to start with, to the 
same point of view on Pluralism and plural sovereignty which 
he so many years later acknowledged that he owed to Cohen; for 
the essential point in all this discussion, which Laski missed, 
and which I think even Cohen missed, is that plural sovereignty 
. . 
does not depend on the theory of the personality of associa-
tions, and, in fact, is ultimately destroyed by this so-called 
Fiction or Concession Theory. Plural sovereignty, as a form 
1. Ibid., pp. lxxxiv, lxxxv. 
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of Federalism, can only be based on the rights and personal-
ity of the individual as being something other and more com-
plicated than a citizen of a State or of one State and so can 
only be based on some form of Natural Law, which, as yet only 
hypothetically_, can deal adequately with the problems of in-
ternational organization. 
This is something of Maitland's line of development: 
••• For_, when all is said; there seems to be age-
nus of which State and Corporation are species. 
They seem to be permanently organized groups of 
men; they seem to be group-units; we seem to at-
tribute acts and intents, rights and wrongs to 
these groups, to these units. Let it be allowed 
that the State is. a highly peculiar gr·oup-uni t; 
still it may be asked whether we ourselves are 
not the slaves of a jurist's theory and a little 
behind the age of Darwin if between the State and 
all other groups we fix an immeasurable gulf and 
ask ourselves no questions about the origin ·of 
species. Certain it is that our medieval ltlstory 
will go astray, unless we can suffer communities 
to acquire a~d lose the character of States some-
what easily. 
He continues: 
••• The modern and multicellular British State--
often and perhaps harmlessly called an Empire --
may prosper without a theory, ·but does not·sug-
gest and, were we serious in our talk of sover-
eignty, would hardly tolerate, a theory that is 
simple enough and insular enough, and yet withal 
imperially Roman enough, to deny an essentially 
state-like character to those 'self-governing 
colonies', communities_, commonwealths, which are 
knit and welded into a larger sovereign whole. 
The adventures of an English joint-stock company 
which happed into a rulership of the Indies_, the 
adventures of another English company which while 
its charter was still very new had become the pu-
ritan commonwealth of Massachusett 1s Bay should 
1. F. W. Maitland, "Introduction"_, Otto Gierke_, Political 
Theories of the Middle Age (trans. Maitland), p. ix. 
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be enough to show that our popular English Staats-
lehre if.~ .it seriously grasped the facts of Eng-
lish history~ would shew some inclination to be-
come a Korporationslehre also • 
••• In the second half of the nineteenth century 
corporate groups of the most various sorts have 
been multiplying all the world over at a rate 
that far outstrips the increase of 'natural per-
sons~' and a large share of all our newest law 
is law concerning corporations ••• 
••• in America where law schools flourish~ where 
supreme courts are many and the need for theory 
is more urgent than it is in England~ highly in-
teresting attempts have been made to dispel the 
Fiction~ or rather to open the·Bracket and find 
therein nothing·but contract-bound men. Contract~ 
that greediest of legal categories, which once 
wanted to devour the State~ resents beingmld 
that it cannot painlessly digest even a joint-
stock company. Maine's famous sentence about 
Contract and Status might indeed be boldly ques-
tioned by anyone who remembered that, at least 
for the philogian, the Roman Status became that 
modern State, Etat, Staat which refused to be ex-
plained by Contract into a mere 'Civil Society. r 
Few words have had histories more adventurous 
than that of the word which is.the State of pub-
lic and the estate of our private law~ and which 
admirably illustrates the interdependence that 
exists between all parts of a healthily growing 
body of jurisprudence.l 
His summaries of the way these words and ideations develop out 
of medieval useage is masterly: 
Let us try to imagine -- we are not likely to 
see -- a book with some such title as English Fel-
lowship Law, which in the first place described 
the structure of the groups in which men of Eng-
lish race have stood from the days when the re-
vengeful kindred was pursuing the blood feud to 
the days when the one-man-company is issuing deben-
tures, when parliamentary assemblies stand three 
deep above Canadian and Austrian soil and· 'Trusts 
and Corporationsr is the name of a question that 
vexes the great Republic of the West. Within these 
1. Ibid.~ pp. x~ xii, xxiv, xxv. 
bounds lie churche$, and even the medieval church, 
one and catholic, religious houses, mendicant or-
ders, non-conforming bodies, a presbyterian system, 
universities old and new, the village community 
which Germanists revealed to us, the manor in its 
growth and decay, the township, the New England 
town, the counties and hundreds, the chartered bo-
roughs, the guild in all ~ts manifold varieties, 
the inns of court, the merchant adventurers, the 
militant 'companies' of English condottieri who 
returning home help to make the-word 'company' pop-
ular among us, the trading companies, the companies 
that became colonies, the trade unions, the clubs, 
the group that meets at Lloyd's Coffeehouse, the 
group that becomes the Stock Exchange, and so on 
even to the one-man-company, the Standard Oil 
Trust and the South Australian statutes for commun-
istic villages. The English historian would have 
a wealth of group-life to survey richer.even than 
that which has come under Dr. Gierke's eye, though 
he would not have to tell of the peculiarly inter-
esting civil group which hardly knows whether it 
is a municipal corporation or a sovereign republ1c. 1 
And even more, for the modern American implication: 
Nowhere has the Concession Theory been proclaim-
ed more loudly, more frequently, more absolutely, 
than in America; ••• Ignorant men on board the 'May-
flower' may have thought that, in the presence of 
God and of one another, they could covenant and 
combine themselves together into 1 a civil body poli-
tic.' Their descendents know better. A classical 
definition has taught that 1a Corporation is a 
Franchise,' and a franchise is a portion·of the 
State's power in the hands of a subject ••• Those 
'Trusts' that convulsed America were assuredly or-
ganized bodies which acted as units, and if ever a 
Gesammtwille was displayed in this world, assuredly 
they displayed it •••• Certainly it will be curious, 
but it will not be inexplicable, if when the Conces-
sion Theory has perished in other lands it still 
lurks and ~ingers in England or among men of Eng-
lish race. 
It can readily be seen how little Laski really absorbed 
from Maitland. These historical tracings are seminal, but 
1. Ibid., pp. xxvi, xxvii. 
2. Ibid., pp. xxxi, xxxii. 
Laski did not follow them through. He never went into the 
effect of the Personality of Associations theory as argued 
by Roscoe Conklin when Conklin helped graft it onto the Con-
stitution of the United States through the Fourteenth Amend-
mentJ and so gave to the corporate wealth and property of 
America at the turn of the century the sanction of personal 
natural rights. Did Laski agree~ then3 with Conklin? Of 
course he did not. Their political philosophies were at op-
posite poles. So how illogical it was that for Theodore 
Roosevelt and for trust-busting Laski had only contempt! So 
had his friend Holmes~ whom perhaps he was only imitatingJ 
but Holmes took the historical opportunity and had the clear-
sightedness to know that Conklin's 11 conspiracy theory11 was 
humbngJ and that that was not what the Fourteenth Amendment 
was for. 
Laski's faith in political Pluralism began changing rap-
- ·-
idly after the publication of Grammar of Politics in 1925. 
Thereafter he moved steadily towards the concepts of a power-
ful state socialism with a complete and absolute governmental 
authority to enforce the individual's rights and liberties. 
There could be given a plethora of quotations to show his accel-
erating alignment with the Communist position3 but it would be 
more space saving to send the reader directly to his writings. 
In the years before his death in 19503 Laski published 
among others -- Fait~J Reason and Civilization (1944), Reflec-
tions on the Revolution of Our Time (1947)J a new Introduction 
to the revised edition of Liberty in the Modern State (1948), 
and The Dilemma of Our Time (1952, posthumously). Almost at 
random the reader can pull out of these pages varying state-
ments which show Laski's political confusions, his hopes and 
his despairs. 
He came the closest to outright support of Communism and 
enthusiasm for the Communist position in Faith3 Reason and 
Civilization, but developed this approval in a way which was 
for Laski's predilections very odd. For he likened the Com-
munist revolution to primitive Christianity, and carried his 
endorsements so far that he seemed to do a right-about-face 
on his hitherto strongly expressed contempt for religion and 
religious values. 1 At times Laski shifts his comparison to 
the ideals of the French Revolution;. in likening them to 
ChristianLty and those of Russian Communism. He says: 
Given the fact of victory by the United-Nations, 
it seems to me-inescapable that the Russian idea 
will play the same part as the principles of 1189 
in reconstituting the outlook of the next age. 
While there is much that is true in these analogies and 
comments, that ntruth 11 belongs in the realm of pure idealism 
unmixed with the sordid facts which make up so much of human 
affairs. There are rough analogies between Communism and 
primitive Christianity as well as between Communism and the 
French Revolution, but there is little if any analogy between 
1. I refer the reader directly to Faith Reason and Civiliza-
tion by Laski, pages 53 to 71 in particular, which de-
velops this comparison. 
2. Ibid., p. 63. The reader if interested should read the 
several pages following for Laski's development here. 
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the latter and primitive Christianity. It is true that the 
Russian Revolution let loose a great impact of a moral fervor 
on the world. It is true that the western nations had blind-
ly written off and disregarded the indignations and hatreds 
which their nineteenth century imperialism and colonial par-
titions have brought down upon them from the weaker and ex-
ploited peoples and countries. Probably we cannot blame 
Laski here for not knowing where the shift in imperialism 
and exploitation was about to take place. But Laski has his 
way of coagulating a lot. of similarities without exact analy-
sis~ and here~ at le~st~ he should make up his mind whether 
he is going to stress either primitive Christianity or the 
early French Revolution in his parallel to Communism. Loosely 
as he puts it together it cannot be both at the same time. 
It is rather odd to find Laski suddenly upholding Christian-
ity -- after a lifetime of extreme disparagement of all re-
ligious beliefs and attitudes -- in order to praise Communism~ 
about whichJ because of the unwinding of history which was to 
come~ he actually knew so ~ery little beyond his own enthusi-
asms. Gone is all the precision of his early studies on sov-
ereignty and the development_of individual rights as connect-
ed with the demand for freedom of religious belief which 
might justify in scholarship his sleazy pouring together of so 
much material hereJ in an amalgamation of the religious~ the 
social and the political. 
Incidentally~ this book~ Faith, Reason and Civilization, 
has some of the most ignorant English literary criticism which 
it would be possible ~or an intelligent and well-educated 
man to produce. In a long~ rambling~ disorganized discus-
sion entitled~ t1The Source of New Values~ n he says of .James 
.J9yce~ for instance~ ttthe day in the life of' Leopold Bloom 
is a mass of' obscene f'rustration~tt1 and of T. s. Eliot: 
t1The most important thing in Mr. Eliot was his horror of' 
the common man~ his shrinking from any contact with the 
masses~ the fastidious sensitiveness which seemed to regard 
whatever is democratic as in its nature vulgar and ugly and 
b b n2 ar arous ••• 
But this is not to say that Laski remained a complete 
Soviet enthusiast to the end. The Dilemma of Our Times,_ his 
last book~ appearing after his death~ is a further commentary 
on and continuation of the earlier Faith, Reason and Civili-
zation, so we are told by its editor~ R. T. Clark. In this 
essay there is a certain shrillness of anxiety~ which is only 
in small part attributable to the fact that he was writing 
under pressure and the work was left unfinished and had to be 
much edited. He has now become disillusioned by Communism in 
practice~ and in this work it is the worst aspects of religion 
to which he compares it. Consequently it is a tougherJ sharp-
er analysis -- better in that it is more realistic. But in 
his basic analogy he has now gone back to his life-long pre-
judice against religion in all its aspects. The sentimental 
1. Ibid.~ p. 101. 
2. Ibid.J pp. 96~ 97. 
346 
glamour is gone with which he quite artificially {for him) 
invested early Christianity. 1 
Page after page in The Dilemma of Our Times reveal a 
marked degree of difference from the trend of Marxist approv-
al which had been growing in him steadily from the publica-
tion of A Grammar of Politics in 192~. Nor is it simply that 
primitive Christianity was a "goodn analogy for him, and the 
organized hierarchical church 11 bad11 • The whole tone has 
changed in treatment, and the publication date is signifi-
cant, for it is now 1951, and in concluding his short intro-
duction to the work, Clark says that since the ttcold war" has 
become the "shooting war11 in Korea, Laski would certainly 
. a have made further revisions if he were still living. 
And in this last work Laski has not left entirely un-
qualified even his literary strictures against the precious 
or decadent bourgeoisie, for by now he sees Communist censor-
Ship as even worse. Yet there is no evidence that he compre-
hends that his own earlier critiques could aid and abet just 
what he is decrying now, as he takes a Communist critic in 
Czechoslovakia to account for saying, nthat 'if hyenas could 
use fountain pens, and jackals could use typewriters, they 
would write like T. s. Eliot• -- a specially interesting con-
elusion from a novelist to whom English is an unknown tongue. 113 
1. I refer the reader to pages 2~4 and 225 of Laski, The Di-
lemma of Our Times to show again Laski's shifting point of 
view. 
2. R. If. Clark, "Introduction11 , Laski, The Dilemma of Our 
Times, p. 8. 
3. Laski, The Dilemma of Our Times, p. 236. 
One wonders at this point whether Laski ever read over 
again anything that he wrote. But there is no further uti-
lity in continuing these close examinations of his political 
and intellectual aberrations. They could go on indefinitely. 
Almost as many inconsistencies -C;OUld be discovered and point-
ed out in his long studies of American politics: The Ameri-
can Presidency (1940) and The American Democracy (1949), par-
ticularly in his treatment of executive power; but time and 
space demand an end. 
Harold Laski died in March, 1950, from a burst abscess 
on the lung which was not diagnosed until the post-mortem. 
The chapters in Kingsley Martin'~ book, 11 0n Being Suddenly 
Infamous,tt and "No Ease in Zion," show an increasingly gloomy 
picture, perhaps against the author's will, of Laski's grow-
ing involvement at the end of his life in disturbing and 
litigious situations. In the summer of 1943 he had a severe 
nervous breakdown, accompanied by serious disagreement with 
American friends, especiallY Felix Frankfurter, about the 
objects and conduct of the war. There were frequent quarrels 
with the heads of the Labour Party, of which he was chairman, 
with At~e, Cripps and Bevin, because Laski spoke and wrote 
widely, presenting his own opinions as though they were of-
ficial, when they were frequently contrary to the Party plat-
form. A panticular instance was the public pronouncement he 
made at the time of Churchill's invitation to Attlee to the 
Potsdam Conference, qualifying and limiting A~e's position. 
For this intervention Laski was severely criticized both 
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within and without the Labour Party. He knew himself' that 
his resignation f'rom holding of'f'ice in the party was too long 
postponed, but it did not come until sorbe.,time af'ter the di-
sastrous law-suit f'or libel in which he engaged in 1946, and 
which he lost, against a London newspaper f'or pbin@ing state-
ments saying that he advocated revolution by violence. The 
trip to Russia with a labor delegation and the interview with 
Stalin was another ambiguous imbroglio. When he published 
Reflections on the Revolution of' Our Times he was denounced 
in Pravda: rrThe social position of' professors in bourgeois 
society is such that only those are allowed to become profes-
sors who sell learning to serve the interests of' Capital.ul 
He never recovered health and spirits af'ter the loss of' the 
law...;sui t which <cost him a great deal of' money, even though 
part of the losses were made up by contributions f'rom f'riends 
in the United States. 
So much care has been spent in this chapter on an analy-
sis of' the Personality of' Associations and Plural Sovereignty 
theories of' Laski because his writings in this f'ield are his 
most noteworthy contribution to political science and because 
his advocacy of' these positions significantly established his 
following. In addition, the ideas clustering around Plural 
Sovereignty do not require so much that is hackneyed f'or 
their discussion, description and comprehension. The material 
here is much less frequently hauled over and sorted through 
1. Kingsley Martin, Harold Laski, A Biographical Memoir, 
p. 185. 
than material on Marxism and state socialism or 11free enter-
prise" or democracy. The implications are fresher and the 
prognosis is probably more truly creative for the future 
than orthodox harangues on Communism vs. Capitalism. For 
whatever is hopeful in the future of world politics may well 
develop out of some of the ramifications of this curious and 
very possibly fruitful concept -- the justifiable breakdowns 
and breakaways of simple sovereignty. 
Laski's later tendencies are more clearly and widely 
understood than his early ones~ and it is much easier to 
criticize them and find their fallacies~ for it is customary 
to know by now the flaws in the Communist or Nee-Communist 
arguments. But he should be given credit for the advocacy 
he made in his extreme youth of the possibility of flexible 
political institutions developing out of the socializing re-
quirements of men in conjunction with the varied demands of 
their personalities. At the very time Holmes became attached 
to him~ he forsaw a response in institutions as yet unnamed~ 
and about which there is as yet no dogma~ to the evolution-
ary play between desperate need and a new higher level of 
creative endeavor which is the best and most significant part 
of the history of Western Man. His tragedy was that he re-
mained so unclear as to what his finest insights were trying 
to uncover~ and what were the best techniques for this dis-
covery. Like so many intellectuals~ like so much of youth~ 
like so many of all of us~ he intended so much better than 
he performed. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion 
In this study we have been looking at ~acts and theories, 
We have attempted to examine certain historical generaliza-
tions3 continuous to and imbedded in philosophy3 religion and 
government: Sovereignty, Justice and Natural Law. We have 
attempted to look at ~acts: How has Natural Law been inter-
preted historically? What do authorities say its rami~ica-
• e tions have meant in Western civilization? What did Justice 
Holmes and Pro~essor Laski say about Natural Law? What did 
they believe about it? What did they know about it? What 
were the in~luences upon them which caused them to pronounce 
as they did? What were their in~luences on each other? 
In examining de~initions o~ Natural Law3 this thesis 
has accepted and advocated ~rom its beginning the broadest 
possible one: The principle o~ Justice, or Reason in the a~­
~airs o~ men; i.e., the belie~ that discernible norms ~or de-
~ensible conduct have an objective status and are there~ore 
determinants implanted by God in the nature o~ men. This 
conclusion pulls together and includes almost all o~ the 
separate and opposite argument$ in the many controversies 
involved in the de~initions and descriptions o~ Natural Law 
in Western intellectual history. The one controversy it 
does not include is the basic intellectual divergence regard-
ing belie~ or non-belier in the existence of God. · 
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We have had then, a double query of which the second is 
the heart of the essay. 1) What is Natural Law? 2) How 
comprehending and productive were Holmes' and Laski's ideas 
on this subject? In answering the first question, the argu-
ment of this thesis has been to develop the above definition, 
showing in quotations from the many sources and writers on 
Natural Law the diverse and varied interpretations which 
have been given to the subject, to cause Natural Law to be a 
continuing basis for the most characteristic thought patterns 
and institutions of Western Civilization. 
The conclusion arrived at for the second of the two 
questionsJ and the principal one for this thesis, is as fol-
lows: Holmes' and Laski's ideas, pronouncements and contri-
butions to Natural Law were of no significance or weight be-
yond what might be held to be in their own opinions alone. 
This statement goes beyond discussions of different under-
standings or techniques in philosophical approach, such as 
scepticism or belief, for Holmes and Laski were consistent or 
11 truen in none. Their methodsJ attitudes and aptitudes were 
based on personal impression and· predilection and as these 
impressions changed from time to time, their implications 
veered also, almost always remaining in a field of no greater 
ultimate value than opinion and even gossip. A possible qual-
ification as to the value of their opinions lies in the nega-
tive one of revealing how illogical and inconsistent eminent 
minds can become, or can, in part, allow themselves to be, 
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and how far off the track of analysis based on facts, great 
personalities -- generally praised and looked up to by their 
contemporaries -- are able to go with impunity. This judg-
ment is given apart from whatev€r value might inhere in 
Holmes' scepticism and the appeal it might be for the 'open 
mind. 1 
This harsh conclusion needs a gloss and an addendum, 
requiring a separate comment for each. There must be a far 
different judgment accorded Holmes' ideas, especially in 
their effect, from that made in the case of the younger man. 
Oliver Weldell Holmes, Junior's, principal conclusion on 
the existence and duty of men lay in what he called 11 job-
bism" -- meaning: do your job to the best of your ability 
even if you don 1 t understand why you are here or called upon 
to do it. One of the best-known statements on •• jobbism 11 may 
be found in Judge Learned Hand's address on Mr. Justice Holmes, 
on the occasion of the presentation of Justice Holmes por-
- -
trait to the Harvard Law School on his eighty-ninth birthday. 
Said Judge Learned Hand then: 
Are you a member of the Society of Jobbists, or 
do you know the guild? ••• All may join, though few 
can qualify. Its president is a certain white-
haired gentleman, with a keen blue eye, and a dan-
gerous turn for dialectic ••• The membership is not 
large, at least in America, for it is not regarded 
with favor, or even with confidence, by those who 
live ·in chronic moral exaltation, whom the ills of 
this world make ever restive, who must be always 
fretting for some cure; who cannot while away an 
hour in aimless talk, or find distraction for the 
eye, or feel agitation in the presence of fair wo-
men. Its members have no program of regeneration; 
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they are averse to propaganda; they do not organ-
ize; they do not agitate; they decline to worship 
any Sacred Cows~ American or Russian ••• When you 
meet a member~ you are aware of a certain serenity 
that must come from being at home in this great 
and awful Universe~ where man is so little and 
fate so relentless ••• l 
Whether or-not this literary language makes the doctrine 
clear~ or particularly attractive3 it is evident that what 
Holmes means by njobbism 11 is that the performance of the task 
you are set to do is everything in life. The ignominy of 
easy quitting or lYing down3 or of giving inferior work or 
short change -- of not performing your task to the best of 
your ability and position -- this is the onlY evil and the 
real sin in individual existence. This is why his figures of 
speech are so constantly military 3 and the life and duty of 
the soldier is his favorite reference. 
Let us quote from one of his own descriptions of this 
Jobbism. On January 273 19253 in a letter to Wu~ he referred 
to buying F. H. Bradley's Essays on Truth-and Reality, recom-
mended by Cohen. Whether or not he came across or read it to 
be impressed~ Bradley's particular essay My Station and its 
Duties~ I do not know, but writing on March 26~ three months 
later, he gives one of the clearest statements of his char-
acteristic belief in Jobbism • 
••• Age increases my conviction that one cannot af-
ford to give much time to the classics. Some time~ 
1. Learned Hand~ The Spirit of Liberty (ed. Irving Dilliar), 
pp. 62, 63. 
yes. But one needs to enlarge and enrich one's 
view of life and the universe. The ideas of the 
classics, so far as living, are our commonplaces. 
It is the modern books that give us the latest 
and the most profound conceptions. It seems to 
me rather a lazy makeshift to mumble over the 
familiar. I was saying this to a lady the other 
day and she said where do you get such a scheme 
of life as in the New Testament? I replied that 
I didn't believe the economic opinion there in-
timated and that to love my neighbor as myself 
did not seem to me the true or at least the neces-
sary foundation for a noble life, that I thought 
the true view was that of my imaginary society 
of the jobbists, who were free to be egotists or 
altruists on the usual Saturday half-holiday pro-
vided they were neither while on their job. 
Their job is their contribution to the general 
welfare and when a man is on that, he will do it 
better the less he thi~ks either of himself or of 
his neighbors, and the'more he puts all his ener-
gy into the problem he has to solve. It is what 
I think best men believe although they often 
suppose that they believe something else that 
they hear on Sundays. I wish I loved mY fellow 
men more than I do, but to love one 1 s neighbor as 
oneself, taken literally, would mean to realize 
all his impulses as one's own, which, no one can, 
and which I humbly think would not be desireable 
if one could.l 
"Jobbism11 , as considered thus, is a valid position. 
Stoicism, which it fajnttw resembles, is more profound, at 
least in its classical form, through the Stoic connection 
with Natural Law. It may be argued that "jobbism11 is not 
a very penetrating life-outlook, or, on the contrary, it 
may be argued that it is the onlY intelligent attitude pos-
sible for the sensitive man fullY aware of all the implica-
1. Justice Holmes to Doctor Wu, An Intimate Correspondence, 
1921-1932. Central Book Co,, New York. Taken from 
October 1935 issue of T 1ien Hsia Monthly, p. 27. 
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tiona in his material surroundings. In any event, it is 
a point of view worthy of respect, no matter what belief 
a possible critic of it might hold himself. 
In the language of William James, Holmes was "tough-
minded." But Holmes' accusation that his former friend 
James became too tender-minded with his 11will to believett, 
could be made with about the same validity against Holmes 
and his "Society of Jobbists." Nevertheless, within this 
framework of the 11 jobbist" and the soldier's duty, Holmes' 
accomplishment was of the greatest. Following his own con-
ception of his duty and the duties of a Supreme Court Jus-
tice, he hammered out a line which brought the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution back from the 
dangerous absurdities which had been engrafted onto' the 
Due Process clause, and stopped the up-to-then unchecked 
development in Constitutional law of giving to the business 
and mercantile corporations those civil rights, privileges 
and immunities which it was withholding from the Negro race. 
It is very likely -- in hindsight, anyway, almost certain 
that it was Holmes' peculiar combination of integrity, 
scepticism, respect, contempt and inconsistency which alone 
could accomplish this legal result and have the effect it 
did have of "saving 11 the Constitution in a period in which 
the Constitution was creaking badly. It seems evident that 
unless this change had been forced on American capitalism 
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in its working process~ the whole torrent of Square Deal~ 
New Freedom~ New Deal liberalism would have veered sharp-
lY and dangerously to the left~ away from our traditional 
forms of government~ and that the social upheaval and vio-
lent strain on the civil body of the two World Wars would 
have basicallY altered the nature of the Republic. What 
would have been the result we do not know~ nor do we know 
what will be the result of present and future tensions hov-
ering with the megatons over our country and the world. Yet 
for a past very important moment in United States history~ 
it seems clear that it was the work and legal opinions of 
such men as BrandeisJ Cardoza and Holmes which created the 
ground and the climate which defeated in public-opinion 
Roosevelt's plan to emasculate the Court. It could bear-
gued that the Supreme Court is not an absolute necessiny 
for our Constitutional organization~ and it is one of the 
little ironies here that Holmes~ who professed~ at least~ 
not to think too highlY of our reverence for judicial re-
view~ probably saved the institution for the checks and bal-
ances of the American system. But Holmes' contribution was 
far more than that. Since he was much older and on the Su-
preme Court bench much longer than the other nliberals 11 J it 
was his work which above all saved the principle of reason 
and justice as being an integral part of representative 
government in the rapidly changing pattern of American cap-
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italism, and so successfullY defeated, with conclusive evi-
dence, the Communist theory of law, which is to define law 
as the oppression of one class by another through the state 
power. 
It seems to me no more and no less a thing than this 
need be said of Holmes. Surely this is a sufficient and an 
overwhelming tribute: that he brought a new interpretation 
and a new language to bear on the United States Constitu-
tion, to preserve and renew its flexible workability within 
the mold of representative government for cultural and eco-
nomic conditions which were drastically changing. There 
are very few other figures in American history for whom so 
much may be said; and -- the Founding Fathers and Brandeis 
apart -- it is only among the Chief Executives wheFe this 
may be indicated 
perhaps Kennedy. 
Lincoln, Wilson, the two Roosevelts, 
Holmes, as we know, claimed all his life that he cared 
nothing for Justice, that the word was merely an empty ab-
straction, that law was whatever was enforceable through the 
courts. For reasons other than that his life-long, honored 
title was "Justicefl Holmes, we may discount this as one of 
the many inconsistencies which in his case worked with just 
the opposite effect from its verbalization. For Holmes did 
care about fiJustice,n and except for one or two brutal mis-
takes in his career, as the Poison Pool decision, his entire 
life and the product of his work was~ven over to determin-
ing what justice was and to bringing it into the scaffolding 
358 
of existent law. It does not matter if he did this work out 
of cynicism and scepticism. These are legitimate philoso-
phical positions to accomplish classically righteous or reli-
gious ends. It does not matter what he said he was doing 
(Abou Ben Adam also said he did not love the Lord). What 
does matter is his great dissentsJ his great opinionsJ which 
revitalized our Fundamental Law and brought it back to an in-
telligent rationale after the gobble-de-gook of judicial non-
sense which at the end of the nineteenth century had grown 
like mold over the implementing of the Fourteenth AmendmentJ 
to allow its reading to become the tool of private industrial 
enterprise as against government; and so quite like what the 
Oommunists said it was. So he cared very much about JusticeJ 
and soJ no matter what inconsequentials he declared on the 
subjectJ he cared very much about Natural LawJ and lived 
under its rubric. 
The semantics of the generations change. We have tried 
to show in this essay how many different interpretations can 
be and have been made of Natural Law. The subject matter of 
certain chapters has been devoted to presenting the manY and 
varied interpretations of Natural LawJ which were a basic 
part of the thinking of the family and ancestorsJ the friendsJ 
the closest companionsJ early and lateJ of Oliver Wendell 
HolmesJ JuniorJ and so the way in which Natural Law thinking 
did shape and influence the kind of man he wasJ and the ful-
fillment of his life's work in the re-creation of the United 
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States Constitution under his own alignments with the ab-
straction~ Justice. 
As for Laski's summary statement~ so much of the last 
chapter has been given over to an analysis of the lapses and 
gaps in his logical thought~ that the final comment can be 
brief. For Laski did not make a real contribution to history 
or to his times. His facile~ aimless good-fellowship based 
on gossiping disparagement~ his unconscionable prevarica-
tions~ destroyed his productivity~ infecting with untruth 
finallY those areas even in which he passionately believed. 
His inconsistency was far worse than Holmes' and far worse 
for him~ because it became incoherency and an almost total 
frustration of the promise of a brilliant beginning. 
Laski's tragedy was that as a religious temperament he 
did not believe in God~ as a contemplative he foreswore genu-
ine mediihation~ and as a scholar he gave up ··· scholar-
ship for the bustle of the market-place~ where the biggest 
commodity he had to present. was hims.elf and the rootless ex-
tention of his own idea. Yet as a political scientist by 
profession and trade~ even worse for him was that he had no 
consistent philosophical ground. He was a very poor philo-
sopher~ even an ignorant one. It is unfortunate for the 
socialist working platform that one of its principal expo-
nents of this half-century has been so weakly based in philo-
sophy. 
One thing that the Liberal Arts men and the trainees in 
the discipline of the Humanities have learned in common with 
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the scientists out of the achievements~ convulsions~ bathos~ 
promise and horrors of these modern times since the Renais-
sance has been a respect for facts and an examination of 
facts -- a knowledge of what makes a fact a fact. It is per-
haps a frail thing on which to base our survival~ and perhaps 
it can be used variously. But in any event~ because Laski 
twisted~ changed~ by-passed or per~erted facts~ for reasons 
of indifference~ convenience~ entertainment~ unscrupulous-
ness, self-conceit or emotionalism, History has the obliga-
tion to weigh the balance against all his good qualities, 
his idealism, his giving to the young and his hope, his tre-
mendous philanthropy, generosi~ learning and benevolence 
and obliterate his record. Aad this is just what History 
does. 
Yet Laski, too~ for all of what he said, 11believed" in 
Natural Law. All his convictions on the equality of men~ on 
human rights and the meaning of democracy~ and in the indi-
vidual conscience as the final arbiter demonstrates this 
throughout his life. Wherever he veered in his definition 
of the sound and fair society) it was because he was seeking 
that perfect possibility of the good life and the rational, 
humane community existing with equal and natural rights for 
every individual and with the conscience of that individual 
the only sure and certain basis for sovereignty and good 
government. This is a great humanitarian position, one that 
cries out strongly to be affirmed in this century which sees 
the noble tradition of the Humanities in Western culture so 
ominously threatened. Why does Laski fail then in getting 
the tribute and credit for his creative stand? He fails to 
obtain this~ I believe~ primarily because~ as he childishly 
negated belief in the sovereignty of God in whom alone is 
the basis for the sovereignty of the individual and through 
whom alone the individual is dignified in worth to be given 
natural rights and the moral obligations of conscience~ he 
made his ideals pusillanimous~ and his preachments ineffect~­
ive. He thus fell between two stools~ for he was unable (as 
is every other political scientist) to base his belief in 
equal rights on anything other than the religious worth of 
the individual. Communism itself is a Christian heresy in 
this respect. But we can be sure that there are::.ati.JJ. stu-
dents of Laski's in the world active today who remember his 
old fire and kindness3 and who -- trained by his influence --
are working as he wished for reason and justice to increase 
democracy and humanity in the affairs of men. 
One might even say~ and say it sadlY3 that Laski was 
J?Uf.ned -by the good fortune of his pristine vigor~ and by 
one of the most outstanding aspects of that early good-for-
tune --his meeting with Holmes. Holmes as an old man with 
his greatness then accomplished~ incurred little harm in 
denying Justice and Natural Law~ when his work was largely 
done and had been done -- when it was most significant --
under the aegis of such great principles. But for Laski to 
deny and deride verbally the forces and philosophical tradi-
tions which had and were to shape his most significant aims~ 
to do this in early youth and then to devote his life to 
trying to analyze a just sovereignty and a reasonable law 
in human affairs~ tainted all his intellectual life with the 
infection of that denial and invalidated his accomplishment. 
In final conclusion~ then~ regardless of what they said 
they believedJ Harold J. Laski and Oliver Wendell HolmesJ 
Junior~ believed in~ and lived as though they believed in~ 
Natural Law. 
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Abstract 
Holmes and Laski on Natural Law 
Using the two volumes of the Helmes-Laski Correspondence, 
published by Harvard and edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe, as one 
of its principal sources~ this dissertation examines the cir-
cumstances leading up to the publication of Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes' essay~ Natural Law in the Harvard Law Review 
in November~ 1918~ when Harold J. Laski was its editor. 
From this focus several lines of inquiry expand~ developing 
from the two major questions of the dissertation: 1) What 
is Natural Law? and 2) How significant~ profound and perti-
nent were Holmes' and Laski's contribution to the theory of 
Natural Law~ the validity of which they denied? 
Th_e lesser points in the inquiry of the dissertation deal 
with the definition of Natural Law and the effect of Natural 
Law on Western civilization~ with Holmes' concept of law~ with 
Laskits theories of Plural Sovereignty and the Personality of 
Associations, with their influence on each other in the stat-
ing or re-stating of their characteristic attitudes~ and with 
the influence on them of relatives and friends and the crises 
in their own biographies. One chapter {Five) is devoted to 
a study of Holmest ancestry and to the contributions to our 
times made by Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes. Another (Six) is 
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taken up with Holmes' friendships with Morris Cohen and John 
Wu~ and with the attitude of these men towards Natural Law. 
The Holmes-Pollock correspondence is also treated as a major 
source throughout. 
An entire chapter (Four) analyzes Holmesr Natural Law 
essay paragraph by paragraph and sentence by sentence~ to 
try to determine objectively the weight of significance in 
what he says~ with the conclusion that there is no systematic 
thinking in his pronouncements here. It is possible he in-
tended to record his own ambiguity of attitude~ but the mys-
ticism of his concluding paragraph~ so admired by some com-
mentators~ is at best neither philosophy nor religion~ though 
it contains splintered and disconnected fragments of both. 
The worth of the article lies in its plea for the open mind~ 
a tolerance based on scepticism and conscious indifference 
rather than on affirmed value. 
In answering the two major questions~ this dissertation~ 
throughout a long examination~ comes to the following conclu-
sions: 1) Natural Law -- acceptedin definition as Justice~ 
Reason or objectively discernible and preferable norms in the 
nature of things for the affairs of men -- has had many di-
verse and conflicting interpretations and influences through-
out Western history for the past twenty-five hundred years~ 
and so is one of the very few great shaping forces for the 
characteristic culture and institutions of Western civiliza-
tion; and 2) Justice Holmest essay on Natural Law~ which he 
disparages~ has no real weight or worth as a con~ribution 
to the subject of Natural Law. Written in his brilliant 
style~ it is made up of many of his life-long cliches on 
the nature of truth and justice~ and is a matter of opinion 
only~ without substance in philosophical base. Laski's 
ideas on Natural Law were often altogether disorganized~ and 
there are many gaps in the logic and organization of his po-
litical thought. His adulation of Holmes worked to his own 
disadvantage~ for there is evidence he was not sincere in 
abandoning ideas of his own about sovereignty which were 
quite the opposite of Holmes' and yet were those on which he 
had based his significant early scholarship. Holmes had less 
and less sympathy for Laski's point of view~ as Laski moved 
toward Marxism~ yet it is probable that Laski absorbed final-
ly an authoritarianism in his political thinking from ex-
changes with him. 
A last chapter examines the co-fusions in Laski's con-
necting together the plural sovereignty with the personality 
of associations theories -- ideas he~ apparently gathered from 
Otto Gierke. Gierke's position is analyzed directly from his 
writings~ with the conclusion that he was unclear in his own 
formulations~ and that Laski was even more unclear in what 
he thought Gierke said. Reasons for the vitiation of Laski's 
work are analyzed, and in summary his frustrations are stress-
ed~ while Holmes' great accomplishment within the framework 
of his own creative inconsistencies is forcefullY stated. 
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The conclusion of the whole is that no matter what they 
said they believed both Holmes and Laski lived and worked as 
though they believed in Natural Law. 
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